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On returning to New York in 1905, aer almost forty years of absence, Henry 
Adams describes the visual and acoustic panorama he encounters in the fol-
lowing terms:
e outline of the city became frantic in its eort to explain something 
that deed meaning. Power seemed to have outgrown its servitude and 
to have asserted its freedom. e cylinder had exploded, and thrown 
great masses of stone and steam against the sky. e city had the air and 
movement of hysteria, and the citizens were crying, in every accent of 
anger and alarm, that the new forces must at any cost be brought under 
control. [. . .] Everyone saw it, and every municipal election shrieked 
chaos. A traveller in the highways of history looked out of the club 
window on the turmoil of Fih Avenue, and felt himself in Rome, un-
der Diocletian, witnessing the anarchy, conscious of the compulsion, 
eager for the solution, but unable to conceive whence the next impulse 
was to come or how it was to act. e two-thousand-years failure of 
Christianity roared upward from Broadway, and no Constantine the 
Great was in sight. (e Education 471–72)
Adams’s e Education of Henry Adams (1907/18) documents an intellec-
tual’s heroic if failed eort to bring the forces of modernization under no-
etic control, to tame the noises of modernity through an act of intellectual 
imagination. Adams’s dynamic theory of history, expounded at length in the 
second half of e Education and in his “Letter to American Teachers of 
History,” imports the second law of thermodynamics into historiography 
to account for what he perceives as a world-historical process of entropic 
degradation, an irreversible descent into disorder and chaos. e purpose 
of Adams’s borrowing from the natural sciences is not to deny multiplicity 
but to master it by bringing it into the framework of a unied and unify-
ing scientic doctrine. It is in the context of this scientic framework that 
the physical noises of modernity are guratively aligned with disorder and 
chaos: “Every day nature violently revolted, causing so-called accidents with 
enormous destruction of property and life, while plainly laughing at man, 
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who helplessly groaned and shrieked and shuddered, but never for a single 
instant could stop. e railways alone approached the carnage of war; auto-
mobiles and re-arms ravaged society, until an earthquake became almost 
a nervous relaxation” (467). For Adams, a resigned critic of his times, this 
multiplicity and noise needed to be mastered at all cost: “Law should be 
Evolution from lower to higher, aggregation of the atom in the mass, con-
centration of multiplicity in unity, compulsion of anarchy in order; and he 
would force himself to follow wherever it led, though he should sacrice ve 
thousand millions more in money, and a million more lives” (224).
 In Genesis, published originally in French in 1982 and translated into Eng-
lish in 1995, the French historian of science and philosopher Michel Serres 
urges us to think dierently about unity and multiplicity, order and noise:
A noisy philosophy would be the shadow of Leibnizianism. e latter 
relegates it to little departments. In the seventeenth century, you see, 
hatred was limited and squabbling was con ned. e uproar, the mur-
mur of the sea, the generalized confused battle, nausea, are not avoided, 
but, once again, are the e­ect of narrowness or limited perceptions.  
[. . .] Clearly, we will have to retain the word noise, the sole positive 
word for describing a state we otherwise can only designate in negative 
terms, such as disorder. e noisy sea is always there, present, danger-
ous. To be sure, it’s enough to make one shudder with fear. Leibniz lumps 
everything into the di­erential, and under the numberless thickness of 
successive orders of integration. e mechanism is admirable. No one 
ever went so far in rational mastery, down into the innermost little re-
cesses of the smallest departments. e straight line of reason that must 
turn its back on this chaos is the ascent into those scalar orders. at 
way lies before us, it is in nite, the perfect at projection remains inac-
cessible. It is divine, it is invisible. (What noise does the classical age 
repress, to what clamor does it close its ears in order to invent our ra-
tionalism?) (20–21)
In disassociating himself from the erection of Leibnizian edices of reason, 
Serres at the same time abandons Adams’s rationalist project and quest for 
unity in favor of a philosophy that attempts “to think the multiple as such” 
(6), accounts for background noise as “the basic element of the soware 
of all our logic” (7) and “the rst object of metaphysics” (54), remembers 
that Aphrodite was “born of the chaotic sea, this nautical chaos, the noise” 
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(25), and for which “the work is a condent chord” while “the masterwork 
trembles with noise” (18). Serres’ allegiance to multiplicity and noise denes 
itself both positively, in its celebration of the birth of things out of chaos 
and noise, and negatively, in its denunciation of the violence that inheres, as 
Adams already perceived, in the move from the many to the one.
 Between these two texts, published near the turn of two dierent centu-
ries, a fundamental reevaluation of noise has taken place.
 It is the purpose of this book to chart this by no means linear history as 
it manifests itself in and through literary texts from the naturalist to the 
postmodern period in American literature. Literature, it will be argued, is 
not solely a privileged site for the representation of the noises of our acous-
tic world but is itself a discourse that generates noise within the channels of 
cultural communication. As such, literature from the late nineteenth to the 
late twentieth century negotiates, arms, critiques, and becomes an integral 
part of the acoustics of modernity/postmodernity. e remainder of this in-
troduction provides a twofold setting for thinking about that acoustics and 
its relation to literary discourse. It rst outlines a number of key moments in 
the history of ideas on noise outside the literary eld and then suggests ways 
in which that history can be made fruitful for literary and cultural studies.
 Near the beginning of such a history, however, we already encounter a 
text that calls into question any strict distinction between the literary and 
the nonliterary, a text that sits on the fence between religious treatise and 
literary work. In e Epic Of Gilgamesh, written in the second millennium 
bc, noise is an oense punishable by the gods:1
In those days the world teemed, the people multiplied, the world bel-
lowed like a wild bull, and the great god was aroused by the clamour. 
Enlil heard the clamour and he said to the gods in council, “e uproar 
of mankind is intolerable and sleep is no longer possible by reason of 
the babel.” So the gods agreed to exterminate mankind. (108)
In this Sumerian version of the ood, noise already occupies the place it 
still occupies for most of us today: noise is a nuisance, an unwanted signal. 
is corresponds both to its earliest recorded sense and its current diction-
ary denition as “a sound that lacks agreeable musical quality or is noticeably 
loud, harsh, or discordant” (Webster’s ird New International Dictionary).
 Since the 1960s, noise pollution has been recognized as an environmental 
problem, a health hazard, and grounds for legal action. Today, the World 
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Health Organization (WHO) puts noise on top of the environmental agen-
da. In the executive summary of its Guidelines for Community Noise (1999), 
the WHO states: “In contrast to many other environmental problems, noise 
pollution continues to grow and it is accompanied by an increasing number 
of complaints from people exposed to the noise. e growth in noise pollu-
tion is unsustainable because it involves direct, as well as cumulative, adverse 
health eects. It also adversely aects future generations, and has socio-cul-
tural, esthetic and economic eects” (par. 3).
 e quality of our acoustic environment has changed radically since the 
introduction of the internal combustion engine and electricity in the indus-
trial revolutions.2 As Emily ompson documents in e Soundscape of Mo-
dernity (2002), acousticians and sound engineers have been responding to 
the noise problem since the 1920s. Since then, new engines and industrial 
machines, cars and road surfaces, airplanes and airports with signicantly 
reduced noise emission have been designed, and noise-abatement legisla-
tion has further contributed to diminishing environmental noise. However, 
a steady increase in mobility and a growing demand for heavier cars with 
broader tires and higher-performance engines—take the fashionable idiocy 
of driving SUVs in a (sub)urban environment as one indicator—has over-
compensated for any noise-reduction measures. Today, road trac is by far 
the biggest source of noise (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; Hof-
mann, “Lärmbekämpfung”).
 Still other, more subtle kinds of noise have proliferated since electricity 
was introduced, especially so since the onset of the information revolution 
in the early 1970s. In the centers of global economic activity, large sections 
of the population are exposed to a continual bombardment of low-impact 
noise emitted by all sorts of electrical appliances (refrigerators, air condi-
tioners, computers, TVs, radios, and so on). While the noise produced by 
these machines oen goes unrecognized, it contributes signicantly to the 
extremely dense texture of our acoustic environment. In its uniformity and 
lack of variance, it provides the constant background noise, the “white noise,” 
against which other acoustic phenomena struggle to make themselves heard. 
Because its energy is distributed over a large section of the audible range, 
such broad-band noise has the eect of masking potentially more meaning-
ful sounds to the point of impeding human communication: “e result is 
a kind of aural ‘crowding’—the distance over which one communicates is 
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severely reduced, and that space starts to include few other people” (Truax 
2001, 139–40).
 Dissatised with current approaches to the noise problem—which rely 
heavily on noise studies and consultants who treat noise from a signal-
processing approach that disregards informational, contextual, and systemic 
aspects—Barry Truax in Acoustic Communication (1984; 2001) opts for a 
communicational approach that conceptualizes noise as a communicative 
disturbance: “We have characterized sound as having a mediating eect on, 
and therefore as creating relationships between, the individual and the en-
vironment. Noise seems to be the source of a negative mediation of such 
relationships, an alienating force that loosens the contact the listener has 
with the environment, and an irritant that works against eective commu-
nication” (Truax 2001, 94).
 Writers of ction long ago recognized this communicational dimension 
of noise pollution. By the time Dos Passos wrote Manhattan Transfer (1925), 
noise had seeped from the factories into the streets of New York, forcing 
characters to retreat into silent insides to make themselves heard:
An elevated train shattered the barred sunlight overhead. He could see 
Ruth’s mouth forming words.
 “Look,” he shouted above the diminishing clatter. “Let’s go have 
brunch at the Campus and then go for a walk on the Palisades.” [. . .]
“en there’s Mrs Sunderland . . .”
“Oh yes I got a glimpse of her going into the bathroom—an old lady 
in a wadded dressing gown with a pink boudoir cap on.”
“Jimmy you shock me . . . She keeps losing her false teeth,” began Ruth; 
an L train drowned out the rest. e restaurant door closing behind 
them choked o­ the roar of wheels on trains. (128)
Dos Passos writes at a time when “traditional auditory irritants were increas-
ingly drowned out by the din of modern technology” (E. ompson 6). His 
depictions of urban and industrial acoustic environments belong to a tradi-
tion of technology critique that can be traced back to writings on technology 
by Karl Marx, Jacques Ellul, Lewis Mumford, and Martin Heidegger and 
that surfaces in the literary works of, among others, Henry David oreau, 
Sarah Orne Jewett, Henry Adams, Sinclair Lewis, John Steinbeck, and Don 
DeLillo (Mitcham and Casey; L. Marx, “e Machine”). It is a tradition that 
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reaches an early literary apex in Stephen Crane’s depiction of the noise of war 
in e Red Badge of Courage (1895). In Crane’s grim vision, noise is not only 
an impediment to human communication; it is a form of sonic violence.
 Yet from Truax’s communicational perspective, noise is not necessarily 
that which drowns out human language and threatens our psychological as 
well as physiological well-being. While he is mainly and deeply concerned 
about the deterioration of the contemporary acoustic environment, Truax 
does recognize that noise can be a potentially meaningful element of com-
munication:
as pointed out by Bateson (1972) and others, noise, in the sense of in-
formation that is unpatterned and unordered by the brain, is the only 
source of new information. e foreign language or musical style that 
once seemed unintelligible becomes meaningful once the cognitive 
structures that are required to decode and understand it are in place.  
[. . .] is sense of the word is farthest removed from that associated 
with sounds that are psychologically irritating or stressful. Whereas 
such annoyance reactions seem ingrained and unchangeable in us, noise 
as a source of new information is open-ended and o­ers the promise of 
all that we may possibly experience. (2001, 97)
Truax here refers to the systems-theoretic order-from-noise principle, which 
states that systemic evolution depends on environmental perturbations that 
trigger processes by which systems transform external noise into internal or-
der and information, thus evolving into higher states of complexity. From a 
systems perspective, disruptions, errors, and noise are indispensable to the 
long-term survival of any system and constitute the motor of systemic evolu-
tion (Foerster; Maturana and Varela; Luhmann, Social Systems).
 Systems theory builds on the work of biologists who, in the 1930s, began 
to claim that the reductive-deductive approach taken by physics could not 
describe the complexity of life (Kneer and Nassehi 17–22). But the roots 
of its interest in noise must be sought in another eld. It is with Claude 
E. Shannon’s pioneering work in information theory that we may begin to 
account for the role of noise in communication processes in terms that are 
not exclusively negative.3 In his seminal paper “e Mathematical eory of 
Communication” (1948), Shannon insisted that the amount of information 
a given message conveys must be calculated in relation to the set of possible 
messages from which the actual message has been chosen: “To be sure, this 
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word information in communication theory relates not so much to what 
you do say, as to what you could say. at is, information is a measure of one’s 
freedom of choice when one selects a message” (Shannon and Weaver 8–9). 
e greater the set of possible messages, the greater the freedom of choice 
a sender has in choosing a specic message. And the greater the freedom of 
choice on the part of the sender of a message, the greater the uncertainty on 
the part of the receiver as to what specic message the sender has chosen out 
of a set of possible messages. Within this framework, it seems intuitively 
clear that a message about which the receiver was highly uncertain prior to 
its arrival conveys more information than one that the receiver could pre-
dict with certainty.4 Conversely, a message that is completely predictable is 
redundant and therefore devoid of information.
 Since the introduction of noise into a channel of communication increas-
es uncertainty and makes messages less predictable (by distorting the signal 
emitted by the sender), it also increases information. In fact, noise is de-
ned in Shannon’s framework as the signal that carries the greatest amount 
of information: noise is the opposite of redundancy. Shannon is, however, 
quick to point out that one needs to distinguish between useful and useless 
information. Noise, he points out, exhibits a large amount of useless infor-
mation:
Uncertainty which arises by virtue of freedom of choice on the part of 
the sender is desirable uncertainty. Uncertainty which arises because of 
errors or because of the inuence of noise is undesirable uncertainty. 
It is thus clear where the joker is in saying that the received signal has 
more information. Some of this information is spurious and undesir-
able and has been introduced via the noise. To get the useful informa-
tion in the received signal we must subtract out this spurious portion. 
(Shannon and Weaver 19)
Noise, it seems, has been successfully exorcised from information theory. 
As an engineer working for the Bell Telephone Laboratories, Shannon was 
clearly interested in eliminating noise in order to ensure maximally ecient 
ways of transmitting (useful) information. Toward the end of his expository 
introduction, however, his coauthor Weaver opens up a dierent avenue of 
thinking about noise.
 roughout his exposition of Shannon’s insights, Weaver insists that “in-
formation must not be confused with meaning” and that “the semantic as-
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Figure 1. Schematic Diagram of a General Communication System. From The Math-
ematical Theory of Communication, by Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver. Copy-
right 1949, 1998 by Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois Press. Used with 
permission of the University of Illinois Press.
pects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering aspects” (Shannon 
and Weaver 8). is exclusion of semantic considerations is already apparent 
in the communication model (gure 1) Shannon proposes at the beginning 
of his article.5 
 No box is provided for the interpretive activity of the receiver, and it is 
clear that the purpose of communication in this schema is to transmit mes-
sages in such a way that the message received is identical to the message sent.6
But when Weaver does turn to semantic problems in his concluding section, 
he proposes changes to Shannon’s communication model:
One can imagine, as an addition to the diagram, another box labeled 
“Semantic Receiver” interposed between the engineering receiver 
(which changes signals to messages) and the destination. is seman-
tic receiver subjects the message to a second decoding, the demand on 
this one being that it must match the statistical semantic characteristics 
of the message to the statistical semantic capacities of the totality of 
receivers, or of that subset of receivers which constitute the audience 
one wishes to aect. (Shannon and Weaver 26)
Weaver’s heightened awareness of the role of the receiver in communication 
indicates a shi away from a model that considers the sender’s intention as 
the sole source of meaning and interpretive authority. Moreover, his insis-
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tence that the message’s semantic properties must be adjusted, in a “second 
decoding,” to the receiver’s capacity for processing meaning already impinges 
on the original premise that the purpose of the communication process is the 
transmission of self-identical messages. Weaver’s move away from a simplistic 
model based on intentionality is further accentuated when he contemplates 
the possibility of adding another box labeled “semantic noise” to Shannon’s 
diagram:
Similarly one can imagine another box in the diagram which, inserted 
between the information source and the transmitter, would be labeled 
“semantic noise,” the box previously labeled as simply “noise” now being 
labeled “engineering noise.” From this source is imposed into the signal 
the perturbations or distortions of meaning which are not intended by 
the source but which inescapably a­ect the destination. And the prob-
lem of semantic decoding must take this semantic noise into account. 
It is also possible to think of an adjustment of original message so that 
the sum of message meaning plus semantic noise is equal to the desired 
total message meaning at the destination. (Shannon and Weaver 26)
Seventeen years aer Wimsatt and Beardsley’s “e Intentional Fallacy” 
(1946) but ve years before Roland Barthes’ “e Death of the Author” 
(1968), Weaver’s suggestion that distortions of meaning not intended by the 
sender might actually contribute to rather than impair the meaning received 
Figure 2. Schematic Diagram of a General Communication System, Modified Accord-
ing to Warren Weaver’s Suggestions in Shannon and Weaver (26).
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at the other end of the communication process represents an engineer’s radi-
cal break with communication models based on the sender’s intention as the 
nal touchstone of communicative success. Weaver’s changes to Shannon’s 
model also reintroduce the noise that has been exorcised via Shannon’s dis-
tinction between useful and useless information (see gure 2).
 Of course, Weaver’s reections on meaning and noise propose a model 
of communication that functions despite the noise rather than because of it. 
Nevertheless, his suggestion that noise is not only an inevitable component 
of all forms of communication but may actually be an integral part of the 
desired message accords noise the status of a potentially benecial element 
of communication. Together with Shannon’s assertion that noise is the signal 
with the highest information-content, it forms, either implicitly or explicitly, 
the basis for all the revalorizations of noise discussed in the remainder of this 
chapter.7 is is as true for literary scholars’ conceptualizations of literature 
as the noise of culture as it is for Michel Serres’ as well as systems theorists’ 
valorization of disorder and noise, which are all inconceivable without Shan-
non and Weaver’s prior theoretical reections on information and noise.
 e crucial move from Shannon’s information theory to systems theory, 
from noise to order-from-noise, is one from a simple sender-receiver com-
munications model to a model of communication that seeks to describe pro-
cesses of information exchange taking place at several hierarchically distinct 
levels within highly complex systems such as computers, the human body, 
or society. e order-from-noise principle was introduced by Heinz von 
Foerster in “On Self-Organizing Systems and eir Environment” (1960). 
Von Foerster begins his now famous talk with the infamous statement that 
“ere are no such things as self-organizing systems!” (31). What von Foer-
ster means is that even self-organizing systems could not exist without envi-
ronments that make energy and order available (for living systems, environ-
mental energy exists in the form of food; environmental order in the form 
of information). But order is not the only thing self-organizing systems nd
in their environments: “self-organizing systems do not only feed upon order, 
they will also nd noise on the menu” (43). In the discussion following his 
talk and transcribed in the appendix to the published article, von Foerster 
claries this statement somewhat by linking systems’ adaptability to noise to 
their chances of evolution and survival: “I think it is favorable to have some 
noise in the system. If a system is going to freeze into a particular state, it is 
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inadaptable and this nal state may be altogether wrong. It will be incapable 
of adjusting itself to something that is a more appropriate situation” (49). 
Despite or perhaps because of the brevity of his remarks, von Foerster’s in-
troduction of the order-from-noise principle had an enormous impact on a 
variety of elds, including literary studies.8
 Today, there are many dierent formulations of the order-from-noise 
principle. e version provided by theoretical biologists Humberto Mat-
urana and Francisco Varela has been highly inuential in its own right. 
Maturana and Varela have developed a theory of autopoietic systems, a term 
that designates a subgroup of autonomous systems. As the term indicates, 
autopoietic systems are not only autonomous but also self-creating systems, 
meaning that the components they consist of are produced in a recursive 
process by the components themselves.9 e only known examples of auto-
poietic systems are living organisms, and Maturana and Varela in fact postu-
late that “autopoiesis is necessary and sucient to characterize the organization 
of living systems” (82).
 Autopoietic systems are not determined by environmental input; they at-
tain their “coherence through [their] own operation, and not through the 
intervention of contingencies from the environment” (Varela 55). As with 
von Foerster’s self-organizing systems, this does not imply that autopoietic 
systems operate completely independent of processes occurring in their envi-
ronment. But Maturana and Varela’s shi to a description of living systems as 
autopoietic necessitates a rethinking of system-environment interaction that 
abandons the more traditional input-output model. As self-organizing and 
self-creating systems, autopoietic systems interact with systems located in 
their environment by way of “structural coupling,” the process by which “the 
autopoietic conduct of an organism A becomes a source of deformation for 
an organism B, and the compensatory behavior of organism B acts, in turn, 
as a source of deformation of organism A, whose compensatory behavior 
acts again as a source of deformation of B, and so on recursively until the 
coupling is interrupted” (Maturana and Varela 120).
 In other words, autopoietic systems interact by perturbing one another. 
ey do not perceive changes in their environment as inputs but as sources of 
noise that trigger processes of reorganization whose specic forms are, how-
ever, determined by the system’s own logic of operation. Autopoietic systems 
thrive on such destabilizing perturbations, which make them more adaptive 
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to disturbances (rather than being destroyed by them) and prevent them 
from ossication. Maturana and Varela join von Foerster and other systems 
theorists in arguing that the adaptability of systems to disorder and noise is 
essential not only to their survival but also to their evolutionary develop-
ment. Noise is thus accorded a productive role in system formation.
 While Maturana and Varela (117–18) are undecided on whether their 
ndings are applicable to the study of social structures and processes, other 
theorists have been less hesitant to move in that direction.10 In his fascinating 
study e Noise of Culture: Literary Texts in a World of Information (1988), 
William R. Paulson draws heavily on the theory of autopoietic systems, 
arguing that, in an informational society, literature is but the noise of the 
cultural system. Literature is “a residue of a no longer dominant mode of 
cultural organization” (181) that meets none of the requirements of a social 
order that to an ever-larger extent relies on the production and consumption 
of easily processable, machine-readable, clear and unambiguous information 
(in stockbroking, in databases, on the increasingly commercialized World 
Wide Web). It will not do to try to reestablish the centrality of literary texts 
by reverting to humanist defenses of literature, by claiming that they are also 
objects of knowledge, that they contain eternal truths, moral and cultural 
values. Rather, we should accept literature’s marginal status in a world of 
information and begin from a recognition of that position of marginality:
Literature is not and will not ever again be at the center of culture, if 
indeed it ever was. ere is no use in either proclaiming or debunk-
ing its central position. Literature is the noise of culture, the rich and 
indeterminate margin into which messages are sent o­, never to return 
the same, in which signals are received not quite like anything emitted. 
(Paulson 180)
To designate literature as noise may seem like a strange move for a literary 
critic concerned about the function and relevance of literature today. But Paul- 
son values literature precisely for its refusal to conform to dominant pro-
cesses of information exchange. Drawing on the systems-theoretic order-
from-noise principle, he conceptualizes literature as the unpredictable 
noise that is capable of producing new meanings, new concepts, and new
information against the backdrop of redundancy continually produced and 
reproduced by the dominant culture. Literature conforms, in other words, 
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to Lyotard’s logic of paralogy and as such allows for “the invention of new 
moves in the linguistic and symbolic games that constitute knowledge and 
society” (Paulson 180).11
 For Paulson, the noise of literature is both internal and external. It is 
internal because literary language deviates from ordinary language use in 
its ambiguities, its indeterminacies, its aporias, its multiple complex rela-
tions between dierent levels of signication: “Rather than attempting to 
reduce noise to a minimum, literary communication assumes its noise as a 
constitutive factor of itself ” (83). e noise of literature is also external in its 
interaction with other cultural domains. Literature’s dierence from other 
forms of communication ensures that it can never be fully assimilated to the 
communicative networks already in place. It is this recalcitrance that allows 
literature to “participat[e] in the process by which new ideas and new con-
structions of reality are formed” (165).12
 ough he relies heavily on models from the natural sciences, Paulson 
does not suggest that literary texts are organisms, and he does not return 
to New Critical postulates of the “organic unity” of the text.13 As he him-
self points out, his discussion of literary autonomy is both a revalorization 
and a demystication of romantic doctrines of the autonomous organic text 
(120–31). For Paulson, autonomy is not an invariant characteristic of liter-
ary works; it is a powerful interpretive convention that calls upon readers to 
assume poetic texts are autonomous objects functioning according to their 
own rules: “part of [a literary text’s] culturally dened role is to persuade 
its reader to treat it as autonomous and experience it accordingly” (135). In 
Paulson’s terms, the literary text is an “articially autonomous object” (135). 
As such, it places special demands on its readers. In particular, it requires 
them to interpret all aspects of the poetic text as contributing to its overall 
signication. In poetic texts, nothing is gratuitous. Hence, whenever readers 
encounter features that are radically alien to their constructions of meaning 
so far, they are forced to modify their interpretation by reading what seems 
random or unintelligible on one level of signication (for example, the literal 
level) as meaningful on another (for example, the gural level): “the reader 
is forced to move on to a new level of understanding in order to integrate 
features which at a simplistic level seemed merely interference in a message” 
(90). e reader must, in other words, continually transform noise into or-
der and information.
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 e order-from-noise principle is already inherent in the nature of poetic 
communication; it is inscribed in the dierentness of literary language.14 In 
the nal analysis, though, readers’ constant transformations of noise into 
information are less a response to specic properties of the literary text itself 
than an entirely appropriate (and eminently useful) activity within an insti-
tutional framework that still derives many of its assumptions from romantic 
and formalist reections on the unity and autonomy of literary texts.
 Quite clearly, this implies a perspective on literary texts that the post-
structuralist challenge to New Critical doctrines as well as modernist and 
postmodernist literary practices have rendered problematic. However, it 
still oers a good description of the conventions that to a large extent gov-
ern the reading practices of most professional and nonprofessional readers 
alike. More important, Paulson’s systems-theoretic approach opens up new 
avenues of thinking about the social function of literature as it invites us 
to reconsider questions of literariness, literary autonomy, and innovation 
that have been all but relegated to the past by poststructuralist theory and 
postmodern assertions of the impossibility of the new. Paulson achieves this 
without falling back into the organicist fallacy of either the Romantics or 
their formalist successors.
 Moreover, he gives us a viable model for correlating the formal proper-
ties of literary texts with their social function, a model that manages to re-
think Adorno’s paradox that literary texts are both autonomous and social. 
Paulson opts neither for an approach that would study literature in isolation 
from other cultural practices nor for one that would level literature’s dier-
ence from other discourses. His systemic approach avoids both the excessive 
determinism of some of the approaches that seek to situate literature pri-
marily in its historical, social, or political contexts and the almost complete 
dissociation of literature from these contexts characteristic of the “organic 
unity” doctrine. In this, Paulson’s deliberations correspond to our intuitive 
awareness that there is something special about literary texts—which is both 
one of the reasons why many of us are in literary studies and a justication 
for the institutionalized status of what we do—but that the literary discourse 
is not completely dierent from or independent of other discursive as well as 
material practices.15
 Finally, Paulson’s conceptualization of literature as an act of communica-
tion that is an anticommunication is important not only because it tells us 
something about literature’s ambiguity and unreliability as an instrument 
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of communication but also because it gives us a model to think about litera-
ture’s continuing relevance in a world of information. Paulson accomplishes 
this without any kind of nostalgia for a time when literature was still at the 
center (or apex) of culture. Instead, he fully acknowledges the marginality 
of literature in the informational society and bases his investigations on that 
premise. Paulson’s model is a model for our times and will continue to be so, 
for the process of informatization will not slow down. e decoding of the 
human genome in 2001 is only one indicator of the speed, cultural relevance, 
and endurance of this process.
 Yet Paulson’s systems-theoretic account of the social function of literature 
also has serious limitations, the most fundamental of which concerns the im-
plications of his theses for the study of what I would call “the politics of rep-
resentation.” From a systems perspective, what is outside a given system and
thus in its environment becomes interesting only if it can be integrated into 
the system’s organization via the order-from-noise mechanism. Anything 
that disturbs a system from the outside is recognizable for the system only if 
it is absorbed as order or information. Concerned as it is with the preserva-
tion of existing systems and the integration of noise as order, systems theory 
has a conservative bias16 and remains unable to account for the radically un-
integrable alterity and negativity that a thinker like Adorno postulates for 
art.17
 Even though Paulson explicitly acknowledges his debt to Michel Serres in 
his preface to e Noise of Culture, Serres’ own theorizing on noise presents a 
necessary corrective to the inherent (one is tempted to write “systemic”) con-
servatism of Paulson’s approach.18 Serres joins systems theorists in arguing 
that “noise gives rise to a new system, an order that is more complex than the 
simple chain” (e Parasite 14). For Serres as for Paulson, the continuation 
of any system’s functioning relies on both the establishment of order and the 
disruption of that order.19 Both critics would agree, moreover, with German 
sociologist and systems theorist Niklas Luhmann that “the meaning pro-
cess lives o disturbances, is nourished by disorder, lets itself be carried by 
noise, and needs an ‘excluded third’ for all technically precise, schematized 
operations” (Social Systems 83). But Serres much more powerfully and insis-
tently moves this third—excluded by Shannon’s distinction between useful 
and useless information and contained by systems theory’s order-from-noise 
principle—to the center of attention.
 Serres’ e Parasite and Genesis, rst published in French in 1980 and 1982 
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respectively, present sustained attempts to restore to philosophy and the his-
tory of science that which has been lost, overlooked, and excluded by dual-
ist systems of thought.20 His principal ally in this endeavor is the parasite, 
a wanderer between the worlds of biology, anthropology, and information 
theory.21 Unloved, feared, and chased out, the parasite—a word that denotes 
noise in technical French—becomes for Serres a gure for that which binary 
thought seeks to suppress and exclude.
 For Serres, multiplicity, disorder, and noise are not mere precursors to 
unity, order, and information; they are originary and constitute the ground 
of our world and our being:
a system has interesting relations according to what is deemed to be 
its faults or deprecations. What then about its noises and parasites. 
Can we rewrite a system, in the way Leibniz understood the term, not 
in the key of preestablished harmony but in what he called seventh 
chords? Not with the equilibrium he loved to mention but with the 
waves and shocks on the line in mind? [. . .] e book of dierences, 
noise, and disorder would only be the book of evil for someone who 
would prohibit the Author of the universe, through calculation, from 
a world that is incorruptibly dependable. is, however, is not the case. 
e dierence is part of the thing itself, and perhaps it even produces 
the thing. Maybe the radical origin of things is really the dierence, 
even though classical rationalism damned it to hell. In the beginning 
was the noise. (e Parasite 13)
Two years aer e Parasite, Serres published his book of noise—a book 
he had originally intended to entitle Noise but was dissuaded from doing so 
by its rst readers (Assad 279). His Genesis begins with “A Short Tall Tale,” 
a brief narrative in which a shipwrecked narrator constructs a ra out of 
countless bottles, each with a little message inside, colliding noisily on the 
Sargasso Sea. e sea, the noise, and the multiple are not only at the begin-
ning of things, they are also at the beginning of Serres’ text: “Before lan-
guage, before even the word, the noise” (54). Genesis presents Serres’ most 
sustained attempt to listen to the noise.
 In a series of meditations that blend the languages of science, philosophy, 
and poetry, Serres develops a theme that was already present in e Parasite. 
In Genesis, we encounter a thinker who has become increasingly concerned 
about the violence inherent in the pursuit of unity and order:
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I am attempting to extricate myself from the hell of dualism. Utterly 
pure rationality is a myth, it is a sacred place, cleansed, puried through 
lustral procedures that expel the confused, the profane, the unclean, 
the victim, accordingly, excluding, in any event, for the greater glo-
ry and power of its new priests. [. . .] To think in terms of pairs is to 
make ready some dangerous weapon, arrows, darts, dovetails, whereby 
to hold space and kill. To think by negation is not to think. Dualism 
tries to start a ruckus [chercher noise], make noise, it relates to death 
alone. It puts to death and it maintains death. Death to the parasite, 
someone says, without seeing that a parasite is put to death only by a 
stronger parasite. Keep the noise down, says he, without perceiving 
that he has monopolized all the noise, without understanding that he 
thus becomes the head of all the fury. (Genesis 131)
Serres shares Henry Adams’s insight that “Chaos was the law of nature, Or-
der was the dream of man” (e Education 427), but he is no longer prepared 
to pay the price to realize the dream of unity and order. In his decision to 
listen to the noise and explore the fuzzy regions of multiplicity and chaos, 
Serres does not celebrate irrationality, and his ire is not directed against ra-
tional inquiry as such (Assad 291) but against the arrogance of a rationalist 
discourse whose desire for unity turns violent in its exclusion of everything 
that does not t its rigid order. e logic of the parasite, he contends, per-
vades all systems, and his/her/its exclusion always only heralds the rise to 
dominance of another parasite. Noise always remains part of the equation.
 With Serres, we get a model of thinking about noise that builds on infor-
mation and systems theory but urges us to consider the costs involved in the 
transformation of noise into information and order. Any such transforma-
tion, Serres contends, threatens to reduce the other to the same; it threat-
ens to deny the otherness of the other and thereby obliterate it.22 Working 
within a broadly poststructuralist framework, a number of cultural theorists 
including the German media archaeologist Friedrich Kittler and the French 
economist and music theorist Jacques Attali have followed Serres’ lead, dis-
covering in noise a source not only of new order but also of the disruption 
and the subversion of systems based on binary logic. Taken together and 
read alongside Adorno’s reections on the social function of literature, these 
critics expose a crucial blind spot in Paulson’s argumentation that will be 
explored further in subsequent chapters.
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 e second, and in my view almost equally serious limitation to Paulson’s 
project concerns his stance on the question of literary representation. In 
conceiving of the interaction between dierent systems exclusively in terms 
of mutual perturbation or structural coupling, Paulson fails to account for 
the representational nature of literary texts. Critics realized long before the 
advent of modernism that there is more to literature than the faithful repro-
duction of “reality.”23 It has become a commonplace that literary texts are to 
a large degree structured according to internal laws that are independent of 
and sometimes opposed to the structures (and strictures) of daily existence. 
Derrida’s famous contention that “there is nothing outside of the text” (Of 
Grammatology 58) has for many critics even reversed the traditional rela-
tionship between texts and “reality”: life as we know it can now be seen as 
structured like a text rather than vice versa. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied 
that literary texts draw some of their material from a space external to them-
selves. Moreover, the relationship between the ctional world of the literary 
text and the external world of objects can at least partly be described in terms 
of representation—a term that invites us to consider both the objects and 
the forms of literary discourse. In view of this, Paulson’s stern rejection of a 
representational approach seems premature: “To seek and nd knowledge in 
literature—where the autonomy of language is made manifest—is to accept 
that the act of knowing resides in language and community, that it is part 
of an adaptive and self-coherent system and not a representation of reality” 
(Paulson 172). Maturana and Varela’s shi from a representational approach 
to living organisms to one that focuses on their capacity for autopoiesis does 
not translate as easily into literary studies as Paulson would have us believe. 
Literary texts remain in a dynamic interaction with empirical reality that can-
not be reduced to processes of mutual perturbation and self-organization. 
e representational perspective in literary studies is only sterile and un-
inventive if we conceive of representation as imitation in the most narrow 
sense, a stance few if any literary critics would adopt.24
 Related to Paulson’s rejection of a representational approach is what con-
stitutes the most radical of his book’s many arguments. In order to ensure the 
continuing relevance of literary studies, he argues, critics today should move 
away “from the dead center of their discipline, from the project of interpret-
ing and describing texts as fully as possible” (182). If literature is no longer 
seen as being about something, we may turn our backs on interpretation and 
interrogate instead the processes by which knowledge is produced in the in-
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teraction and mutual perturbation of a variety of discourses, including the 
literary discourse but not necessarily centered around it. In Paulson’s view, 
a systemic approach to literature allows us to rethink its social function in a 
time of retrenchment and is emphatically not “a gadget for producing read-
ings and interpretations” (181). Literary studies, Paulson agrees with Kittler, 
must become truly interdisciplinary and can no longer be practiced in isola-
tion from the discourses of science and technology. Paulson concedes that 
such a project might very well mean the end of literary studies as we know 
it, and he ends his book with the hope that “Out of a new dialogue between 
literature and science, out of interferences between disciplinary discourses, 
we may yet be able to arrange a graceful exit from the era of Literaturwis-
senscha” (185).
 While I agree with William Paulson that the task of literary scholars can-
not be to study poetic texts in isolation and with the sole purpose of un-
derstanding them as completely as possible, I share neither his rejection of 
representational approaches nor his abandonment of the interpretive proj-
ect. In fact, the remainder of this book is crucially concerned with estab-
lishing passages between Paulson’s and other thinkers’ conceptualizations 
of literature as “the noise of culture” and analyses of literary representations 
of noise. Despite the invention of the phonograph in the 1870s, which ef-
fectively ended the monopoly of writing on the storage of sound (Kittler, 
Aufschreibesysteme), literary texts from the late nineteenth to the late twen-
tieth century continue to be sites of both the cultural production and the 
representation of noise, and it is this convergence that a history of literary 
acoustics addresses.
 Let us turn to William Burroughs’s Naked Lunch for an example. In one 
of the many passages that seem to lend support to Burroughs’s claim that he 
has “no precise memory of writing the notes which have now been published 
under the title Naked Lunch” (7) but ultimately undermine it in their self- 
reexive quality, Burroughs discusses both the form and content of his work:
e Word is divided into units which be all in one piece and should 
be so taken, but the pieces can be had in any order being tied up back 
and forth, in and out fore and a like an innaresting sex arrangement. 
is book spills o­ the page in all directions, kaleidoscope of vistas, 
medley of tunes and street noises, farts and riot yipes and the slamming 
steel shutters of commerce, screams of pain and pathos and screams 
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plain pathic, copulating cats and outraged squawk of the displaced bull 
head, prophetic mutterings of brujo in nutmeg trances, snapping necks 
and screaming mandrakes, sigh of orgasm, heroin silent at dawn in the 
thirsty cells, Radio Cairo screaming like a berserk tobacco auction, and 
utes of Ramadan fanning the sick junky like a gentle lush worker in 
the grey subway dawn feeling with delicate  ngers for the green folding 
crackle . . . (180)
is passage functions rst of all as a commentary on the formal arrange-
ment of Naked Lunch. In Burroughs’s narrative (if that is the word), the 
“Word” is stripped of the metaphysical unity it might have once possessed; 
it is fractured beyond repair—and beyond Burroughs’s mockery of religious 
oratory. is book truly spills o the page in all directions; its cut-up tech-
nique, associative ordering of thoughts, and fragmentary syntax provide a 
source of noise that reects and complements the novel’s events and actions. 
e novel’s formal aspects forestall the reader’s easy assimilation of experi-
ences that are out of the ordinary and shocking to most people (sadomasoch-
ism, raw violence, drug abuse). Burroughs’s formal innovations therefore not 
only mimetically reproduce the chaos and breathlessness of his characters’ 
lives; his way of dissecting language and reducing “sense to nonsense” and 
“government propaganda to noise” (Kittler, Grammophon 167; my transla-
tion) is itself a form of resistance by negativity in Adorno’s sense.25
 At the same time, the passage captures the auditory manifestations of 
some of the novel’s main themes. It makes the reader participate in the 
acoustic turmoil of the city, the cries of pleasure and screams of violence, the 
blare of the radio and din of the crowd, the full range of noises that dene 
the acoustic world of Burroughs’s subculture of junkies and sexual mists. 
Moreover, the reference to “Radio Cairo screaming like a berserk tobacco 
auction” constitutes one of the book’s many allusions to radio transmission 
and thus to a eld in which the elimination of noise, of “moment[s] of static, 
dangling wires, broken connections” (171) has been of primary importance 
to engineers since the rst radio broadcast in 1906. Indeed, in the paragraph 
following the passage quoted above, Burroughs attributes all of its noises to 
radio broadcasting and assigns them revelatory force: “is is Revelation 
and Prophecy of what I can pick up without FM on my 1920 crystal set with 
antennae of jisom” (180). As part of the ctional world Burroughs creates, 
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these noises have a decidedly literal quality. At the same time, their represen-
tation is inextricably intertwined with Burroughs’s reections on the recal-
citrant, noisy form of his book. e two forms of noise mutually reinforce 
each other, building up to the overwhelming brouhaha the reader is sucked 
into. Naked Lunch, then, assumes noise as a part of itself not only in its for-
mal inventiveness and breaches of decorum but also in its representations of 
physical noise.
 Burroughs’s decision to associate the subculture he depicts with a pan-
orama of noises points to a related convergence between reections on the 
social function of literature and literary representations of noise. Naked 
Lunch is not only a noisy text because it reproduces on the level of textual 
organization the noises it registers emerging from the margins of society. 
Literary texts need not be formally experimental to kick up a fuss, to make 
noise. Burroughs’s text provides a platform for the voices of those few whose 
street talk and junkie slang is merely noise in the ears of the many. In giving 
a voice to forms of cultural expression that fall outside the perimeter of of-
cial culture, Burroughs embarks on a project many writers of ction have 
come to embrace as their own.26 In choosing to dwell among the eccentrics, 
the outcasts, and the losers of history, Burroughs gives expression to voices 
and sounds that ocial culture has a tendency to relegate to the danger-
ous, unstable realms of nonsense and noise. e OED entry for “noise” pro-
vides an interesting example in this respect. It is hardly a coincidence that 
ve out of the sixteen examples given for the rst sense of “noise” (“Loud 
outcry, clamour, or shouting; din or disturbance made by one or more per-
sons”) record the noises of others: heathens, Bretons, thieves and murderers, 
women:
1297 R. GLOUC. (Rolls) 8167 Of trompes & of tabors þe sarazins made 
þere So gret noyse þat cristinemen al destourbed were.
c1330 R. BRUNNE Chron. Wace (Rolls) 11531 At þat word was noise & 
cry Of þe Bretons þat stoden ney.
1481 CAXTON Godfrey v. 23 Of the noyse that sourded emonge the 
hethen men discordyng in theyr lawe.
1633 G. HERBERT Temple, Redemption 12. At length I heard a ragged 
noise and mirth Of theeves and murderers.
1702 ROWE Tamerl. IV. i, ou hast thy sexes Virtues, eir Aectation, 
Pride, Ill Nature, Noise.
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And when the City of New York systematically began to address its noise 
problem in 1907, it rst banned the use of megaphones by the Coney Island 
barkers (E. ompson 123–24). In America, the policing of soundscapes 
reaches back to colonial times when African-Americans, Native Americans, 
and the lower orders in general were identied as the most troublesome 
noisemakers (M. Smith 9–12). e disparagement of the sounds of others 
as noise has a long tradition that involves processes of exclusion—which can 
be processes of silencing in the most literal sense—in which immigrants’ 
accents, female modes of communication, or jazz music are considered un-
desirable interferences with the sociocultural and communicative networks 
already in place.27 In some instances, such acoustic boundary-drawings along 
the lines of race, class, and gender are accompanied by genuine concerns 
about the debilitating eects of excessive levels of noise. is is the case with 
Victorian middle-class professionals’ campaigns against the street musicians 
of mid-nineteenth century London. eir anti–street music movement was 
informed as much by fears that the sounds produced by organ grinders or 
brass bands would imperil the mental and physical well-being of their own 
class as by an oen openly expressed xenophobic disdain for the lower-class 
immigrants who took their music to the streets (Picker, Victorian 41–81). 
Literature participates in such processes, both in arming and contesting 
them. As will be argued in greater detail in the following three chapters, 
naturalist portrayals of immigrant accents, modernist renditions of working-
class dissent, or postmodernist representations of alternative systems of com-
munication all constitute interventions in those debates.
 Many of the writers discussed in this book challenge and sometimes re-
verse the hierarchy between voice and noise, sense and nonsense by valorizing 
the sound-making of others as a productive disturbance of established modes 
of communication and sense-making. ese authors, chief among them the 
modernists and early postmodernists, are faced with the task of preserving in 
(and through) their writing something of the otherness of alternative forms 
of sounding.28 is is a task that is complicated by the fundamental question 
of how any acoustic phenomenon can be translated into the written format 
of a literary text. As Bruce R. Smith points out, any translation of the oral 
into the written threatens to codify and thereby tame the unruly realm of 
orality. Smith’s examples are moralistic treatises Puritans wrote about the 
dances and gests of early modern England: “Something heard, felt, en/joyed 
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becomes, in their hands, something seen, known, mastered” (166); Kittler 
documents European musicologists’ use of the phonograph to record the 
unruliness of other peoples’ “exotic music” so as to be able to reduce it to 
“exact notation” (Literature 35). e question arises just how the alterity of 
the sounds and noises of others can be conserved in rather than contained 
by literary representation.
 For many of the authors discussed in the following pages, any answer to 
this question must be based on the premise that the literary representation of 
others demands special forms of representation. us, we encounter slippag-
es of language into pure sound in Jean Toomer’s and Zora Neale Hurston’s 
tributes to the African-American oral tradition, highly fragmented prose in 
John Dos Passos’s portrayal of working-class voices of dissent, and a narrative 
structure that replicates the noisy alterity of the alternative communications 
system at the heart of omas Pynchon’s e Crying of Lot 49. ese authors 
challenge and disturb dominant modes of communicating about others by 
means of representational innovations that turn the literary text itself into a 
source of noise within the networks of culture.
 Yet artists’ attempts to preserve something of the otherness of other 
sounds and voices do not guarantee a progressive politics of representation. 
Futurist and Dadaist spectacles of noise in the rst decades of the twentieth 
century were informed as much by primitivism and militarism as by a desire 
to disrupt classical harmonies (Kahn 45–67). In many a naturalist text, the 
dierentness of immigrant, working-class, or politically dissenting forms of 
sound-making is highlighted only to be exposed to ridicule, to be denigrated 
as noise and excluded from the realm of acceptable sense-making. e inter-
relations between the literary representation of noise and literature’s poten-
tial to function as the noise of culture are complex and contingent on the 
historical context of literary production, distribution, and reception. Our 
analyses and judgments of the politics of dierent writers’ acoustic imagina-
tion will therefore need to proceed on the basis of careful analyses of the 
dierent representational strategies of specic works of literature as well as 
their place within the discourse networks of their times.
 As the examples discussed above already show, the relevance of concep-
tualizations of literature as the noise of culture is not restricted to a spe-
cic literary period. But the obvious applicability of an aesthetics of noise 
to formally dicult texts does suggest that such reections have a decidedly 
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modernist bent. From the dual perspective proposed by a history of liter-
ary acoustics, this comes as no surprise. Modernist formal experimentation 
and innovation can been seen as responses to problems of representing the 
noise of modernity not only in its metaphorical but also in its literal, acoustic 
sense. Artists confronted with a rapid urban growth that engendered massive 
demographic changes, the carnage of World War I, and the acceleration of 
industrial and scientic progress were exposed to a chaos of sense perceptions 
that demanded new modes of artistic representation. For a growing number 
of writers, the literary forms of realism and naturalism no longer served to 
render the cultural atmosphere of a world radically unhinged. Literature, 
already severely challenged in its claims to verisimilitude by photography, 
lm, and the phonograph, entered a crisis of representation, and modernist 
experimental forms are a response to that crisis.
 While this does not entail that modernist montage, fragmentation, or dis-
sonance simply reproduce the visual and acoustic chaos of life at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, it registers a historical contingency of mod-
ernist form beyond the needs of the system of art to periodically renew itself. 
e futurist musician Luigi Russolo’s groundbreaking compositions best ex-
emplify the new art forms inspired by the soundscape of modernity. Russolo 
theorized that urban noise was the most authentic musical expression of the 
twentieth century. Consequently, he built a number of new instruments, so-
called noise-intoners (intonarumori), that allowed him to bring the noise 
of the city into the concert hall. As Emily ompson documents, Russolo’s 
dozen or so public performances in Italy and London in 1913 and 1914 met 
with anything from enthusiastic endorsement to ridicule and outrage, and 
his rst public performance in Milan erupted into a stght between fellow 
futurists and unappreciative members of the audience. What even some of 
Russolo’s most fervent admirers failed to understand, though, was his em-
phasis on “the abstract over the imitative quality of his music” (E. ompson 
137).29 Most revolutionary about Russolo’s compositions was not that they 
reproduced the noise of the city but that they elevated noise into a principle 
of composition.30 Writing against the same acoustic background, modern-
ist authors pursued similar aims, though with the dierent (and, strictly 
speaking, silent) tools of their own trade. Both modernist writing and mu-
sic, then, emerged from a cultural situation whose metaphorical and literal 
noise helped shape artistic forms. A recognition of the modernist lineage of 
the “literature as noise” paradigm—on which I will elaborate in chapter 2 
UP
F
CO
PY
Introduction    /    25
—therefore allows us to link its origins to a period characterized by a pro-
liferation of noises that was instrumental in making literature jeopardize its 
communicative function and enabled it to become the noise of culture.
 However, even as we situate the emergence of a modernist aesthetics of 
noise within the historical context of technological modernity, we are forced 
to recognize that the process of modernization was already well under way 
when the naturalists published their rst books. e end of the Civil War 
in 1865 was followed by an upsurge in industrial production, particularly in 
the metal industries (cast iron, steel); by the introduction of more powerful 
steam engines; and by the concentration of a rapidly growing percentage of 
the U.S. population in the urban centers of industrial production. Natural-
ist writers felt compelled to give a sustained ctional account of the new 
acoustic spaces produced by urbanization and industrialization, and their 
texts raise interesting questions with regard to the literary representation
and representability of noise. As with modernist texts, we may sound out the 
politics of naturalists’ mappings of urban and industrial acoustic spaces and 
ask ourselves to what extent their texts truly give a platform to or, conversely, 
seek to contain the noises of modernity and its social conicts. From the 
perspective of a history of literary acoustics, answers to this question touch 
on the complex relationship between the representational forms of literary 
texts and their historically contingent social functions. is question invites 
us, in other words, to think about the politics of representation.
 Postmodern writing raises a similar range of questions. Yet while many 
of the sounds introduced by the industrial revolutions continue to sound 
in the acoustic spaces of postmodernity, the information revolution has in-
serted new kinds of noise into the postmodern soundscape. e inhabitants 
of informational cities are exposed to a continuous stream of broad-band 
noise emitted by electronic apparatuses of all kinds. is “white noise” feeds 
into an acoustic world in which noise has been all but exorcised from the 
channels of real-time communication, but in which the very machines that 
enable this interference-free exchange of information contribute signi-
cantly to an extremely dense acoustic environment in which noise is a near- 
ubiquitous presence. Postmodern writers of ction register this new quality 
of the soundscape in their texts and experiment with old representational 
forms and invent new ones to render the omnipresent and mostly subliminal 
quality of the noises of postmodernity.
 is brief overview of some of the arguments that will be developed in 
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greater detail in the following pages already attests to the need to account 
for the historical specicity of writers’ representations of and reections on 
noise. e following three chapters, which form the core of this book, pre-
sent an attempt to historicize the question of the social function of literature 
in a series of analyses that address the convergences between the noises lit-
erature represents and the noises it produces in the three successive literary 
periods of naturalism, modernism, and postmodernism. ese chapters are 
crucially concerned with the politics of literary representation and in their 
double focus on the literary production and representation of noise seek to 
contribute to the study of American literature from the late nineteenth to 
the late twentieth century a history of literary acoustics that is embedded 
in the ongoing project of writing the history of modernity and postmoder-
nity.
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 e Soundscapes of Naturalism
We must speak by the card,
Or equivocation will undo us.
Shakespeare, Hamlet
Around the turn of the previous century, the scene of writing changed radi-
cally. With the invention of the phonograph (in 1877) and lm (in 1895), 
writing lost its monopoly on data storage. As Kittler points out, the new 
media technologies “store acoustic and optical data with superhuman pre-
cision” (Aufschreibesysteme 310; my translation) and relegate writing to the 
status of one medium among others. For Kittler, this transition marks the 
end of literature in the Romantic sense: “As long as the book had to take care 
of all serial data ows, [. . .] words trembled with sensuality and memory. All 
the passion of reading consisted of hallucinating a meaning between letters 
and lines: the visible or audible world of romantic poetry. [. . .] Electricity 
itself has brought this to an end. If memories and dreams, the dead and the 
specters have become technically reproducible, then the hallucinatory power 
of reading and writing has become obsolete” (Literature 40–41). Under the 
new media regime, Kittler reasons, only two options are le for writers of 
literature: they could either—as the modernists would—focus their atten-
tion on the medium of writing itself and “begin a cult by and for letter fetish-
ists” or become producers of song lyrics and thus turn from “the imaginary 
voices” of literature “to the real” voices of records (Kittler, Grammophon 
135–36; my translation).
 Kittler’s far-reaching claims need to be qualied, not least because, from a 
literary-historical perspective, they elide realist and naturalist attempts to re-
produce the sights and sounds of the real. At the same time, though, Kittler’s 
media archaeology invites us to ask a fundamental question concerning all 
literary representations of noise: How can writing represent noise at all if it 
must, by force, reduce the unruly noise that lies outside of language to the 
rules and order of the alphabet? at question is particularly relevant to the 
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naturalist writers discussed in this chapter, who witnessed the loss of the tex-
tual monopoly on the storage of acoustic data at a time when the American 
soundscape was rapidly becoming saturated with the noises of technological 
modernity.
 In his seminal work on soundscape studies, e Tuning of the World (1977), 
R. Murray Schafer captures the acoustic changes involved in the transition 
from a predominantly rural and agrarian to an urban industrial society as a 
shi from a hi- to a lo- soundscape:1
A hi-  system is one possessing a favorable signal-to-noise ratio. e 
hi-  soundscape is one in which discrete sounds can be heard clearly 
because of the low ambient noise level. e country is generating more 
hi-  than the city; night more than day; ancient times more than mod-
ern. [ . . .] In a lo-  soundscape individual acoustic signals are obscured 
in an overdense population of sounds. e pellucid sound—a footstep 
in the snow, a church bell across the valley or an animal scurrying in the 
bush—is masked by broad-band noise. Perspective is lost. On a down-
town street corner of the modern city there is no distance; there is only 
presence. ere is cross-talk on all the channels, and in order for the 
most ordinary sounds to be heard they have to be increasingly ampli-
 ed. (43)
Schafer agrees with the vast majority of listeners around the world that 
the noises introduced by the inventions of the industrial revolutions—in 
particular by the steam engine, the blast furnace, and later by the internal 
combustion engine used in cars, motorcycles, and generators—violate our 
aural sense. His judgment of the soundscape at the time of his writing is 
correspondingly harsh. is becomes obvious when he comments, for in-
stance, on “the slop and spawn of the megalopolis” that “invite a multiplica-
tion of sonic jabberware” (216) or when he points out its “continuous sludge 
of trac noise” (230). Such value judgments are hardly surprising, and as 
we read the works of naturalist authors caught in the midst of the second 
industrial revolution, we detect a similar dislike of technological noises. Am-
brose Bierce’s denition of noise in e Devil’s Dictionary (1911) brings out 
this antipathy best: “Noise, n. A stench in the ear. Undomesticated music. 
e chief product and authenticating sign of civilization” (169). While many 
an antebellum observer still welcomed and admired “the hum of industry” 
(M. Smith 119–46), complaints about industrial noise became increasingly 
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frequent by the turn of the century. Around 1900, it seems, noise calls for 
domestication.
 e ctional texts of the 1890s I am going to discuss in this chapter—
 Dreiser’s Sister Carrie (1900); Norris’s McTeague: A Story of San Francisco 
(1899); Crane’s Maggie: A Girl of the Streets (1893), and e Red Badge of 
Courage (1895)—all address the processes of industrialization and urbaniza-
tion and register the changes wrought by them. e accelerated growth of 
industrial production aer the Civil War, the expanded possibilities of com-
munication, the rise of corporate capitalism and U.S. imperialism, the in-
creasingly violent social conicts, and the move of an unprecedented number 
of people from dierent regions and countries to the industrial cities of the 
North radically altered the ways many Americans lived their lives and per-
ceived the world. Many of these changes had an important acoustic dimen-
sion. e increasingly powerful steam engines used in factory production, 
the radical expansion of the railway system (the westbound Central Pacic 
Railroad and the eastbound Union Pacic met at Promontory Summit in 
Utah in 1869, connecting the United States coast to coast for the rst time), 
and the sudden copresence of dierent dialects and languages in the space 
of the city changed the sonic environment of a great number of Americans. 
At a historical moment in which sounds of all kinds had become techni-
cally reproducible, naturalist writers had to contend with a radically altered 
soundscape that threatened to exceed their powers of representation.
 Dreiser evokes the enormous scope of industrial progress and the noises it 
brings with it in one of his descriptions of Chicago: “Its population was not 
so much thriving upon established commerce as upon the industries which 
prepared for the arrival of others. e sound of the hammer engaged upon 
the erection of new structures was everywhere heard. Great industries were 
moving in. e huge railroad corporations which had long before recognised 
the prospects of the place had seized upon vast tracts of land for transfer and 
shipping purposes” (Sister Carrie 16). By the time Norris wrote McTeague 
(1899), the noises of civilization had restored howling to the western wilder-
ness. An acoustic onslaught of literally monstrous proportions tears apart 
the “vast silence” (423) of the Californian desert to which McTeague ees 
aer he has killed his wife:
Here and there at long distances upon the cañon sides rose the headgear 
of a mine, surrounded with its few unpainted houses, and topped by its 
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never-failing feather of black smoke. On near approach one heard the 
prolonged thunder of the stamp-mill, the crusher, the insatiable mon-
ster, gnashing the rocks to powder with its long iron teeth, vomiting 
them out again in a thin stream of wet gray mud. Its enormous maw, fed 
day and night with the carboys’ loads, gorged itself with gravel, and spat 
out the gold, grinding the rocks between its jaws, glutted, as it were, 
with the very entrails of the earth, and growling over its endless meal, 
like some savage animal, some legendary dragon, some fabulous beast, 
symbol of inordinate and monstrous gluttony. (380)
In Norris, monstrosity is as much a gure for the violent impact of indus-
trial noise on listeners’ ears as for the excessive demands acoustic modernity 
places on the old technology of writing.
 With the advent of electricity in the second industrial revolution, a fur-
ther, qualitatively dierent source of noise was added: “e Electric Revolu-
tion extended many of the themes of the Industrial Revolution and added 
some new eects of its own. Owing to the increased transmission speed of 
electricity, the at-line eect was extended to give the pitched tone, thus 
harmonizing the world on center frequencies of 25 and 40, then 50 and 60 
cycles per second” (Schafer, Tuning 88). Flat-line sounds are characteristic of 
machines and were already introduced in the rst industrial revolution.2 e 
motto of the 1893 Chicago Columbian Exposition, “Make Culture Hum!,” 
therefore not only points to its obsequiousness (Homberger 152) but also 
indicates an acoustic transformation well underway. Examples of at-line 
sounds are the clatter of the weaving machine, the drone of the generator, the 
“corundum burr in McTeague’s [dental] engine humm[ing] in a prolonged 
monotone” (McTeague 21), or the “nightly whine” (74) of the streetlamps 
registered in Crane’s “e Monster.” Due to their repetitiveness and uni-
formity, such sounds are more redundant and predictable and therefore less 
informative than other sounds. Now, with the introduction of electricity, the 
acceleration of sound was added to the acceleration of life.
 Authors writing at or near the turn of the century struggle to document 
the changes aecting their acoustic environment and oen link their descrip-
tions with an attentiveness to the processes of technological, scientic, and 
social change we have come to understand as urbanization and industrializa-
tion. eir texts remind us “that denser, urban populations are louder than 
less dense ones; that more ethnically diverse populations, by virtue of the 
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dierent sounds created by dierent tongues and accents, can sound more 
discordant than more homogenous populations; that steam power is louder 
and sounds qualitatively dierent from muscle power; that industrial-urban 
societies are characterized by increased decibel levels” (M. Smith 121). How-
ever, many, in fact most of the noises naturalist texts register do not origi-
nate in a technological source. e screaming of soldiers in e Red Badge of 
Courage, the noise in Maggie’s entertainment halls, or the barking of dogs in 
McTeague are all not produced by the machines of the industrial revolutions 
and seem to have little to do with the process of modernization. Yet both the 
noises characters make and those they perceive appear within and are partly 
shaped by an acoustic environment that has been drastically altered by the 
progress of modernity. If, for instance, we read that Carrie still has “the roll 
of cushioned carriages [. . .] in her ears” (Sister Carrie 166) when returning 
from a tour of the more prosperous neighborhoods, we should be aware that 
the very possibility of this aural experience cannot be taken for granted and 
is not available to all inhabitants of an urban industrial soundscape, ctional 
or not. Likewise, when Jimmie Johnson yells at pedestrians from the height 
of his “large rattling truck” (Maggie 14), he does so above the din of the city 
streets. In many cases, the representation of noise in naturalist texts gives us 
a clue as to the nature of a text’s comment on the acoustic as well as the social 
condition of American modernity.
 Rather than reducing literary naturalism to a reection or even a result of 
certain historical processes, I want to analyze the ways in which literary dis-
course and its acoustic worlds interact with, comment on, and become part 
of these processes. is entails a rejection of Kittler’s technological deter-
minism as well as of his overly reductive view of literature as a mere storage 
medium. At the same time, it acknowledges the validity of his insistence that 
literature must be studied within the context of the discourse network(s) of 
its time. In doing this, I will be particularly interested in the dierent degrees 
to which the noises naturalist texts register are contained. While literature 
always tames noise since, “In order to store the sound sequences of speech, 
literature has to arrest them in the system of twenty-six letters and thereby 
exclude noise sequences from the beginning” (Kittler, Literature 34–35), 
some literary texts contain the noises they represent more forcefully and, in 
some cases, more violently than others. Strategies of containment can oen 
be deduced from the ways in which authors negotiate between dierent so-
cial worlds and the characters inhabiting these worlds. Both characters and 
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narrators may comment on viewpoints and voices dierent from their own 
and thus provide a reader guidance that does the work of containment for 
diverging viewpoints. In other cases, as in Crane, the noises of industrializa-
tion, war, social discontent, or the problems involved in the representation 
of noise itself may thwart all attempts at containment and inltrate the for-
mal organization of narratives in ways that anticipate a modernist aesthetics 
of noise.3 In any case, the complex relationships between the literary repre-
sentation of noise on the one hand and the cultural production of noise by 
literature on the other deserve careful scrutiny if we seek to avoid simplistic 
generalizations about the politics of specic literary works.
 Before we immerse ourselves further in questions concerning the politics 
of naturalist representation, one more observation is in order. e percep-
tion of noise is a highly subjective phenomenon; one man’s music is another 
man’s noise. is is already implied in the commonplace denition of noise 
as “unwanted sound” (Truax 1984, 86). Dierent people perceive the same 
noise dierently. e way we experience noise is not only contingent on its 
frequency of oscillation (experienced by the listener as pitch) and intensity 
(experienced by the listener as volume) but also on the information it con-
tains about its source (we may tolerate the noises produced by some but not 
by others),4 on the constitution of our hearing apparatus, on our momentary 
emotional and corporeal disposition, on the degree of our previous expo-
sure to environmental noise, and on a number of other factors aecting our 
physiological and psychological makeup.5
Soundscapes of the Soul
Naturalist authors are well aware of the psychological dimension of aural 
perception and use literary characters’ perceptions of noise to give us indica-
tions as to their states of mind. In one passage of Crane’s e Red Badge of 
Courage, for instance, even the violently loud noises of war appear as nothing 
but music to an elated Henry believing his regiment to be close to victory: 
“In his ears, he heard the ring of victory. He knew the frenzy of a rapid suc-
cessful charge. e music of the trampling feet, the sharp voices, the clanking 
arms of the column near him made him soar on the red wings of war. For a 
few moments he was sublime” (124). In McTeague, Frank Norris likewise uses 
his title character’s perception of noise as a key to what goes on in his mind. 
One of the ways in which Norris indicates McTeague’s continuing unrest 
is by portraying his alertness to the noises of the city. Even as McTeague’s 
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immense anger at Marcus Schouler seems gone the minute he receives his 
longed-for giant gold molar, his unusual attentiveness to the nocturnal 
soundscape of the city suggests that his anger continues to brood not very 
far below the surface:
But he was restless during the night. Every now and then he was awak-
ened by noises to which he had long since become accustomed. Now 
it was the cackling of the geese in the deserted market across the street; 
now it was the stoppage of the cable, the sudden silence coming almost 
like a shock; and now it was the infuriated barking of the dogs in the 
back yard—Alec, the Irish setter, and the collie that belonged to the 
branch post-oce raging at each other through the fence, snarling their 
endless hatred unto each other’s faces. (150)
Intermingled with the other noises of the night, the barking dogs function 
not solely as projections of McTeague’s agitated mind and bestial nature; 
the mere fact of their perception by McTeague at this stage in the narrative 
indicates unnished business and prepares the reader for the eruption of vio-
lence when McTeague breaks Marcus’s arm with “a sharp snap” that sounds 
“almost like the report of a pistol” (235) three chapters later (in chapter 11, 
where the “two dogs,” who “hate each other just like humans” [216], make 
another appearance).
 Norris’s repeated descriptions of the barking dogs are admittedly not the 
most subtle pregurations of the deadly hatred building up not only be-
tween him and Marcus but also between him and Trina. Dreiser’s portrayal 
of his characters’ changing perceptions of noise in Sister Carrie provides a 
subtler guide to their inner lives. As Hurstwood becomes increasingly es-
tranged from his wife, the very sound of her voice rings dissonantly in his 
ears: “When in the ush of such feelings [about Carrie] he heard his wife’s 
voice, when the insistent demands of matrimony recalled him from dreams 
to a stale practice, how it grated” (140). But when he waits for Carrie in a 
“pretty little park,” music is in the air: “In the thickness of the shiny green 
leaves of the trees hopped and twittered the busy sparrows. [. . .] He heard 
the carts go lumbering by upon the neighboring streets, but they were far o 
and only buzzed upon his ear. e hum of the surrounding city was faint; 
the clang of an occasional bell was as music. He looked and dreamed a new 
dream of pleasure which concerned his present xed conditions not at all” 
(146–47). When, in a parallel scene in the park, Carrie refuses to meet him 
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because she has found out that he is married, when he fears his indelity will 
be disclosed to his business associates, and when his wife has begun to make 
monetary demands, Hurstwood no longer perceives the music of the city but 
only the discordant sounds of “Trucks and vans [. . .] rattling in a noisy line” 
(236). Carrie herself goes through similar changes in her perception of the 
acoustic environment. Upon her arrival in Chicago, “the sound of the little 
bells upon the horse cars” is still “as pleasing as it was strange and novel” (12). 
But when she is plagued by the “urgent voice” (91) of her conscience, the 
mysterious noises of the wind exert their powerful inuence on her imagi-
nation, and she becomes “fearful of the whistling wind” (90).6 Later, when 
the manager of the Casino promises her a place in the chorus line and the 
prospect of a theater career draws nearer, Carrie again experiences urban 
noise as a charming sound: “Already the hard rumble of the city through the 
open window seemed pleasant” (388).
 e barking dogs in Norris, the noise of war in Crane, and the singing 
birds in Dreiser all function as acoustic analogues of the “landscapes of the 
soul” evoked by earlier authors and discussed by critics since the eighteenth 
century.7 And indeed, psychologization is one of the ways in which natural-
ist writers strive to make sense of and contain the senseless noise of their 
historical moment. Yet there are two important dierences. First, the critical 
use of the term landscape of the soul has come to acquire strongly religious 
connotations. is is evident, for instance, in Ernest Fontana’s discussion of 
references to Dante in Walter Pater’s work: “e allusions to Dante’s great 
poem [Divina Commedia] continued to provide Pater with the outlines of a 
spiritual topography, inspiring his own attempts to imagine, in a belated age 
of ‘second thoughts,’ the inner landscape of the soul” (31). is is also borne 
out by more popular uses of the term; one need only enter landscape of the 
soul on a good World Wide Web search engine to nd out.
 Second, naturalist texts betray a greater awareness than earlier writing of 
the degree to which the subjectivity of characters’ perceptions is conditioned 
by social facts. is social dimension, in which I am particularly interested, 
is almost entirely absent from the uses to which landscape of the soul has 
been put in critical discussions. If we take a second look at the examples 
discussed above, we nd that noises begin to grind in Hurstwood’s ears at a 
moment when he not only feels estranged from his wife and abandoned by 
Carrie but when his future prosperity begins to be seriously endangered as 
he is reminded to his dismay that there is a crucially important monetary di-
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mension to his relationship with Mrs. Hurstwood, who has all their property 
in her name. Moreover, his wife could easily end Hurstwood’s career by in-
forming his employers of her husband’s indelity. In Montreal, Hurstwood 
is deeply worried about the consequences of his the and subsequent ight 
from Chicago, but he still speculates he might be restored to his post upon 
returning the money, and he is still able to aord a room in a hotel he knows 
from earlier visits. For a short time, his ears are again attuned to the music in 
the air and the song of the birds—which is, incidentally, the sound listeners 
all over the world have consistently identied as the most pleasant sound 
of their acoustic environment (Schafer, Tuning 29).8 But along with Hurst-
wood’s optimism, his receptiveness to pleasing sounds quickly vanishes as he 
is forced to move to a smaller at (in Sister Carrie, the indicator of social de-
cline par excellence) and is shortly aer dealt a decisive blow when he has to 
shut down the saloon, his only source of income. To Hurstwood’s mind, the 
air is no longer lled with birdsong, but with the noises of a thunderstorm. 
As his downfall is contrasted with Carrie’s rise to fame, so are the two charac-
ters’ perceptions of noise. Hurstwood’s loss of his job is paralleled by Carrie’s 
employment by the theater. Separated from Hurstwood by then, the news of 
her engagement in the chorus is music to her ears and immediately changes 
her perception of the city noise, whose “clang and clatter” (209) Hurstwood 
missed when, in Montreal, he was still in a position comfortable enough to 
do so. As Dreiser puts it in a dierent context, for Carrie “things were now 
going socially with a hum” (152).
 Dreiser emphasizes the relationship between Carrie’s auditory percep-
tions and her unrelenting social aspirations throughout the novel. In an ear-
lier passage, Carrie is moved by the sound of music:
e constant drag to something better was not to be denied. By those 
things which address the heart was she steadily recalled. [. . .] Now 
Carrie was a­ected by music. Her nervous composition responded to 
certain strains, much as certain strings of a harp vibrate when a cor-
responding key of a piano is struck. She was not delicately moulded 
in sentiment, and yet there was enough in her of what is commonly 
known as feeling to cause her to answer with vague ruminations to cer-
tain wistful chords. (102–3)
As Dreiser makes clear, it is less the beauty of music that moves Carrie to 
tears (as we learn a little later) than her immediate association of piano mu-
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sic with a life better than her own. e scene occurs aer Drouet has shown 
Carrie around the houses of the rich, thereby further kindling her desire for 
material wealth. Dreiser’s qualication of Carrie’s response to the music as 
arising from “what is commonly known as feeling” (my emphasis) indicates 
that her response is somehow tainted by this desire. e next two sentences 
make this clear: “[e chords] awoke longings for those things which she 
did not have. ey caused her to cling closer to things she possessed” (103). 
To put this in Pierre Bourdieu’s (Language; Outline) terms, Carrie does not 
merely recognize the value of piano music as cultural capital but entirely 
reduces artistry to its economic dimension: “For Carrie, the melody and the 
light created a halo about nice clothes, showy manners, sparkling rings. It 
lent an ineable claim to the world of material display” (105).9
 In Dreiser’s political economy of sound, it is music that keeps the noise of 
the factory and the street at bay. While Dreiser critiques Carrie’s participa-
tion in that economy, his own text cannot fully extricate itself from it. Drei-
ser’s soundscapes of the soul do not inject noise into the discourse network 
of 1900. Instead, they serve to tame the noise of modernity by integrating it 
into a literary-psychological framework of sense-making whose roots lie in 
the eighteenth century. Dreiser’s acoustic imagination very clearly belongs to 
a dierent century than that of the futurist writers and musicians who began 
to glorify noise and elevate it to a compositional principle only ten years aer 
Sister Carrie was published.
Social Soundscapes
Upon entering the underclass hell of Crane’s Maggie, the reader encounters 
a radically dierent acoustic panorama than the one laid out in Sister Carrie. 
Naturalist ction is keenly aware of the fact that not everyone was equally 
aected by the noises of modernity, and Crane is particularly alert to the dif-
ferences. As we move back in time from Dreiser to Crane, piano music gives 
way to a brutalistic proletarian soundscape. Maggie already begins with an 
uproar. As little Jimmie throws stones at the Devil’s Row children and de-
es an ally’s warning words with “a valiant roar,” the infuriated crowd ejects 
“Howls of renewed wrath” and “curse[s] in shrill chorus.” e clamor con-
tinues with the little boys “swearing in barbaric treble” (3) until a stone hits 
Jimmie’s mouth, which causes his “roaring curses” to change to “a blasphe-
mous chatter” (4). As Jimmie is silenced, the crowd rejoices: “In the yells of 
the whirling mob of Devil’s Row children there were notes of joy like songs 
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of triumphant savagery” (4). e crowd falls upon defeated Jimmie, who is 
now reduced to “the shrieking and tearful child from Rum Alley” (4). As 
readers enter the world of Crane’s Maggie, they enter an oppressively dense 
web of screaming, cursing, groaning, and wailing. Jimmie is nally dragged 
home by his father, where a mad, drunken mother screams at and abuses the 
rest of the family. Home grants reprieve from neither the violence nor the 
noise. As Jimmie ees from his mother’s rage to an elderly neighbor, they 
can still hear its force—through the thin walls of the tenement building and 
intermingled with the other noises of the night—weighing down on Maggie 
and the infant Tommie:
Jimmie and the old woman listened long in the hall. Above the mued 
roar of conversation, the dismal wailings of babies at night, the thump-
ing of feet in unseen corridors and rooms, mingled with the sound of 
varied hoarse shoutings in the street and the rattling of wheels over 
cobbles, they heard the screams of the child and the roars of the mother 
die away to a feeble moaning and a subdued muttering. (10)
Much of the oppressiveness of Maggie’s mother’s weeping and yelling de-
rives from its constant presence. In Schafer’s terms, Mary Johnson’s erce 
noises no longer possess the quality of discrete, isolated sound signals; they 
have become keynote sounds of Maggie’s existence.10 Maggie documents 
how violently discordant sounds become pathogenic once they acquire the 
permanence of keynote sounds. Maggie never escapes the noise; there is no 
silent sanctuary, no hiding place from it in the Bowery of Crane’s New York. 
When she is not exposed to her mother’s senseless rage, her constant “raving” 
(26), “cursing trebles” (29), and “maddened whirl of oaths” (33), she works at 
the shirt factory, where another “whirl of noises and odors” (26) awaits her. 
e “turmoil and tumble of down-town streets” (14) and the “rattling av-
enues” (53) of the Bowery present the same dissonance to Maggie’s ears. She 
remains trapped in the acoustic hell of one of the poorest and noisiest parts 
of an American metropolis that nds itself at the forefront of industrializa-
tion. Rather than containing that noise, as Dreiser does, Crane lets it sound 
throughout his narrative.
 Maggie exemplies that divisions along the lines of social class not only 
distinguish one author’s acoustic world from another’s but also separate 
the acoustic worlds of individual texts into dierent soundscapes. In this 
respect, Crane’s acoustic sensorium is more nely tuned than that of early 
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soundscape studies. Since Schafer draws much of his information about 
past soundscapes from literary sources, his reticence about interrogating the 
links between social class and exposure to noise is especially surprising. is 
absence becomes particularly conspicuous when he quotes a passage from 
Dickens’s Hard Times (1854), a novel that to all intents and purposes cries 
out for a reading along the line of social class:
Stephen bent over his loom, quiet, watchful, and steady. A special con-
trast, as every man was in the forest of looms where Stephen worked, 
to the crashing, smashing, tearing pieces of mechanism at which he 
laboured. (Hard Times 69; qtd. in Schafer, Tuning 75)
Yet Schafer only notes the text’s awareness of the obnoxiousness of machine 
noises. His valuable and oen ear-opening account of some of the atroci-
ties of the modern urban acoustic environment would have beneted from a 
greater awareness of social divisions within the urban soundscape.11
 Bruce Smith attempts to ll this gap in his more recent study, e Acoustic 
World of Early Modern England (1999). Intent on investigating the “politi-
cal geography of sound” of Elizabethan England, Smith provides a welter of 
examples for acoustic divisions with clear sociopolitical implications. Con-
trasting the account given by Robert Langham, an aural witness, with the of-
cial account given in e Princely Pleasures at the Court at Kenilworth (1576) 
of the Queen’s presence at court in July 1575, Smith discusses the striking 
dierences between the perceived acoustic qualities of the royal amusements 
inside Kenilworth Castle and the noises of dancing, singing, and drinking 
produced by the inhabitants of Warwickshire outside the castle’s walls in 
celebration of the Queen:
e contrast is eloquent. Within the [queen’s] hall, there was delectable 
dancing indeed. Without, an unruly throng. Within the hall, there was 
music; without, sounds that were heard, so Langham implies, as noise. 
rough what it includes and what it excludes, e Princely Pleasures at 
the Court at Kenilworth inscribes a political geography of sound. (34)
Naturalist writers recognize similar divisions. e naturalist city is not a 
unied whole but a space in which dierent kinds and intensities of noise 
are produced and heard in dierent places. us, the naturalist city and its 
soundscapes become, in Amy Kaplan’s words, “a spatial metonymy for the 
elusive process of social change” (44). For instance, when Maggie, aban-
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doned by Pete and denied by her family, resorts to prostitution toward the 
end of the narrative, she knows she will not nd her customers among the 
auent and hurries by their theaters. Some of the theaters are just closing, 
releasing a noisy crowd into the streets:
Upon a wet evening, several months aer the last chapter, two inter-
minable rows of cars, pulled by slipping horses, jangled along a promi-
nent side-street. A dozen cabs, with coat-enshrouded drivers, clattered 
to and fro. Electric lights, whirring soly, shed a blurred radiance.  
[. . .] People having been comparatively silent for two hours burst into 
a roar of conversation, their hearts still kindling from the glowings of 
the stage. (54)
In a move that is reminiscent of Langham’s description referred to above, 
Crane divides ctional space into a silent inside and a noisy outside, and it is 
clear that Maggie has never gained and never will gain access to the inside.12
e very contrast outlined here has been absent from Maggie’s own noisy 
world all along. Now, walking the streets as a “girl of the painted cohorts of 
the city” (54), her auditory sensorium registers a mere glimpse of the inside: 
“A concert hall gave to the street faint sounds of swi machinelike music, as 
if a group of phantom musicians were hastening” (55). As Maggie hastens by 
the cheerful crowd and turns “into darker blocks than those where the crowd 
travelled” (55), she enters a soundscape devoid of the more pleasant sounds 
she has just heard. Maggie and the reader are back in the drunken, noisy at-
mosphere of destitution: “A drunken man, reeling in her pathway, began to 
roar at her. ‘I ain’ ga no money, dammit,’ he shouted, in a dismal voice” (55). 
In this environment, the subdued sounds of the theaters again give way to 
the loud noises of the saloons that are patronized by Maggie’s potential cus-
tomers: “In front of one of these places, whence came the sound of a violin 
vigorously scraped, the patter of feet on boards and the ring of loud laughter, 
there stood a man with blotched features” (55–56).
 While Maggie ultimately focuses more on the noises of domestic violence 
than on those arising from the city streets or factory machines, it draws a 
compelling panorama of the industrial urban ghetto as the ultimate lo- 
soundscape, an acoustic environment that not only alienates and isolates 
people from one another but also forces them to raise their voice so as to be 
heard above the clatter of the streets and the factory drone.13 Crane’s nar-
rator continues to expose the ludicrousness of not only Maggie’s boundless 
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admiration for the obtuse Pete but also her “dim thoughts” about “far away 
lands where, as God says, the little hills sing together in the morning” (19).
 e places she actually does escape to together with Pete, the entertain-
ment halls, are among the loudest spaces in Crane’s acoustic world. Maggie’s 
initial acoustic impressions on their rst visit to one of these halls are pleas-
ant enough. Maggie registers nothing but “a low rumble of conversation and 
a subdued clinking of glasses” (22) and correspondingly feels transported 
into a world of “high-class customs” (23). Her blatant misapprehension of 
the situation is not perturbed when “half tipsy men near the stage joined in 
the [female singer’s] rollicking refrain and glasses were pounded rhythmical-
ly upon the tables” (23). e boisterous entertainment is a welcome diversion 
that helps her forget for a moment the misery of her existence: “She drew 
deep breaths of pleasure. No thoughts of the atmosphere of the collar and 
cu factory came to her” (25). While Maggie’s simplicity and gratefulness 
for everything Pete has to oer largely prevent her from perceiving either the 
continuities in the acoustic environment of the halls and that of the factory 
or the decrepitude of the spectacle Pete exposes her to, Crane’s dissonant 
narrator makes sure the reader notices it. In some passages, Crane’s attempts 
to indicate the narrator’s ironic distance to Maggie’s perceptions are over-
done: “[Pete] could appear to strut even while sitting still and he showed 
that he was a lion of lordly characteristics by the air with which he spat” (40). 
Crane is subtler in other passages. In his description of a melodrama perfor-
mance, the narrator conveys both his sympathy for the audience’s empathic 
response to characters who share its plight and a sense of the inappropriate-
ness of that response, whose vocal partisanship jeopardizes the unfolding of 
even the most simple plot as it drowns out the villains’ speeches:
e loud gallery was overwhelmingly with the unfortunate and the op-
pressed. ey encouraged the struggling hero with cries, and jeered the 
villain, hooting and calling attention to his whiskers. [. . .] In the hero’s 
erratic march from poverty in the  rst act, to wealth and triumph in 
the  nal one, in which he forgives all the enemies that he has le, he 
was assisted by the gallery, which applauded his generous and noble 
sentiments and confounded the speeches of his opponents by making 
irrelevant but very sharp remarks. (27–28)
As the narrative progresses, Pete takes Maggie to increasingly louder and 
cheaper places. Crane conveys much of the rawness of the spectacle catered 
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to the poor by the noises of the audience. At a later performance, we again 
encounter the crowd of “men seated at the tables near the front applaud[ing] 
loudly, pounding the polished wood with their beer glasses” (39). But now 
their clamor rises to a “deafening rumble of glasses and clapping of hands” 
(39) as the female ballad singer disposes of another layer of clothing. Just as 
Hurstwood’s downfall is documented by his move to ever-shabbier apart-
ments, so is Maggie’s by the progression of ever-dingier halls. To Crane’s 
discerning ears, not much has changed since the rst industrial revolution 
in the second half of the eighteenth century, when “Workers lived in squalid 
quarters near the factories, cut o from the countryside, with almost no rec-
reational facilities except the public houses; and these, if we accept the evi-
dence of numerous earwitnesses, became centers of much greater noise and 
rowdiness during the eighteenth century than before” (Schafer, Tuning 72).14
At the end of the line, we nd Pete and Maggie in the midst of a cacophony 
of poor music, drunken laughter, and shouted oaths:15
In a hilarious hall there were twenty-eight tables and twenty-eight 
women and a crowd of smoking men. Valiant noise was made on stage 
at the end of the hall by an orchestra composed of men who looked 
as if they had just happened in. Soiled waiters ran to and fro, swoop-
ing down like hawks on the unwary in the throng; clattering along the 
aisles with trays covered with glasses [. . .]. e usual smoke cloud was 
present, but so dense that heads and arms seemed entangled in it. e 
rumble of conversation was replaced by a roar. Plenteous oaths heaved 
through the air. e room rang with the shrill voices of women bub-
bling o’er with drink-laughter. e chief element in the music was speed. 
e musicians played in intent fury. A woman was singing and smiling 
upon the stage, but no one took notice of her. e rate at which the 
piano, cornet and violins were going, seemed to impart wildness to the 
half-drunken crowd. Beer glasses were emptied at a gulp and conversa-
tion became a rapid chatter. (44)
It is with these deafening noises in the background that Pete nally abandons 
Maggie for another girl and leaves her to the miserable existence of a “fallen 
woman,” despised by all and rejected by her own family. If literature is, as 
Kittler insists, one of the “technologies and institutions that allow a given 
culture to transmit, store and process relevant data” (Aufschreibesysteme 519; 
my translation), Crane’s text stores precisely the data that threatens to exceed 
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the powers of literary representation in the age of the phonograph. In this, 
Maggie heralds the emergence of a new aesthetics of noise, an aesthetics that 
Crane would, however, fully implement only in e Red Badge of Courage.
In Maggie, the noise of the streets and the factory and the endless fracas 
of the Johnson household are carried directly over into the dreary halls. En-
tertainment may provide temporary relief for Maggie’s troubled mind but 
grants no reprieve to her ears. Hardly any silent sanctuaries exist in Crane’s 
ctional universe. And if they do, toward the end of the text, Maggie is not 
granted access. It might be argued that, in the world of entertainment, noise 
is an essential component and sometimes even one of the chief sources of 
attraction. We can already see something of this in Maggie, where Crane’s 
representation of the clamor produced by both the performers and the audi-
ence not only serves to indicate the shabbiness of the spectacle on oer but 
also helps explain some of its allure. As George explains his reason for going 
to the pub in Donald Howarth’s A Lily in Little India (1966): “It’s not beer I 
go for. [. . .] I go for the noise” (39).16 However, a comparison of the ctional 
worlds of entertainment in Maggie and Sister Carrie will serve to reinforce 
the idea that dierent types of entertainment with dierent acoustics are 
associated with dierent social classes.
 In Dreiser, Carrie’s plans to attend the performance of a melodrama 
shortly aer her arrival in Chicago meet with Sven Hanson’s stern censure 
because they do not accord with the austerity of his working-class outlook 
on life. For the Hansons, theater is a frivolity indulged in by the rich. eir 
disapproval initiates a narrative dynamic in which Carrie’s fascination with 
the world of entertainment is rmly inscribed by her social aspirations. Ac-
cordingly, we nd Carrie and Drouet at an opera performance whose “color 
and grace [catches] her eye” (77) soon aer Carrie has le the narrowness of 
the Hanson household for Drouet’s apartment and money. While the halls 
of Crane’s Maggie are part of the economy of want that Maggie is caught 
in, the world of entertainment in Sister Carrie is, like the piano music that 
moves her to tears, associated with the economy of prosperity and success 
Carrie strives to enter. Had Maggie not been written before Sister Carrie, 
Maggie’s descent into progressively poorer halls could be read as a parodic 
inversion of Carrie’s rise to fame on the stage.
 Drouet tragically misrecognizes this nexus between entertainment and 
social mobility when he provides Carrie with her rst part in a play orga-
nized by the Black Elk Lodge. Anxious to please his social superiors, Drouet’s 
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promise to come up with an actress for the play fuels Carrie’s ambitions and 
accelerates her estrangement from him rather than advancing his own ca-
reer: “e independence of success now made its rst faint showing” (193). 
Appropriately, several of the scenes that document their growing alienation 
occur within the context of theatrical performances. e irony involved in 
Drouet’s judgment of a cuckolded character in a play he attends together with 
Carrie and Hurstwood is not lost on the latter two, whose aair has been go-
ing on for some time. Says Drouet, “Served him right [. . .] a man ought to be 
more attentive than that to his wife if he wants to keep her” (139). In a later 
scene, Drouet’s lack of support for Carrie’s rst performance compares badly 
with Hurstwood’s enthusiasm: “She felt his indierence keenly and longed 
to see Hurstwood. It was as if he were now the only friend she had on earth” 
(171). To Carrie, Hurstwood’s worth is measurable in several ways, and as she 
gains access to the world of theater, she not only gains access to Hurstwood’s 
heart but also accumulates some of the cultural capital she needs to become 
more truly worthy of Hurstwood’s social sphere, of the “merchants and well-
positioned individuals” (173) that make up the play’s audience. eater, in 
short, becomes associated with the possibility of a more prosperous lifestyle. 
is pattern repeats itself later in the narrative when Carrie leaves a rapidly 
deteriorating Hurstwood behind to pursue her (highly successful) theater 
career. In New York, the stage becomes for Carrie what she always wanted 
it to be: “a door through which she might enter that gilded state which she 
ha[s] so much craved” (377). e theater’s “atmosphere of carriages, owers, 
renement” (177) has been exerting its mighty spell on Carrie ever since the 
night of her rst performance, where it was reected in and reinforced by 
an acoustic ambience that is far removed from the drunken roar of Crane’s 
halls: “It was thus that the little theatre resounded to a babble of successful 
voices, the creak of ne clothes, the commonplace of good nature” (180). 
e performance begins with a “so curtain-raising strain” (180–81) that 
quickly reduces the spectators’ talk to “a whisper” (181). Along with the 
other members of the audience, Drouet “[holds] out silently” (182) when 
the play starts o disastrously. In stark contrast to the rising crescendo of 
noises in Crane’s halls, the play’s acoustics become even more subdued as the 
melodrama unfolds and the actors’ performances improve. Carrie’s “qual-
ity of voice and manner” now begin to resemble “a pathetic strain of mu-
sic” (189) until they are in “harmony with the plaintive melody [. . .] issuing 
from the orchestra” (192). In Dreiser’s acoustic world, music functions as 
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what Jacques Attali calls representation, that is, an “attempt to make people 
believe in a consensual representation of the world” that “stamp[s] upon the 
spectator the faith that there is a harmony in order” (46).
 As many critics of the novel have noted, there is a constant tension in 
Sister Carrie between the sentimental language Carrie’s longings are framed 
in and the realistic portrayal of social conditions in the narration of Hurst-
wood’s downfall. Amy Kaplan (140–60) neither agrees with commentators 
like Donald Pizer (Novels) or Daryl Dance—who tend to regard the novel’s 
sentimentalist streak as an infelicitous or parodically undermined aberra-
tion from a more serious realist project—nor does she join a more recent 
critic like Walter Benn Michaels, who stresses the novel’s sentimentalism and 
maintains that “Realism in Sister Carrie is the literature only of exhausted 
desire and economic failure” (46). Instead, Kaplan argues that “the critical 
opposition associating sentimentalism with consumption and desire, and re-
alism with work and deprivation, is already generated by the narrative strate-
gies of Sister Carrie, as a way of managing the contradictions of a burgeon-
ing consumer society” (143). Kaplan notes how the novel’s sentimentalism 
is rmly inscribed by consumerist ideology and embarks on an investigation 
of the text’s “sentimental language of consumption” (146). We have already 
encountered this language when Carrie weeps as the piano music reminds 
her of the things she does not possess, when the old-fashioned term wor-
thy Carrie uses for Hurstwood acquires nancial connotations, or when the 
melancholic melodies of melodrama imbue the theatrical spectacle with 
an atmosphere of prosperity. Carrie’s relationships with both Drouet and 
Hurstwood become vehicles for the (illusory) satisfaction of her sentimental 
desires for consumption. When Kaplan mentions that Drouet “recasts the 
melodramatic role of seducer in the appropriate form of the traveling sales-
man” (145), we may add that Carrie lets herself be bought by Drouet’s money 
in order to escape the drab Hanson household only to be sold again by him 
as he asks her to perform for the Elk Lodge. By this time, long before the text 
makes this clear, Carrie herself has become an investment: “She was capital” 
(447). For Carrie, the economy of consumerist desire runs smoothly, with-
out causing much unnecessary disturbance. As if to emphasize that fact, the 
text even registers the noiselessness of Drouet’s money: “ere were some 
loose bills in his vest pocket—greenbacks. ey were so and noiseless and 
he got his ngers about them and crumpled them up in his hand” (61).
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 Kaplan goes on to note that the desire for social change Sister Carrie reg-
isters almost exhausts itself in the desire to acquire more goods:
Although desire in Sister Carrie propels constant motion, it also be-
comes a substitute for actively changing either the social order or the 
individuals within it. is form of desire contributes to the paradoxical 
sense of stasis in the text at the times of greatest motion; Carrie is con-
stantly on the move up the social scale—from one city, one man, one 
job to the next—yet she always seems to end up in the same place, as 
the nal scene suggests: rocking, and dreaming, and longing for more. 
In Sister Carrie, the desire for social change is channeled into the de-
sire for novelty, the desire to construct a social reality in which change 
most oen yields to more of the same. (149)17
To my mind, Kaplan’s discernment of a “paradoxical sense of stasis” at the 
center of a novel whose title character keeps yearning for more captures the 
prevalent mood of the novel better than Walter Benn Michaels’s claim that 
Sister Carrie endorses a capitalist economy of excess and insatiable desire 
that associates the satisfaction of desire and the possibility of equilibrium 
with “incipient failure, decay, and nally death” (42).18 e crucial dier-
ence between Kaplan and Michaels is that the former identies stasis as the 
paradoxical consequence of Carrie’s desire to change by improving her social 
status, whereas the latter tends to regard desire in capitalism and social stasis 
as diametrically opposed principles. As a result, Kaplan’s reading manages 
to retain a much stronger sense of the contradictions within Sister Carrie’s 
capitalist economy.
 In Michaels’s reading, the ideal of equilibrium is based on a precapitalist 
“economy of scarcity, in which power, happiness and moral virtue are all 
seen to depend nally on minimizing desire” (35). is ideal, ambivalently 
represented in the novel by Ames, is mercilessly swept away by capitalism’s 
logic of desire and excess. Hurstwood’s downfall and death are precipitated 
by his failure to adapt quickly enough to the new logic: “Dreiser associates 
Hurstwood’s decline, conventionally enough, with what he calls a ‘lack of 
power’ [222], but this lack of power is not a function of Hurstwood’s in-
ability to get what he wants, it is a function of his inability to want badly 
enough” (Michaels 43). Hurstwood’s advice to Carrie to “Stick to what you 
have” (222) belongs to the world of bygone days.
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 Michaels’s equation of equilibrium and death unwittingly points to a 
reading in line with scientic models available at the time of Dreiser’s writ-
ing. In nineteenth-century thermodynamics, equilibrium is the condition a 
closed system nds itself in when all its energy has been converted into heat. 
Equilibrium is the state of maximum entropy at which the system has come 
to a total standstill. In e Education of Henry Adams, Dreiser’s older con-
temporary Henry Adams, drawing on Hermann von Helmholtz’s idea of the 
“heat death” (Freese 99–105), envisioned the universe as a closed system that 
is subject to this rapid and total dissipation of energy. Yet in Henry Adams’s 
grim vision of the end of the world, the state of equilibrium represented by 
the heat death is not an alternative to the unrelenting pressing forward of 
industry and capital. It is its very own end point. A “thermodynamic” read-
ing of Sister Carrie would therefore stress that the sense of stasis both Kaplan 
and Michaels detect in Sister Carrie works toward exposing the threat of 
stasis within capitalism rather than pointing toward an outdated mode of 
precapitalist existence. Michaels himself acknowledges this fear at the heart 
of capitalism when he mentions “the early-nineteenth-century economists’ 
fear of a ‘stationary state’ and the early-twentieth-century Marxist critique of 
imperialism, what Lenin was to call in 1916 ‘the highest stage of capitalism’ 
(by which he meant the last stage)” (49–50). Yet Michaels believes this fear 
is largely exorcised in Sister Carrie. Contrary to Michaels and more in line 
with Kaplan, I would argue that Dreiser’s association of equilibrium with 
death testies to the prevalence of the threat of terminal stasis rather than 
assigning it, along with Hurstwood, to the dustbins of history.
 Once we focus on equilibrium as a potential end point of the progress of 
capitalism, the question arises, what keeps the system from running down to 
a nal stasis? e answer systems theory would provide is, of course, noise 
(in the sense of a perturbation of systemic and communicational processes). 
And indeed, the sense of social stasis at the heart of the novel is disturbed 
when a desperate Hurstwood decides to become a strikebreaker and thereby 
gets involved in the struggle over social conditions. e noises of social dis-
content erupt as the strikers yell insults at Hurstwood while the policemen 
who protect him reply in kind. e level of noise increases as the situation 
aggravates:
Now the stones were o­ as Hurstwood took his place again amid a 
continued chorus of epithets. Both ocers got up beside him, and the 
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conductor rang the bell, when bang! bang! through window and door 
came rocks and stones. One narrowly grazed Hurstwood’s head. An-
other shattered the window behind him. (424)
Hurstwood eventually gets dragged o the car, beaten, and shot at. As a re-
sult, Hurstwood decides to abandon his short-lived stint as a scab. It is with 
respect to the incidents surrounding the strike that my own reading departs 
most decidedly from both Michaels’s and Kaplan’s. Kaplan reasons that be-
cause the strike fails to have an eect on the principal characters’ thoughts 
and actions (Hurstwood continues his fall into oblivion while Carrie’s rise to 
fame proceeds uninterrupted), it is contained. Contrary to Kaplan, I would 
argue that it is precisely Carrie’s obliviousness to the events and Hurstwood’s 
total lack of understanding that allow social conict to surface as the dis-
turbance of the principal characters’ value systems (if not of the characters 
themselves) it really represents. Hurstwood’s ignorance exceeds that of the 
policeman, whose reections on the role of the police in the strike reveal 
that “Of its true social signicance, he never once dreamed. His was not the 
mind for that” (413).19 As the text makes clear, the policemen at least have 
some prior experience with strikes: “ey had been in strikes before” (413). 
When Hurstwood returns from his involvement in the strike, wounded and 
exhausted, he washes, sits down in the rocking chair, and reads the news 
about the strike without wasting another thought about his role in it. In my 
reading, Hurstwood’s incomprehension works against and not in favor of 
narrative containment. With his sentimental rhetoric deeply compromised 
by the novel’s association of sentimental language with consumerist desire, 
not even the narrator’s one moralizing comment about the strikers (“It was 
the hissing and jeering mob of Christ’s time” [427]) can contain the noisi-
ness of the strike.
 In Sister Carrie, there is no authoritative narrative voice or character to 
tell readers how to interpret the strike. It is in the very absence of narrative 
reintegration that the contradictions of capitalist consumer culture emerge 
with raw, unmediated force. In the strike scene, Sister Carrie stages a break-
down of realist-naturalist literary form in the face of the conicts and noises 
of modernity it seeks to contain. In this scene, then, Sister Carrie anticipates 
or at least gestures toward a modernist aesthetics of noise. My reading there-
fore diers not only from Kaplan’s and Michaels’s but also from a reading 
along the order-from-noise principle as postulated by systems theory. e 
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lack of mediation that characterizes Dreiser’s portrayal of the strike’s noise 
prevents its reabsorption into the ideological system of consumer capitalism. 
Social conict is, in other words, not the noise that rejuvenates the system 
and keeps it from running down. Like the threat of stasis, the threat of social 
disturbance acts as a reminder of unresolved tensions at the heart of both the 
capitalist system and literary strategies of representation that strive to make 
that threat manageable.
Acoustic Violence
Nevertheless, it remains true that, in Sister Carrie, violent social conict is 
conned to one episode. In Maggie, it enters the domestic sphere and re-
mains at the very center of the narrative. is is reected in and reinforced by 
a ctional soundscape that is largely devoid of the more harmonious sounds 
of Dreiser’s world of entertainment. In Maggie and several other naturalist 
texts, the sheer magnitude of noise has a detrimental eect on characters’ 
minds and bodies as noise becomes part of the violence of their daily lives. 
ese texts explore in much greater detail than Dreiser’s the social and acous-
tic dissonances of a rapidly changing world. Some of the more violent noises 
represented in them have their source in industrial machines; others emerge 
from and make themselves heard against the background of the chaos and 
the din of the industrial age. Both Crane and Norris attribute a menacing, 
oppressive force to noise. In Norris’s McTeague, for instance, both the mon-
strous thunder of the stamp-mill and the constant noises of the collie and 
the setter barking at each other “in a frenzy of hate” (McTeague 124) assume 
a decidedly ferocious quality.
 Violent noises of a dierent kind enter the relationship between Mc-
Teague and Trina as his drunken shouting drowns out and stops her sobbing: 
“‘stop that noise. Stop it, do you hear me? Stop it.’ He threw up his open 
hand threateningly. ‘Stop!’ he exclaimed” (300). Trina’s vocal expression of 
grief is silenced as McTeague’s ferocious bass conquers all available acoustic 
space. We may take this quite literally since, as Schafer points out, “e de-
nition of space by acoustic means is much more ancient than the establish-
ment of property lines and fences” (Tuning 33). e parish is a good example 
of such an acoustic space, dened by the range within which the church bells 
can be heard.20 In industrial America, the noises of machines testify to their 
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cultural centrality as they increase in number and intensity, conquering the 
acoustic space of modernity.21 ese noises are reproduced in McTeague’s 
acts of violence. As he beats Trina senseless, we are reminded of the noise of 
the stamp-mill: “In the schoolroom outside, behind the coal scuttle, the cat 
listened to the sounds of stamping and struggling and the mued noise of 
blows, wildly terried, his eyes bulging like brass knobs” (375). Trina nally 
dies “with a rapid series of hiccoughs that soun[d] like a piece of clockwork 
running down,” sounds the cat reproduces aer Trina’s death: “At times he 
would draw back and make a strange little clacking noise down in his throat” 
(378). McTeague, about whom it is said that “One might as well stop a loco-
motive. [. . .] e man is made of iron” (146), is the human equivalent and 
product of the industrial age.
 e more commonly identied subtext of McTeague’s ferociousness is of 
course genetic determinism. e novel abounds in references to dark he-
reditary traits beyond McTeague’s control. e following passage is a case in 
point:
Below the  ne fabric of all that was good in him ran the foul stream of 
hereditary evil, like a sewer. e vices and sins of his father and of his 
father’s father, to the third and fourth and  ve hundredth generation, 
tainted him. e evil of an entire race owed in his veins. Why should 
it be? He did not desire it. Was he to blame? (32)
But the discourses of industrialization and determinism are not as far apart 
as one might initially think. June Howard (1985) makes a compelling argu-
ment for their intimate relatedness. In their suggestion that the brute does 
not lurk far below the surface of the man, naturalist narratives evoke not 
only the specter of biological determinism and with it the fear of regressing 
to an earlier evolutionary stage but also the threat of a descent into the lower 
reaches of the social hierarchy:
We may call the “persistent fancy,” the obsessive fear that haunts natu-
ralism, by the scandalous name of proletarianization. It is an anxiety 
traditionally associated with although certainly not limited to the 
petty bourgeoisie who, possessing small capitals or professional skills, 
passionately defend their narrow footholds of economic security.  
[. . .] the privileges of autonomy, awareness, control that characters and 
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narrators struggle so desperately to establish and maintain are deeply 
marked as class privileges, and loss of those privileges is gured as the 
destruction of intellect, humanity, even civilization itself. (Howard 
95–96)
e ideology of hereditary determinism recodes rather than replaces the 
contradictions of industrial capitalism. Howard goes on to note that the 
social decline of Hurstwood in Sister Carrie and Maggie in Crane’s text fol-
lows a similar pattern, though more along the lines of what we might call 
social rather than hereditary determinism. Howard adds that “e narrative 
of proletarianization, demonstrating that one can tumble down as well as 
climb up the social ladder, implicitly proposes a frightening question to the 
reader: is anyone safe?” (101). At the same time, she insists that this threat 
is contained by the characters’ fall “beyond the reach of empathy” (101). In 
the end, Howard argues, the brute is cast out by both the narrative and its 
readers, its noise muted.
 While Howard certainly makes a strong point with regard to the gure of 
McTeague, I would argue that Maggie and Hurstwood present very dierent 
cases. In Crane and Dreiser, the conation of the discourses of determin-
ism and social decline not only forces the largely middle-class readership 
to contemplate the existence of social antagonisms but also exposes their 
minds to the threat of social deterioration22 in ways that narrow the protec-
tive distance between readers and lower-class characters. I do not agree with 
Howard’s argument that the fatality of events that befall naturalist characters 
on the downward slope removes readers’ empathy for them. e opposite 
seems true: precisely the haphazard nature of their decline appears to make 
us empathize with characters that have lost control over their own destinies. 
Moreover, it is my contention that few readers will withdraw their sympa-
thies from Maggie or Hurstwood because they have fallen so low. Again, the 
reverse seems closer to the truth. Maggie’s, Hurstwood’s, and even Trina’s 
fates continue to enlist our sympathies at the same time as they remind us of 
the contradictions within industrial capitalism and its consumerist variety. 
If Sister Carrie is the romance of money, Hurstwood’s downfall threatens 
to subvert that romance while Trina’s sexually charged avarice in McTeague 
registers its perversion.
 As for Norris’s Trina, the brutality and noise of domestic violence is for 
the greater part of her life also at the center of Maggie’s existence. Witness 
Jimmie’s perception of it as he is forced to return to his family’s apartment 
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aer his own father has stolen the pail of beer that would have bought him 
sanctuary in a neighbor’s at:
ere was a crash against the door and something broke into clattering 
fragments. Jimmie partially suppressed a howl and darted down the 
stairway. Below he paused and listened. He heard howls and curses, 
groans and shrieks, confusingly in chorus as if a battle were raging. 
With all was the crash of splintering furniture. e eyes of the urchin 
glared in fear that one of them would discover him. (11)
Such noises are not merely expressions of hatred and rage, but they are them-
selves part of the violence Jimmie, Maggie, and Tommie have to endure. 
When a grown-up Jimmie and his companion challenge Pete to a brawl over 
Maggie’s honor, the ght does not begin when Pete launches the rst blow 
but when the allied two begin to “laug[h] in his face,” when Jimmie “snarl[s] 
like a wild animal,” and when they answer Pete “with copious sneers” (36–37). 
e boundaries between provocation, intimidation, and violence get blurred 
as the combatants’ noises anticipate, contribute to, and become part of the 
violence of the ght: “e breaths of the ghters came wheezingly from their 
lips and the three chests were straining and heaving. Pete at intervals gave 
vent to low, labored hisses, that sounded like a desire to kill. Jimmie’s ally 
gibbered at times like a wounded maniac” (38).
 As McTeague and Maggie repeatedly emphasize, noise may be of such in-
tensity that it becomes a form of auditory torment. In naturalist literature, 
this is nowhere more evident than in the Civil War of Crane’s e Red Badge 
of Courage, where the explosions, shooting, screaming, and shouting directly 
and profoundly aect the actions and the psyches of those exposed to the 
noise. In the acoustic world of Crane’s war novel, noise is an integral part 
of warfare.23 As Schafer indicates when he points out “the peculiar bend-
ing of the Latin word bellum (war) into the Low German and Old English 
bell(e) (meaning ‘to make a loud noise’)” (Tuning 50), noise and war are al-
ready etymologically related.24 In Crane, war is a form of sonic destruction. 
Crane carefully orchestrates his panorama of noises. e actual noise of war 
is preceded by important acoustic events. As Henry Fleming remembers in a 
ashback, it was noises that prompted him to join the army:
e newspapers, the gossip of the village, his own picturings, had 
aroused him to an uncheckable degree. [. . .] One night, as he lay in 
bed, the winds had carried to him the clangoring of the church bell as 
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some enthusiast jerked the rope frantically to tell the twisted news of 
a great battle. is voice of the people rejoicing in the night had made 
him shiver in a prolonged ecstasy of excitement. Later, he had gone 
down to his mother’s room and had spoken thus: “Ma, I’m going to 
enlist.” (47)
His youthful imagination already excited by “the gossip of the village,” the 
sound of “the church bell”—anthropomorphized as the “voice of the peo-
ple”—becomes Henry’s call to arms. is pattern of rumor followed by noise 
is repeated throughout the novel as soldiers’ imaginations are kindled by the 
uncertainty of the immediate future.
 Writing on another Henry and another civil war, Shakespeare personied 
Rumor at the beginning of 2 Henry IV: “Open your ears; for which of you 
will stop / e vent of hearing when loud Rumour speaks?” (Induction 1–2). 
Crane’s rst two sentences read as follows: “e cold passed reluctantly from 
the earth, and the retiring fogs revealed an army stretched out on the hills, 
resting. As the landscape changed from brown to green, the army awakened, 
and began to tremble with eagerness at the noise of rumors” (43). Both texts 
register the auditory dimension of rumor, which comes as no surprise given 
that one of the earliest recorded senses of “noise” was “Common talk, ru-
mour, report; also, evil report, slander, scandal” (OED). In Crane, the noise 
of rumors never subsides; there is a constant “rustling and muttering among 
the men” (82); they are continually “whispering speculations and recount-
ing the old rumors” (58). Occasionally, rumors rise to a crescendo as soldiers 
debate their truth content, “clamor[ing] at each other, numbers making fu-
tile bids for the popular attention” (44). e ambient noise level remains 
high even before Henry’s regiment is engaged in combat. Filtered through 
Henry’s consciousness, the novel registers a welter of acoustic details ranging 
from the “creakings and grumblings as some surly guns were dragged away” 
(59) to the sound of “the snoring tall soldier” (65) and “the insect voices of 
the night” (66).
 When Henry imagines the onset of the battle, he does so in acoustic 
terms: “he began to believe that at any moment the ominous distance might 
be aare, and the rolling crashes of an engagement come to his ears” (59). 
Henry continually expects “to hear from the advance the rattle of re” (60) 
and, plagued by the prospect of running from the battle, he is quite literally 
all ears: “He felt that every nerve in his body would be an ear to hear the voic-
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es, while other men would remain stolid and deaf ” (65). As the long-awaited 
clash with the Confederate troops nally materializes, industrial metaphors 
intrude into Crane’s text as the acoustic world is torn apart: “e skirmish 
re increased to a long clattering sound. With it was mingled far-away cheer-
ing. A battery spoke. [. . .] ey were pursued by the sound of musketry re 
[. . .]. e din became a crescendo, like the roar of an oncoming train. A 
brigade ahead of them and on the right went into action with a rending roar. 
It was as if it had exploded” (75). Crane’s orchestration of the noises of war 
is reminiscent of Walt Whitman’s Drum-Taps, whose opening poems (“First 
O Songs for a Prelude,” “Eighteen Sixty-One,” and “Beat! Beat! Drums!”) 
welcome the approaching sounds of war with an enthusiasm that still in-
forms Henry Fleming’s acoustic imagination at the beginning of e Red 
Badge of Courage. In the later poems of Whitman’s collection, especially in 
“e Artilleryman’s Vision,” the musicality of war gives way to the acoustic 
chaos and terror that also moves to the center of Crane’s text as the narrative 
progresses.25 Both authors’ literary soundscapes testify to and reinforce a 
growing disillusionment with the realities of war.
 As Crane’s narrator comments on the transition from calm to clamor in 
a later passage, “It was as if worlds were being rended” (103). One of the 
worlds that is rended in Crane’s Civil War is, of course, that of the United 
States, a country whose ideological divisions were reected in and reinforced 
by acoustic dierences even before the war. Commenting on the “sectional 
soundscapes” of antebellum America, Mark M. Smith writes:
A rapidly modernizing North listened to the South and heard the 
shrieks of slavery, the awful silence of oppression, and the unmistak-
able tones of moral, economic, and political premodernity. Masters lis-
tened to the North and heard, with increasing volume so it seemed, the 
disquieting throb of a northern mob made reckless by industrialism, 
urbanism, wage labor, and passionate democracy. (14)
In the acoustic hell of the Civil War, these sectional soundscapes clash. Crane 
repeatedly evokes the enormity of the acoustic impact of that clash, its “ear-
shaking thunder” (104). Much of the chaos readers experience when they 
tap into Henry’s consciousness draws its strength from Crane’s orchestration 
of acoustic details. On the four pages of the “loudest” chapter, chapter 4, 
no fewer than sixteen dierent sources of noise can be counted. ey range 
from “the passionate song of the bullets and the banshee shrieks of shells” 
UP
F 
OP
Y
    /    The Noises of American Literature
(79) to “Wild yells [coming] from behind the walls of smoke” (79) and “the 
commander of the brigade [. . .] galloping about bawling” (80). In a later pas-
sage, Crane describes the eruption of the battle’s noises as drowning out all 
other sounds. Noise lls the universe as the carnage begins anew:
Of a sudden the guns on the slope roared out a message of warning. 
A spluttering sound had begun in the woods. It swelled with amazing 
speed to a profound clamor that involved the earth in noises. e split-
ting crashes swept along the lines until an interminable roar was devel-
oped. To those in the midst of it it became a din  tted to the universe. 
It was the whirring and thumping of gigantic machinery, complications 
among the smaller stars. e youth’s ears were  lled up. ey were inca-
pable of hearing more. (197)
In Crane’s Civil War, the sensory overload that literary critics and historians 
perceive as a dening characteristic of industrial modernity is amplied be-
yond measure. Here and elsewhere the battle noise is depicted as interfering 
drastically with Henry’s processes of perception, as making him “incapable 
of hearing more.” Corresponding to its denition in information theory as a 
disturbance of the signal, the noise interrupts processes of communication, 
incapacitating not only Henry’s aural sense as it continues to violate “his 
misused ears” (184) but also undoing the very possibility of speech:
Always the noise of skirmishers came from the woods on the front and 
le, and the din on the right had grown to frightful proportions. e 
guns were roaring without an instant’s pause for breath. It seems that 
the cannon had come from all parts and were engaged in a stupendous 
wrangle. It became impossible to make a sentence heard. e youth 
wished to launch a joke—a quotation from newspapers. He desired to 
say, “All quiet on the Rappahannock,” but the guns refused to permit 
even a comment on their uproar. He never successfully completed the 
sentence. (156)
e Civil War declines to be commented upon, and Henry’s tongue more 
than once lies “dead in the tomb of his mouth” (117). Henry’s attempt to 
order his experiences by relating them to a cultural item of the civilization 
that is torn apart in front of his senses fails miserably. ere is a twofold irony 
involved in Henry’s attempt. First, there is the ironical twist Henry himself 
recognizes in the incongruity between the news about the war and its actual 
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experience, which revolves around an incongruity between two senses of the 
word quiet. Had he been permitted to speak this irony, it would have been 
not only the basis of his joke but also a way of coping with war by distanc-
ing himself from it. Readers (rather than Henry) will detect a second layer 
of irony in the fact that the quietness mentioned in the newspaper may be 
read as referring not to the absence of ghting but to Henry’s inability to n-
ish his sentence. What remains unheard is not the noise of war but Henry’s 
silenced speech.26
 e passage quoted above is of further interest because it gives us an 
insight into why the noises of war acquire such “frightful proportions.” In 
Crane, noise is not merely a side eect of the war machinery let loose but one 
of its essential components. “ere chance[s] to be no interference” (196) 
as war itself becomes the interference. In fact, the narrator in one passage 
explicitly denes the battleeld as “the place of noises” (96). While much of 
their menacing quality derives from their great intensity, their omnipresence 
and unlocatability signicantly contribute to the noises’ devastating impact, 
not least because soldiers’ survival in the Civil War oen depended on their 
ability to read acoustic signs correctly (M. Smith 205–8). In Crane’s war, 
“noises [. . .] become a part of life” (207); they are everywhere and in no par-
ticular place. When, toward the end of the novel, Henry is nally able to lo-
cate some of the sources of the noise, this provides at least a certain degree of 
comfort: “It was a relief to perceive at last from whence came some of these 
noises which had been roared into his ears” (195).27 Before that, however, a 
plethora of discordant sounds is melted into an incredibly dense soundscape 
of ocers “roaring directions and encouragements” (86), wounded soldiers 
“cursing, groaning and wailing” (168), eeing soldiers asking “a thousand 
wild questions” (131), “the ripping sound of musketry and the breaking crash 
of artillery” (98), “the grumble of jolted cannon” (132–33), the “hollow rum-
ble of drums” (146), and “the dull popping of the skirmishers and pickets, 
ring in the fog” (155). e roar of military dispute exceeds all bounds and 
cannot be contained. It is further intensied by the shouting and yelling of 
attacking soldiers: “‘Here they come! Here they come!’ Gun locks clicked. 
Across the smoke-infested elds came a brown swarm of running men who 
were giving shrill yells. ey came on, stooping and swinging their ries at 
all angles” (83).
 roughout the history of warfare, war cries have been used as part of 
military strategy. Greek generals were already aware of the eectiveness of 
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martial noises: “One should send the army into battle shouting, and some-
times on the run, because their appearance and shouts and the clash of arms 
confound the hearts of the enemy” (Onasander, qtd. in Schafer, Tuning 50). 
In the Civil War, the rebel yell became an acoustic signature of Southern 
troops that was feared by Northern combatants and remembered in the 
South long aer the war had ended (M. Smith 204–5). But the war cries of 
attacking troops in e Red Badge of Courage, their “rasping yell[s]” (184), 
are not only designed to terrify the enemy. ey combine with the noise of 
rumors and the general noise of battle to confer on the troops the identity of 
a unied whole, the identity of a crowd intent on killing.28
 As Schafer reminds us, the acoustic experiences detailed in e Red Badge 
of Courage are not unique to the historical moment of the American Civil 
War. e violent impact of war noises has throughout recorded history been 
a conscious part of military tactics:
Man has always tried to destroy his enemies with terrible noises. We 
shall encounter deliberate attempts to reproduce the apocalyptic noise 
throughout the history of warfare, from the clashing of shields and 
the beating of drums in ancient times right up to the Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki atom bombs of the Second World War. (Tuning 28)
To complement Schafer’s account, we might point out two of the more 
striking instances of sonic destruction in the history of modern warfare. Sci-
entists working for the German Wehrmacht during the Second World War 
“prototyped a revolutionary sonic ‘cannon,’ which red a shock wave strong 
enough to bring down a plane. Today, the U.S. Department of Defense is 
testing acoustic ries that can stun and even kill soldiers” (Boulware par. 
29).29 But the noises of war need not acquire such enormous proportions to 
aect the lives of soldiers. e phenomenon of shell shock, which prompted 
Freud to develop his theory of the death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Prin-
ciple, is well known. Loud detonations may constitute the element of surprise 
that is responsible for the experience of fright causing various war neuroses 
(Freud 12–14).
 Crane repeatedly attributes vocal qualities to the sounds of war to em-
phasize their intense impact on Henry’s consciousness: “As he, leading, went 
across a little eld, he found himself in a region of shells. ey hurtled over 
his head with long wild screams. As he listened he imagined them to have 
rows of cruel teeth that grinned at him” (94). To Henry’s overcharged ears 
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and mind, the roar of battle gains truly monstrous proportions, and his ex-
perience of the totality of war noises testies to their destructive force: “e 
noises of the battle were like stones; he believed himself liable to be crushed” 
(94). Rare are the moments when he nds himself detached enough from the 
war clamor to attribute it to the speech of a divine observer: “e noise was 
as the voice of an eloquent being, describing” (104).30 More oen, though, 
the noise of the battleeld resembles the screams of a “red animal,” a “blood-
swollen god” (130), Mars unleashed.
 e most notable feature of Crane’s martial acoustics remains his fre-
quent attribution of human characteristics to the noises of war. Anthro-
pomorphization is one of the ways in which human beings try to tame the 
frightening otherness of the nonhuman world. But Crane’s literary use of the 
technique serves the purpose of reinforcing the menacing quality of the mar-
tial noises. As human speech is rendered impossible by the clamor of war, it is 
superseded by the voices of the war machinery, by “the courageous words of 
the artillery and the spiteful sentences of the musketry” (105), by “e voices 
of the cannon [. . .] mingled in a long and interminable row” (168) and the 
“stentorian speeches of the artillery” (207). As the war machine grows more 
eloquent, human speech degenerates into “barbaric cr[ies] of rage and pain” 
(198), “growling and swearing” (159), “grotesque exclamations” (198), grunt-
ing, bawling, bellowing, gabbling and howling. Filled with rage, fear, and 
hatred for the enemy, the soldiers’ voices are reduced to infantile babbling 
and animal noises:
Many of the men were making low-toned noises with their mouths, and 
these subdued cheers, snarls, imprecations, prayers, made a wild, bar-
baric song that went as an undercurrent of sound, strange and chantlike 
with the resounding chords of the war march. e man at the youth’s 
elbow was babbling. In it there was something so and tender like the 
monologue of a babe. (85–86)
In naturalist fashion, Henry himself is transformed into the equivalent of 
a erce dog as one of his comrades attempts to quench his war ardor: “e 
youth cried out savagely at this statement. He crouched behind a little tree, 
with his eyes burning hatefully and his teeth set in a curlike snarl. [. . .] ere 
could be seen spasmodic gulpings at his throat” (163). With the voice of its 
protagonist reduced to an angry growl that seems to force even the narra-
tor into a protective distance (“ere could be seen”), the noise of Crane’s 
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war becomes literally “unspeakable” (196). Crane’s portrayal of the soldiers’ 
loss of language alongside its resurgence in the angry voices of the tools of 
destruction provides a compelling account of dehumanization in warfare. 
Henry’s desire to learn more about himself, to “accumulate information of 
himself ” (52), is thwarted as he is stripped of his human identity while the 
noise of war drowns out all meaningful information.
 Donald Pease provides an alternative interpretation of Henry’s displays 
of rage that complements my own. In Pease’s reading, Henry’s rage is also 
connected with his loss of identity, but it ensues less from the reduction of 
the human to the bestial than from the failure of Henry’s acts of narrative 
self-fashioning. Pease begins his argument by noting the striking absence 
of the questions of slavery and Southern secession from Crane’s text. In his 
search for the narratives that take the place of the stable frame of historical 
reference the text lacks, Pease identies two conicting visions in the novel. 
On the one hand, there are narrative strategies informed by ctional war 
narratives—all of them descendants of the “Homeric” (46) battles Henry 
measures his own experiences against—that seek to confer meaning on the 
war as well as on Henry’s acts of self-fashioning. On the other hand, there is 
a forceful voice that speaks only of chance events, incidents, and the chaotic 
fragments of experience. is voice subverts all attempts at sense-making 
through narrative representation. Consequently, “Henry Fleming must feel 
alienated in turn both by those incidents that portend their inaccessibility 
to signicance but also by the very narratives intended to impose signi-
cance upon them” (Pease 162). Out of this dilemma arises a pressing need for 
Henry “to take possession of the war in personal terms. Involved in incidents 
unable to be retrieved in human terms, Henry must invent a history for him-
self that would at least guarantee the continuity of his identity” (162). Yet 
this crucial endeavor is beset with diculties.
 Henry’s rst attempt at self-fashioning involves a fantasy of self-aggran-
dizement that, perversely, relies on Henry’s conviction that his fear of the 
battle testies to a superior insight on his part, an insight that sets him apart 
from and above the other soldiers: “e generals were stupids. e enemy 
would presently swallow the whole command. [. . .] e generals were idiots 
to send them marching into a regular pen. ere was but one pair of eyes in 
the corps” (71). is rst attempt ounders when many soldiers run from 
the second ght, thus making plain to Henry that fear is too general a feel-
ing among the soldiers of his regiment to help constitute his own identity as 
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apart from that of the others. Fear gives way to shame as Henry deserts his 
regiment. In his second attempt at self-fashioning, Henry tries to counteract 
his feelings of shame by rationalizing his running away as the way of Nature. 
He is delighted and relieved to see a squirrel escaping “with chattering fear” 
as he throws a pinecone at it: “ere was the law, he said. Nature had given 
him a sign. e squirrel, immediately upon recognizing danger, had taken 
to his legs without ado” (100). But this second attempt at self-fashioning is 
thwarted by Nature itself, which remains indierent to Henry’s existence 
and refuses to conform to his representations of it. e nal blow to Henry’s 
narrative constructions of identity occurs when he witnesses the tall soldier’s 
horrible death. No reassuring narratives can contain this climactic event, 
and it withdraws all legitimacy from Henry’s prior attempts to account for 
his role in the war. All that he is le with is rage: “e youth turned, with 
sudden, livid rage, toward the battleeld. He shook his st” (116). As Pease 
argues convincingly, this rage, which nds an outlet in Henry’s excessive 
brutality in the next battle, is a rage born from a loss of self, from the nal 
breakdown of all strategies of self-fashioning: “Henry formerly identied 
himself with all the representations gleaned from his battle narratives, once 
he loses those representations Henry ghts with all the reckless abandon of 
one who has already been lost in battle. [. . .] [Henry] replaces identity with 
the force of its abandonment” (Pease 173). As he does so, Henry turns into 
a “war devil” (166) with nothing le to do but “pull his trigger with a erce 
grunt” (165).
 e emergence of Henry’s rage alongside the failure of his constructions 
of identity is manifested most clearly in the breakdown of the distinction 
between the human and the nonhuman world discussed above. In this break-
down, we see that Crane’s protomodernist emphasis on the subjectivity of 
experience has the eect not only of subverting scientic objectivity but also 
of collapsing the very distinction between the objective world of things and 
their subjective perception.31 With an awareness of how these categories can 
become blurred, “Crane was prepared to see the world as ux rather than 
order. Or, more precisely, ux containing elements of order, everyday order 
within a larger context that exceeds known rules” (Levenson 161). Rather 
than trying to order the chaos of war by way of narrative, Crane has it subvert 
more traditionally realist strategies of representation. More forcefully than 
Dreiser, Crane refuses to contain the noise. Instead, he has it seep into the 
formal organization of his text and subvert all of Henry’s attempts at fash-
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ioning stable representations of the self. Literature as noise, then, is Crane’s 
answer to the combined challenge of a martial soundscape that tests the lim-
its of literary representability and the increasingly general availability of a 
technological medium, the phonograph, whose storage capacity for almost 
any kind of sound far exceeds that of the written text. In Crane’s noisy text, 
there is no ordering principle that would contain the chaos, no psychologi-
cal framework (such as Dreiser’s soundscapes of the soul) that would tame 
the noise. Such sense-making structures are almost entirely absent from a 
ctional universe that remains perfectly indierent to human aairs: “Na-
ture had gone tranquilly on with her golden process in the midst of so much 
devilment” (89). is is why Leo Bersani’s comments on realist literary form 
at least partly apply to Dreiser but not to Crane: “e realistic novel gives us 
an image of social fragmentation contained within the order of signicant 
form—and it thereby suggests that the chaotic fragments are somehow so-
cially viable and morally redeemable” (60).
 e literary forms Crane chooses in his representations of noise are, then, 
an integral part of his politics of representation. is holds true not only 
of e Red Badge of Courage but, to a lesser extent, also of Maggie. eir 
subtle explorations of two of the dening soundscapes of modernity, war 
and the city, and their eect on individuals inhabiting these social spaces 
make Crane’s Maggie and e Red Badge of Courage into more of a unity 
than is commonly perceived. I do not agree with Schafer’s grim assessment 
that the noises of war and “the ferocious acoustical environment produced 
by modern civilian life deriv[e] from the same eschatological urge” (Tun-
ing 28) or even that, “as the machines whirl in the hearts of our cities day 
and night, the signicant battleground of the modern world has become the 
neighborhood Blitzkrieg” (185). But we do not have to look far to perceive 
relationships between the urban industrial soundscape and the violent fracas 
of war. In e Red Badge of Courage, Crane himself uses industrial metaphors 
to describe the noise of war. We have already encountered his comparison of 
the rising clamor of battle with “the roar of an oncoming train” (75) and, lat-
er, with “the whirring and thumping of gigantic machinery” (197). Another 
invention of the rst of the industrial revolutions is evoked at the beginning 
of chapter 11, where “the furnace roar of the battle [. . .] growing louder” 
(122) intrudes on Henry’s consciousness. His exhaustion is likewise cast in 
the vocabulary of the factory: “He was grimy and dripping like a laborer in 
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a foundry” (88). Crane’s text registers links between industry and war two 
decades before war became fully mechanized and sixty-eight years before the 
term military-industrial complex was coined.32 Crane died before the age of 
thirty. But the years that lie between the end of the Civil War and the pub-
lication of e Red Badge of Courage provided him with enough evidence to 
make those connections.
 e postbellum world Crane was born into experienced a rapid increase 
in industrial production that would turn the United States into the world’s 
largest economic power and chief imperialist actor by the turn of the century 
(P. Jenkins 163–74). ese changes occurred on such a large scale and with 
such rapidity that, looking back, Henry Adams remembers how he encoun-
tered America as a wholly dierent nation upon returning from England in 
1868: “His world was dead” (e Education 229).33 e Civil War, that “rev-
olutionary media network of telegraph cables and parallel railway tracks” 
(Kittler, Grammophon 275; my translation), in important ways prepared 
the ground for the accelerated industrial expansion that was to follow it. As 
Philip Jenkins (144–45) points out, its devastation of Southern plantations 
meant that the United States could now protect its industry by erecting high 
tari barriers (which would have imperiled the exportation of the Southern 
cotton production while it was still thriving). Moreover, wartime production 
and military contracting allowed businessmen to accumulate large amounts 
of capital that could be invested in civilian industrial production aer the 
war. Finally, there now existed a national market for commodities produced 
in ever-larger quantities. Crane’s industrial metaphors in e Red Badge of 
Courage point to this convergence between warfare and industrial produc-
tion and link Henry’s acoustic experiences on the battleeld to Maggie’s in 
the industrialized city of New York. Crane’s representation of the martial 
soundscape therefore constitutes naturalism’s grimmest assessment of the 
acoustic world of modernity, whose violent impact on the lower strata of 
society was already documented in his own Maggie.
Audiographs
Apart from the Civil War, industrial growth in the second half of the nine-
teenth century was driven by another historical process that would change 
the face of urban America forever. U.S. industrialization was both enabled 
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by and produced a mass immigration that drastically altered the ethnic com-
position of cities, particularly in the East:
American industrial expansion was made possible by the ready avail-
ability of cheap labor in the form of the huge numbers of migrants en-
tering the country from the 1860s onwards. From the 1880s the scale 
of migration constituted the largest population movement in recorded 
history. Between 1881 and 1920 there were over 23 million immigrants: 
1907 was the peak year, with 1.2 million newcomers [. . .]. is migra-
tion had a radical e­ect on the ethnic composition of the United States. 
Before 1880 the vast majority of immigrants came from the British Isles 
or Northern Europe, chiey Germany; but aer that point the empha-
sis shied decisively to the peoples of southern and eastern Europe, 
including Italians, Poles, Hungarians and all the nationalities of the 
Austrian-Hungarian Empire. In 1870 New York City had 80 000 Jews; 
by 1915 there were 1.5 million. By 1930 perhaps six million Americans 
were of Italian stock. (P. Jenkins 174–75)
e new immigrant voices were recorded and oen critically examined by 
realist, naturalist, as well as later writers. A common representational strat-
egy was to emphasize the obscurity of foreign-sounding speech. William 
Dean Howells participates in this when, in A Hazard of New Fortunes, he 
has Basil March comment on “the jargon” of the Neapolitans’ “unintelligible 
dialect” (158), and so does Henry Adams in e Education when he evokes 
the olfactory and linguistic prole of “a furtive Yacoob or Ysaac still reeking 
of the Ghetto, snarling a weird Yiddish to the ocers of the customs” (229). 
Immigrant voices, Howells and Adams seem to imply, are oen nothing but 
unintelligible noise.
 In Norris’s McTeague, Mr. Sieppe’s ridiculously exaggerated German ac-
cent and garbled syntax combine with his militaristic posturing to produce 
the caricature of a German-American who functions as the novel’s primary 
laughingstock:
“Owgooste!” he shouted to the little boy with the black greyhound, 
“you will der hound und der basket number three carry. Der tervins,” he 
added, calling to the two smallest boys, who were dressed exactly alike, 
“will releef one unudder mit der camp-stuhl and basket number four. 
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Dat is comprehend, hay? When we make der start, you childern will in 
der advance march. Dat is your orders.” (65–66)
More interesting still is the case of Marcus Schouler, Mr. Sieppe’s nephew. 
While Marcus is not aicted with his uncle’s linguistic shortcomings, his 
speech is repeatedly designated as noise. e reader meets Marcus as he ac-
companies McTeague to a saloon in the novel’s rst chapter:
Marcus had picked up a few half-truths of political economy—it was 
impossible to say where—and as soon as they had settled themselves 
to their beer in Frenna’s back room he took up the theme of the labor 
question. He discussed it at the top of his voice, vociferating, shaking 
his  sts, exciting himself with his own noise. (13)
Here and elsewhere, Norris furnishes Marcus Schouler with a linguistic pro-
le that compromises the German-American socialist’s diatribes against so-
cial inequalities. e saloon owner Frenna’s admonition to Schouler could 
serve as a motto for my discussion of the constrained roles played by immi-
grants and, in Schouler’s case, political dissenters, in McTeague’s novel: “You 
must make less noise in here, Mister Schouler” (140).
 With the Polish-American Jew Zerkow, yet another immigrant becomes 
the object of acoustic proling. e passages on Zerkow, a man whose “domi-
nant passion” is “inordinate, insatiable greed” (43), are so clearly anti-Semitic 
that one begins to wonder whether Marcus Schouler’s attack on Chinese 
cigar-makers (“Ah, the rat-eaters! Ah, the white-livered curs” [121]) was actu-
ally intended to reect negatively on him. Norris’s anti-Semitism culminates 
in his depiction of Zerkow’s murder of Maria. e harness maker Heise’s 
description of Maria’s body contains an unequivocal reference to shechitah, 
the kosher way of slaughtering animals by slitting their throat with a very 
sharp knife: “He’s done for her sure this trip. Cut her throat. Lord, how she 
has bled! Did you ever see so much—that’s murder—that’s cold-blooded 
murder” (318). Prior to this climactic event, Zerkow’s depravity is reected 
in and reinforced by the quality of his voice:
“Who is it? Who is it?” cried the rag-picker from within, in his hoarse 
voice, that was half whisper, starting nervously, and sweeping a handful 
of silver into his drawer. (125)
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“Now, then, Maria,” said Zerkow, his cracked, strained voice just rising 
above a whisper, hitching his chair closer to the table, “now, then, my 
girl, let’s have it all over again. Tell us about the gold plate—the service. 
Begin with, “ere were over a hundred pieces and every one of them 
gold.” (239)
“You fool!” he wheezed, trying to raise his broken voice to a shout. 
“You fool! Don’t you dare try an’ cheat me, or I’ll do for you. You know 
about the gold plate, and you know where it is.” Suddenly he pitched 
his voice at the prolonged rasping shout with which he made his street 
cry. He rose to his feet, his long, prehensile ngers curled into sts. He 
was menacing, terrible in his rage. (242)
In his portrayal of Zerkow, Norris uses a strategy well known from fairy tales. 
e moral depravity of fairy-tale villains is always reected in their external 
appearance. To put it bluntly, witches are not only wicked but also have a 
croaking voice, a warty nose, and other kinds of physical deformity such as a 
hunchback. In their conation of external appearance and internal essence, 
fairy tales participate in the economy of mythical thought, for which, ac-
cording to Ernst Cassirer, “the attribute is not one dening aspect of the 
thing; rather, it expresses and contains within it the whole of the thing” 
(65).34 Norris’s depiction of Zerkow repeats that pattern: “He was a dry, 
shrivelled old man of sixty odd. He had the thin, eager, cat-like lips of the 
covetous; eyes that had grown keen as those of a lynx from long searching 
amidst muck and debris; and claw-like, prehensile ngers” (42–43). On the 
one hand, Zerkow’s grating voice merely adds to his hideous appearance and 
serves to reinforce his wickedness. But once we recognize the similarities in 
the rendition of Mr. Sieppe’s, Zerkow’s, and Schouler’s speech and keep in 
mind that they are all immigrants, we discover an additional mechanism at 
work.
 ese literary gures take their place in a long history of discursive strug-
gles that involves the disparagement of the aurality of others as noise. For 
instance, while it did address legitimate concerns about noise pollution, the 
anti–street music movement of mid-nineteenth century London was also 
informed by ercely racist sentiments among middle-class professionals that 
made themselves heard most clearly in the denunciation of organ musicians 
as “blackguard Savoyards and herds of German swine” (qtd. in Picker, Vic-
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torian 52). Such acoustic proling along the lines of class and race can be 
traced back to times well before the nineteenth century. e Irish tongue of 
their colonial subjects was to many English observers of the early modern 
era but “one step removed from noise” (B. Smith 306). A sixteenth-century 
commentator even went as far as arguing that “the Irish language was forged 
out of the debris of Babel” (306). A faint echo of such attitudes can still be 
heard in the strike scene of Dreiser’s Sister Carrie, during which an “old Irish-
woman” (424) yells at the police ocers for beating her son while one of the 
screaming strikers is singled out as “a young Irishman” (427). e narrator’s 
description of the ensuing “babel of voices” (427) owes as much to the up-
roar of the riotous strike as to the presence of immigrant Irish voices. A simi-
lar rhetoric was used by European colonizers of Native American soil, who 
evoked the corruptness of Indian languages to justify the displacement and 
eventual destruction of native lives:35
Prompted by the biblical account of the Tower of Babel, Europeans 
were predisposed to hear in Native American languages evidence of 
confusion, dispersal, and degeneration. Robert Johnson, arguing the 
case for further colonization in his pamphlet e New Life of Virginea 
(1612), cites the barbarity of the Algonkian language as evidence of 
its speakers’ depravity—and of their aptness for being pulled up and 
discarded like so many weeds. (B. Smith 322)
While the portrayals of Mr. Sieppe, Schouler, and Zerkow do not proceed 
along identical lines, their exclusion from the ctional community at the 
center of McTeague at least partly repeats the patterns identied by Picker 
and Smith. rough the use of literary form, Norris enacts a symbolic form 
of violence as his immigrant characters’ speech as well as that of the ethnic 
communities they represent are identied as noise.
 In the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, symbolic violence des-
ignates an exercise of the power to represent the legitimate social world, of 
the power to impose one’s vision of the world, one’s meanings, on others. 
In Bourdieu’s scheme, educational institutions are among the main perpe-
trators of symbolic violence. eir “pedagogic actions” inculcate the values 
and systems of meaning of the dominant class, thereby reproducing in co-
vert form the existing relations of power (Bourdieu and Passeron; Bourdieu, 
Distinction). In a series of essays originally published in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s and collected in English translation in Language and Symbolic 
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Power, Bourdieu applies his ndings to the study of language.36 In line with 
his stated intention “to extend economic calculation to all the goods, mate-
rial and symbolic, without distinction, that present themselves as rare and 
worthy of being sought aer in a particular social formation” (Outline 178), 
Bourdieu frames his argument in economic terms:
Linguistic exchange [. . .] is also an economic exchange which is estab-
lished within a particular symbolic relation of power between a pro-
ducer, endowed with a certain linguistic capital, and a consumer (or a 
market), and which is capable of producing a certain material or sym-
bolic prot. In other words, utterances are not only (save in exception-
al circumstances) signs to be understood and deciphered; they are also 
signs of wealth, intended to be evaluated and appreciated, and signs of 
authority, intended to be believed and obeyed. (Language 66)
Language in Bourdieu becomes linguistic capital. As such, it participates in 
the larger economies of cultural capital (various forms of legitimate knowl-
edge) and symbolic capital (prestige, honor, social recognition) and thus 
takes its place among other kinds of capital, including social capital (valued 
social relations) and economic capital.37
 According to Bourdieu, what counts in the linguistic marketplace is less 
the content than the style of one’s speech.38 Dreiser’s Hurstwood is keenly 
aware of this when, hobnobbing with the socially superior, he engages in the 
most meaningless conversations: “en began one of those pointless social 
conversations so common in American resorts where the would-be gilded 
attempt to rub o gilt, from those who have it in abundance” (265–66). As 
Hurstwood knows, such linguistic exchanges are only “pointless” with re-
gard to their propositional meaning. At the level of social interaction, they 
constitute important investments of social and symbolic capital that in the 
long run may well yield a prot that is measurable in strictly monetary terms. 
As Dreiser points out, much of the linguistic knowledge required to secure 
symbolic prots on such occasions is formulaic in nature: “‘Did you ever 
hear the story of,’ and ‘at reminds me,’ were the most repeated phrases” 
(266). is becomes especially clear if we compare Hurstwood to a char-
acter who clearly lacks this pragmatic knowledge. Determined to procure 
tickets for a spectacle he intends to attend with Trina and his prospective 
parents-in-law, Norris’s McTeague musters all his courage, approaches the 
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ticket booth, and “deliver[s] himself of the formula he had been reciting for 
the last dozen hours”:
“I want four seats for Monday night in the fourth row from the front, 
and on the right-hand side.”
 “Right hand as you face the house or as you face the stage?” McTeague 
was dumbfounded.
“I want to be on the right-hand side,” he insisted, stolidly; adding, “in 
order to be away from the drums.”
“Well, the drums are on the right of the orchestra as you face the 
stage,” shouted the other impatiently; “you want to the le, then, as 
you face the house.”
“I want to be on the right-hand side,” persisted the dentist.
Without a word the seller threw out four tickets with a magni cent, 
supercilious gesture.
“ere’s four seats on the right-hand side, then, and you’re right up 
against the drums.”
“But I don’t want to be near the drums,” protested McTeague, begin-
ning to perspire. (94)
e exchange, during which McTeague becomes increasingly nervous and 
the seller begins to laugh at him, continues for another page. Due to his in-
experience and inability to produce linguistic expressions appropriate to the 
situation, McTeague loses face. In Bourdieu’s terms, McTeague incurs heavy 
symbolic losses while the seller secures symbolic prots as he demonstrates 
his superior knowledge at McTeague’s expense. McTeague instinctively rec-
ognizes the (symbolic) violence that is being done to him and threatens to 
retaliate with the physical violence he knows all too well: “you—you can’t 
make small of me. I’ll thump you in the head, you little—you little—little—
little pup” (95).
 As is already indicated by these short analyses of two very dierent situ-
ations, a reading informed by Bourdieu’s theories allows for a more subtle 
investigation into ctionalized social interactions than the deterministic 
interpretations repeatedly oered by naturalist texts themselves. Central to 
Bourdieu’s project is his desire to transcend the classical opposition between 
objectivism and subjectivism in the social sciences.39 Human actors are obvi-
ously neither mere products of society nor agents free to do whatever they 
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desire, and Bourdieu’s concept of the “habitus” allows him to steer a middle 
course between the two extremes:
e structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g. the 
material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) pro-
duce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured 
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as 
principles of the generation and structuring of practices and represen-
tations which can be objectively “regulated” and “regular” without in 
any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted 
to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an 
express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being 
all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the or-
chestrating action of a conductor. (Outline 72)
In Bourdieu’s “genetic structuralism” (Outline 162), habitus is both the prod-
uct of socialization within social institutions such as the family, school, or 
a peer-group (a “structured structure”) and a mental structure that serves as 
the basis for the generation of individual practices (thoughts, actions, rep-
resentations, expressions, perceptions, appreciations, and so on) and thus a 
“structuring structure.” e habitus does not strictly determine the practices 
of social actors. Rather, it “disposes actors to do certain things, it provides 
a basis for the generation of practices” (R. Jenkins 78). Nevertheless, the 
generative force of the habitus is strong enough to ensure that the practices 
of social actors who underwent a similar process of inculcation tend to ex-
hibit a high degree of similarity. Members of a given class therefore share a 
class habitus that manifests itself in similarities between the most diverse 
practices, ranging from similar aesthetic preferences, occupational choices, 
and consumption patterns to similar ways of eating, dressing, walking, and 
talking, all the practices, in other words, that make up a given lifestyle.40 In 
the ctional world of Dreiser’s Sister Carrie, it is its manifestations of a class 
habitus more distinguished than their own that make Rector’s—where “one 
could encounter politicians, brokers, actors, some rich young ‘rounders’ of 
the town, all eating and drinking amid a buzz of popular, commonplace con-
versation” (42)—such a desirable place to both Drouet and Hurstwood.
 In Bourdieu’s model, linguistic expressions are generated on the basis of 
the dispositions of the linguistic habitus. ese dispositions “imply a certain 
propensity to speak and to say determinate things (the expressive intent) 
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and a certain capacity to speak, which involves both the linguistic capacity 
to generate an innite number of grammatically correct discourses, and the 
social capacity to use this competence adequately in a determinate situation” 
(Bourdieu, Language 37). e fact that the “social capacity” Bourdieu refers 
to is distributed unequally allows speakers with a favorable linguistic habitus 
to secure symbolic prots on the linguistic market, for example, by being able 
to address an audience in a formal or ocial setting (Language 69–71). Mc-
Teague, for instance, is shown to lack this capacity when he is forced to give 
a speech on the occasion of his engagement to Trina: “I don’ know what to 
say—I—I—I ain’t never made a speech before; I—I ain’t never made a speech 
before. But I’m glad Trina’s won the prize—” (120). e logic of symbolic 
loss and prot permeates all human practices, but only some actors—those 
with the appropriate habitus—are likely to realize a prot of distinction on 
the market of symbolic goods. A social actor’s habitus, acquired during a 
long process of socialization, is therefore a form of “internalized capital” 
(Bourdieu, Distinction 114). “Internalization” can be taken literally not only 
because the habitus is a form of internalized social structure but also because 
it manifests itself in what Bourdieu calls bodily (or corporeal, or body) hexis: 
“Body hexis speaks directly to the motor function, in the form of a pattern 
of postures that is both individual and systematic, because linked to a whole 
system of techniques involving the body and tools, and charged with a host 
of social meanings and values” (Outline 87). For Bourdieu, symbolic rela-
tions of power are manifested in the minutiae of corporeal behavior, in “a 
way of talking, a tilt of the head, facial expressions, ways of sitting and of us-
ing implements, always associated with a tone of voice, a style of speech, and 
(how could it be otherwise?) a certain subjective experience” (87).41 Bodily 
hexis thus both signals and creates distinction, it is “political mythology real-
ized, em-bodied, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable manner of 
standing, speaking, and thereby of feeling and thinking” (93–94).42
 Refracted through Bourdieu’s twin concepts of habitus and hexis, lan-
guage becomes but one form of corporeal expressiveness to which meanings 
and values are attached in social interaction. is makes immediate sense 
if we return for a moment to the portrayal of immigrant speech in Norris. 
Only one of the characters’ speech, Mr. Sieppe’s, is identied as foreign in 
strictly linguistic terms. In the case of Schouler and Zerkow, it is prosodic 
and paralinguistic features, an excessive loudness and a hoarse whispering 
quality respectively, that mark their linguistic productions as deviant. e 
UP
F C
OP
Y
    /    The Noises of American Literature
distinctive earmarks of Zerkow’s speech are located somewhere on a con-
tinuum between the phonemes of language on one end of the spectrum and 
other, nonverbal sounds produced by the human voice (wheezing, sobbing, 
clearing one’s throat) on the other. In all three cases, the eect remains the 
same: Norris furnishes his immigrant characters with a bodily hexis whose 
vocal manifestations are endowed with very little symbolic capital and there-
by relegates not only them but also the political views and ethnicities they 
represent to the margins of his ctional world. Rather than contributing to 
a critique of symbolic violence, Norris’s text enacts that violence in its pro-
cesses of exclusion.43
 In naturalist ction, this pattern is conned neither to immigrant char-
acters nor to the sounds of the human voice. Like human beings, ctional 
characters are not merely passive receivers of acoustic phenomena but ac-
tively participate in the making of the soundscapes they live in. In Maggie’s 
entertainment halls, for instance, the boisterous crowd is responsible for 
half the spectacle. Characters in novels snore, sigh, snarl, and scream; they 
grunt, gabble, gossip, and grumble; they clamor, cry, cough, and curse. At a 
more basic level, human bodies, ctional or not, continually produce noises 
whether they walk, stand still, sleep, get up, or sit down. If you try to shut 
your ears the way you shut your eyes, you will still hear yourself breathing. If 
you hold your breath, you will still hear the blood circulating in your veins. 
As John Cage learned when he visited the anechoic chamber at Harvard, 
only death truly silences human bodies.44
 If observed, the noises people make will be subject to the value judgments 
of observers. Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore learned this lesson 
the hard way when he was widely and publicly accused of bad manners for 
sighing audibly to indicate his disapproval of several statements made by his 
Republican opponent and later victor George W. Bush during the televised 
pre-election debates in 2000. Naturalist authors were very much aware of 
such mechanisms and constructed acoustic proles for their characters to 
indicate various character traits that serve both to position characters on the 
social scale and to direct readers’ judgments of them.
 ese indicators are oen singular and subtle in nature. For instance, 
once Dreiser has Carrie confess her love to Hurstwood and perceive him as 
“a drag in the direction of honor” (131), Drouet’s lack of renement is thrown 
into sharp relief against Hurstwood’s elegance: “[Drouet] plunged his face 
in a basin of water and pued and blew as he rubbed his neck and ears with 
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his hands, the while Carrie gazed upon him with mingled thoughts of recol-
lection and present judgment” (135). Readers will understand immediately 
that delicate Carrie does not approve of what she sees and hears, and they 
will not be surprised when they learn on the following page that Carrie feels 
“For the rst time [. . .] as if she must move away from him” (136). At this 
point in the narrative, Drouet no longer possesses either the economic or 
the symbolic capital Carrie is looking for. e episode has two related narra-
tive functions: it prepares the reader for Carrie’s growing estrangement from 
Drouet and at the same time foreshadows Drouet’s eventual disappearance 
from the narrative’s main concerns. It therefore drives a wedge not only be-
tween Drouet and Carrie but also between Drouet and the reader, whose 
emotional involvement with this character is gradually displaced on to other 
characters.
 While acoustic proling is conned to isolated episodes in Dreiser, Nor-
ris’s McTeague is a dierent case altogether. At the center of events through-
out the narrative, McTeague is furnished by Norris with a consistent acoustic 
prole, or audiograph. I dene an audiograph as a characterization technique 
that endows ctional bodies with a set of distinctive acoustic properties de-
signed to position characters with regard to the ensemble of social facts and 
practices that constitute the ctional world they inhabit. ese acoustic 
properties may range from characters’ accents, dialects, or intonation pat-
terns to the sounds produced by their laughter, snoring, or the acoustic im-
pact of their footsteps. e positioning accomplished via audiographs may 
involve value judgments on the part of other characters, narrators, and im-
plied authors as well as implied and empirical readers. Following Bourdieu, 
I trace the oen striking unity of both acoustic practices and the value judg-
ments that are attached to them to the generative schemes of the habitus.45
While audiographs may be used as part of the narrative technique of telling 
(for instance, when a narrator censures a character’s snoring), their principal 
mode of operation is clearly that of showing.
 Besides its sheer massiveness and strength, one of the more remarkable 
characteristics of McTeague’s body is the amount of noise it produces. When 
he walks, the air vibrates with the sound of the “heavy, elephantine tread of 
[his] huge feet” (185) or the noise of “his great feet dragging and grinding on 
the oor” (374). When he forces his breath through his nose, he emits “a fear-
ful snorting noise” (136). McTeague does not laugh the way other characters 
do; he “bellow[s] with laughter” (136) or “explode[s] in a roar of laughter” 
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(99). While Trina chuckles “demurely, her lips closed tight, her little chin 
thrust out, her small pale nose, with its adorable little freckles, wrinkling,” 
McTeague “roar[s] with all the force of his lungs, his enormous mouth dis-
tended, striking sledge-hammer blows upon his knees with his clenched st” 
(75). Even his singing in the morning is “a bellowing roar, enough to make 
the window sashes rattle” (62). When he is angry or excited, McTeague’s 
“enormous jaws shut together with a sharp click” (59), and “his teeth” begin 
to “gr[i]nd themselves together with a little rasping sound” (31). When he 
is furious, his voice breaks forth into a deafening scream. Witness his initial 
reaction to Marcus biting him during a wrestling match:
en followed a terrible scene. e brute that in McTeague lay so close 
to the surface leaped instantly to life, monstrous, not to be resisted. 
He sprang to his feet with a shrill and meaningless clamor, totally un-
like the ordinary bass of his speaking tones. It was the hideous yelling 
of a hurt beast, the squealing of a wounded elephant. He framed no 
words; in the rush of high-pitched sound that issued from his wide-
open mouth there was nothing articulate. [. . .] His only idea was to 
batter the life out of the man before him, to crush and annihilate him 
upon the instant. (234)
e animal in him, itself described as “shouting and clamoring” (30) not far 
below the surface, is released in an outburst of violence. Two representation-
al strategies intersect here as the slippage from voice to noise (“meaningless 
clamor,” “nothing articulate”)—which we have already encountered in the 
portrayals of Sieppe, Schouler, and Zerkow—combines with the reduction 
of the human voice to the animal squeal, positioning McTeague beyond the 
limits of human intelligibility and cognition. McTeague’s audiograph, which 
includes linguistic deciencies in a more narrow sense (stammering when 
excited, limited range of vocabulary, lower-class sociolect), thus contributes 
signicantly to the process of “casting out the outcast,” which June Howard 
(70–103) has identied as a central concern of naturalist narratives.
 In various ways, then, the portrayals of gures as dierent as McTeague, 
Schouler, Mr. Sieppe, or Zerkow exemplify the ways in which naturalist au-
thors mark out certain characters as inferior, deviant, or distant on the basis 
of their violation of what Mark M. Smith calls “aural etiquette” (97). While 
the processes of inclusion and exclusion enacted by naturalist texts may be 
based primarily on a character’s belonging to a given gender, class, or race—
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the latter is borne out by the fact that McTeague is the only character of 
purely Anglo-Saxon stock in this group—secondary characteristics such as 
style of dress, intensity of bodily movements, or acoustic prole in important 
ways form part of the techniques employed in literary texts to represent the 
legitimate social world. ese details of characterization cannot be reduced 
to an expression or realization of underlying or primary factors of race, class, 
or gender, and Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, hexis, and symbolic 
violence provide us with tools to discuss the relationships between what may, 
aer all, only appear to be primary and secondary social markers.
 is leads to a larger issue in critical debates about realist ction.46 Nine-
teenth-century authors oen seem obsessed with insignicant details, such 
as decorations of houses, dresses characters wear, owers in a garden. In “e 
Reality Eect,” Roland Barthes has made the argument that it is primarily 
this abundance of details with no apparent narrative function that creates 
verisimilitude in realist texts. In realist ction, we nd minute descriptions 
of clothes, houses, and furniture that have no other function than to make 
the narrative more realistic. Roman Jakobson provides an illustrative anec-
dote for what Barthes would later call l’eet de réel: “A pupil is asked to solve 
a problem: ‘A bird ew out of its cage; how soon will it reach the forest if it 
ies at such and such a speed per minute, and the distance between the cage 
and the forest is such and such?’ ‘What color is the cage?’ asks the child. is 
child is a typical realist” (“On Realism in Art” 25). e technique described 
by Jakobson and Barthes is used by all writers discussed in this chapter and 
is probably put to greatest eect in Carrie’s unrelenting fascination with the 
world of commodities. is observation alone should guard us against draw-
ing too rigid a distinction between realist authors and a writer like Dreiser, 
whom Donald Pizer identies as “the author whose work and career most 
fulll the received notion of American naturalism” (“American” 57).
 Contra Jakobson and Barthes, however, I wish to maintain that many of 
these details are functional in that they are used by authors to indicate the so-
cial status and various personality traits of ctional characters. For instance, 
the three-paragraph description of the three rooms Drouet rents for Sister 
Carrie and himself serves to document the improvement of her social status. 
As Carrie leaves behind the glum poverty of her sister’s working-class house-
hold, she also leaves behind its “thin rag carpet” (13) for the “good Brussels 
carpet” of an apartment that is located in an area “occupied by a middle class 
who were both respectable and moderately well-to-do” (88). Descriptions 
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of habitats acquire an increasingly important function in Dreiser’s novel 
as Carrie’s rise to success is reected in her choice of a luxurious suite in 
a hotel that sports an “elegantly carpeted and decorated hall, [a] marbled 
lobby, and showy waiting room” (453), while Hurstwood, down on his luck, 
is forced to move to a “cheaper room—thirty-ve cents a day” (459) before 
he nally gasses himself in the room of a hostel described as “a dingy aair, 
wooden, dusty, hard” (499). Acoustic proles and audiographs participate 
in this economy as they signal characters’ distinction and thus position them 
with regard to the production, circulation and exchange of various kinds of 
capital. As such, they are an integral part of naturalism’s political economy 
of sound and contribute signicantly to the processes of containment, exclu-
sion, and symbolic violence enacted within many a naturalist text.
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 e Noises of Modernist Form
Motor-cars came shooting out of deep, narrow streets into the shallowness of bright 
squares. Pedestrian darkness formed into cloudy strings. Where stronger lines of 
speed transected their loosely woven haste, they clotted up, then trickled on faster 
and, aer few ripples, resumed their regular pulse. Hundreds of sounds were inter-
twined into a coil of wiry noise, with single points projecting, sharp edges running 
along it and submerging again, and clear notes splintering o—ying and scat-
tering. Even though the peculiar nature of this noise could not be dened, anyone 
returning aer years of absence would have known, with his eyes shut, that he was 
in that ancient capital and imperial city, Vienna.
Robert Musil, e Man without Qualities
In its interrogation of the links between the alterity of literary discourse and 
its social function, Paulson’s e Noise of Culture does not exist in a theoreti-
cal vacuum. His conceptualization of literature as the disruptive, innovative 
noise within the communicative networks of culture is part of a long line of 
thought on the nature and function of the literary. While the relevance of 
that tradition in literary theory and criticism is, as I argue in the previous 
chapter, by no means limited to the discussion of modernist literature and 
art, many of its pivotal contributions originated in studies of that period. 
Its highly self-reexive treatment of questions of representation, its “intoler-
able wrestle with words and meanings,” and “Obsessive attempts to say ‘the 
unsayable’” (McFarlane 72) make modernist writing a specially privileged 
site for exploring the relationship between the social function of literature 
on the one hand and the specicity of literary writing, its poeticity, on the 
other. e Russian formalists were important contributors to such debates.1
Yet while Paulson acknowledges his indebtedness to these thinkers as well as 
their Belgian counterparts in Groupe μ, he tends to downplay both their in-
terest in questions relating to the social function of literature and their close 
ties with the modernist movement in art—and thus the historical specicity 
of their as well as his own claims. Once we recognize that the “literature as 
noise” paradigm is rooted in a critical tradition that combines a sustained 
interest in poeticity with a more specic focus on modernist writing, we 
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are able to historicize that paradigm and make it useful for a discussion of 
modernist literature.
 For instance, while Shklovsky’s concept of defamiliarization formulates 
an insight into the nature of literary writing whose relevance extends be-
yond the modernist period, it is equally clear that it applies particularly well 
to literary texts characterized by a high degree of formal innovation. It is 
no coincidence that the development of Russian formalist thought in the 
rst three decades of the twentieth century ran parallel to the literary move-
ment of modernism.2 Not only formalism’s focus on the linguistic material 
of the poetic utterance links it to modernist concerns but also its recourse 
to organicist metaphors, its thinking about literary autonomy, its interest in 
poetic “strangeness” or deviation.3 Yet the Russian formalists did not focus 
exclusively on the formal properties of literary texts; they opened their in-
vestigations to their social function.
 To say that the Russian formalists insisted on the autotelia of literary 
texts—that is, that literary language is an end in itself and serves no external 
purpose—tells only half the story. As Tzvetan Todorov (138–39) points out, 
Shklovsky’s early “Art as Technique” (1917) already moves away from that 
position. For Shklovsky, defamiliarization is not solely a property eective 
within the literary system, allowing for the system’s constant rejuvenation. 
By changing our ways of perception, literary discourse also exerts a heterotel-
ic function; it assumes extraliterary signicance; it intervenes in the world:
art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make 
one feel things, to make the stone stony. e purpose of art is to impart 
the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known. 
e technique of art is to make objects “unfamiliar,” to make forms 
dicult, to increase the diculty and length of perception because 
the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be pro-
longed. (Shklovsky 20)4
If we consider Shklovsky’s deliberations on the purpose of art in conjunction 
with his repeated assertion that “e language of poetry is [. . .] dicult, 
roughened, impeded language” (27), we get a notion of literature that is a 
far cry from the exclusive focus on literariness and formal properties of texts 
that Russian formalists are oen associated with. Shklovsky’s concept of de-
familiarization has close anities to Paulson’s conceptualization of literary 
discourse as the noise of culture. Both accounts arm that literary language 
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resists easy assimilation to forms of discourse characterized by greater au-
tomatization and redundancy. For both theorists, literature’s internal noise 
assumes an extratextual function by breaking with habitual modes of per-
ception; for both of them, literature triggers processes of innovation and
thwarts desires for ready consumption.
 While Shklovsky is ultimately more concerned with the phenomenology 
of reading than the politics of reading and writing (modernist) literature, 
later critics writing about modernist literature addressed the social func-
tion and politics of modernist writing in more explicit terms. Many critics 
have linked modernism’s formal ruptures to a rupture of a dierent order: 
modernism was and is seen not only as a reaction against established po-
etic conventions but also as a reaction against and a rejection of the existing 
social order. For those critics, modernism is a cultural perturbation within 
and against modernity. Erich Auerbach anticipates many commentators on 
modernist literature, including Lionel Trilling and the conservative critic 
Daniel Bell (“Beyond Modernism”), when he writes in Mimesis that mod-
ernism is “not only a mirror of the decline of our world” (551) but also an 
acerbic attack on it: “ere is hatred of culture and civilization, brought out 
by means of the subtlest stylistic devices which culture and civilization have 
developed, and oen a radical and fanatical urge to destroy” (551). Yet even 
with a critic as subtle as Auerbach, the question remains: In what respects 
do modernism’s “subtlest stylistic devices” bring out its “hatred of culture 
and civilization”? If modernist literature is the noise of cultural modernity, 
reminding it of its shortcomings and failures, how is that social function 
related to the specic forms of writing that we have come to associate with 
literary modernism?
 It is here that Adorno’s reections in Aesthetic eory (1970) will lead us 
beyond a simplistic view of modernist art as society’s antagonist. For Ador-
no, any clear-cut distinction between art on the one hand and society on the 
other is rendered absurd by the simple fact that art itself is a social phenom-
enon. Art is a product of labor and as such not exempt from processes of ma-
terial social production. Art is also social because it draws most of its subject 
matter from the reservoir of empirical reality. But this does not exhaust the 
possibilities. Art is also social in a third sense:
Art [. . .] is social not only because of its mode of production, in which 
the dialectic of the forces and relations of production is concentrated, 
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nor simply because of the social derivation of its thematic material. 
Much more importantly, art becomes social by its opposition to soci-
ety, and it occupies this position only as autonomous art. By crystalliz-
ing in itself as something unique to itself, rather than complying with 
existing social norms and qualifying as “socially useful,” it criticizes so-
ciety by merely existing, for which puritans of all stripes condemn it. 
(Adorno, Aesthetic 225–26)
Paradoxically, art is primarily social in its autonomy: “Asociality becomes 
the social legitimation of art” (234). Precisely because art stands at a remove 
from society and does not conform to the strictures of practical life is it able 
to participate in a critique of empirical reality. e critical function of art is 
not conned to the restricted case of art that directly points out and criticiz-
es the shortcomings and wrongdoings of social structures and actors. On the 
contrary, committed art unwittingly arms empirical reality by conforming 
to its discursive needs.5
 Authentic art as Adorno conceives it follows the maxim that “only what 
does not t into this world is true” (59). e position it adopts toward so-
ciety is one of negativity. is negativity is of several interrelated orders. 
First of all, authentic art mimetically reproduces the bleakness of a society 
that is dominated by a logic of instrumental rationality and total exchange: 
“e darkening of the world makes the irrationality of art rational: radically 
darkened art. What the enemies of modern art, with a better instinct than 
its anxious apologists, call its negativity is the epitome of what established 
culture has repressed and that toward which art is drawn” (Aesthetic 19).6
 But the darkness Adorno perceives in modernist art not only character-
izes its thematic content. More important, it also characterizes its formal 
organization. For Adorno, modernism’s interest in problems of form has a 
critical function: “e historicophilosophical signicance of the emancipa-
tion of form is that it refuses to mollify alienation in the image, exclusively 
thereby incorporating the alienated; that it denes the alienated as such” 
(145). What Adorno means by this becomes clearer in his discussion of the 
abstractness of much modernist art, where he claims that “Art is modern art 
through mimesis of the hardened and alienated; only thereby and not by the 
refusal of a mute reality, does art become eloquent” (21). Modernist negativ-
ity is therefore not simply a form of protest but contains the reied structures 
of empirical reality.
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 It would, however, not do justice to the complexity of Adorno’s argument 
to claim that modernist form simply reproduces the alienated character of 
modernity and thereby critiques it. Anyone who has ever experienced the 
diculty and recalcitrance of modernist art intuitively grasps that it does 
not simply reproduce the structures of empirical reality. Modernism is not 
simply an oppositional form of realism. Modernist art stands at a greater 
remove from society than traditional concepts of mimesis imply, and it is 
primarily formal aspects that create this distance:
Its contribution to society is not communication with it but rather 
something extremely mediated: It is resistance in which, by virtue of 
inner-aesthetic development, social development is reproduced with-
out being imitated. At the risk of self-alienation, radical modernity 
preserves art’s immanence by admitting society only in an obscured 
form, as in the dreams with which artworks have always been com-
pared. Nothing social in art is immediately social, not even when this 
is its aim. (Adorno, Aesthetic 226)
Again, we encounter the paradox that art is primarily social in its autonomy. 
Adorno takes this argument to its most radical conclusion when he claims 
that the sheer incomprehensibility of an artwork like Ionesco’s Rhinoceros 
constitutes an act of resistance: “e hermetic work brings more criticism 
to bear on the existing than do those that, in the interest of intelligible social 
criticism, devote themselves to conciliatory forms and silently acknowledge 
the ourishing culture industry” (145). In Adorno’s bleak view, radical art is 
the last refuge for opposition in a world dominated by an all-pervasive logic 
of exchange and instrumental rationality. As such, it must insist on its dier-
ence from other spheres by formal means. Negativity in this sense is not just 
negative mimesis; it is an act of refusal, and artworks must adopt a stance of 
total refusal: “in order to resist the all-powerful system of communication 
they must rid themselves of any communicative means that would perhaps 
make them accessible to the public” (243).
 While Adorno does not use the word noise, his preferred model of literary 
communication assigns modernist literary works precisely the function of 
interference, static, noise. What distinguishes his approach from Paulson’s, 
however, is his insistence that communicative disturbance is an end in itself 
rather than merely an intermediate step toward the creation of new order 
and information. In the last instance, Adorno’s radicalism poses the ques-
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tion of whether art is still possible within a totally administrated and com-
modied world. e inner-aesthetic answer to this question is anti-art, art 
negating itself: “Art, for its part, seeks refuge in its own negation, hoping to 
survive through its own death” (338). is is the ultimate consequence of 
Adorno’s conviction that any transformation of an artwork’s diculty and 
recalcitrance into communicable information would nullify the artwork’s 
oppositional stance. In literature as in other works of art, noise must remain 
noise, even at the cost of art’s negation of itself.7 In Roland Barthes’ words, 
“what the reader reads” when reading literature is a “countercommunication. 
[. . .] literatures are in fact arts of ‘noise’” (S/Z 145).
 As will become apparent in the remainder of this chapter, my reading of 
modernist texts follows Adorno’s and Barthes’ line of argument more closely 
than it does Paulson’s. If modernist literature is the noise of cultural mo-
dernity, it is that not because its dierence triggers processes of innovation 
within a self-organizing social system but because its irreducible negativity 
and noise enable it to occupy a position of critical distance from the pro-
cesses of social, cultural, and economic production that sustain the system. 
Literary modernism constitutes, in Astradur Eysteinsson’s words, “an inter-
ruption of prevalent social discourse” (202) rather than a source of cultural 
rejuvenation and is for that reason an at least “potentially subversive semi-
otic force” (228). Stressing the potentially oppositional force of modernism’s 
formal dislocations and disruptions, I argue that the negativity, diculty, 
and recalcitrance of modernist writing produces a noise that cannot be fully 
recuperated by the reader, refuses instant assimilation to the communicative 
networks already in place, and oers at least a certain degree of resistance to 
processes of appropriation by the forces of commodication.8
 My twofold interest in conceptualizations of literature as noise and liter-
ary representations of noise continues to be at the center of my reections 
as I explore the literary acoustics of modernism. With regard to the latter, it 
is hardly surprising that many of the noises represented in modernist texts 
were already present in the texts of their naturalist precursors. e acous-
tic legacy that the House of Morgan and other industrialists and nanciers 
(the Rockefellers, the Carnegies, the Mellons, the du Ponts, the Fords, the 
Vanderbilts) bequeathed to America and the world continues to be heard 
throughout the martial and industrial soundscapes of modernism. In Dos 
Passos’s 1919 (1932), for instance, the continually expanding American rail-
road system, large parts of which are owned by the Morgan family, intro-
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duces “the roar of the air and the swi pound of the wheels on the rails” (99), 
the noise of trains “whistl[ing] and rumbl[ing] into the platform” (265), 
and “the rattle of the express train” (278) to ever-new acoustic territories. 
e shipping industry—whose role Dos Passos emphasizes by devoting one 
of the ctional narratives to the sailor Joe Williams—likewise continues to 
make a strong impact on the U.S. soundscape, be it through “the siren of 
the reboat New York let[ting] out a shriek” (189), “the great blind shapes 
of steamboat sirens” (99), “the rattle of [the Callao’s] winches” (121), or the 
sound of “rusty freighters with their screws so far out of the water you could 
hear ’em thrashing a couple of hours aer they were hull down and out of 
sight” (183). Finally, while many new tools of destruction have been intro-
duced between Crane’s Civil War and Dos Passos’s First World War, we can 
still hear “shrapnel twanging its harps out of tiny powderpu clouds” (1919 
79), “Guns [. . .] barking in every direction” (106), and “the roar of exploding 
lyddite” (114).9
 In addition to these more readily observable convergences, late nine-
teenth- and early twentieth-century literary texts also display a similar range 
of concerns in their representations of noise. For instance, Gino’s rhetorical 
question about the eectiveness of naval guns in A Farewell to Arms (1929) 
formulates an insight about the destructiveness of the noises of war we have 
already gained from our reading of e Red Badge of Courage: “I don’t sup-
pose they are so eective [. . .]. But they scare me. ey all sound as though 
they came directly for you. ere is the boom then instantly the shriek and 
burst. What’s the use of not being wounded if they scare you to death?” (163). 
Likewise, a modernist like Dos Passos recognizes just as clearly as Crane the 
dierentiation of the urban soundscape into socially dened segments that 
are exposed to dierent noise levels. When the nancial situation of Ben 
Compton’s family improves, their acoustic environment changes along with 
it: “When Pop was well enough to work again he rented half a two-family 
house in Flatbush where at least they’d be away from the noise of the elevat-
ed” (1919 340). Finally, the bodily hexis of modernist characters, including 
the noises they make, can be read just as much as indicators of their social 
status as the hexis of their naturalist precursors. e following paragraph 
from Manhattan Transfer is reminiscent of Crane’s depictions of Maggie’s 
entertainment halls and immediately recognizable as a description of lower-
class citizens, even when taken completely out of context: “Heads tossed back 
on thick necks let out volleys of laughter, glasses were banged on the round 
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ringmarked table, thighs resounded with slaps, elbows were poked into ribs” 
(61).
 But as we move from naturalist to modernist texts, we also notice changes, 
both in terms of the quality and quantity of the noises that are represented 
and authors’ representational techniques. e “urban inhabitants of early-
twentieth-century America perceived that they lived in an era unprecedent-
edly loud” (E. ompson 6), and some of the more tangible changes in the 
soundscape of modernity can be traced back to technological advances that 
were made in the late nineteenth century but only made themselves heard 
on a large scale at the beginning of the twentieth century. In his contribu-
tion to Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane’s still very useful collection 
Modernism 1890–1930 (1976), Alan Bullock names some of these advances:
Overlapping with this great industrial expansion was a technological 
revolution which, in the 1890s and 1900s, produced a series of key de-
velopments that remain the foundation of the technology of the twen-
tieth—as distinct from that of the nineteenth—century. ese were:
the internal combustion engine, the diesel engine and the steam tur-
bine;
electricity, oil and petroleum as the new sources of power;
the automobile, the motor bus—the  rst London motor buses ap-
peared in 1905—the tractor and the aeroplane;
the telephone, the typewriter and the tape machine, the foundation of 
modern oce organization;
the production by the chemical industry of synthetic materials—dyes, 
man-made  bres and plastics. (59)10
Add to this the invention of new sound technologies such as “radio, sound 
lm, microphony, amplication, and phonography” (Kahn 10) and the grad-
ual displacement of the interactive technology of the phonograph by the 
one-way technology of the gramophone (Picker, Victorian 112, 142–45), and 
you get an aural world that inspires and demands new ways of hearing.
 e social spaces most heavily aected by the new sounds of moderni-
ty were the industrial city and the battleeld. Hemingway’s A Farewell to 
Arms registers the acoustic changes brought about by the deployment of 
warplanes, though oen from a distance: “e rain had stopped during the 
forenoon and three times we had heard planes coming, seen them pass over-
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head, watched them go far to the le and heard them bombing on the main 
highroad” (182). e staccato of machine guns is a martial noise that is still 
missing from e Red Badge of Courage but makes a distinctive impact on 
the soundscapes of Dos Passos’s 1919 (“e world’s no fun anymore / only 
machinegunre and arson” [11]) and A Farewell to Arms (“I listened to the 
ring to the north toward Udine. I could hear machine-gun ring” [194]). 
Electronic sirens warning civilians about enemy attacks were not invented 
until aer Crane’s novel was published; in 1919, they are among the most 
frequently represented noises of war (another indication that Dos Passos’s 
novel comments on World War I “from a distance”), be it in the ctional 
narratives:
She came out on a boulevard at last where there were men and women 
strolling, voices and an occasional automobile. Suddenly the nightmare 
scream of a siren started up in the distance, then another and another. 
(105)
ey were eating in a little restaurant in Montmartre. e cashlady 
and the waiter made them all go down into the cellar when the sirens 
started wailing for the second time. (75)
or in the impressionistic Camera Eyes: “the barrelvaulted room all smells 
fever and whitewash carbolic sick wops outside the airraid siren’s got a night-
mare” (135).
 In the modernist city, other technological advances leave their acoustic 
traces. Automobiles make themselves heard in Hemingway’s Milan (“Down 
below on the street a motor car honked” [139]) just as they do in Dos Pas-
sos’s New York (“Behind them automobiles slithered with a constant hissing 
scuttle in two streams along the roadway” [152]). A whole new mélange of 
noises rises from the city streets and engulfs the modern metropolis.
 By 1926, the acoustician Edward Elway Free was using the newly devel-
oped audiometer to quantify the noises that assailed New Yorkers’ ears. 
Free identied horse-drawn trac, chain-driven trucks, automobiles, and 
elevated trains as the main sources of noise (E. ompson 148–49). Writing 
in 1925, a journalist for the Saturday Review of Literature described the new 
urban soundscape thus:
e air belongs to the steady burr of the motor, to the regular clank 
clank of the elevated, and to the chitter of the steel drill. Underneath 
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is the rhythmic roll over clattering ties of the subway; above, the drone 
of the airplane. e recurrent explosions of the internal combustion 
engine, and the rhythmic jar of bodies in rapid motion determine the 
tempo of the sound world in which we have to live. (qtd. in E. omp-
son 117)
Writing in the same year and in language more reminiscent of this chapter’s 
epigraph, Dos Passos captures the noise of the city in metaphorical terms: 
“Black spiraling roar outside was melting through the walls making the cud-
dled shadows throb” (Manhattan Transfer 50).
 e typewriter was already invented in the late 1860s, but the constant 
clattering of typists at work in large oce buildings was a phenomenon that 
emerged in the early twentieth century. In Manhattan Transfer, Dos Pas-
sos has Ellen atcher describe that appliance’s contribution to the ambi-
ent noise level of the oce environment: “Ellen leaned back in the taxi and 
closed her eyes for a second. Not even the bath and the halour’s nap had 
washed out the fagging memory of the oce, the smell of it, the chirruping of 
typewriters, the endlessly repeated phrases, faces, typewritten sheets” (333). 
In an early poem, Hemingway compares its staccato sound to that of the 
newly developed machine gun—an entirely appropriate comparison since, as 
Kittler reminds us, the rst of those “discourse machinegun[s]” (Literature 
44) was produced by the arms manufacturer Remington, whose business 
had suered losses since the end of the Civil War:
e mills of the gods grind slowly,
But this mill
Chatters in mechanical staccato,
Ugly short infantry of the mind (qtd. in Limon 99)
As Hemingway renes his own “hard” style, writing becomes warfare. 
Hemingway’s evocation of the typewriter also points to a more fundamental 
dierence between naturalist and modernist texts. e typewriter not only 
dissected into separate letters what was a steady ow in handwriting but was 
also instrumental in making writing visible as a technology, thus inviting 
the kind of self-reexivity characteristic of Hemingway’s poem and modern-
ist writing in general. “e typewriter [. . .] changed the nature of writing” 
(Kittler, “Technologies” 735), and modernist language experiments testify to 
the change. Formal disruptions and fragmentations in particular add an ad-
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ditional layer of signication that overlays the representational concerns that 
texts like Dos Passos’s 1919 or Jean Toomer’s Cane share with texts from the 
1890s. is additional layer accounts for much of the distinctively modernist 
feel of Cane and 1919.
 My specic interest with regard to modernism’s formal ruptures lies in 
the varying degrees to which they manage to preserve something of the inef-
fability and intractability of the noises they represent. To give two examples 
discussed in greater detail below: in the light of Toomer’s ingenious mixing 
of African-American oral traditions and Anglo-American literary strategies, 
the fragmented form of Cane may be read as a reminder of unresolved racial 
tensions within a segregated America; Matthew O’Connor’s rambling, dis-
continuous speeches in Djuna Barnes’s Nightwood, though drawing heavily 
on psychoanalytic discourse, do not provide any consoling narrative for the 
alienated subjects of modernity. As with naturalist ction, my main focus 
is on the ways in which stylistic strategies, ranging from dissonant narra-
tors and onomatopoeia to imagist techniques and the dissolution of uni-
ed points of view, are involved in processes of containment and inclusion/ 
exclusion in modernist representations of noise. As in my discussion of the 
earlier texts, the noises I am particularly interested in are those of the so-
cial, cultural, racial, and political conicts of modernity, ranging from the 
deafening roar of aerial bombs in World War I to the soundscapes of urban 
conict in the metropolis, and from the incomprehensible ramblings and 
cries of alienated characters on the brink of mental breakdown to the chal-
lenges to (post-)slavery racism by the sounds of African-American spirituals 
and spirituality.
 In choosing to focus in this chapter on literary texts as dierent as Jean 
Toomer’s Cane (1923), John Dos Passos’s Manhattan Transfer (1925) and 1919 
(1932), Djuna Barnes’s Nightwood (1936), and Zora Neale Hurston’s eir 
Eyes Were Watching God (1937), I do not lay claim to providing a study of a 
representative sample of modernist ction. I do, however, wish to make the 
point that the representational strategies I identify as an aesthetics of noise 
occur across a fairly broad spectrum of modernist writing. e concept of 
modernism that emerges from these readings stresses shared communica-
tional and representational concerns across widely divergent literary forms.
 For instance, the realistic surface, relatively simple temporal structure, 
and rural setting of Hurston’s eir Eyes Were Watching God seem to have 
little in common with the impressionist imagery, fragmented narrative, and 
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distinctly urban feel of Dos Passos’s Manhattan Transfer. Yet once we per-
ceive that both Hurston’s introduction of African-American orality into a 
literary format and Dos Passos’s disintegration of narrative continuity are 
part of an aesthetics that valorizes the disruption of established patterns of 
cultural communication, commonalities between their projects emerge that 
overlay obvious dierences in terms of narrative and syntactic structure, geo-
graphical and cultural setting, and political outlook. Written in the pres-
ence of noise, these texts refuse to assimilate their project to contemporary 
acousticians’ attempts to regulate and tame the noise; their literary acoustics 
do not yield to what Emily ompson has identied as the quintessentially 
modern “desire for clear, controlled, signal-like sound” (3).
 e question of a shared modernist project assumes special signicance 
with regard to African-American modernism, the Harlem Renaissance in 
particular, whose formal and thematic distance from the canonized works 
of Anglo-Saxon modernism has prompted many a critic to decry the for-
mer’s lack of innovatory force and experimental daring and eectively to 
deny these texts the label “modernism” along with the (academic) prestige 
attached to that label. For these and related reasons, I will begin my discus-
sion of literary texts with a reassessment of the place in literary history of 
two pivotal contributions to African-American literature: Toomer’s Cane 
and Hurston’s eir Eyes Were Watching God. Rather than arguing that 
these texts are “like” or “as good as” those written by Toomer and Hurston’s 
Anglo-Saxon contemporaries, I explore the points of convergence between 
two distinctive traditions of modernist writing.
Antiphonal Play
In his monograph on African-American modernism, Modernism and the 
Harlem Renaissance, Houston A. Baker Jr. identies two central strategies of 
African-American writing in the rst decades of the twentieth century. e 
rst, “mastery of form,” refers to the various ways in which standard Anglo-
American literary and cultural forms, ranging from the sonnet to stereotypi-
cal images of blacks invoked in minstrel shows, were adapted for strategic 
and sometimes ironic purposes. Baker’s principal examples for the mastery 
of form are Booker T. Washington’s and Charles Waddell Chesnutt’s trans-
formative appropriations of the language and representations of minstrelsy: 
“Like Billy Kersands stretching the minstrel face to a successful black excess, 
or Bert Williams and George Walker converting nonsense sounds and awk-
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wardly demeaning minstrel steps into pure kinesthetics and masterful black 
artistry, so Washington takes up types and tones of nonsense to earn a na-
tional reputation and its corollary benets for the African American masses” 
(Baker 33). Baker argues that the mastery of form is a masquerade that was 
necessary to reach the kind of widespread support Washington gained. e 
second strategy, “deformation of mastery,” describes an African-American 
expressiveness that challenges standard forms in a more aggressive manner, 
introducing and advertising cultural elements alien to the Anglo-Saxon tra-
dition. In its celebration of traditions with decidedly African roots, it chal-
lenges and attacks hegemonic cultural forms: “e deformation of mastery 
refuses a master’s nonsense. It returns—oen transmuting ‘standard’ sylla-
bles—to the common sense of the tribe. Its relationship to masks is radically 
dierent from that of the mastery of form. e spirit house occupying the 
deformer is not minstrelsy, but the sound and space of an African ancestral 
past” (56). Baker cites W.E.B. Du Bois’s incorporation of the black folk tra-
dition, in particular the musical sounds of spirituals, as his prime example of 
the deformation of mastery.
 What strikes me as problematic in Baker’s approach is less his reduction of 
African-American modernism to just two fundamental strategies. In fact, I 
believe that unless such reductions revert to binary reductionism—by which 
I mean that they either try to explain everything by means of the binary 
scheme or fail to recognize the points of intersection between and neces-
sary intertwinement of the terms—they are oen of great heuristic value 
and provide useful points of departure for critical inquiry. What I do take 
issue with is Baker’s complete dissociation of the Harlem Renaissance from 
Anglo-Saxon modernism. While I fully agree with him that “judgments on 
Afro-American ‘modernity’ and the ‘Harlem Renaissance’ that begin with 
notions of British, Anglo-American, and Irish ‘modernism’ as ‘successful’ ob-
jects, projects, and processes to be emulated by Afro-Americans are misguid-
ed” (xv–xvi), this does not necessarily entail either that “Africans and Afro-
Americans—through conscious and unconscious designs of various Western 
‘modernisms’—have little in common with Joycean or Eliotic projects” (xvi) 
or that we need to dismiss the work of Anglo-Saxon modernists—as Baker 
does in his rst two chapters—as “oen decidedly puerile and undeniably 
transient” (13) in order to talk about the Harlem Renaissance in terms of suc-
cess rather than failure. I nd Baker’s isolationism particularly problematic 
because the second strategy he identies in African-American modernism, 
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the deformation of mastery, resonates with central concerns of that other 
modernist tradition: defamiliarization, formal innovation, “making it new.”
 Jean Toomer’s Cane, published in 1923 and thus not only in the rst years 
of the Harlem Renaissance but also, as Werner Sollors notes, “before Ernest 
Hemingway’s and William Faulkner’s rst important books were to appear” 
(18), provides a perfect example of multiple intersections between black and 
white modernisms. As Sollors points out, Cane is, like Anglo-Saxon mod-
ernist texts, in “Its very form an attempt at nding a literary equivalent for 
the dislocations that modernity had wrought by moving people from soil 
to pavements, making them ashamed of their traditional folk culture or 
changing it into commercial entertainment, and radically altering the epic 
pace of sun and seasons, of sowing and reaping, into the accelerated and 
syncopated rhythm of trains and cars, the staccato of quickly shiing images 
and thoughts” (20). While the ethnic specicity of some of the sociocultural 
changes Sollors describes is obvious (African-Americans became “ashamed 
of their traditional folk culture” because it was and remains linked to the 
memory of slavery), Toomer’s decision to present us with a mixture of po-
etry, drama, and prose that eschews narrative continuity and challenges the 
boundaries between the dierent genres; his potent blend of rural and urban, 
pre-industrial and technological imagery; his use of imagist techniques (for 
example, in the poem “Nullo”); and his strategic employment of repetition 
(in “Rhobert” in its most Steinian manifestation) bear close anities to the 
practice of Anglo-Saxon modernist innovators like John Dos Passos, Ernest 
Hemingway, Ezra Pound, or Gertrude Stein (in that order), and to their ar-
tistic reactions to the progress of modernity. However, this does not entail, as 
Sollors claims, that either Toomer or his white contemporaries were striving 
for an expression of unity and wholeness as a sort of countermeasure to the 
sense of fragmentation and alienation experienced by many at the beginning 
of the twentieth century:
Toomer sees his own mission [. . .] as providing a ground for spiritual 
unity. His quest for union, for wholeness, for the circle is achieved pre-
cisely by thematizing the divisions that the book’s author felt were so 
destructive and virulent in the modern world: race, sex, class, region. 
Toomer saw himself as a visionary who would try to redirect readers 
toward a wholeness—however elusive it might be—that they had lost 
in their di­erentiations by category. (28)
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e circle Sollors refers to is the sequence of curves that preface the three 
parts that make up Cane: (,), and ( ). While he concedes that these signify 
the “interrelatedness of fragmentation and quest for wholeness” (21), Sol-
lors’s reading privileges the latter at the expense of the former. is becomes 
particularly obvious when he links the (alleged) modernist search for unity 
to Toomer’s own vision of the emergence of a new American race that is 
“neither white nor black nor red nor brown” but “one whole and undivided 
human race” (qtd. in Sollors 29). In Sollors’s reading, organic unity doctrine 
and melting-pot ideology are close allies. Too close for comfort. Against 
Sollors’s as well as Toomer’s own assertion in a letter to Waldo Frank that 
“Cane’s design is a circle” (qtd. in Hutchinson 50), I wish to maintain that 
Toomer’s mixing of black folk tradition with a mastery of literary devices 
generally associated with Anglo-Saxon modernism produces tensions that 
are not resolved back into the fullness of the circle.11 Hence, my own read-
ing emphasizes that the two curves that preface the third part of Cane are 
precisely two curves, not a circle: ( ).
 On a thematic level, Sollors’s argument for “interracialism” (35) as a driv-
ing force in Toomer’s writing seems to me too conciliatory for a book that 
has the following description of a lynching in it:
She was in the family-way, Mame Lamkins was. ey killed her in th 
street, an some white man seein th risin in her stomach as she lay there 
soppy in her blood like any cow, took an ripped her belly open, an th 
kid fell out. It was living; but a nigger baby aint supposed t live. So he 
jabbed his knife in it an stuck it t a tree. An then they all went away. 
(90)
Reading Cane, we are continually reminded that the year of its publication 
coincides with the strongest historical presence of the Ku Klux Klan: “At its 
height, around 1923–24, there were between four and eight million Klan 
members, including a strong female contingent” (P. Jenkins 211). It is entirely 
in keeping with this that Toomer’s gruesome description is based on actual 
“NAACP documentation on lynching in the South” (Karrer 138).
 But Toomer’s awareness of remaining tensions between the races extends 
beyond the thematic level to the text’s formal organization. It is here that 
elements drawn from African-American oral culture contribute to and in-
tersect with modernist literary strategies to produce a highly fragmented 
text whose discontinuities and formal tensions gesture toward racial chasms 
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rather than their resolution into a new unity. So while Toomer does bring 
African-American and Anglo-Saxon modes of representation into a dialogue 
that exhibits shared stylistic and representational concerns, he does not sug-
gest that there exists a corresponding “interracialism” on the level of social 
interaction between blacks and whites in the South. What the modernism 
of Toomer’s Cane has in common with Anglo-Saxon modernisms is not a 
search for wholeness and unity but an insistence on fragmentation and un-
resolved tensions on the textual level and within the eld of social practices. 
Sollors’s own remarks on the harsh sounds of Cane may serve as a starting 
point for our own investigation:
Although the precise meaning of an instance on a given page may be 
hard to dene, the very fact that words are repeated throughout the 
book gives the reader a sense of acoustic and visual familiarity, a phe-
nomenon reminiscent of ree Lives. For example, Cane is a book of 
repeated “thuds,” harsh knocking sounds that syncopate the reading 
from “Becky” [6; the sound of the chimney falling into Becky’s cabin] 
to the end of “Kabnis” [115; the sound of Halsey at work]. In “Blood 
Burning Moon” the thud is the sound of Bob’s body falling and of the 
mob’s action [33–34], giving a menacingly violent undercurrent of 
meaning to such later thuds as those in the gymnasium in “Bona and 
Paul” [70; the sounds of drilling exercises]. (25)
Such acoustic repetitions reverberate throughout Cane, be it the “pines” that 
“whisper to Jesus” in “Becky” (5, 6, 7); the “Cane leaves swaying, rusty with 
talk, / Scratching choruses above the guinea’s squawk” in “Carma” (10, 11); 
the cackling chicken, barking dogs, and crowing roosters in “Blood-Burn-
ing Moon” (28, 30, 33); a black woman’s “lullaby beneath the mate-eyes of 
a southern planter” in “Bona and Paul” (71, 76); the “zooming Cadillacs, / 
Whizzing, whizzing down the street-car tracks” in “Seventh Street” (39); or, 
more subtly and guratively, the “Songs” of a jazz club that “soak the walls” 
until “e walls sing and press inward” in “eater” (50, 51, 53). Alternating 
between the rural sounds and songs of the South and those of urban Harlem, 
between rustling cane leaves and whizzing streetcars, between a plantation 
worker’s lullaby and a pianist’s jazz tunes, these repetitions provide a dense 
acoustic panorama of African-American life in the rst decades of the twen-
tieth century.
 Foremost among the sounds that structure Cane are the songs of black 
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folk culture, the spirituals, lullabies, and work songs whose roots lie in Af-
rican sound-making, but whose more recent context is that of slavery on 
American soil and its own soundscape of “the silence of enslavement” and 
“the clanking of cruelty” (M. Smith 157). Toomer’s inclusion of spirituals 
like “Deep River” (41, 81), “My Lord, what a morning” (91), or “Swing low, 
sweet chariot” (65) as well as many unnamed tunes therefore simultaneously 
celebrates African-American song and serves as a reminder of both the in-
justices of slavery and the deep racial divisions that continue to structure 
the lives and perceptions of Americans on both sides of the color-line. e 
painful memory of slavery attached to them is evoked in one of Toomer’s 
brilliant metaphors: “e women sang lustily. eir songs were cotton-wads 
to stop their ears” (29). When W.E.B. Du Bois wrote e Souls of Black Folk 
(1903), the spirituals’ association with and historical emergence in slavery 
was, besides their appropriation by minstrelsy, one of the main reasons why 
many African-Americans sought to distance themselves from a rich black 
folk tradition (Sundquist 467–90). Twenty years later, Toomer could evoke 
the sounds of African-American spirituality with pride without losing sight 
of the songs’ uncanny association with racial inequality and injustice of the 
past as well as the present.12 e nal stanzas of his “Song of the Son” bring 
out this ambivalence best:
O Negro slaves, dark purple ripened plums,
Squeezed, and bursting in the pine-wood air,
Passing, before they stripped the old tree bare
One plum was saved for me, one seed becomes
An everlasting song, a singing tree,
Caroling soly souls of slavery,
What they were, and what they are to me,
Caroling soly souls of slavery. (12)
Like Du Bois in e Souls of Black Folk—whose title is evoked in Toomer’s 
repeated line “Caroling soly souls of slavery”—Toomer refuses to read the 
spirituals as signs of shame but reclaims their aesthetic worth along with 
their indictive force. As Barbara Foley points out, Toomer’s variation on 
“Deep River” drives home the latter point with particular vigor: the original 
“Deep River / my home is over Jordan / Deep river / I want to cross over 
into campground” turns into Toomer’s “White man’s land. / Niggers, sing. / 
UP
F
CO
PY
    /    The Noises of American Literature
Burn, bear black children / Till poor rivers bring / Rest, and sweet glory / 
In Camp Ground” (81). Toomer’s modernist deformation of the spiritual’s 
words spells out even more clearly the original’s indictment of a southern 
culture of death that resounded with the noise of “screams, lashes, and clank-
ing chains” (M. Smith 2). No wonder the song, like “Night winds in Geor-
gia,” sets o in Kabnis the feeling of a “weird chill” (81).
 Yet the weirdness or strangeness of these songs does not reside exclusively 
in their evocation of a violent past but also in their continual slippages into 
the realm of pure sound. In Cane, an unnamed female singer’s voice can be 
heard “rising and falling in a plaintive moan” and gradually “swell[ing] to 
shouting” (88); Fern “spatter[s] inarticulately in plaintive, convulsive sounds, 
mingled with calls to Christ Jesus” and then “s[i]ng[s] brokenly” (17) before 
she collapses into the narrator’s arms; King Barlo announces that Jesus is 
“awhisperin strange words deep down, O way down deep, deep in [his] ears,” 
and the audience joins him by humming “Fragments of melodies” (20–21). 
Shouts, hollers, moans, hums, and cries mix with onomatopoeic words un-
til words lose their meanings and language becomes indistinguishable from 
noise, as in “Cotton Song”:
Nassur; nassur,
Hump.
Eoho, eoho, roll away
We ain’t agwine t wait until Judgment Day! (10)
While these noises originate in the realm of black music and song—be it 
in the spirituals of the South or the jazz tunes of the North (“Ji-ji-bo, JI-JI-
BO!” [58])—they do not remain conned to it but seep into the structure 
of Toomer’s text. e “thuds” Sollors notices in “Bona and Paul” are soon 
joined by the “Whir. Whir” (71) of Bona’s dizzying head as she runs into Paul 
and, somewhat later in the same story, by the “Hi diddle, hi diddle” (76) of 
the jazz pianist in the Crimson Garden club. “Eohos” reverberate throughout 
Cane (9, 10, 55, 69) and mingle in the acoustic space of Toomer’s text with 
the “Hi! Yip!” and “Gedap” (10) of Carma’s mule wagon, the thunderous 
“Boom. Boom. BOOM!” (115) of Halsey’s workshop, the “mutter, laughs, 
utter, whishadwash” (61) of a theater audience before the performance be-
gins, the “chug-chug of a gas engine” (10), or Kabnis’s vocal expression of 
disgust: “Ugh” (84). Together, the repetition of these noises punctures the 
ow of the text, making it “rhythmical and syncopated” (70), like the thuds 
UP
F
CO
PY
The Noises of Modernist Form    /    93
of the men’s footfalls at the beginning of “Bona and Paul.” ese noises give 
the text a decidedly oral quality and thereby serve to remind readers of the 
vicissitudes of translating into a literary format what rst emerged in the 
context of oral tradition. ey restore the materiality of sound to African-
American vocalization and serve as traces of what remains inassimilable and 
desirably “strange” in the translation of speech, music, and song into the me-
dium of the literary text. e literary form of Cane, then, simultaneously 
documents an attempt to represent in literature that which ultimately re-
mains unrepresentable in writing (as opposed to the phonograph) and an act 
of linguistic resistance that testies to both Toomer’s proximity to Anglo-
American modernism and his literary independence. Moreover, the sound-
ing excess of Cane’s noises ssures the economy of restraint apparent in the 
text’s imagist moments. So while we need to be aware that their syncopated 
rhythms contribute to and participate in modernist strategies of repetition 
and communicative disruption that have their analogues in Anglo-American 
literature of the period, our recognition of the cultural specicity of African-
American sounding should guard us against conating the aesthetic projects 
of two related yet distinctive traditions in American literary modernism.13
ese noises mark an alterity whose origins must be sought in the context 
of slavery and beyond, in the African roots of African-American song and 
spirituality.
 In another important contribution to African-American literary modern-
ism, Zora Neale Hurston, in eir Eyes Were Watching God (1937), approach-
es the question of the translatability of oral culture into literature from a 
somewhat dierent angle. Henry Louis Gates Jr. brings out the dierences 
best when he credits Hurston with inventing what he calls the “speakerly 
text,” that is, “a text whose rhetorical strategy is designed to represent an 
oral literary tradition, designed to emulate the phonetic, grammatical, and 
lexical patterns of actual speech and produce the illusion of oral narration,” 
and when he argues that “Whereas Toomer’s Cane draws upon the black 
oral voice essentially as a dierent voice from the narrator’s, as a repository 
of socially distinct, contrapuntal meaning and beliefs, a speakerly text would 
seem to be oriented primarily toward imitating one of the numerous forms 
of oral narration to be found in classical Afro-American vernacular litera-
ture” (“Hurston” 165). is not only brings out the two authors’ distinctive 
uses of the oral tradition but also accounts for generic dierences between 
Toomer’s more lyrical and Hurston’s more narrative, “chatty,” writing style. 
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However, my own reading of Hurston’s novel diers from Gates’s in that it 
lays a stronger emphasis on remaining tensions in Hurston’s writing between 
culturally dierent linguistic registers than Gates’s notion of the speakerly 
text would seem to allow for in its conation of the oral and the literary, the 
spoken and the written.
 Eric Sundquist’s seminal To Wake the Nations: Race in the Making of 
American Literature provides a theoretical framework for such a reading, 
which avoids both Baker’s separatism and Sollors’s desire for unity.14 Follow-
ing Sundquist, my reading proposes a small contribution to the study of an 
interracially shared tradition in American literature that does not elide the 
dierences that bear the marks of a history of slavery, peonage, and racism 
underlying that tradition. More specically, while my reading of eir Eyes 
Were Watching God is heavily indebted to Sundquist’s reading of another 
text written by an African-American, W.E.B. Du Bois’s e Souls of Black 
Folk, it also insists on a commonality of concerns that links Hurston’s mod-
ernism to that of Dos Passos, Barnes, or Hemingway. Moreover, by insist-
ing on the multiplicity and complexity of the interrelations between oral 
and literary traditions, it also seeks to avoid what Baker rightly chastises in 
many accounts of the Harlem Renaissance as failure: the reduction of one 
culture to the terms and norms of the other (Baker 9–14). Rather than ask-
ing whether African-American modernism is as experimental, innovative, 
and iconoclastic as Anglo-American modernism (whether Hurston is as 
Poundian as Pound), I will examine their dierent strategies for reaching 
similar (representational, aesthetic) goals. As in Toomer, the question of the 
representability of the unrepresentable returns in Hurston in the guise of 
the translatability of the untranslatable, of the permutation of the oral into 
the literary, or, in other words, of the benets and costs of transforming 
noise into information.
 At the heart of Sundquist’s reading of e Souls of Black Folk is an inter-
rogation of the relations existing between the individual chapters’ arguments 
and the two epigraphs preceding each chapter, one of them a musical bar that 
reproduces part of an African-American spiritual, the other a more standard 
belletristic epigraph drawn from the Western tradition of “high” literature. 
Sundquist makes much of the fact that the spirituals are reproduced only 
in musical notation, without titles or lyrics. Only in Du Bois’s nal chapter, 
entitled “e Sorrow Songs,” are most of the musical epigraphs identied. 
e limited visibility of the spirituals in Du Bois’s text not only points to 
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their absence from standard literary histories but also suggests that their 
improvisatory nature and incorporation of noises (hollers, shouts, moan-
ing) cannot be captured accurately by standard forms of musical notation. 
An exploration of the multiple relations between the musical epigraphs, the 
belletristic epigraphs, and the arguments of Du Bois’s essays raises additional 
issues relating to the politics of cross-cultural representation.
 Sundquist draws on Franz Boas’s article “On Alternating Sounds” (1889) 
to discuss these issues. In this inuential essay, Boas charged fellow anthro-
pologists with “sound-blindness” (47) with regard to so-called alternating 
sounds. Boas argues that alternating sounds—apparently random phonetic 
variations in speech attributed by anthropologists to more “primitive” lan-
guages (for example, Inuktitut, Kwakiutl, Haida)—are a chimera produced 
by anthropologists whose culture-specic patterns of perception prevented 
them from recognizing the phonetic subtleties of another culture’s language. 
For instance, an observer may, as Boas himself did on various occasions, tran-
scribe a sound that is unknown in his own language and whose phonetic and 
acoustic qualities are somewhere between /m/ and /v/ as /m/ on one occa-
sion and as /v/ on another. Reviewing this and other examples, Boas con-
cludes that “there is no such phenomenon as synthetic or alternating sounds. 
[. . .] alternating sounds are in reality alternating apperceptions of one and 
the same sound” (52). In Sundquist’s reading of e Souls of Black Folk, the 
epigraphs function as alternating sounds in two respects:
Writing at a historical moment of bleak social and political prospects 
for African Americans, Du Bois marked the gulf between black and 
white America in many ways, not least in the blunt dialectical challenge 
of his epigraphs. At the interpretive level the paired epigraphs most 
oen act as a joint dialectical commentary on the individual chapters; 
in this respect they might (to cite Boas again) be styled “alternating 
sounds” in the simple sense that they provide a double gloss on Du 
Bois’s various essays in sociological and cultural analysis. [. . .] e mu-
sical epigraphs are [also] “alternating sounds” in the other sense that 
I have outlined already in the example of Chesnutt—an example of a 
cultural “language” (in this case black) that cannot be properly inter-
preted, or even “heard” at all, since it fails to correspond to the custom-
ary mapping of sounds and signs that make up the languages of the 
dominant (in this case white) culture. (468–70)
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Du Bois’s double strategy of reproducing only the musical bars of the spiri-
tuals—which in itself is already a gesture against ready appropriation—and 
bringing them into a relationship with both the belletristic epigraphs and 
his own scholarly arguments raises a host of questions surrounding issues 
of translatability and representability: To what degree is any textual repre-
sentation of spirituals a misrepresentation? What is lost in the translation
of African expression and experience into not only an African-American 
context but also into the recognizably Western formats of musical nota-
tion and academic prose? How, if at all, is the mixture of speech and music 
that characterizes much African-American expressivity to be rendered in 
print? Has not the phonograph—invented only eight years aer omas 
Wentworth Higginson published his groundbreaking Army Life in a Black 
Regiment (1869)—rendered any such endeavor obsolete?15 Du Bois was well 
aware that all of these questions had pertinence not only to a critique of 
white distortions of black culture (in minstrelsy, the plantation novel, eth-
nographic writings and recordings, or concert performances of spirituals for 
a predominantly white audience) but also to his own position as a spokes-
person for African-Americans (it is here that representation acquires its most 
literally political connotations). As Sundquist points out, the same complex 
of questions is activated when Du Bois reproduces “Do bana coba,” the song 
rst sung in his family, in the nal chapter of e Souls of Black Folk. Du Bois 
identies it as “primitive African music” (157), but its words are in no known 
African language:
e antiphonal relationship between word and music that structures 
the unfolding argument of e Souls of Black Folk, to expand an ear-
lier point, is an elaboration of the concept of vocalization—the alli-
ance of speech and music at the base of the African American artistic 
tradition. “Do bana coba” literalizes that vocalization as an unknown 
language beyond words, a cry out of the territory of sound that is trans-
geographical and Pan-African in the most elemental sense. It oers an 
ancestral equivalent for the cries and shouts, the laboring hollers, typi-
cally long, wavering single- or double-line calls, that were the basis for 
the black work song and consequently for some forms of the spiritual. 
And it locates in ancestral cultural gis never to be fully recovered the 
sign of dierence that was designated a “problem” by white commenta-
tors. (Sundquist 529–30)
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To talk about vocalization in terms of noise is emphatically not to fall prey 
to the primitivism of many Anglo-Saxon and European modernists but to 
evoke two distinct yet related senses of the word. First, it refers to the naming 
practices of those “white commentators” who conceive of African-American 
expressivity, particularly in its vocal and musical dimensions, as nothing but 
senseless, unintelligible noise. Noise in this sense describes an aggressive form 
of misapprehension that is linked to an imposition of one’s own norms and 
patterns of perception onto those of others—a process we have already seen 
at work in naturalist literature. Second, it refers to a culture’s mode of self-
description that stresses its dierence from another, oen dominant, culture. 
Noise in this sense validates precisely those moments of cultural expressivity 
that fall outside the parameters of a given norm, elements that, like noise in 
the channels of communication, grate and disturb the discourses they are 
introduced into so as to bring about the unpredictably new. It describes, in 
other words, the elements of negativity and communicative resistance in 
what Baker calls the deformation of mastery. As such, it may be (but need 
not be) a reaction against uses of the word noise in the rst sense and engage 
in what Salman Rushdie has described as a reappropriation of dominant 
language uses (402). To give an example from the realm of popular culture: 
When black hip hop artists Public Enemy released their second album, It 
Takes A Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back, in 1988, they titled the song in 
which they endorse Black Muslim leader Louis Farrakhan “Bring the Noise” 
(“Farrakhan’s a prophet and I think you ought to listen to / what he can say 
to you, what you ought to do”). Whatever one may think of Farrakhan’s poli-
tics, this is clearly more than an act of reclamation; it is a celebration of the 
dierent, inassimilable voice of dissent, a voice, moreover, whose prophecies 
are communicated via a medium—music—that has itself been described as 
“a herald of times to come” (Attali 4).
 e antiphonal play Eric Sundquist discerns in W.E.B. Du Bois’s e 
Souls of Black Folk returns in a dierent guise in Zora Neale Hurston’s eir 
Eyes Were Watching God. In Hurston, it is the interplay of orality and lit-
eracy that performs a function similar to Du Bois’s ingenious combination 
of music and text. Hurston’s decision to embed her narrative within a frame 
story (in which Janie tells her life story to Pheoby Watson) already brings 
oral and literary traditions into a dialogue. On the one hand, the frame story 
is a time-honored narrative device whose employment in world literature 
reaches from e Arabian Nights, with its close anity to oral storytelling, 
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to its metactional and highly “literary” transformation in John Barth’s Chi-
mera and beyond. On the other hand, the device of the frame story in eir 
Eyes Were Watching God serves to accentuate the oral dimension of Hurston’s 
narrative as a story that is told by someone to someone.
 Hurston deploys all the resources of the cra of ction to negotiate be-
tween dierent degrees of orality and literacy. e novel begins with an 
omniscient (and extradiegetic) narrative voice that introduces the diegetic 
narrator ( Janie) and the narratee (Pheoby) of Janie the character’s life story: 
“So at the beginning of this was a woman and she had come back from bury-
ing the dead” (9).16 e narrator is soon joined by the porch-sitters, whose 
judgmental comments, rendered in direct speech, provide more information 
on Janie. As we move from the narrative frame to Janie’s rst-person account 
of her life at the beginning of the second chapter, we are introduced to the 
direct speech of Janie’s vernacular: “Ah know exactly what Ah got to tell yuh, 
but it’s hard to know where to start at. Ah ain’t never seen mah papa. And 
Ah didn’t know ’im if Ah did” (20). Hurston remains in this mode for sev-
eral pages and seems almost reluctant to abandon the method of represent-
ing words in writing that is closest to speech. Only gradually do rst-person 
narrative and direct speech give way to third-person narrative and a mixture 
between direct discourse and other, more mediated forms of representing 
words and thoughts (free indirect discourse, indirect discourse, narratized 
discourse): “She [ Janie] thought awhile and decided that her conscious life 
had commenced at Nanny’s gate. On a late aernoon Nanny had called her 
to come inside the house because she had spied Janie letting Johnny Taylor 
kiss her over the gatepost” (23). But as if to counterbalance this more “liter-
ary” style, Hurston moves storytelling and a variety of signifyin(g) rituals 
to the center of her narrative as soon as Jody and Janie move to Eatonville. 
ese include the “mule talk” (85) surrounding Matt Bonner’s skinny, mean 
mule; the “eternal arguments” (99) between Sam Watson and Lige Moss; the 
“acting-out courtship” (105) of Charlie Jones; and the ensuing verbal spar-
ring between Jim and Dave. As Gates observes, the narrator’s voice recedes 
into the background in these scenes, giving full rein to Hurston’s celebration 
of oral performativity (“Hurston” 184).
 To be sure, from a narratological point of view, these rituals of speech are 
embedded in a complex narrative structure. In fact, some of them involve 
meta-metanarratives, that is, they include narratives that are embedded in 
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Janie’s narrative, which is itself embedded in the extradiegetic narrator’s nar-
rative:
[empirical author (Hurston)]
  [implied author]
   [extradiegetic narrator (omniscient)]
   [diegetic narrator ( Janie)]
    [metadiegetic narrator (“mule-talkers”)]
     meta-metadiegetic narrative (“mule talk”)
    [metadiegetic narratee (village audience)]
   [diegetic narratee (Pheoby)]
  [extradiegetic narratee]
  [implied reader]
[empirical reader]17
is structure is further complicated by the fact that, although Janie clearly 
is the (diegetic) narrator of her own life story, that story is for the most part 
told in the third person. As Hurston introduces elements of the black folk 
tradition into a highly intricate literary form—whose frame structure has 
distinctive roots in the oral tradition—the boundaries between the oral and 
the literary become blurred and Baker’s two strategies, the mastery of form 
and the deformation of mastery, inseparably intertwined.
eir Eyes Were Watching God is, like e Souls of Black Folk and Cane, 
what Baker calls a “singing book” (68), a form of cultural performance that 
manages to retain the sounds of African-American expressivity in its trans-
lation of the oral into the literary. roughout the novel, Hurston follows 
Charles W. Chesnutt’s advice to render the black vernacular “with such a 
degree of phonetic correctness as to suggest the sound” (qtd. in Baker 42; 
my emphasis). is endeavor extends beyond phonetic accuracy to include 
prosodic as well as paralinguistic features of African-American sounding. 
Hurston’s writing thus participates in “the establishment of a mode of sound-
ing reality that is identiably and self-consciously black and empowering” 
(Baker 71). When Janie’s grandmother, aer an argument with Janie, “half 
s[i]ng[s], half sob[s] a running chant-prayer over the head of the weeping 
girl” (29–30), when the crowd accompanying the mule’s carcass on its way to 
the grave is joyfully “shouting [. . .] advice and orders and useless comments” 
(95), when Janie’s sorrow over Jody’s impending death manifests itself in a 
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“deep sob” that sounds like “beating a bass drum in a hen house” and then 
rises “high like pulling in a trombone” (132), when Janie hears “someone 
humming like they were feeling for pitch” and then nds Tea Cake “mim-
icking the tuning of a guitar” (152), Hurston evokes the distinctive sounds 
of African-American vocalization, which nd their most compelling expres-
sion in the novel’s nal paragraph. Janie’s memories of Tea Cake reverberate 
beyond the end of the novel as they fuse with the sounds of grief and those 
of African-American sounding:
e day of the gun, and the bloody body, and the courthouse came and 
commenced to sing a sobbing sigh out of every corner in the room; out 
of each and every chair and thing. Commenced to sing, commenced 
to sob and sigh, singing and sobbing. en Tea Cake came prancing 
around her where she was and the song of the sigh ew out of the win-
dow and lit in the top of the pine trees. Tea Cake, with the sun for 
a shawl. Of course he wasn’t dead. He could never be dead until she 
herself had  nished feeling and thinking. (286)
Janie’s second husband, Joe Starks ( Jody), is presented as an unsympathetic 
gure not only in his jealousy, possessiveness, and sexism but, crucially, also 
in his aversion to black merrymaking and noise-making. Soon aer he is pro-
nounced mayor of the all-black town of Eatonville, Jody distances himself 
from its inhabitants’ vocal expressions of joy: “Ah wish mah people would 
git mo’ business in ’em and not spend so much time on foolishness. [. . .] it’s 
awful tuh see so many people don’t want nothin’ but uh full belly and uh 
place tuh lay down and sleep aerwards. It makes me sad sometimes and 
then agin it makes me mad. ey say things sometimes that tickles me nearly 
tuh death, but Ah won’t laugh jus’ tuh dis-incourage ’em” (99). What Jody, 
who “talks tuh unlettered folks wid books in his jaws” (79), fails to recognize 
is that the noises of laughter and ritualized communicative interaction have 
an important community-building function in the town of Eatonville; that 
they participate, as Tom Conley puts it in a dierent context, in “the vital 
function of ‘noise’” understood as “a circulation of energies in which a social 
order is given to function” (89).
 When Charlie announces to three pretty girls walking down the street, 
“Ah’m crazy about you. [. . .] Ah’ll do anything in the world except work for 
you and give you mah money,” he does it “to the entertainment of everybody” 
(105). e audience of Charlie’s mock courtship knows its score, too: “e 
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girls and everybody help laugh” (105). e verb “help” here indicates that the 
audience is aware of the importance of its participatory role. When Charlie’s 
attention shis to beautiful Daisy Blunt, he involves three more men in the 
verbal game: “Now Daisy, you know Jim, Dave and Lum is ’bout tuh kill one 
’nother ’bout you” (106). Two of them, Jim and Dave, take up the challenge 
aer a “big burst of laughter at Daisy’s discomture”: “e boys had to act 
out their rivalry too. Only this time, everybody knew they meant some of 
it. But all the same the porch enjoyed the play and helped out whenever ex-
tras were needed” (107). What started out as the verbal initiative of a single 
young man soon involves everybody in a shared, communal experience. Jody 
alone does not like what he sees and hears: “ere was one of those big blow-
out laughs and Janie was wallowing in it. en Jody ruined it all for her” 
(108) by sending her back inside the store. Janie eventually takes revenge 
by “playin’ de dozens” (123) on Jody, signifyin(g) upon his impotence. But 
only once she is in the Everglades with Tea Cake can she fully return to the 
joyful community of noisemakers: “All night now the jooks clanged and 
clamored. Pianos living three lifetimes in one. Blues made and used right on 
the spot. Dancing, ghting, singing, crying, laughing, winning and losing 
love every hour” (196–97). Her memories of Eatonville are tainted by her 
forced absence from that community: “e men held big arguments here 
like they used to do on the store porch. Only here, she could listen and laugh
and even talk some herself if she wanted to. She got so she could tell big 
stories herself from listening to the rest” (200). If Jody was at least partially 
successful in curbing Janie’s participation in her acoustic community, her 
newfound embracement of the role of storyteller—which, crucially, is also 
the role she occupies within the framing narrative—represents her liberation 
from these constraints, not unlike the way in which Hurston’s introduction 
of black vernacular into her writing represents her liberation from some of 
the constraints of the novelistic form.18 Jody’s estrangement from the Eaton-
ville community (if not his death) is therefore an instance of poetic justice 
not only in the light of the values and practices of Janie and the townspeople 
but also when measured against Hurston’s own writing practice.
 Jody’s disdain for the lively oral culture of Eatonville and his inability to 
grasp its community-building function gradually turn him into a stranger 
in the very town he is supposed to govern. Its inhabitants soon realize that 
the only sound Joe Starks tolerates is that of his own voice. As Sim Jones 
complains to Sam Watson (in words that register the acoustic dimensions 
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of Jody’s grasp for power): “Sam, you know dat all he do is big-belly round 
and tell other folks what tuh do. He loves obedience out of everybody under 
de sound of his voice” (78). Jody’s aloofness with regard to the townspeople 
and their noises is shown in an even less favorable light to the reader aer his 
death, when Mrs. Turner, whose hatred for people with skin of a darker hue 
than her own threatens to poison the atmosphere in the Everglades, repeats 
Joe Starks’s judgment: “Who wants to be mixed up wid uh rusty black man, 
and uh black woman goin’ down de street in all dem loud colors, and whoo-
pin’ and hollerin’ and laughin’ over nothin’? [. . .] Ah don’t go in no nigger 
store tuh buy nothin’ neither. Colored folks don’t know nothin’ ’bout no 
business. Deliver me!” (210–11). For her, too, it “was distressing to emerge 
from her inner temple and nd these black desecrators howling with laugh-
ter before the door” (216).
 Hurston has oen been accused of painting too bright a picture of 
African-American life in the rst half of the twentieth century. More serious-
ly, Richard Wright charged her with “voluntarily continu[ing] in her novel 
the tradition which was forced upon the Negro in the theater, that is, the 
minstrel technique that makes the ‘white folks’ laugh” (25).19 Her celebration 
of laughter as a central moment in African-American expressivity seems to 
lend further support to such claims. However, my own reading of eir Eyes 
Were Watching God follows critics like Sundquist or Baker, who discover sub-
versive potential in the literary or critical combination of cultural elements 
drawn from both sides of the color line. Hurston’s decision to portray a rela-
tively balanced rural black community rather than the viciousness of racism 
and urban destitution may appeal to white readers, but she always remains 
careful to negotiate between a more accommodating mastery of form (which 
does make use of “positive” stereotyping and works within the framework 
of a predominantly Western literary genre) and a more aggressive advertis-
ing of black folk tradition in the deformation of mastery (which unsettles 
the novelistic form by infusing elements foreign to the history of the novel 
within the Anglo-Saxon tradition). Paradoxically, it is in the culturally more 
specic deformation of mastery that Hurston’s aesthetic and political proj-
ect converges most clearly with the aesthetics of communicative resistance 
practiced by her white contemporaries.
 In Mosaic Modernism (2000), David Kadlec discerns a similar strategy 
in Hurston with regard to attempts to dene African-American identity. 
Again, it is her experimental blend of oral and literary modes that chal-
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lenges received ideas and forms. Kadlec explicitly links this strategy to the 
practice of modernist writing and narratological innovation in ways that 
supplement my own deliberations on narrative structure in eir Eyes Were 
Watching God. Kadlec makes the argument that Hurston’s revalorization of 
black folk tradition—far from pandering to a white audience—enables her 
to transcend the binarism of contemporary discourses on African-American 
identity, in which it seemed that one had to choose between racial determin-
ism (blackness as biologically given) or cultural determinism (blackness as 
socially constructed): “In the face of the failure of race and culture alike, 
Hurston believed that Negro identity lay in the discursive performance of 
materials upon which no rm claims to possession could be laid. It was this 
belief that enabled her to signicantly extend the modern novel’s narrative 
showings” (215). In particular her mixing of black vernacular and literary 
language—which is also a mixing of predominantly black linguistic registers 
and predominantly white ones—subverts the determinisms of race/nature 
and culture/nurture.
 Kadlec’s main focus is on Hurston’s employment of free indirect dis-
course, which, in its conation of the voice of narrator and character, exem-
plies this mixing and eects this subversion.20 A case in point is the passage 
where Janie expresses sorrow over Jody’s agony on the deathbed:
So Janie began to think of Death. [. . .] What need has Death for a 
cover, and what winds can blow against him? He stands in his high 
house that overlooks the world. Stands watchful and motionless all 
day with his sword drawn back, waiting for the messenger to bid him 
come. [. . .] She was liable to nd a feather from [Death’s] wings lying 
in her yard any day now. She was sad and afraid too. Poor Jody! He 
ought not to have to wrassle in there by himself. (eir Eyes 129; qtd. 
in Kadlec 216)
As Kadlec points out, “wrassle” marks the transition from highly stylized 
biblical imagery and language to black vernacular idiom as the narrative and 
the gural voice fuse in the passage’s two nal sentences. Hurston’s intro-
duction of free indirect discourse into African-American literature marks a 
modernist literary innovation with political reverberations: “As suggested by 
the big-picture talkers who approach culture with caution in eir Eyes Were 
Watching God, Hurston recognized that performative oral practices could 
serve to cut through the hegemony of universals like nature and nurture, and 
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she eventually channeled this awareness into a new type of modern literary 
narrative” (Kadlec 209). We may add to this that the remaining strangeness 
of the word wrassle serves to remind readers of an insight for which the read-
er, Zora Neale Hurston, as well as Jean Toomer are indebted to Hurston’s 
teacher Franz Boas: that no cultural language can be fully understood, inter-
preted, or codied in terms of another, and that the residual dierence may 
be harnessed to bring about the new, be it in anthropological investigation 
or modernist literary innovation.
 As we move from the rural world of Hurston’s Eatonville to the urban, in-
dustrialized spaces of Dos Passos’s 1919, we cannot fail to notice the massive 
dierences between two texts published only ve years apart. e rst and 
most readily apparent dierence concerns the ethnic composition of their 
respective sets of characters. In Hurston, all characters are black. In Dos Pas-
sos, all title characters of the ctional narratives—and thus all major char-
acters—are native-born whites. Blacks join immigrants as the foil against 
which some of the whites’ racist practices and attitudes ( Joe Williams’s con-
stant use of racial epithets; Daughter’s diatribes against immigrants; a con-
struction boss’s talk of “kike[s]” and “wops” [343]) are revealed.21 A second 
important dierence between the two texts lies in their dierent imagina-
tions of community. While the characters of eir Eyes Were Watching God 
form a tightly knit, organic community against whose values and norms a 
character like Jody may be judged, no such social cohesion or shared out-
look exists within either 1919 or the geographically more limited Manhat-
tan Transfer. Dos Passos’s urban characters are alienated, isolated subjects 
of a technological modernity that has largely bypassed the inhabitants of 
Hurston’s rural southern town.
 From a literary-historical perspective, though, the most fundamental dif-
ferences between 1919 and eir Eyes Were Watching God lie in their formal 
organizations. e montage technique of Dos Passos’s Newsreels, the im-
pressionistic, associative ordering of sense impressions in his Camera Eyes, 
and the indeterminate shis between prose and poetry in his biographical 
sketches of public gures rupture the narrative ow to such an extent that 
Hurston’s more linear mode of storytelling may seem antiquated in com-
parison. Moreover, the four-part structure of 1919 (Newsreels, Camera Eyes, 
biographical sketches of public gures, ctional narratives) introduces gaps 
into the ctional narratives and opens up multiple possibilities of connec-
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tion between the four parts and their segments that necessitate the reader’s 
participation in the construction of meaning to a greater degree than Hur-
ston’s textual structures.22 Finally, Dos Passos’s text displays far more of the 
linguistic self-reexivity that we have come to associate with a certain type 
of modernist writing in the presence of the typewriter. Unlike Hurston, Dos 
Passos dissects words, combines them into new units, breaks up sentence 
structures, and juxtaposes widely divergent genres, linguistic styles, and reg-
isters.
 To draw up this list of dierences, inconclusive as it is, is to ask the ques-
tion of whether we are not dealing with two entirely separate traditions of 
modernist writing. But once we reconceptualize Dos Passos’s formal inno-
vations in communicational terms, the distance between his project and 
Hurston’s becomes smaller. Such a reading stresses that Dos Passos’s strate-
gic interruptions of the narrative ow in three of the novel’s four discourses 
represent a challenge to and disturbance of conventional forms of literary 
communication (between text and reader, between text and wider cultural 
congurations) that have their counterpart in Hurston’s infusion of oral 
modes of narration into a literary text. In this reading, Dos Passos’s mul-
tiple morphological, syntactic, and genre-related dislocations inject noise 
into dominant (literary, cultural, political) discourses within modernity, 
unsettling those discourses with strategies that range from the mastery of 
form (in Dos Passos’s more parodic and satirical moments, particularly in 
“e Body of an American”) to the deformation of mastery (in his inclu-
sion of working-class perspectives and voices of dissent). Most important, a 
communicational approach allows us to understand Dos Passos’s staging of 
conicting viewpoints and ideologies as the source of an interference that 
functions analogous to Hurston’s antiphonal play and has a similar innova-
tory aesthetic as well as political potential. To talk about conicts between 
dierent ways of representing and interpreting the world in terms of commu-
nicational interference is no mere gure of thought. As we take a closer look 
at the literary representation of such conicts, particularly in Dos Passos, we 
learn that their manifestations in social space include a crucially important 
acoustic dimension. In Dos Passos, the source of this noise lies less in ethnic 
and cultural dierences and tensions—even though these are addressed via 
the immigrant and nonwhite characters—than in the more narrowly politi-
cal debates about U.S. participation in the First World War.
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Conquests of Acoustic Space
As the German political scientist Manfred Henningsen pointed out in 1980: 
“the experiential and symbolic insignicance of the Great War in contempo-
rary America contrasts with the outbursts of passion, the demagoguery and 
propaganda the war once managed to provoke. is atmosphere of agita-
tion and excitement was so complete that it seeped from politics and news 
journalism into literature, academic publishing, universities and churches” 
(368; my translation).23 While America’s entry into World War I was sup-
ported by a majority of Americans by 1917, a signicant and vocal minority 
remained ercely opposed to U.S. military intervention in Europe: “Radicals 
and socialists opposed entry into a struggle between rival capitalist cliques; 
liberals and pacists hated the destruction caused by war, especially over a 
matter that had no obvious bearing on American life; many ethnic groups 
denounced any attempt to align the United States with countries they hated 
for reasons of their past or present misdeeds. German and Irish voting blocs 
were both committed to preventing any assistance to the British Empire” 
(P. Jenkins 201).24 Yet any opposition to the war eort was greeted with 
erce repression:
there was extreme hostility to the slightest expression of doubt or criti-
cism about the course of war. [. . .] Radicals and paci sts began a lively 
propaganda campaign against the war and the dra, but in June 1917 
the federal government passed a draconian Espionage Act that severely 
limited any such criticism. is was enforced ruthlessly: by the post 
oce, which refused to carry seditious literature in the mail; by local 
and state police, who raided socialist and IWW oces; and by private 
groups, who denounced any suspicious or “un-American” behavior, by 
which was commonly meant the slightest association with unorthodox 
or foreign ideas. (P. Jenkins 204)
Dos Passos’s 1919, the second book in his U.S.A. trilogy—whose title refers 
to the Versailles Peace Treaty conference—constitutes literary modernism’s 
pivotal retrospective contribution to those struggles and debates. Dos 
Passos captures the prevalent political atmosphere when he has the Red 
Cross ocial Major Moorehouse—a character who for Lisa Nanney “epito-
mizes the betrayal of the original promises of America and the distortion 
of the ‘old words’ of the nation’s founding by the massive forces of industry 
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and government” (181)—explain his views on those opposing the war: “e 
trouble now was that people didn’t know enough about what a valuable ef-
fort the Red Cross workers were making and were too prone to listen to the 
criticisms of proGermans working under the mask of pacism and knockers 
and slackers always ready to carp and criticize” (1919 174). In the heated de-
bates of the time, few dierentiations were being made; being a pacist was 
for many the equivalent of being “a proGerman or a Bolshevik or some god-
dam thing” (187). On the other side of the fray, calls for “the dictatorship of 
the proletariat” (12) and “la revolution mondiale” (304) were made with in-
creasing intensity. e tensions increased during the war and were followed 
by some of the most violent race and labor conicts in the nation’s history. 
e state responded with massive repression. Dos Passos puts it bluntly: “To 
be a red in the summer of 1919 was worse than being a hun or a pacist in the 
summer of 1917” (367).25
 Dos Passos’s novel is less a book about World War I than about the com-
peting discourses surrounding U.S. involvement in it. Accordingly, compared 
to Crane’s e Red Badge of Courage, little martial noise is represented in 1919. 
True, Dos Passos’s acoustic portraits of World War I reect the technological 
changes that brought about noise in heretofore unimagined proportions. 
His description of an aerial bombing shares Crane’s anthropomorphizing 
imagination:
Some Austrian planes that had been droning overhead suddenly cut 
o­ their motors and dumped a load of bombs right in front of them. 
e antiaircra guns had been barking for some time and shrapnel 
sparkling in the moonhazy sky overhead but they’d been too drunk to 
notice. One bomb fell geump into the Brenta and the others  lled the 
space in front of the window with red leaping glare and shook the villa 
with three roaring snorts. Plaster fell from the ceiling. ey could hear 
the tiles skittering down o­ the roof overhead. (157)
More oen, though, “e guns soun[d] quiet and distant” (148), and char-
acters are both mentally and spatially far removed from the scene of battle: 
“Eveline sat up on a sort of table. She was so excited looking at the people and 
listening to the distant snort of the bombs that she hardly noticed that colo-
nel [sic] was squeezing her knee a little more than was necessary” (106).26 e 
noises 1919 does register are more those of the social and political conicts 
that coincided with or stemmed from America’s military intervention in Eu-
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rope. More oen than not, these conicts are fought out in civilian rather 
than military space. Dos Passos provides their ugliness in all its graphic and 
acoustic detail. During the general strike in Paris, demonstrators attack their 
opponents by “throwing stones and bits of cast iron at the fancydressed re-
publican guards hissing whistling poking at the horses with umbrellas” (319). 
When the police force cracks down on an IWW meeting in Everett, we hear 
“the crack of saps on men’s skulls” (349). e socialist Ben Compton passes 
out under “Blows with clubs and riebutts” that are “splitting his ears” (350). 
In a later passage, soldiers returning from the war celebrate Armistice Day 
by cutting o union activist Wesley Everest’s “penis and testicles [. . .] with a 
razor.” Everest is reduced to “a great scream of pain” before the mob “hang[s] 
him from the bridge in the glare of the headlights” (369).27
 e clashes between antiwar protesters, strikers, and the Wobblies on one 
side of the fence and military ocials, the police, and an angry mob on the 
other ll the acoustic space of Dos Passos’s text. e noisy urban mobs and 
crowds—still identied in Norris and Dreiser almost exclusively with leist 
agitators—now make themselves heard on both sides of the battle line. In 
Dos Passos, the urban crowd is no longer necessarily a threat to the social 
and political order; more oen it speaks in its defense. When Joe Williams 
is arrested under suspicion of being a German spy, an anonymous crowd is 
there to pass judgment on him: “‘Look at the lthy ’un,’ one man said. A 
woman hissed, there were a couple of boos and a catcall” (24). e scenario 
is repeated on a larger scale when Joe and other men suspected of dodg-
ing the dra are walked along Broadway by the police: “ey were quite a 
bunch being marched down Broadway; smart guys in the crowd of clerks and 
counterjumpers along the sidewalks yelled ‘Slackers’ at them and the girls 
hissed and booed” (122). is is the same kind of crowd that welcomes Presi-
dent Wilson with “handclapping and patriotic cheers” when he returns from 
the Versailles Peace Treaty conference, while the other crowd, “the working 
stis” and the Wobblies, “let him pass in silence” (198).
 at the ghts fought over the interpretation of the war are also ghts for 
dominance over acoustic space (which can, as the previous example shows, 
take the form of silence) becomes clearest in the songs and marches of the op-
posing factions. While Italian bands are “practicing e Star-Spangled Ban-
ner” (295) in anticipation of U.S. president Wilson’s visit to Rome, crowds 
in Paris are “singing the International” (319) at the First of May demonstra-
tions. As the
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GOLDEN VOICE OF CARUSO SWELLS IN
VICTORY SONG TO CROWDS ON STREETS (228)
strikers confronting strikebreakers and the police in New York have dier-
ent concerns and dierent songs: “Some of the strikers were singing Solidar-
ity Forever, others were yelling Scabs, Scabs and making funny long jeering 
hoots” (219). While a newspaper announces that “Bands will play while a 
vast throng marches happily to the rhythm of wartime anthems and airs” 
(82), a cacophony of shouts, songs, and noises erupts on the streets of Paris: 
“at the Gare de l’Est they’re singing the International entire the gendarmerie 
nationale is making its way slowly down Magenta into stones whistles bits of 
iron the International Mort aux Vaches” (319). e “throaty roar of the Rus-
sian Marseillaise” (140), the “tremendous roar of the Marian Internationale” 
(142) can be heard throughout 1919, marking the presence of oppositional 
forms of sounding and the need of crowds to reassure themselves of their 
continued existence as a crowd by making noise.28
 One important insight that emerges from analyzing Dos Passos’s staging 
of acoustic conicts is that noise is an astonishingly eective method of as-
serting one specic individual’s or group’s dominance not only over acoustic 
space but, more specically, over the lives of other individuals or groups. In 
1919, the noises that powerful social actors make continually compete with 
and threaten to drown out the voices of the dispossessed. Michel Serres is 
correct in saying that “one must make more noise than the others in order 
for one’s shout of no more noise to be heard and for the others to obey. One 
must demonstrate more fury to strike fear into fury. Neither noise nor fury 
ever ceases, even under the dominion of those who claim to eliminate them. 
e latter have simply monopolized the noise” (Genesis 74). But Serres’s 
philosophical account must be supplemented by the soundscape studies of 
scholars like R. Murray Schafer or Bruce R. Smith, who document the ac-
tual conquest of physical space by physical noise in various centuries, rang-
ing from Smith’s enquiries into “how successful” Queen Elizabeth I was “in 
dominating the auditory eld” (250) in early modern England to Hitler’s 
assertion that the NSDAP “should not have conquered Germany without 
[. . .] the loudspeaker” (qtd. in Schafer, Tuning 91).
 Noise blurs the distinction between material and discursive eects as it 
conquers material, physical space and at the same time becomes part of an 
attempt to assert one social actor’s meanings, interpretations, and ideologies 
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against the vocal opposition of another.29 A good example of such a blurring 
is the use of the factory whistle, which is revealed in 1919 as a blunt but eec-
tive tool of social control. When Ben Compton and his fellow construction 
workers go on strike, their superiors employ this simple device in an attempt 
to impose their own conditions: “Any man who wasn’t on his job next time 
the whistle blew was red and would have to get a move on and remember 
that the State of Pennsylvania had vagrancy laws.” And the strategy works: 
“When the whistle blew again everybody went back to work except Ben and 
Nick” (343). Like church bells or a teacher’s clapping of hands, the factory 
whistle belongs to the “little world of signals” (166) Michel Foucault has 
analyzed as crucial to the ordering of time, presence, and work as well as the 
disciplining of bodies in religious communities, the army, schools, factories, 
hospitals, and prisons.30
 e most powerful assertions of personal, political, and ideological agen-
das in the acoustic world of 1919 occur, however, at the level of the songs 
sung by the competing factions. eir importance in 1919 is underlined by 
Dos Passos’s dedication of a biographical sketch to Joe Hill, a songwriter of 
the early unionist movement. Contrary to political speeches or manifestos, 
the ideological force of songs does not derive from any intellectual interven-
tion in the political debates surrounding the war. ey are powerful precisely 
because they circulate below and beyond the level of reasoned argument.31
Particularly the songs supportive of the ocial war rhetoric are shown to rely 
less on the powers of reasoned debate or even persuasion than on those of 
suggestion:
Keep the home res burning
Till the boys come home [. . .]
While our hearts are yearning [. . .]
ough the boys are far away
ey long for home
ere’s a silver lining
rough the dark clouds shining [. . .]
Turn the bright inside out
 Till the boys come home (272–73)
Of course, we may quite readily ascribe a more or less specic ideological 
agenda to the national anthem, to “Keep the Home Fires Burning,” or other 
patriotic war songs like “Onward Christian Soldiers” (140), “Over ere” 
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(317), or “America I Love You” (375),32 but their political impact is ground-
ed in their (mis)recognition by those who sing them as an articulation of 
common sense rather than ideology. Aer all, what parents would not want 
their children to return from the war? Another way of saying this is that the 
ideological content of these songs is the oen unspoken presuppositions and 
assumptions that are armed, more oen unconsciously than consciously, 
whenever the songs are sung.33 In the case of “Keep the Home Fires Burn-
ing,” it is the promise of postwar domestic bliss that obscures the underlying 
assumption that the state actually has the right to send “the boys” to war in 
the rst place. e more acoustic space this song conquers—that is, the more 
individuals and groups reinforce its presence in collective memory through 
repetition—the more successfully it manages to displace protests against this 
assumption with a discursive construction of a community united by fearful 
hope.34
 In the Newsreels of 1919, with which he meant to capture “the clamor, the 
sound of daily life” (qtd. in Nanney 193), Dos Passos challenges in various 
ways the commonsensical assumptions and hidden ideological content car-
ried by these songs.35 For instance, he inverts a dominant strategy of repre-
sentation by identifying the ocial (rather than the oppositional) discourse 
with so much noise: “when they return home what will our war veterans 
think of the American who babbles about some vague new order, while
dabbling in the sand of shoal water” (1). In other passages, he uses parody 
to dispute the patriotic songs’ conquest of acoustic space. A case in point 
is Sardinaglia’s parodic deation of military marches in his self-composed 
“march of the medical colonels”: “Tenente Sardinaglia was under arrest in 
his quarters up there for two days making up a little march on his mandolin 
that he called the march of the medical colonels. Serrati told them about it 
giggling behind his hand while they were waiting for the other ocers to 
come to mess” (158). But Dos Passos’s most eective strategy of opposition 
to the patriotic war songs emerges when he sets them next to more obviously 
ideologically charged songs like the Internationale. Brought into a dialogue 
with these openly political songs, the songs that repeat and reinforce the 
ocial war rhetoric lose their innocence, and their unspoken assumptions 
are revealed as the ideological messages they are. When, for instance, Dos 
Passos has Irving Berlin’s popular “Don’t Bite the Hand at’s Feeding You” 
compete with the Internationale in the acoustic space of his novel, the war 
song’s nationalism and xenophobic sentiments are thrown into sharp(er) re-
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lief against the socialist anthem’s bid for international solidarity and its claim 
to speak on behalf of the whole human race (an aspect that is reinforced by 
the anthem’s multilingual rendition):
If you don’t like your Uncle Sammy
If you don’t like the red white and blue [. . .]
If you don’t like the stars in Old Glory
en go back to your land across the sea
To the land om which you came
Whatever be its name [. . .]
If you don’t like the red white and blue
en don’t act like the cur in the story
Don’t bite the hand that’s feeding you. (82–83)
’Tis the nal conict
Let each stand in his place
e international party
Shall be the human race (322)
C’est la lutte nale
 Groupons-nous et demain
L’internationale
 Sera le genre humain (321)
 Alternatively, a song like “I Love My Country Indeed I Do” challenges 
the tacit understanding of Berlin’s song that objectors to the war are either 
slackers or un-American:
I love my country indeed I do
But this war is making me blue
I like ghtin ghtin’s my name
But ghtin is the least about this ghtin game (231)
 Within the ctional soundscape of Dos Passos’s novel, the labor song 
“We Meet Today in Freedom’s Cause” is a particularly interesting case of 
oppositional sounding. is song is sung to the tune of Philip Paul Bliss’s 
“Hold the Fort,” a song “based on the events of a Civil War battle in October 
1864 near Atlanta, GA” (Tubb par. 2). ough its lyrics refer to the causes of 
trade unionists and have nothing in common with the words for “Hold the 
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Fort,” Unionist soldiers in the Civil War could equally well have sung them. 
In its evocation of the historical context and music of the Civil War, “We 
Meet Today in Freedom’s Cause” reclaims the rhetoric of the just battle that 
the patriotic war songs sought to arrogate to themselves. In reclaiming the 
heritage of the Civil War as well as a discourse of freedom, the labor song 
challenges the symbolic claims of songs like the national anthem, “America I 
Love You,” or the patriotic hymn and former national anthem “My Country 
’Tis of ee”:
America I love you
 You’re like a sweetheart of mine [. . .]
From ocean to ocean
 For you my devotion
Is touching each boundary line [. . .]
Just like a little baby
Climbing its mother’s knee [. . .]
America I love you [. . .]
And there’s a hundred million others like me (374–75)
My country ’tis of thee
Sweet land of libertee
Of thee I sing (365)
Hold the fort for we are coming
Union men be strong;
Side by side we battle onward,
Victory will come. [. . .]
We meet today in Freedom’s cause
And raise our voices high
We’ll join our hands in union strong
To battle or to die—[. . .]
Hold the fort we are coming
Union men be strong (362–63)
 Dos Passos’s evocation of discourses surrounding the Civil War points to 
a crucial dierence between his and Stephen Crane’s ctional treatment of 
war. e two authors started from fundamentally dierent premises: While 
the Civil War was fought over a cause—the abolition of slavery—widely 
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recognized as just, no such straightforward justication for the loss of hu-
man lives could be adduced for U.S. military involvement in World War I. 
Moreover, the pacist movement that opposed U.S. entry into World War I 
simply did not exist in the historical context of the Civil War. Precisely be-
cause of the widespread perception of the Civil War as a just war, Crane was 
forced to oer his war critique by indirect means. Crane could hardly attack 
the ocial rhetoric without nding himself aligned with the most reaction-
ary voices. Instead, he chose to completely elide ocial justications for the 
war, making an absence the scandal of his text. Dos Passos, on the other 
hand, directly tackles the state rhetoric with an array of literary strategies 
that include, for instance, his rendition of an alternative soldier song that ex-
plodes the myth of a nation unied by the war eort. In his variation on “I’ll 
Tell You Where ey Are,” a popular song among soldiers in the trenches of 
World War I (Rickheit), the patriotic “we” of the “Uncle Sam” song (“And 
then by God we’ll all go to Chermanee”) gives way to the divided “you” and 
“they” of battleeld reality:
Oh old Uncle Sam
 He’s got the infantree
He’s got the cavalree
 He’s got artilleree
And then by God we’ll all go to Chermanee
God Help Kaiser Bill! (78)
If you want to nd the generals
 I know where they are
If you want to nd the generals
 I know where they are [. . .]
I saw them
 I saw them
Down in the
 Deep dugout (334–35)
 In other passages, Dos Passos transposes the conict between competing 
forms of ideological sounding into a character’s consciousness. Paxton Hib-
ben, the brilliant thinker from a wealthy family who turned to socialism, 
mentally arms the voices of the downtrodden and excluded against the 
sounds of the war propaganda: “got to Chicago in time to hear them singing 
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Onward Christian Soldiers at the convention in the Colosseum; in the close-
packed voices and the cheers, he heard the trample of the Russian Marseil-
laise, the sullen silence of Mexican peons, Colombian Indians waiting for a 
deliverer, in the reverberance of the hymn he heard the measured cadences 
of the Declaration of Independence” (140–41).
 In still other passages, conicts are fought out more in the eld of intel-
lectual debate. e following variation on the Internationale is one of the 
more opaque examples:
Arise ye pris’ners of starvation
Arise ye wretched of the earth
For justice thunders condemnation
A qui la Faunte se le Beurre est Cher? (321)
 e nal line is recognizably French, but in the form Dos Passos ren-
ders it, it is gibberish that should read “A qui la faute si le beurre est cher?” 
(Whose fault is it when butter is expensive?). In its normalized form, it al-
ludes to Frédéric Bastiat’s “Protectionism, or the ree Aldermen” (1848), a 
short pamphlet in dramatic form against economic protectionism. Bastiat, a 
nineteenth-century free-trade advocate, satirist, and popularizer of econom-
ics, reduces to absurdity the arguments of protectionists by having his dra-
matic character Paul, one of the title’s three aldermen, suggest to his col-
leagues that the production of butter be moved to Paris. When John asks 
how butter produced in urban Paris could possibly compete with butter from 
rural Normandy, Paul replies: “From tomorrow on, I shall demand protection; 
I shall persuade the commune to keep butter from Normandy and Brittany 
from entering Paris. en the people will either have to get along without it 
or buy mine, and at my price, too” (Bastiat 232). In Bastiat’s play, the three 
aldermen succeed in convincing the town council to prohibit the importa-
tion of wood, butter, and meat so as to be able to establish production of 
these goods in the midst of Paris—with the result that wood, butter, and 
meat become so expensive that Parisians have to spend all their earnings on 
these three products. Twenty years later, Paris is an economically devastated 
woodland overrun by cows and pigs. e answer the play’s only sane char-
acter and “hero,” the appropriately named Jacques Bonhomme, gives to the 
question “A qui la faute si le beurre est cher?” is: the economic absurdity of 
protectionism. As Bonhomme puts it: “If butter is dear, it is not because you 
are paying high wages to the workers; it is not even because you are making 
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big prots; it is solely because Paris is ill-situated for that industry, because 
you insisted that people produce in the city what they should be producing 
in the country, and in the country what used to be produced in the city” 
(240).
 By defamiliarizing the words of the question and reducing them to noise, 
Dos Passos not only pokes fun at the style and content of Bastiat’s economic 
treatises—aer all, as some of the passages quoted above show, Dos Passos 
is himself a master of the reductio ad absurdum—but also suggests that we 
might have to look for new answers to the question. e text of the Interna-
tionale (into which the Bastiat quote is inserted) provides such an answer: 
if the price of butter is high, it is not the fault of economic protectionism 
but, as the French version of the socialist anthem has it, of “les corbeaux, les 
vautours,” the ravens and vultures of the capitalist class. Likewise, the solu-
tion to the problem is not to be sought, as Bastiat suggests, in the “spacious 
atmosphere of free trade” (238) but in the abolition of private property, the 
creation, that is, of a political order in which “La terre n’appartient qu’aux 
hommes.”
 In Dos Passos’s novel, oppositional songs produce noise on several inter-
related levels. In the most literal sense, the conuence of hundreds of voices 
singing the Internationale at the top of their lungs during a demonstration 
produces a considerable amount of physical noise that reverberates through 
the city streets. Yet even if we refuse to designate these songs as noise and 
insist on their musical qualities, they contribute to the production of noise 
as they clash with ocial forms of sounding. ey are perceived as a commu-
nicational interference with patriotic war songs and national anthems both 
by those who sing them and those who hear them, no matter what side of 
the fray the senders and addressees are on. is interference is a noise or a 
dissonance that is political and acoustic at the same time. It is an equivoca-
tion as Roland Barthes denes it in S/Z, an interference between two mu-
tually incompatible understandings or interpretations of the wor(l)d (145). 
Finally, Dos Passos’s reproduction of songs within the written medium of 
the literary text produces yet a further dissonance between an oral medium 
that is less codied and codiable (note the signicant dierences in vo-
cabulary between dierent renditions of the Internationale, particularly but 
not only in various translations) than the written medium it interacts with. 
Literature, Dos Passos knows, cannot store sounds with the precision of the 
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phonograph, but it can bring them into a productive tension with the old 
technology of writing. Dos Passos’s treatment of songs in his novel is in this 
respect similar to Toomer’s and Hurston’s integration of African-American 
sounding in their texts, although the attribution of literary and oral media 
is less clear-cut in Dos Passos’s antiphonal play and occurs along the lines of 
class rather than race.
 Many of the passages discussed so far participate in the modernist aes-
thetics of fragmentation that characterizes the four-part structure of 1919 as 
a whole. As is indicated by the large number of elision markers ([. . .]) in my 
song quotes, parts of these songs are scattered throughout the Newsreels. In 
using the montage technique, Dos Passos achieves interesting combinations 
of widely divergent ideological signals, resulting in ironic juxtapositions like 
the following:
MACHINEGUNS MOW DOWN MOBS
IN KNOXVILLE
America I love you (375)
 His use of hyperbole (“LENINE SHOT BY TROTSKY IN DRUNKEN 
BRAWL” [272]) and understatement (“BOLSHEVIKS ABOLISH POST-
AGE STAMPS” [272]) to subvert the newspapers’ screaming headlines and 
their discursive contribution to and proliferation of the Red Scare (“I.W.W. 
IN PLOT TO KILL WILSON” [267]; “HOW TO DEAL WITH BOL-
SHEVISTS? SHOOT THEM! POLES’ WAY!” [232]) is not speci cally 
modernist, but it imitates and parodies the fragmented form and brashness 
of the newspaper front page. e same can, of course, be said about the liter-
ary montages of the Newsreels as a whole. Other strategies of fragmentation 
include the syntactic dislocations that inform the impressions of the general 
strike in Paris (quoted above), the constant switching between di­erent lan-
guages, and this morphological assault on the words of “Onward Christian 
Soldiers”:
On     ward Christian so     old     gers
March     ing as to war (114)
 Dos Passos saw the political potential in modernist formal innovation 
when he called the movement “an explosion [. . .] that had an inuence in its 
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sphere comparable with that of the October revolution in social organiza-
tion and politics” (qtd. in Nanney 10). is relationship between aesthetics 
and politics deserves a closer look.
 e formal ruptures of 1919 not only reproduce the social and discursive 
tensions within the empirical reality the novel is a part of and comments on, 
and their function is by no means conned to a subversive fragmentation of 
dominant ways of making sense. Neither are they solely mimesis of the nega-
tive, as Brian Lee argues with regard to the Newsreels: “what they induce in 
the reader—and are surely meant to induce—is nausea, dened by Sartre as 
the subject’s inability to digest its experience by reecting on it. eir ran-
dom, indeterminate, neutral presentation reects a world which is in itself 
impenetrable, unalterable, and devoid of essential meaning” (212–13). Dos 
Passos’s disintegration of linear narrative is also a performance of negativ-
ity in Adorno’s sense. Its fragmentary form withholds the gratications of a 
linear plot structure and narrative resolution. It admits social reality into its 
ctional realm only in a highly distorted form, thereby rendering its tensions 
and conicts inaccessible to the readerly desire for instant comprehensibility. 
It forestalls easy appropriation and assimilation of both its own structures 
of meaning and those of the social reality whose structures it reproduces. It 
withdraws into its own aesthetic sphere while remaining deeply social, clos-
ing itself o so as to function all the more eectively as a form of social com-
mentary. Dos Passos’s 1919 is literature as noise that conforms to Adorno’s 
dictum that “Real denunciation is probably only a capacity of form” (Aes-
thetic 230) and exemplies his claim that “Art’s asociality is the determinate 
negation of a determinate society” (226).
 is does not imply that U.S.A. refuses to engage with the historical “re-
ality” of the United States. As Hartwig Isernhagen’s discussion of U.S.A. in 
Ästhetische Innovation und Kulturkritik: Das Frühwerk von John Dos Passos 
1916–1938 (1983) makes clear, negativity, cultural critique, and historiograph-
ical reection are closely linked in Dos Passos’s aesthetics. U.S.A.’s formal 
ruptures can be read as much as an interrogation of the representability of 
history as a critical comment on the fragmented nature of its object of repre-
sentation (the U.S.A.). e trilogy’s four discourses oer competing models 
of writing history—history as substance in the Newsreels and Camera Eyes 
versus history as linear process in the biographical sketches and ctional 
narratives; history as something that is “made” by public actors in a series 
of decisions in the biographical sketches versus history as something one 
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undergoes as a result of changes in one’s personal circumstances in the c-
tional narratives; and so on—that, “taken together, [. . .] emerge as negations 
and refusals of conventional historiography” (Isernhagen, Ästhetische Inno-
vation 171; my translation). Dos Passos’s formal innovations thus challenge 
not only realist modes of writing but also modes of representing history that 
share with literary realism a preference for narrative continuity and linearity. 
is combined challenge of aesthetic and historiographical critique raises 
questions about the legitimacy of dierent representations of the world. Yet 
Dos Passos’s cultural critique does not exhaust itself in exposing the uses and 
abuses of language, and it is not only concerned with social actors’ varying 
claims to “own” the legitimate or correct interpretation of social reality but, 
crucially, also documents the very loss of authentic language:
e systematic relationship between the four discourses lies in the fact 
that they all emerge as reduced forms of holistic historiography that, 
even when taken individually, already signal their deciency by evok-
ing conventions of ction-writing without conforming to them. e 
most general unity of the oeuvre is given, then, at the very abstract level 
of implicit reection on its own use of language and the very possibil-
ity of language. Particularly this second aspect can be linked—via the 
notion of negativity—with the works’ thematic language critique and, 
by extension, their cultural critique. (Isernhagen, Ästhetische Innova-
tion 200–201; my translation)
While Adorno nds the critical potential of modernist art in its recalci-
trant form, Isernhagen’s reading of U.S.A. allows us to specify the trilogy’s 
critical potential as historiographical, representational, and cultural in scope 
and to locate it at the intersections between the trilogy’s four discourses. 
What Roland Barthes’ deliberations in S/Z add to these observations is a 
communicational perspective that allows us to recognize that the negativ-
ity of modernist literature frequently arises out of an interference between 
incompatible understandings or ways of making sense. My own reading of 
1919 identies the origin of such interferences as much between as within 
and across the text’s four discourses, in the noisy clashes between dierent 
social actors’ attempts to stake their claims in the available acoustic space. 
Unlike his naturalist precursors (with the exception of Crane), Dos Passos is 
not content with depicting the noisy social conicts in the city but lets the 
noise of social discontent seep into the formal organization of his text. It is in 
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this respect that 1919 is an “art of noise” in Barthes’ sense: what Dos Passos’s 
reader feeds on is “A defect in communication, [a] decient message; what 
the whole structuration erects for him and oers him as the most precious 
nourishment is a countercommunication” (S/Z 145). It is this (structural, for-
mal) noise that distinguishes Dos Passos’s representation of social conict 
and its (physical) noises most perceptibly from many a naturalist’s anxious 
strategies of containment. By breaking up the smooth ow of the narrative, 
he lets this noise sound within and beyond the connes of the literary text 
without reconciling the interferences by the imposition of conciliatory liter-
ary form.
 In 1919, this noise is not conned to the Newsreels, where headlines, frag-
ments of news stories, short ctional accounts, and political songs collide in 
a cacophony of voices, but it extends to the associative ordering of memory 
traces in the Camera Eyes, to the montage technique in the biographical 
sketches as well as to the struggles over acoustic territory fought out in the 
ctional narratives.36 As I have argued above, Dos Passos’s representations 
of the physical, audible noise of strikes, state violence, and demonstrations 
form an integral part of his modernist aesthetics, but the textual noises of 
1919 also encompass the interspersed passages from Marx’s Capital and Marx 
and Engels’s Manifesto of the Communist Party in the Ben Compton chapter 
(339, 345, 348, 351, 357) and the repetitions of words, phrases, and sentences 
throughout the novel. His most brilliant and most extended employment of 
modernist strategies of fragmentation, though, occurs in the nal (quasi-) 
biographical sketch.
 My analysis of “e Body of an American” remains concerned with the 
politics of literary representation but takes us beyond our investigation of 
Dos Passos’s ctional soundscapes. In this brief sketch, his critique clearly 
goes further than “a reaction to a cultural situation perceived in unspeci-
ed ways as in need of innovation” (Isernhagen Ästhetische Innovation 213; 
my translation) but challenges more specically and aggressively a dominant 
discourse’s representational claims. Dos Passos uses complex literary strate-
gies to subvert the ocial rhetoric surrounding the gure of the Unknown 
Soldier. Starting in the rst paragraph, the language of the ocial discourse 
is defamiliarized by running words together, thus forcing readers to linger 
on a discourse whose emptiness is exposed as we pay closer attention to its 
wording:
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Whereasthe Congressoheunitedstates byaconcurrentresolution-
adoptedon the4thdayofmarch lastauthorizedthe Secretaryofwar to 
cause to be brought to theunitedstatesthe body of an American who-
wasamemberoftheamericanexpeditionaryforcesineuropewholosthis 
lifeduringtheworldwarandwhoseidentityhasnot beenestablished for 
burial inthememorialamphitheatreohe nationalcemeteryatarlington-
virginia. (375)
e ocial construction of a unied representative dead soldier is disman-
tled as Dos Passos insists on the multiplicity of heterogeneous, irreducible 
identities the Unknown Soldier is made to stand in for:
John Doe was born
 and raised in Brooklyn, in Memphis, near the lakefront in Cleveland, 
Ohio, in the stench of the stockyards in Chi, on Beacon Hill, in an old 
brick house in Alexandria Virginia, on Telegraph Hill, in a halim-
bered Tudor cottage in Portland the city of roses (376)
His portrayal of the mutilated, fragmented body of the supposedly repre-
sentative soldier further serves to undermine that body’s claim to represen-
tativeness. As the individual dead soldier’s identity is dismantled, so is that of 
his quasi-mythical enlargement: “how can you tell a guy’s a hundredpercent 
when all you’ve got’s a gunnysack full of bones, bronze buttons stamped with 
the screaming eagle and a pair of roll puttees?” (375). By pointing out the ex-
clusionary logic that went into the selection of the stand-in, Dos Passos fur-
ther subverts the logic of the ocial substitute: “Make sure he ain’t a dinge, 
boys, make sure he ain’t a guinea or a kike” (375). e deconstruction of the 
ocial discourse proceeds as Dos Passos juxtaposes it with another discourse 
that insists on the less than glorious details of the soldier’s army life. Again, 
Dos Passos defamiliarizes the ocial rhetoric, this time by listing the phrases 
of military speech in fragmentary form and divorced from their original con-
text: “Atten’SHUN suck in your gut you c———r wipe that smile o your 
face eyes right wattjy think dis is a choirch-social. ForwarD’ARCH” (377). 
Dos Passos’s strategy takes a dierent turn as he insists on the materiality 
of bodily suering in his depiction of the soldier’s dying. He here reverses 
his former approach, restoring the soldier’s corporeal identity rather than 
dismantling its ctive construction:
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e blood ran into the ground, the brains oozed out of the cracked 
skull and were licked up by the trenchrats, the belly swelled and raised 
a generation of bluebottle ies,
and the incorruptible skeleton,
 and the scraps of dried viscera and skin bundled in khaki. (379)
By the time Dos Passos has President Harding evoke the name of God in 
ironic incongruity during the burial of the unknown and unnamed soldier 
(“Our Father which art in heaven hallowed be thy name” [377]), the wartime 
rhetoric has been fractured beyond repair.
 e most specic critique in 1919, however, is leveled not against the 
state’s abuse of language but against the collusion of the war eort with pri-
vate as well as public business interests. Much more explicitly than Crane, 
Dos Passos critically reviews the “extraordinary industrial growth of our 
nation since the Civil War” (1919 273) and identies the same processes at 
work during and immediately aer World War I, a war described by Ben 
Compton as “a crazy unnecessary war that nobody can benet from except 
bankers and munition makers” (356). While Stephen Crane’s exposure of 
the military-industrial complex was still largely implicit, conned to his 
use of industrial metaphors in representing the noises of the Civil War, Dos 
Passos much more openly indicts the entanglement between war and indus-
try. Hemingway’s depiction of World War I in A Farewell to Arms (1929) is 
in this respect closer to Crane than to Dos Passos. Hemingway’s use of in-
dustrial metaphors and anthropomorphizing imagery is reminiscent of e 
Red Badge of Courage: “rough the other noise I heard a cough, then came 
the chuh-chuh-chuh-chuh—then there was a ash, as when a blast-furnace 
door is swung open, and a roar that started white and went red and on and 
on in a rushing wind” (50).
 Dos Passos’s critique is at the same time more straightforward and more 
reective, ranging over all discourses except the Camera Eyes—where a simi-
lar degree of explicit critical reection would have been hardly compatible 
with the stream-of-consciousness technique. Several of the headlines in the 
Newsreels point out the close ties between war and business interests in no 
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BONDS BUY BULLETS BUY BONDS (77)
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY STIMULATED BY WAR (144)
NO DROP IN PRICES TO FOLLOW PEACE SAY BUSINESS 
MEN (276)
Sometimes, Dos Passos’s critique of war proteering is voiced by characters 
in the ctional narratives who are clearly enraged by that state of aairs. Jerry 
Burnham, the American war correspondent who at one point saves Eveline 
Hutchins from a French colonel’s rude advances, provides a case in point: 
“But the war won’t ever be over . . . too damn protable, do you get me? Back 
home they’re coining money, the British are coining money; even the French, 
look at Bordeaux and Toulouse and Marseilles coining money and the god-
dam politicians, all of ’em got bank accounts in Amsterdam and Barcelona, 
the sons of bitches” (172). In other passages, the war proteers themselves 
reveal the close ties between civilian and wartime industrial production even 
as they attempt to deny them. When J. Ward Moorehouse, the former Red 
Cross major who turns the skills he acquired during wartime to prot as an 
“adviser on public relations and publicity to big corporations like Standard 
Oil” (313), asserts before the press that international capitalism is the only 
true guarantor of peace, the reader does not have to resort to complex inter-
pretive strategies to expose the major’s assertion as the self-serving lie it is: “a 
working agreement had been reached between certain American oil produc-
ers and perhaps the Royal Dutch-Shell, oh, no, of course not to set prices but 
as proof of a new era of international cooperation that was dawning in which 
great aggregations of capital would work together for peace and democracy, 
against reactionaries and militarists on the one hand and against the bloody 
forces of bolshevism on the other” (372).
 Ironically, the venue at which the inextricable intertwinement between 
military strategy and the interests of big business becomes most apparent is 
the Versailles Peace Treaty conference. Mr. Rasmussen, another “Standard 
Oil man” (301), puts it most bluntly: “‘I have positive information that [the 
British] can’t hold Baku without heavy reinforcements and there’s no one UP
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they can get them from except from us.’ [. . .] He kept talking about Baku and 
Mohommarah and Mosul, how the Anglo-Persian and the Royal Dutch were 
getting ahead of the U.S. in the Near East. [. . .] ‘We stand to lose our primacy 
in world oil production’” (241–42).37 But Dos Passos’s critique does not rest 
at an indictment of big business’s illegitimate interferences in the peace talks. 
In his highly polemical biographical sketch of President Woodrow Wilson, 
entitled “Meester Veelson,” Dos Passos exposes the political agenda of the 
Peace Conference itself as a series of ruthless business deals:
ree old men shuing the pack,
dealing out the cards: [. . .]
machine gun  re and arson
starvation, lice, cholera, typhus;
oil was trumps. (197)
 Just how damning Dos Passos’s judgment of Wilson’s war politics is be-
comes apparent when he repeats the same lines in another biographical 
sketch on the “House of Morgan,” thus identifying Wilson as a war proteer 
of Morgan’s stature:
(Wars and panics on the stock exchange,
machinegun re and arson,
bankruptcies, warloans,
starvation, lice, cholera and typhus:
good growing weather for the House of Morgan.) (271)
 In 1919, the Morgan family represents the immoral epitome of the en-
tanglement between war and business. Retracing the history of that famous 
house, Dos Passos exposes its rise to fame as grounded in the prots it drew 
from other people’s disasters. In this light, the Morgans’ war loans during 
World War I appear as nothing but a logical extension of their involvement 
in the Civil War. Aer J. Pierpont Morgan’s demise in 1913, the Morgan dy-
nasty—identied by historian Philip Jenkins as “yet another war proteer 
from the 1860s” (173)—continues its participation in the business of war un-
der the leadership of his son, J. P. Morgan: “By 1917 the Allies had borrowed 
one billion, ninehundred million dollars through the House of Morgan: 
we went overseas for democracy and the ag; and by the end of the Peace 
Conference the phrase J.P. Morgan suggests had compulsion over a power of 
seventyfour billion dollars” (1919 271).
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e Noise of the City Machine
As in Crane, Dos Passos’s thematization and critique of the military-indus-
trial complex constitutes one of the main links between his war narrative and 
his city novel. As far as individual characters are concerned, George Bald-
win, the opportunistic lawyer of Manhattan Transfer, is equally cognizant 
of the intimate relationship between warfare and business interests as Major 
Moorehouse of 1919. While Ellen atcher still struggles to fathom the sig-
nicance of the events in Sarajevo, Baldwin is already calculating the war’s 
possible eect on the stock market:
Sarajevo, the word stuck in her throat when she tried to say it [. . .]
 “It’s terrible to think of, terrible,” George Baldwin was groaning. “e 
Street’ll go plumb to hell . . . ey’ll close the Stock Exchange, only 
thing to do.” (Manhattan Transfer 199)
But Dos Passos’s understanding of the links between industrialization, -
nance, and war reaches deeper than his indictment of war proteering. In 
Manhattan Transfer as well as 1919, the increasing mechanization of indus-
trial societies itself is portrayed as a threat to human lives. In this light, the 
unnamed Red Cross ocial’s use of industrial metaphors as he shouts down 
the mildly pacist opinions of Richard Ellsworth Savage perhaps unwitting-
ly betrays an insight on Dos Passos’s part (if not necessarily the ocial’s) into 
the potentially violent force of the machine:
Young man, [. . .] your opinions, while showing a senseless and cow-
ardly turn of mind, don’t matter. e American people is out to get 
the kaiser. We are bending every nerve and every energy towards that 
end; anybody who gets in the way of the great machine the energy and 
devotion of a hundred million patriots is building towards the stainless 
purpose of saving civilization from the Huns will be mashed like a y. 
I’m surprised that a collegebred man like you hasn’t more sense. Don’t 
monkey with the buzzsaw. (1919 163)
e motif of the violent machine informs Manhattan Transfer as much as 
it does Crane’s e Red Badge of Courage and Norris’s McTeague.38 In Dos 
Passos’s New York, citizens are almost routinely knocked down by automo-
biles. When Bud Korpenning, one of the downtrodden characters who will 
end his life by suicide, arrives at the scene of a dispute between a car driver 
and enraged pedestrians, he asks one of the onlookers:
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“Wassa matter?”
“Hell I dunno . . . One o them automoebile riots I guess. Aint you read 
the paper? I don’t blame em do you? What right have those golblamed 
automoebiles got racin round the city knocking down wimmen an chil-
dren?”
“Gosh do they do that?”
“Sure they do.” (34)
Gus McNiel, the milkman, is almost killed by a train:
“Hay dere for crissake . . .” a man is yelling at Gus from the curb. “Look 
out for de cars!”
A yelling mouth gaping under a visored cap, a green ag waving. “God-
amighty I’m on the tracks.” He yanks the horse’s head round. A crash 
rips the wagon behind him. Cars, the gelding, a green ag, red houses 
whirl and crumble into blackness. (53)
Trains in particular are represented as dangerous machines that emit vio-
lently loud noises. e elevated “shoots” (51) or “thunder[s] overhead” (51), 
sending “Jagged oblongs of harsh sound” (148) breaking over New Yorkers’ 
heads. Its noises are perceived as nothing less than “annihilating clatter” (21). 
Returning from an X-ray treatment and being warned by a friend about the 
dangers of contracting cancer as a result, Ruth Prynne envisions the people 
in the subway she rides on her way home as a “trainload of jiggling corpses, 
nodding and swaying as the express roared shrilly towards Ninetysixth 
Street” (266). As in the previous examples, the acoustic impressions add to 
her perception of the train as a vehicle of destruction and death.
 As Heinz Ickstadt (70) and other critics have noted, Dos Passos portrays 
the city itself as a relentless machine. For Dos Passos’s characters, the big city 
is no longer the space of dreams and innite possibilities it still represented 
for Dreiser’s Carrie,39 but a brute mechanical force. Already the novel’s very 
rst epigraph likens immigrants arriving in New York to apples crushed by a 
machine amid a welter of noises:
ree gulls wheel above the broken boxes, orangerinds, spoiled cabbage 
heads that heave between the splintered plank walls, the green waves 
spume under the round bow as the ferry, skidding on the tide, crashes, 
gulps the broken water, slides, settles slowly into the slip. Handwinches 
whirl with jingle of chains. Gates fold upwards, feet step out across the 
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crack, men and women press through the manuresmelling wooden tun-
nel of the ferryhouse, crushed and jostling like apples fed down a chute 
into a press. (15)
As for the unnamed Japanese governor who visited the city for the rst time 
in 1920, many an immigrant’s “rst impression of New York” must have been 
“its noise” (qtd. in E. ompson 115).
 In Manhattan Transfer, New York becomes a totalized machine whose 
impersonal force poses a very tangible threat to those who, unlike Jimmy 
Herf, choose to remain in it. Its deleterious eect on Dos Passos’s characters 
reaches well beyond the hazards of trac-related or industrial accidents and 
noise pollution. e nal chapter demonstrates most conclusively the dehu-
manization of its victims, who become nothing but mechanical appendages 
to the city machine. e words, actions, and thoughts of Ellen atcher and 
George Baldwin during their nal encounter testify to their almost com-
pletely reied existence. Checking her makeup in the ladies’ room before 
dinner, Ellen keeps “winding up a hypothetical dollself ” (334) that rigidies 
into a “photograph of herself in her own place, forever frozen into a single 
gesture,” a “porcelain gure” (335), as she takes her seat at the dinner table. 
George’s nal confession describes a state they both know all too well: “God 
if you knew how empty life had been for so many years. I’ve been like a tin 
mechanical toy, all hollow inside” (336). Volker Klotz captures the machine-
like nature of both the city and its inhabitants most succinctly when he states 
that Dos Passos’s New York “is a motorized construct that either assigns hu-
man beings functionality as parts or ejects them if they do not function” 
(320; my translation).40
 In Manhattan Transfer, the modernist topos of alienation is inseparable 
from the mechanization of the industrial city and its population. Robert C. 
Rosen sees the alienation of its characters reproduced in the novel’s frag-
mented form:
Dos Passos’s method of portraying characters—including, to some ex-
tent, Jimmy and Ellen—make much the same point as the novel’s over-
all structure. What Blanche Gelfant calls the “impressionistic method 
of creating character,” a “strict selection of isolated moments for drama-
tization,” reveals disordered, alienated lives. Because Dos Passos shows 
us only disjointed fragments of a character’s life, motives are oen ob-
scure or attenuated, feelings seem momentary and trivial. We rarely see 
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thought preceding action; characters tend to respond to immediate 
stimuli. e dehumanizing nature of the city is revealed through the 
hollowness of its victims. (43)
To Rosen’s observation—which recalls Adorno’s contention that experimen-
tal modernist form “refuses to mollify alienation in the image” (Aesthetic 
145)—we may add that the novel’s formal organization itself has anities 
with the conguration of a mechanical device. Its metallic precision, its in-
terlocking systems of otherwise isolated parts, its repetitive structure (for 
instance, the novel’s rst epigraph, quoted above, is reproduced in the “Roll-
ercoaster” chapter [229]), its carefully constructed tripartite organization 
(titles, epigraphs, texts), and the rate at which scenes interchange betray the 
creative impulses of a literary engineer. Michael Gold’s largely negative re-
view, published in the New Masses in 1926, captures this aspect better than 
many of the novel’s advocates: “is novel ies and hurries so, like an express 
train, it has such a sti schedule to maintain, it swoops and maneuvers like a 
stunt aeroplane, that maybe slow and peasant-minded people cannot follow 
easily. e method is too new and experimental. But read the book twice 
and the method conveys its own emotion—the zoom of the aeroplane ight 
over a city” (73). Manhattan Transfer is a good example of Richard Poirier’s 
observation about the anity between technology and modernist writing: 
“All literature is to some degree aware of itself as a technology. But literary 
modernism thrusts this awareness upon us and to an unprecedented degree 
asks us to experience the enormous diculties of mastering a technology” 
(113). By 1925, modernist literature had fully absorbed the impact of the pho-
nograph and lm—two technologies that emerged around the turn of the 
century and challenged the “immemorial monopoly of textual data process-
ing” with the result that “the technical status of books themselves” (Kittler, 
“A Discourse” 157) was revealed as writing became visible as one medium 
among others. In its assimilation of the technological principle, Dos Passos’s 
novel anticipates and goes beyond Hart Crane’s 1930 call for poetry to
absorb the machine, i.e., acclimatize it as naturally and casually as trees, 
cattle, galleons, castles and all other human associations of the past  
[. . .]. For, contrary to general prejudice, the wonderment experienced 
in watching nose dives is of less immediate creative promise to poetry 
than the familiar gesture of a motorist in the modest act of shiing 
gears. I mean to say that mere romantic speculation in the power and 
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beauty of machinery keeps it at a continual remove; it can not act cre-
atively in our lives until, like the unconscious nervous responses of our 
bodies, its connotations emanate from within—forming as spontane-
ous a terminology of poetic reference as the bucolic world of pasture, 
plow, and barn. (64)
In Manhattan Transfer, the machine does not solely provide “a terminology 
of poetic reference” but also a blueprint for artistic creation. Once we recog-
nize the presence of a machine aesthetic in Manhattan Transfer, Dos Passos’s 
judgment of the industrial metropolis emerges as far more ambivalent than 
my foregoing discussion suggests.41 True, Dos Passos does not celebrate the 
noises of industrial progress in the vein of Luigi Russolo, the futurist theorist 
and musician who laid out his concept for a fusion of classical music with 
environmental noise in e Art of Noises (1913)—and Manhattan Transfer 
certainly shares none of Russolo’s protofascist glorication of ags, whips, 
and warfare:42
In antiquity, life was nothing but silence. Noise was really not born be-
fore the 19th century, with the advent of machinery. Today noise reigns 
supreme over human sensibility. [. . .] In the pounding atmosphere of 
great cities as well as in the formerly silent countryside, machines cre-
ate today such a large number of varied noises that pure sound, with 
its littleness and its monotony, now fails to arouse any emotion. [. . .] 
Let’s walk together through a great modern capital, with the ear more 
attentive than the eye, and we will vary the pleasures of our sensibili-
ties by distinguishing among the gurglings of water, air and gas inside 
metallic pipes, the rumbling and rattlings of engines breathing with 
obvious animal spirits, the rising and falling of pistons, the stridency of 
mechanical saws, the loud jumping of trolleys on their rails, the snap-
ping of whips, the whipping of ags. We will have fun imagining our 
orchestration of department stores’ sliding doors, the hubbub of the 
crowds, the dierent roars of railroad stations, iron foundries, textile 
mills, printing houses, power plants and subways. And we must not 
forget the very new noises of Modern Warfare. (Russolo 3–8; qtd. in 
Schafer, Tuning 110–11)
But to say that “Manhattan Transfer expresses radical disaection with the 
city” (Lehan 238) does not tell the whole story either, for it neglects Dos 
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Passos’s appreciation of the energy, vitality, and beauty of the city machine 
expressed, for instance, in this lyrical evocation of the sights, smells, and 
sounds of New York:
Across the zinc water the tall walls, the birchlike cluster of down-
town buildings shimmered up the rosy morning like a sound of horns 
through a chocolatebrown haze. As the boat drew near the buildings 
densened to a granite mountain split with knifecut canyons. e ferry 
passed close to a tubby steamer that rode at anchor listing towards Stan 
so that he could see all the decks. An Ellis Island tug was alongside. A 
stale smell came from the decks packed with upturned faces like a load 
of melons. ree gulls wheeled complaining. A gull soared in a spiral, 
white wings caught the sun, the gull skimmed motionless in whitegold 
light. e rim of the sun had risen above the plumcolored band of 
clouds behind East New York. A million windows ashed with light. 
A rasp and a humming came from the city. (229)
is New York is not solely a “City of Destruction” (327) and a “crazy epi-
leptic town” (178) that reduces its inhabitants to machines; it is at the same 
time an intensely beautiful, if awed, monument to modernity. Aer all, this 
is the city whose noises had moved the French immigrant Edgard Varèse to 
compose his Amériques (1921), a magnicent, noise-infested musical tribute 
to New York at the beginning of the Roaring Twenties (Kahn 86–87). In 
Manhattan Transfer, the architect Phil Sandbourne’s plans to improve the 
cityscape also express Dos Passos’s belief in the redeemability of New York. 
Fittingly, Sandbourne’s vocabulary is that of modernist innovation:
Do you remember years ago old man Specker used to talk about vit-
reous and superenameled tile? Well I’ve been workin on his formula 
out at Hollis . . . A friend of mine there has a two thousand degree 
oven he bakes pottery in. I think it can be put on a commercial basis 
. . . Man it would revolutionize the whole industry. Combined with 
concrete it would enormously increase the exibility of the materials 
at the architects’ disposal. We could make tile any color, size or  nish 
. . . Imagine this city when all the buildings instead of bein dirty gray 
were ornamented with vivid colors. Imagine bands of scarlet round the 
entablatures of skyscrapers. Colored tile would revolutionize the whole 
life of the city . . . Instead of fallin back on the orders or on gothic or 
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romanesque decorations we could evolve new designs, new colors, new 
forms. (234)
While Dos Passos would seek to distance himself from Sandbourne’s com-
mercial impulses, he and his character share a belief in the integrability of 
artistic creation and technological expertise.43 To discover with Dos Passos 
something of the aesthetic potential of the industrial city and its machines, 
we need to be careful not to conate the (implied) author’s perspective with 
Jimmy Herf ’s grim assessment.44 Only then can we appreciate the funda-
mentally ambivalent nature of Dos Passos’s comment on technological mo-
dernity; only then do we see that a determination to aestheticize the ugly 
exists side by side with his sharp awareness of and compassion for the victims 
of industrial progress.
Darkness
Not unlike Dos Passos’s Manhattan Transfer and 1919, Djuna Barnes’s Night-
wood (1936) gives a voice to the outcasts and dissenters who remain outside 
the parameters of ocial culture. But while Dos Passos’s unionists, pacists, 
underprivileged, and beggars mainly come to life in their confrontations 
with representatives of ocial culture (patriots, bankers, industrialists, poli-
ticians), Barnes’s lesbians, transvestites, Jews, and circus performers inhabit 
physical and mental worlds that are largely their own (Robin’s nightworld 
and bestial nature, O’Connor’s monologues and lthy room, Felix’s obses-
sion with history, the circus scene).45 Rather than portraying her characters 
within a framework of social conict, pitting the voices and songs of one 
group against those of another (as Dos Passos does in 1919) or the destitu-
tion of a Bud Korpenning against the decadent frivolities of a colonel’s party 
(staged by Dos Passos in adjoining passages of Manhattan Transfer), Barnes 
delves deep into the strange, idiosyncratic worlds of her outsiders. Accord-
ingly, the noises of her ction are of a dierent kind: they do not, as in Dos 
Passos, emerge from an interference between antagonistic ways of interpret-
ing the world but from a struggle to represent her subject matter and the 
dierentness of her characters’ speech, thoughts, and actions.
 Barnes chooses to dwell among those who are neither seen nor heard. 
As is also indicated by the title of her novel as well as its constant refer-
ences to darkness and the night, she is as much interested in questions of 
visibility as in questions of audibility. In fact, Nightwood can be read as an 
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extended artistic exploration of the limits of representability.46 My reading 
of Nightwood will therefore have to move beyond the eld of acoustics into 
more general issues of representation and include questions of visuality and 
visualization. is will allow me to situate the foregoing discussion of mod-
ernist literature in a broader framework. e end of this section returns to 
more specically acoustic issues.
 Barnes’s probing of the limits of representation informs four dierent yet 
related levels of her text. First, her foregrounding of the “negative” side of 
some of the fundamental antitheses that structure Judeo-Christian think-
ing (heterosexuality and homosexuality, cleanliness and dirt, innocence and 
guilt, sobriety and intoxication, day and night, life and death, chastity and 
sexuality) thematizes that which to many only forms the unspoken or (for 
reasons of conventional morality) unspeakable background against which 
the thinking and speaking of the “positive” becomes possible. Second, char-
acters like Robin Vote, Matthew O’Connor, and Guido Volkbein fall outside 
the representational conventions of ocial culture, whose clinical terms (the 
invert, the homosexual, the mentally ill) name one aspect of their dierence 
but fail to capture the intensity and richness of their existence.47 Barnes reg-
isters the unrepresentability of her cast of outcasts in conventional terms 
in the fragmented, associative, and darkly gurative language of her novel. 
ird, while Nightwood was certainly not the rst work of ction to explore 
lesbian relationships,48 it is, as Carolyn Allen argues convincingly, forma-
tive of a specic, post-Steinian tradition of female writing that explores the 
dynamics of lesbian love and sexuality from a “theoretical” angle, that is, 
through “representations of women’s erotics” that “contribute to personal 
and political knowledges in particular sociohistorical formations” (3).49 As 
such a pioneering text, Nightwood manages to say that which has not been 
said before, that which is, in other words, only just becoming represent-
able. Finally, there is a profound sense of loss and emptiness at the center of 
Barnes’s narrative. Her characters’ desires revolve around lost objects (Robin 
for Nora, Robin and aristocracy for Felix) or, in O’Connor’s case, around 
a painful existential void. O’Connor’s torrential monologues, Nora’s acts 
of remembrance, and Felix’s impersonations of aristocracy are all desperate 
attempts to ll the emptiness. But only O’Connor recognizes the futility 
of these attempts. His pain reaches deeper because only he is aware of the 
more fundamental nature of human misery: “No man needs curing of his 
individual sickness; his universal malady is what he should look to” (32). He 
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knows that even if Nora’s or Felix’s representations managed to make present 
the lost object rather than its irrecoverable absence, they would be faced with 
a deeper abyss of meaninglessness that lurks beneath the more immediate 
tragedy of personal loss.50 O’Connor’s verbosity may have therapeutic uses, 
but his recognition of the universal nature of human misery, expressed in his 
conviction that “the world is [. . .] about nothing” (124), points to a dierent 
reading of his monologues as a struggle to represent that nothingness.
 Once we recognize that O’Connor’s struggle with (rather than for) words 
is part of Barnes’s larger project of probing the limits and impasses of repre-
sentation, his gure moves toward the center of critical attention. O’Connor 
is no artist gure in the strict sense, but his verbal brilliance, self-reexivity, 
and iconoclastic negativity make it possible to read a number of his pro-
nouncements as critical reections on modernist writing. Charles Baxter’s 
“A Self-Consuming Light: Nightwood and the Crisis of Modernism” (1974) 
argues most forcefully for a reading along those lines. Baxter’s reading of 
Nightwood as an extended reection on the diculties and impasses of mod-
ernist writing raises important issues with regard to modernism’s interest 
in problems of representation and form. For Baxter, O’Connor’s seemingly 
inexhaustible eloquence, displayed in his rambling monologues, exempli-
es the plight of the modernist artist whose verbal brilliance cannot hide 
the emptiness that lurks behind the words. Like self-referential and self-
contained modernist works of art, his monologues retreat from reality and 
turn back upon themselves. Like the modernist artist, he shuts himself o 
from the possibility of a genuine dialogue with his audience, retreating fur-
ther from the world of experience, hiding in his lthy room, and increasing 
his own pain and isolation:
By means of the now-familiar Jamesian purication of technique, the 
ontological status of the Image, and the artist’s detachment from his 
work, the Modernist writer—especially the novelist—eectively cuts 
o the channels that lead from the creation to a universe of discourse. 
e novelist’s art shields the work and gives it an independent life. 
But such Being exists in a closed universe where the novel can talk 
only to itself, usually about its own isolation. Technical lavishness then 
increases in direct proportion to the narcissism of the work. Matthew 
O’Connor, consequently, speaks not only for the artist of Modernism 
(and in the language appropriate to it) but also for the work in which 
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he appears. Nightwood explains its condition through him; he is like 
a medium at a prolonged séance. And what the novel says, as chapter 
follows chapter, is that it is being suocated by its own remoteness.  
[. . .] Its autotelia closes it o from reciprocal information; language 
looks into a mirror and sees only itself. Indeed, O’Connor’s last ex-
tended lament in the novel concerns such a depletion, his habit of 
emptying himself of and with words that have lost their magical prop-
erties and exist, like the autoerotic, in a self-contained and self-refer-
ential state. Such speech is consequently by and large exhibitionistic. 
(Baxter 1176, 1181)
ere is much to disagree with in Baxter’s article, including his persistent use 
of sexual metaphors to describe modernist writing (autoeroticism, exhibi-
tionism); his tendency to equate same-sex love with narcissism; his dismissal 
of Robin Vote as “a false double in a novel packed with counterfeits” (1179); 
his persistent but never unequivocal insinuation that Nightwood is a poetic 
failure. But if we are prepared to lay our initial embarrassment and outrage 
aside, we will nd that Baxter’s ideologically dubious and psychologically 
absurd analogies obscure what is otherwise a valid point of departure for 
critics of this dark and dicult modernist text.
 Baxter’s reading accords with the fundamentally dark atmosphere of 
Barnes’s text, a text that is preoccupied with the “universal malady” (32) of 
humankind, with the “gap in ‘world pain’ through which the singular falls 
continually and forever” (51), with characters “who are full to the gorge with 
misery” (83), a text that has O’Connor, the self-pronounced “god of dark-
ness” (126), and Robin Vote, “a gure of doom” (41), at its center and her son, 
Guido, “an addict to death” (107), on its periphery. Moreover, it manages to 
establish a link between the novel’s dark tone and the numerous passages 
that suggest an anity between O’Connor and professional storytellers of 
the past and present, some of them noted by Baxter. e doctor’s full name, 
“Dr. Matthew-Mighty-grain-of-salt-Dante-O’Connor” (80) links him to 
the Italian poet of the late Middle Ages, his rapt discourse on the night to 
the German Romantic Novalis and his “Hymnen an die Nacht.” O’Connor 
is at least as much an Irish storyteller who “tell[s] the story of the world to 
the world” (161) as a “medical student” (14), and his warning not to “ma[k]e 
the literal error” (89) as well as his claim to be “the greatest liar this side of the 
moon, telling my stories to people like [Nora]” (135) seem to predispose him 
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toward the former rather than the latter. O’Connor’s highly metaphoric use 
of language explodes the discourse of the psychoanalyst, aligning him with 
Donne, whom he quotes, instead (97). Like Donne’s, O’Connor’s words 
speak of hard intellectual wit and a keen interest in the themes of religion 
and death; O’Connor’s extended metaphorical discourse on the acorn and 
the tree (83–84) has something of the complex quality of the metaphysical 
conceit. Moreover, O’Connor becomes a storyteller in an almost metac-
tional sense when he appropriates the narrator’s and eventually the author’s 
voice.51 As Baxter points out, “ere are in fact certain passages (like the 
initial awakening of Robin Vote) that sound as though they were written 
by Matthew O’Connor” (1186). Finally, when O’Connor asks, “must I, per-
chance, like careful writers, guard myself against the conclusions of my read-
ers?” (94), and says to Nora a little later, “I have a narrative, but you will be 
put to it to nd it” (97), the doctor sounds like Djuna Barnes admonishing 
her readers.
 But when Baxter links O’Connor’s association with authorial gures (on 
dierent intra- and extratextual levels) exclusively with the doctor’s persis-
tent sense of failure and concludes that, in the gure of Matthew O’Connor, 
Nightwood documents the failure of modernist writing, he fails to notice the 
more auspicious models of writing and authorship suggested by O’Connor’s 
monologues. His struggle with words undeniably drags him down into a sea 
of meaninglessness, but along the way it also produces spectacularly strange 
and radiantly beautiful prose that augurs well for the modernist artist. In 
other words, if O’Connor is, as Baxter asserts, correct in saying that he has 
“given [his] destiny away by garrulity” (91), he, the transvestite and unli-
censed practitioner, also asserts the value of his stories, because “Only the 
scorned and the ridiculous make good stories” (159).
 What Baxter dismisses as the narcissism and autoeroticism of modernist 
writing is, then, an integral and necessary part of Barnes’s negative aesthet-
ics. In order to represent that which has been forgotten and obliterated by 
dominant discourses, the text needs to dissociate itself from those discours-
es. Any pandering to the discursive needs of a cultural formation that rejects 
her characters as deviant and seeks to contain forms of negative knowledge 
would either risk reducing her set of characters, as I have argued in the pre-
vious chapter with regard to naturalism and as T. S. Eliot fears in his in-
troduction to the novel, to “a horrid sideshow of freaks” (Nightwood xvi), 
or threaten to eradicate the dierence of Barnes’s gures and themes in the 
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normalizing forms of scientic or realist prose. O’Connor’s valorization of 
Guido’s physical and mental dierence seeks to avert both of these dangers in 
a characteristically self-reexive moment: “With Guido, you are in the pres-
ence of the ‘maladjusted.’ Wait! I am not using that word in the derogatory 
sense at all; in fact my great virtue is that I never use the derogatory in the 
usual sense” (116–17). Agreeing with her character on this account, Barnes 
sets the poetic strangeness and self-referentiality of her text against the dia-
lectical forces of abjection and normalization. Nightwood is indeed, as Baxter 
argues, an almost hermetic text, but Barnes’s refusal to grant readers easy 
access to her text works in the text’s favor rather than against it. Modernist 
literature that aspires to function as a cultural perturbation of modernity 
needs to sever some of its communicative ties with the prevalent discourses 
of its historical moment; it needs to prolong the process of perception and 
foreclose ready assimilation to the communicative and interpretive networks 
that are already in place. In Barnes’s alternative brand of modernism, this 
more widely shared modernist project of communicative refusal merges with 
her more specic interest in the representability of the negative (the outcast, 
the night, loss, nothingness). Paradoxically, then, it is the autotelia Baxter 
vilies with such fervor that allows Nightwood to function as a critical dis-
cursive intervention.
 In this reading, the darkness of Barnes’s text does not reinforce a sense of 
poetic failure. Instead, it manages to preserve something of the dierentness 
of that which polite society seeks to repress but cannot quite grasp with its 
means of representation; it refuses to expose it to the full glare of daylight.52
e energy Nightwood draws from its preoccupation with doom, death, and 
decay53—an aspect that, signicantly, almost completely eludes Baxter’s 
grasp—derives to a large extent from the possibility of a liberating slippage 
from conventional representability. Yet at the same time as it conjures up a 
representational space outside domination, the text’s darkness pinpoints the 
very principle of repression.54
 Once we recognize that Barnes’s multiple departures from a realist aes-
thetics, her associative ordering of thoughts, dissolution of stable (gender) 
identities,55 linguistic self-reexivity and metaphorical acrobatics56 are neces-
sitated by her focus on negative forms of knowledge (of the night, of empti-
ness, of the outcasts of modernity) and that the combination of formal inno-
vation and thematic darkness serves as a strategy of resistance to processes of 
assimilation and co-optation—if not to the fascist then to dominant (racial, 
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sexological, moral) discourses within modernity—several of O’Connor’s 
pronouncements emerge as reections on Barnes’s modernist aesthetics of 
noise. In this reading, then, what we may discover in O’Connor’s speeches 
is not, as Baxter has it, a poet’s admission of failure but a series of reections 
on the formal and thematic negativity of Barnes’s brand of modernism.
 In various ways, O’Connor evokes tenets of Barnes’s modernist program. 
At the level of narrative progression, O’Connor’s rambling and discontinu-
ous yet sharp-witted monologues not only form part of Barnes’s formal in-
novations but also present a mise en abyme of the novel’s formal concerns, 
not unlike the doorkeeper parable is a mise en abyme of Kaa’s hermeneutic 
riddles in e Trial (1925). Like some of Barnes’s stories that trail o into 
nothingness (as Guido’s does) or end indeterminately (as the story of Robin 
and Nora’s relationship and the book as a whole do), O’Connor’s observa-
tions and stories remain inconclusive and fail to oer either his listeners 
or Barnes’s readers the consolation of narrative resolution and fullness of 
meaning. O’Connor’s lengthy discourse on the night is a particularly good 
example here. As Nora’s sporadic interruptions of the doctor’s talk and his 
refusal to give straightforward answers to her questions reveal, the two are 
talking at cross-purposes:
“But, what am I to do?” she said.
 “Be as the Frenchman who puts a sou in the poorbox at night that he 
may have a penny to spend in the morning—he can trace himself back 
by his sediment, vegetable and animal, and so nd himself in the odour 
of wine in its two travels, in and out, packed down beneath an air that 
has not changed its position during its strategy.” (84–85)
“You beat the liver out of a goose to get a pâté; you pound the muscles 
of a man’s cardia to get a philosopher.”
 “Is that what I am to learn?” she asked bitterly.
 e doctor looked at her. “For the lover, it is the night into which his 
beloved goes,” he said, “that destroys his heart; he wakes her suddenly, 
only to look the hyena in the face that is her smile, as she leaves that 
company.” (87)
“Matthew,” Nora said, “what will become of her? at’s what I want 
to know.”
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 “To our friends,” he answered, “we die every day, but to ourselves we 
die only at the end. We do not know death, or how oen it has essayed 
our most vital spirit. While we are in the parlour it is visiting in the 
pantry.” (96)
Nora wants pragmatic advice but is given only enigmatic parables, meta-
phors, and similes. Yet Nightwood’s readers are not oered a position of supe-
riority, understanding what Nora does not. e precise point of O’Connor’s 
explanations—assuming for a moment that they have a point and are expla-
nations—remains as elusive to them as they do to her. Nora’s helplessness 
before his river of words is to a large extent the readers’ before Barnes’s con-
voluted narrative. True, Barnes throughout Nightwood evokes conventional 
structures of signication (auctorial narration, morals, religion, psychoanal-
ysis), but she does so without oering them as a remedy for the struggle with 
meaning that both her characters and readers experience in the world of her 
book. In Nightwood, these discourses are empty formulae that hold out but 
always frustrate the promise of sense-making: “e forms exist, but they are 
no longer in the service of any realizable content. e doctor is a moralist 
without morals, a narrator without a coherent story, who tells his story, as 
he says, ‘for nothing’ [165]” (Ecker 152; my translation). But to charge both 
O’Connor and Barnes, as Baxter does, with a failure to communicate ef-
fectively is to miss the point. O’Connor is no healer and Barnes no priestess 
of words. O’Connor explicitly rejects that role (“Do you think, for Christ’s
sweet sake [. . .] that I am so happy that you should cry down my neck?” 
[154]), and Barnes refuses to deliver the exegesis along with the sermon. e 
artist’s and her character’s communicative refusals signal their rejection of 
those roles, indicating that—in the face of the ineable and “the absence 
of given, guaranteed, intersubjectively constructible meaning” (Isernhagen, 
“Enthüllen” 362–63; my translation)—traditional interpretive and linguistic 
patterns need to be replaced by the modernist’s struggle with words.
 When O’Connor reproaches Nora for “dress[ing]” in her relationship 
with Robin “the unknowable in the garments of the known” (136), his criti-
cism points to a second, related convergence between the doctor’s statements 
and Barnes’s aesthetics. O’Connor’s censure aims both at Nora’s desperate 
eorts to bring Robin from the “lthiness” of her nocturnal existence to 
the safety of their home and at her attempts to understand Robin by talk-
ing about her in the languages of domesticity and romance—as she does in 
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the following passage: “Oh Matthew. I don’t know how to go. I don’t know 
which way to turn! Tell her, if you ever see her, that it is always with her in 
my arms—forever it will be that way until we die” (150). Robin is the rst to 
let Nora know how constraining her constructions are and how debasing her 
concern for her (Robin’s) propriety is. When Nora tries “to take someone’s 
hands o her,” Robin in her anger observes correctly that Nora’s moral cat-
egories rather than her own actions introduce lthiness into her life: “You 
are a devil! You make everything dirty! [. . .] You make me feel dirty and 
tired and old” (143). O’Connor, whose room is perceived to be in “incredible 
[. . .] disorder” and “appallingly degraded [. . .], like the rooms in brothels” 
(78–79) by none other than Nora, understands Robin’s indignation: “e 
French have made a detour of lthiness—Oh, the good dirt! Whereas you 
are of a clean race, of a too eagerly washing people, and this leaves no road 
for you” (84). Moreover, he mocks Nora’s more subtle attempts to control 
Robin retrospectively by describing their relationship in terms of romantic 
love: “there you were sitting up high and ne, with a rose-bush up your arse” 
(151). O’Connor’s concern not to reduce the unknowable to the known, the 
nocturnal wilderness to the moral category of “lthiness,” the passionate yet 
conictual relationship to the codes of domesticity or romantic love, is the 
modernist artist’s principal credo. It lies at the heart of Pound’s instruction 
to “make it new,” underlies Adorno’s disdain for committed art, and forms a 
crucial aspect of Barnes’s aesthetics.
 e modernist artist’s interest in that which ocial culture seeks to repress 
or co-opt but can never fully grasp dictates representational strategies that 
refuse to make the deviant palatable and introduce noise into the ocially 
sanctioned channels of communication instead. To dress the unknowable in 
the linguistic garments of the known, to drag it out into the full visibility of 
the light of day, would be almost equivalent to acquiescing in domination. 
O’Connor’s irrecoverably “strange” monologue on the night is therefore part 
of Barnes’s larger project of communicative resistance to assimilation, which 
also enlists the voices of other characters as well as the narrator’s. When, in 
the “Go Down, Matthew” chapter, Nora regains her voice before the on-
slaught of the doctor’s talk and explains that “A man is another person—a 
woman is yourself, caught as you turn in panic; on her mouth you kiss your 
own” (143); when the otherwise prosaic Felix remembers that “ere was 
in [Robin’s] movement a slight drag, as if the past were a web about her” 
(119); when the narrator explains that Guido, “if born to anything, [is] born 
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to holy decay” (107), that Robin is “an infected carrier of the past” (37), or 
that the good of “the détraqués, the paupers [. . .] is incommunicable” (52), 
their gurative diction reveals something about the dynamics of lesbian 
love, about Robin’s relation to history, about Guido’s physical and mental 
dierence, about the plight and joys of the urban poor without any claim of 
having made them fully visible or truly knowable. In such passages, Barnes’s 
departures from what one might call instrumental communication emerge 
as challenges to epistemological control. It is in this rejection of the full 
mastery of meaning that Barnes joins the writers of the avant-garde as Julia 
Kristeva conceives them:
For at least a century, the literary avant-garde (from Mallarmé and Lau-
tréamont to Joyce and Artaud) has been introducing ruptures, blank 
spaces, and holes into language. [. . .] in a culture where the speaking 
subjects are conceived of as masters of their speech, they have what is 
called a “phallic” position. e fragmentation of language in a text calls 
into question the very posture of this mastery. e writing that we have 
been discussing confronts this phallic position either to traverse it or to 
deny it. (“Oscillation” 165)
O’Connor’s relation to this phallic position is ambivalent. On the one hand, 
we continually see him judging others and lecturing to them from a self- 
appointed position of superior knowledge. Moreover, he constantly takes 
the oor, arrogates it to himself in ways that recall feminist linguists’ cri-
tiques of male languages of domination.57 On the other hand, O’Connor’s 
frank admission of impotence in the “Tiny O’Toole” (96) passage and his 
repeated assertion that he is “the Lily of Killarney” (96), the “last woman 
le in this world” (100), dely undermine any claims to a phallic position. 
More important, O’Connor rejects the mastery of meaning that Kristeva 
associates with that position. His refusal to communicate his knowledge of 
the night in anything but enigmatic metaphors and associative detours—a 
refusal that may more properly be called an inability—betrays his metac-
tional awareness of Barnes’s struggle with the limits of representing those 
themes and gures that continue to frustrate the desire for epistemological 
mastery. In this reading, then, the night comes to stand in for all that which 
exists in the shadows of representability (lesbianism, male homosexuality, 
death, mental disorder).
 O’Connor’s valorization of Guido’s dierentness points to a third overlap 
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between the doctor’s and Barnes’s narrative projects. When he points out 
to Guido’s father, Felix, that “a world like his may be more apt than yours 
and mine—he is not made secure by habit—in that there is always hope” 
(120), O’Connor embraces the destabilizing potential of alternative ways of 
perceiving the world. Djuna Barnes shares her character’s appreciation and 
puts it to work both on the thematic and the formal level of her text. Guido’s 
perceptual break with the habitual recurs on a larger scale throughout Night-
wood. It informs O’Connor’s as well as Barnes’s disruptions of narrative con-
tinuity; their innovations in metaphorical language; their self-reexive de-
partures from realist verisimilitude as well as their redrawing and blurring of 
normative gender categories; their violations of decorum (blasphemy, depic-
tion of aberrant sexuality, transgression of gender normativity, erasure of the 
human/beast boundary);58 their emptying out of conventional structures of 
signication; and their focus on the “night side” of culturally validated di-
chotomies. If Barnes’s formal innovations are, as I have argued, at least partly 
motivated by the author’s desire to preserve something of the dierentness 
of her characters and subject matter, then it is the combined eect of formal 
and thematic deviations from the conventional and normative that “frac-
tures,” as Karen Kaivola puts it in her reading of the novel, “our expectations 
of how language represents the world” (67) and challenges our habitualized 
mechanisms of perception. Barnes’s aesthetics thus adds an important quali-
cation to Shklovsky’s contention that the purpose of art is to defamiliar-
ize language so as to break through patterns of perception automatized by 
repetition and habit. While Shklovsky locates the habit-shattering potential 
of literature almost exclusively on the level of linguistic form, Barnes’s chal-
lenge to automatized perception derives its force from an intertwinement of 
formal and thematic concerns.
 What Barnes’s aesthetic program—mirrored and most fully realized in 
the gure of O’Connor and his speeches—shares with Shklovsky’s pro-
nouncements on literariness as well as the more historically specic claims of 
Adorno and Barthes is the valorization of poetic strategies that—in the form 
of negativity, “thickened” textures, or equivocation—delay, inhibit, and dis-
turb processes of communication between authors and readers. Barnes’s in-
troduction of noise, static, interference into the literary channels of commu-
nication serves not only to prolong the process of perception as an aesthetic 
end in itself but also constitutes an act of resistance against the assimilation 
of the other, the normalization of the deviant, the reduction of the unknown 
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to the known. While Robin’s return at the novel’s end, “crawling aer [Nora’s 
dog]—barking in a t of laughter, obscene and touching” (170), is the literal-
ization of Barnes’s aesthetics of irrecoverable noise, O’Connor’s pronounce-
ments, delivered “at the top of his voice” (15), function as metaphorical 
elaborations on that aesthetic. Appropriately, O’Connor uses a metaphorics 
of discordant sound when he describes himself as “an instrument [. . .] that 
has lost its G string” (159) and, somewhat later in the novel, as “e mock-
ing bird” who “howls through the pillars of Paradise” (163). When he com-
pares the wedding of joy and terror in suicide to “a formless sea where a swan
[. . .] sinks crying” (137), his condensation of beauty, death, formlessness, 
and noise into a single image could as well serve as a metaphorical descrip-
tion of the style and thematic concerns of the book he appears in. Similarly, 
when he refers to the mind as a “priceless galaxy of misinformation” (150), or 
reminisces, as in the passage quoted below, about the noises of Parisian and 
Viennese nights, O’Connor joins Barnes in his discovery of an incalculable 
aesthetic and epistemological potential in states of disorder, misinformation, 
and noise.
e criers telling the price of wine to such e­ect that the dawn saw 
good clerks full of piss and vinegar, and blood-letting in side streets 
where some wild princess in a night-shi of velvet howled under a 
leech; not to mention the palaces of Nymphenburg echoing back to 
Vienna with the night trip of late kings letting water into plush cans 
and line woodwork! (81–82)
Of all the authors under consideration in this chapter, then, Djuna Barnes 
through the gure of O’Connor develops the most self-reexive contribu-
tion to a modernist aesthetics of noise. Her change of focus from noise as a 
product of the interference between antagonistic political agendas, cultural 
heritages, or ways of reading the world to noise as a product of the artist’s 
probing of that which exists outside or beyond conventional systems of vi-
suality and representation foregrounds modernism’s central concern with 
questions of representability—a concern that also underpins Toomer’s and 
Hurston’s literary transformations of African-American vocalization and 
Dos Passos’s historiographical and cultural critique—and thus takes us to 
the heart of what distinguishes modernist from most naturalist forms of 
writing.
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 Noise Everywhere
 e Postmodern Situation
Noise masked as music had pursued her since early childhood. During her years at the 
Academy of Fine Arts, students had been required to spend whole summer vacations at a 
youth camp. ey lived in common quarters and worked together on a steelworks construc-
tion site. Music roared out of loudspeakers on the site om ve in the morning to nine at 
night. She felt like crying, but the music was cheerful, and there was nowhere to hide, not 
in the latrine or under the bedclothes: everything was in range of the speakers. e music 
was like a pack of hounds that had been sicked on her.
At the time, she had thought that only in the Communist world could such musical 
barbarism reign supreme. Abroad, she discovered that the transformation of music into 
noise was a planetary process by which mankind was entering the historical phase of total 
ugliness. e total ugliness to come had made itself felt as omnipresent acoustical ugliness: 
cars, motorcycles, electric guitars, drills, loudspeakers, sirens. e omnipresence of visual 
ugliness would soon follow.
Milan Kundera, e Unbearable Lightness of Being
Paradoxically, Fredric Jameson’s seminal Postmodernism, or, e Cultural 
Logic of Late Capitalism (1991) both presents what is still the most sustained 
analysis of the politics of postmodern art and fails to provide an adequate 
intellectual framework for assessing that politics. e main problem with 
Jameson’s account lies in its conation of the economic and the cultural 
sphere, a conation that is already apparent in the title of his book:
the expression late capitalism carries the other, cultural half of my title 
within it as well; not only is it something like a literal translation of the 
other expression, postmodernism, its temporal index seems already to 
direct attention to changes in the quotidian and on the cultural level as 
such. To say that my two terms, the cultural and the economic, thereby 
collapse back into one another and say the same thing, in an eclipse of 
the distinction between base and superstructure that has itself oen 
struck people as signicantly characteristic of postmodernism in the 
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rst place, is also to suggest that the base, in the third stage of capital-
ism, generates its superstructures with a new kind of dynamic. (xxi)
Against Jameson, I would argue that if we, as critics, are truly interested—as 
Jameson himself certainly is—in assessing the politics of postmodern art, we 
need to renounce his conation of the economic and the cultural because if 
we do not, the question of whether postmodern art can be oppositional is 
preempted, the answer always already given. For if the cultural artifact and 
what lies outside it were subject to one and the same logic (that of late capi-
talism), there would be nothing the cultural artifact could be oppositional 
to. is is not to deny that Jameson’s analyses of specic cultural artifacts are 
subtle and important contributions to the study of postmodern culture but 
to point out that his conclusions as to these artworks’ oppositional potential 
are all to some extent predictable. With Linda Hutcheon, I would maintain 
that “to assume an equation of the culture and its ground, rather than allow-
ing for at least the possibility of a relation of contestation and subversion, is 
to forget the lesson of postmodernism’s complex relation to modernism: its 
retention of modernism’s initial oppositional impulses, both ideological and 
aesthetic, and its equally strong rejection of its founding notion of formalist 
autonomy” (Politics 26).
 Hutcheon’s A Poetics of Postmodernism (1988) and e Politics of Postmod-
ernism (1989) present formidable challenges to Jameson’s complaint that 
postmodernism has abandoned politics along with a genuine sense of his-
tory. Contra Jameson’s assertion that “In the postmodern [. . .] the past itself 
has disappeared (along with the well-known ‘sense of the past’ or historic-
ity and collective memory)” (Postmodernism 309),1 Hutcheon argues that 
postmodernism is infused with a profound if problematized sense of history. 
Postmodern novels like Doctorow’s Ragtime, Umberto Eco’s e Name of the 
Rose, or Ishmael Reed’s Mumbo Jumbo are anything but ahistorical. Instead, 
they interrogate the possibilities of representing the past in and for the pres-
ent. Having abandoned the notion that either literature or historiography 
can open a Rankean window on the past “as it really was,” these ctions self-
reexively explore the kinds of stories about the past that both literature 
and historiography can tell. As “historiographic metactions,” they both ac-
knowledge the need for such stories (since they are the only means we have 
of gaining access to the past) and challenge the validity of their construc-
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tions of the real. Hutcheon believes that this doubleness of historiographic 
metaction also characterizes its politics of representation:
postmodernism is a fundamentally contradictory enterprise: its art 
forms (and its theory) at once use and abuse, install and then desta-
bilize convention in parodic ways, self-consciously pointing both to 
their own inherent paradoxes and provisionality and, of course, to 
their critical or ironic re-reading of the art of the past. In implicitly 
contesting in this way such concepts as aesthetic originality and textual 
closure, postmodernist art oers a new model for mapping the border-
land between art and the world, a model that works from a position 
within and yet not totally within either, a model that is profoundly 
implicated in, yet still capable of criticizing, that which it seeks to de-
scribe. (Poetics 23)
For Hutcheon, postmodernism is a form of “complicitous critique” (Politics 
2), a critique that accepts its own implication in that which it criticizes as 
it abandons the idea of artistic autonomy; it is a critique that nevertheless 
continues to challenge and subvert dominant ways of reading the past as 
well as the present.2
 Yet Hutcheon’s reminder that postmodernism inherits much of its oppo-
sitional impetus from early modernism points to two phases in the history 
of postmodernism.3 Both Hutcheon and Jameson note that the 1960s were 
a crucially important moment for the development of the postmodern.4
But both critics too quickly turn their attention away from 1960s postmod-
ernism, though for dierent reasons. While Jameson’s stress on postmod-
ernism’s implication in late capitalist structures aligns itself with a general 
(though by no means unequivocal) sympathy for the modernist project to 
the eect that early, anti–high modernist and oppositional postmodern-
ism is relegated to the margins of his discussion,5 Hutcheon in her desire 
to validate a 1980s postmodernism that is both historical and self-reexive 
charges 1960s postmodernism with “ahistorical presentism” and an “ideal-
ist or essentialist belief in the value of the ‘natural’ and ‘authentic’” (Poetics 
203). us, neither Hutcheon’s postmodernism of complicitous critique nor 
Jameson’s fully complicitous postmodernism of late capitalism provides an 
adequate descriptive model for an earlier postmodernism of the 1960s and 
early 1970s.
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 To account for the representational politics of the literary texts discussed 
in this chapter—omas Pynchon’s e Crying of Lot 49 (1966), Ishmael 
Reed’s Mumbo Jumbo (1972), and Don DeLillo’s White Noise (1985)—we 
need to distinguish between an earlier phase of postmodernism (including 
e Crying of Lot 49 and Mumbo Jumbo) and a later phase (including White 
Noise). Andreas Huyssen provides us with such a model in Aer the Great 
Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism. On the American scene, 
Huyssen distinguishes between the early postmodernism of the 1960s (Cage, 
Warhol, the Beats, the Beatles, Barthelme), which attempted to revitalize the 
historical avant-garde and its adversarial stance against a codied form of 
high modernism, and a two-pronged postmodernism of the 1970s and early 
1980s, one part of which was “largely armative” of the status quo while 
the other was alternative in its attempts to redene “resistance, critique, and 
negation [. . .] in non-modernist and non-avantgardist terms” (188).
 In its historical specicity, this captures more adequately than either 
Jameson’s or Hutcheon’s accounts the shiing nature and dierent political 
positionings of several postmodernisms. In his identication of the histori-
cal avant-garde as an important model for 1960s postmodernism, Huyssen 
also species more clearly than Hutcheon the relationship between early 
modernism and early postmodernism as well as that between early and late 
postmodernism. Moreover, it avoids Jameson’s, however qualied, assertion 
of a “radical break or coupure” (Postmodernism 1) between modernism and 
postmodernism, an assertion that is based on a too-monolithic conception 
of the two periods.6 Finally, Huyssen’s account also retrospectively enables 
us to perceive more clearly which tradition (or, rather, antitradition) of mod-
ernist writing the texts discussed in the previous chapter belong to.
 Huyssen (191–95) identies four dening features of 1960s postmodern-
ism, all of which it inherits from the avant-garde movements at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century: a strong sense of new frontiers, discontinuity, 
and generational conict; an attack on the institution of art; technologi-
cal optimism; and an attempt to validate popular culture as against high- 
cultural artistic production. Both Pynchon’s and Reed’s ctions exemplify 
all of these traits: Pynchon’s in its ubiquitous allusions to the counterculture 
of the 1960s; its implicit suggestion that professional readers—that is, liter-
ary critics—are “like Puritans are about the Bible. So hung up with words, 
words” (53); its fascination with networks and circuits; and its multiple pop 
music references; and Reed’s in its staging of conicts between the more 
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traditional voodoo practice of Papa LaBas and the new, syncretic practices 
of Black Herman; its evocation of a sense of new beginning in the Harlem 
Renaissance; its challenges to a white culture perceived as bookish; its tech-
nological enhancement of voodoo in Battraville’s “Radio Loa” (151); and its 
celebration of jazz and ragtime. In more than one sense, e Crying of Lot 
49 as well as Mumbo Jumbo are examples of a belated American reception of 
the European avant-garde as described by Peter Bürger in his eory of the 
Avant-Garde: “e intention of the historical avant-garde movements was 
dened as the destruction of art as an institution set o from the praxis of 
life” (83).
 Reading Bürger, we encounter a h feature of the historical avant-garde 
that Pynchon’s and Reed’s texts share, a feature that actually links them 
closely to the texts by Toomer, Hurston, Dos Passos, and Barnes discussed 
in the previous chapter, texts that do not belong to an avant-garde tradition 
in any strict sense. While insisting that the avant-garde’s principal function 
was to reveal art as an institution and attack it as such, Bürger agrees with 
Adorno that, at the level of formal description, “e avant-gardiste work is 
dened as nonorganic. Whereas in the organic work of art, the structural 
principle governs the parts and joins them in a unied whole, in the avant-
gardiste work, the parts have a signicantly larger autonomy vis-à-vis the 
whole. ey become less important as constituent elements of a totality 
of meaning and simultaneously more important as relatively autonomous 
signs” (83–84). In Pynchon, it is the refusal of plot closure; the plurality of 
possible readings of the ctional world oered by the novel and its charac-
ters; the eclecticism of scientic, literary, historical and political references; 
and the bewildering complexity and ambivalence of the Tristero system that 
add up to a fragmented, nonorganic text. In Reed, nonorganicity arises, not 
unlike in Toomer and Hurston, from a productive tension between orality 
and literacy, from parodic uses and abuses of racial essentialisms and ethnic 
dichotomies, and from the unruliness of the Jes Grew epidemic itself. Reed 
explicitly challenges ideas about the reliability, closure, and univocality of 
texts when he has both Moses’s and the Knights Templar’s appropriations of 
the Book of oth misre.
 e link established here between Reed on the one hand and Toomer 
and Hurston on the other suggests that these early postmodern texts may 
have more in common with the modernist texts discussed in the previous 
chapter than Huyssen’s strict separation between an adversarial avant-garde 
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and a later, fully institutionalized modernism allows for. And indeed, e 
Crying of Lot 49 and Mumbo Jumbo resonate with the modernist concerns of 
Dos Passos’s aesthetics of fragmentation as well as his historical imagination, 
Barnes’s thematic and formal negativity, and Toomer’s and Hurston’s defor-
mations of mastery and antiphonal play. With regard to modernism, this 
implies that any rigid distinction between an early, avantgardist and oppo-
sitional modernism and a later, dominant and institutionalized modernism 
is rendered problematic. What is called for, then, is a history of adversarial 
modernisms that encompasses both the historical avant-garde and texts that 
emerge outside or aer the closing of the avant-garde but retain much of its 
oppositional ethos and its closely related nonorganic aesthetics.7 With re-
gard to postmodernism, it means that we need to remain suspicious of rigid 
boundary-drawings between modernism and postmodernism, whichever 
side of the demarcation line the critic validates. e following discussion 
will therefore begin with an analysis of some of the formal and thematic con-
tinuities between Reed and Pynchon and the adversarial modernists of the 
preceding chapter. For the other postmodernist text analyzed here (White 
Noise), the situation is dierent. I will return to DeLillo in the nal section 
of this chapter.
Communicative W.A.S.T.E.
More explicitly than any other work of ction discussed in this book, omas 
Pynchon’s e Crying of Lot 49 thematizes the subversive and innovative po-
tential of noise. To delineate the status and function of noise in Pynchon’s 
ctional system, a brief digression into the eld of thermodynamics is neces-
sary. Much has been written on Pynchon’s use of two dierent concepts of 
entropy in his narrative.8 For our purposes, it will be sucient to give a short 
introduction to entropy in the thermodynamic sense and its implications 
for one possible reading of e Crying of Lot 49 and then discuss the links 
the novel establishes between thermodynamic entropy and the concept of 
entropy as it is used in information theory.
 e second law of thermodynamics states that “e entropy of an isolated 
assembly must increase or in the limit remain constant” (Roy 145). An alterna-
tive way of putting this is to say that the entropy of a closed system le to its 
own devices invariably increases until it reaches a maximum at equilibrium.9
In this state, the molecules in the closed system are assembled in a homoge-
neous and unstructured, disordered mass. In accordance with the rst law 
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of thermodynamics, no energy has been lost, but the energy is no longer 
available to do work since “e usefulness of thermal energy derives from 
order—specically from the orderly division of hot and cold into distinct 
regions. Without such temperature variation there would be no relatively 
cold regions for the heat to pass to, and it is only during such passage that 
heat can be harnessed” (Engel 51). At equilibrium, the system comes to a 
standstill, and heat can no longer be transformed into work. is process is 
an irreversible process, for once the system has reached equilibrium, it will 
remain in this state.
 Maxwell’s Demon is a thought experiment that reverses what is an irrevers-
ible process according to the second law. e Demon is a kind of doorkeep-
er who sorts faster-moving (hotter) molecules and slower-moving (colder) 
molecules into dierent regions within the closed system, thus maintaining 
a continuous heat dierential. e Demon would, in other words, refute the 
second law of thermodynamics by reverting the process of entropic increase. 
Maxwell argued that the Demon’s sorting activity could not be regarded as 
expenditure of work and that his thought experiment therefore holds out the 
promise of a perpetual motion machine.10
 Clerk Maxwell’s challenge to the second law of thermodynamics was not 
le unanswered. In an article published in 1951, Leon Brillouin took issue 
with Maxwell’s far-reaching claims. In particular, Brillouin demonstrated 
that the process of perception that necessarily precedes the Demon’s distinc-
tion between faster and slower molecules introduces more entropy into the 
system than the Demon’s sorting activity could possibly decrease: “Any ex-
periment by which information is obtained about a physical system produc-
es, on the average, an increase of entropy in the system or in its surroundings. 
[. . .] An observation is always accompanied by an increase in entropy, and 
thus involves an irreversible process” (Science 184). Hence, one of the crucial 
insights arising from the controversy about Maxwell’s Demon is that there is 
a price to pay for the acquisition of information, the price being an increase 
in entropy.
 As Anne Mangel points out in what remains one of the best treatments of 
Pynchon’s references to thermodynamic entropy, “In e Crying of Lot 49, 
Pynchon uses Maxwell’s notion of the Demon as a metaphor for Oedipa’s 
experiences” (196).11 At the beginning of the novel, Oedipa lives in a world 
of Tupperware parties, supermarket Muzak, and domestic conformity, char-
acterized by “a fat deckful of days which seemed (wouldn’t she be the rst 
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to admit it?) more or less identical” (Lot 49 6). As a form of sounding that 
“heralds [. . .] the establishment of a society of repetition in which noth-
ing will happen anymore” (Attali 6), Muzak is the supreme expression of 
Oedipa’s world. is world of undierentiated sameness and cultural inertia 
corresponds to a thermodynamic state of maximum entropy at which the 
system has reached its nal destination and come to a standstill. It is a state 
characterized by both disorder and uniformity; it is a chaos of sameness. As 
Peter Abernethy points out in his discussion of entropy in e Crying of Lot 
49, in the context of thermodynamics, “disorder and chaos [. . .] do not mean 
a random jumble of things but rather uniformity, a lack of distinctions, a 
sameness, a lack of individuality, a tendency toward complete conformity. It 
is a ‘steady-state’ in which ‘matter and energy’ are evenly distributed” (20).
 Pierce Inverarity’s advice to Oedipa to “keep it bouncing” (123) assigns her 
the role of the Demon who must sort out the system’s parts in order to per-
petuate its motion (Freese 532–33). Oedipa’s quest for the Tristero parallels 
the Demon’s sorting activity in its attempt to reverse the process of entropic 
decay. is is already hinted at in the novel’s rst paragraph, where Oedipa’s 
obligation toward Pierce Inverarity’s estate is described as “the job of sort-
ing it all out” (5). e nature of Oedipa’s quest, however, not only matches 
the Demon’s sorting activity but is also an illustration of the ultimate failure 
of Maxwell’s thought experiment as described by Brillouin. For the more 
Oedipa tries to sort the information she receives into a meaningful whole, 
the more the clues proliferate and the less order Oedipa is able to impose 
on Pierce Inverarity’s tangled web of business interests and the intricacies of 
the Tristero system. Revelations “come crowding in exponentially” (56), and 
the sheer inux of information leaves Oedipa increasingly confused, forever 
unable to “bring the estate into pulsing, stelliferous Meaning” (56) and still 
awaiting “the crying of lot 49” (127) as the novel ends. In short, analogous to 
the Demon’s dilemma, Oedipa’s process of perception has created more en-
tropy than her sorting managed to diminish (Mangel 194–200).12 e loss of 
dierentiation that accompanies the net increase in entropy is acknowledged 
by Oedipa toward the end of the novel when she asks despairingly, “how had 
it ever happened here, with the chances once so good for diversity?” (125) 
and is further emphasized by the circular structure of the novel, which rein-
forces the impression that, at the end of the novel, Oedipa is back to where 
she started.13
 However, in the ctional world of e Crying of Lot 49, or at least in the 
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imagination of some of its characters, the movement toward entropic deg-
radation is countered by repeated injections of informational entropy into 
the system. While the thermodynamic world of von Helmholtz and Henry 
Adams knew entropy only as dissipation of energy, the informational world 
of Shannon and Pynchon has learned to distinguish between two types of 
entropy with contrary connotations. In Pynchon’s novel, an encounter be-
tween informational and thermodynamic entropy is played out:
Metaphorically, one compensates for the other. In both, entropy is a 
measurement of disorganization; but disorganization in information 
theory increases the potential information which a message may con-
vey, while in thermodynamics entropy is a measure of the disorganiza-
tion of the molecules within closed systems and possesses no positive 
connotation. (Schaub, “Gentle” 51)
In line with Shannon’s observation that noise is the maximally entropic and 
information-richest signal, Pynchon has a motley crew of noisemakers dis-
turb the boredom and inertia of Southern Californian suburbia. ere are, 
of course, the Paranoids, the rock band that serenades Oedipa and Metzger. 
Emerging from the chaos of an aerosol can “hissing malignantly” as it is swi-
ly propelled through their bathroom against the acoustic background of “a 
slow, deep crescendo of naval bombardment, machine-gun and small-arms 
re, screams and chopped-o prayers of dying infantry” (23–24) emerging 
from the TV set, the two lovers are greeted by the Paranoids’ “shuddering 
deluge of thick guitar sounds” (25), which ends abruptly when the band 
blows a fuse. As Schaub remarks, the spray can is “an image of entropy—a re-
gion of fast molecules within the can exhausting itself within the connes of 
the bathroom” (“Gentle” 55). In the connes of a motel room, then, Pynchon 
stages an encounter between thermodynamic and informational entropy, an 
encounter that is also played out in the Nefastis Machine and structures the 
novel as a whole. In this context, it is signicant that the Paranoids serenade 
Oedipa’s marital indelity with Metzger, the coexecutor of Inverarity’s estate 
and her rst personal link to the strange, conspiratorial world of W.A.S.T.E. 
and the Tristero. eir noise is prophetic in Jacques Attali’s sense: it heralds 
the organization of things to come. e noises heard at the Echo Motel will 
continue to reverberate throughout e Crying of Lot 49.
 W.A.S.T.E., the underground mail delivery system connected to the Tris-
tero network, turns out to be the most prominent source of noise. As a net-
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work of the marginalized and underprivileged, the Tristero has been read as a 
subversive force that manages to disrupt the patterns of cultural conformity 
that structure Oedipa’s life in Kinneret-Among-e-Pines at the beginning 
of the novel.14 In informational terms, W.A.S.T.E. has been interpreted as a 
source of revitalizing input to a communication system that has run down, 
continually reproducing itself through a perpetual exchange of empty mes-
sages, through an “Endless, convoluted incest” (Lot 49 8).15 In this reading, 
W.A.S.T.E. is the noise that disturbs processes of communication, makes 
them less predictable, and introduces informational entropy to interrupt the 
repetition of the same.
 By choosing to name itself W.A.S.T.E., the alternative postal system also 
acts as a reminder of processes of exclusion and manages to set in motion 
what Salman Rushdie has called “the process of reclaiming language from 
one’s opponent” (402). Rushdie here refers to the strategy of marginalized 
groups to wear with pride the epithets that are being hurled at them by their 
enemies.16 It is a strategy designed to de-stigmatize formerly stigmatized 
words, to render them unavailable as words of abuse. us, homosexuals 
came to call themselves “queer,” some disabled persons “cripples,” and some 
African-Americans involved in the gangsta rap scene began to refer to them-
selves as “niggaz.” is strategy is also very much a phenomenon of youth 
culture. In Pynchon’s e Crying of Lot 49, examples include the protopunk 
name of “Sick Dick and the Volkswagens” (14) and “KCUF” (9), the radio 
station where Oedipa’s husband, Mucho, works.17 In this context, the name 
W.A.S.T.E. is also a strategic and political choice designed to re-inscribe with 
positive connotations a term genteel society uses disparagingly. It is a gesture 
of deance, and the “message” that the name W.A.S.T.E. sends runs along the 
following lines: “We are the waste you dispose of, and we produce the noises 
you do not want to hear, and we do so because we refuse to be part of a so-
ciety which despises us and which we despise.” For genteel society, the com-
municative practices of W.A.S.T.E. might indeed be nothing but noise, but 
at least for those communicating through W.A.S.T.E. and maybe for society 
as a whole, this noise may be the unexpected and highly informative input 
that changes the way we perceive the world, and that might revivify a cultural 
and communicative situation characterized by monotony, redundancy, and 
repetition.
 Shannon and Weaver’s reevaluation of noise, then, allows us to account 
for the signifying practices of the disinherited in e Crying of Lot 49 in 
UP
F
CO
PY
Noise Everywhere: The Postmodern Situation    /    153
terms that correspond more closely to their self-fashioning. In this reading, 
the noise produced by W.A.S.T.E. is that which injects new life into the stul-
tifying atmosphere of Oedipa’s life as a middle-class housewife at the begin-
ning of e Crying of Lot 49. Even if her quest takes Oedipa to the point of 
paranoia and madness, and even if she fails to accomplish her task of “sorting 
it all out,” it has certainly enriched her life beyond the scope of Tupperware 
parties and suburban domesticity.
 In imagining noise as a potentially desirable signal, Pynchon makes use of 
a modernist aesthetics of communicative disruption and negativity. Indeed, 
the function of W.A.S.T.E. itself within culture is analogous to that attrib-
uted to modernist art in Astradur Eysteinsson’s recourse to Adorno: “In the 
face of [. . .] human debasement, art’s basic mode of resistance is in a sense 
that of opting out of the system’s communicative network in order to attack 
it head on from the ‘outside’” (Eysteinsson 41). At the same time, though, the 
topicality of Pynchon’s novel rmly locates it in the 1960s and thus near the 
beginning of a postmodern world. e Crying of Lot 49 is full of references to 
1960s youth culture and its means of communication, ranging from the Echo 
Motel’s manager, Miles, a “drop-out” with “a Beatle haircut and a lapless, 
cuess, one-button mohair suit” (16), to bands such as Miles’s own Para-
noids or Sick Dick and the Volkswagens, to KCUF, to Oedipa’s impressions 
upon visiting Berkeley: “She came downslope from Wheeler Hall, through 
Sather Gate into a plaza teeming with corduroy, denim, bare legs, blonde 
hair, hornrims, bicycle spokes in the sun, bookbags, swaying card tables, long 
paper petitions dangling to earth, posters for undecipherable FSMs, YAFs, 
VDCs, suds in the fountain, students in nose-to-nose dialogue” (71). Paul 
Maltby makes the strongest case for a link between the Tristero and 1960s 
counterculture when he discusses W.A.S.T.E. as an alternative communica-
tions network similar to the newly emerging underground media of the same 
era:18
e possibility of an alternative cultural order supplanting America’s 
late-capitalist system is a question which haunts e Crying of Lot 49 
(1966). is cultural order is represented by the “Tristero System” 
which is, or is imagined to be, an underground communications net-
work used by those alienated from the ocial culture. e latter are 
thought of by Oedipa Maas, the novel’s mediating consciousness, as a 
community of internal exiles—marginals, driers, deviants, visionar-
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ies—who may be “truly communicating” [117–18] in terms of an order 
of meaning which is radically discontinuous from the hegemonic one. 
[. . .] While the term Tristero denotes groups which cannot simply be 
identied with the New Le or countercultural radicals, one can see 
how, for a politically conscious author of the mid-1960s, the alterna-
tive communications network might also serve as a symbol of mass 
alienation from the ocial culture, as an expression of a profound ri 
within a community. (136, 138)
Together with Huyssen’s concept of an avantgardist postmodernism, Malt-
by’s remarks enable us to understand Pynchon’s interest in 1960s counter-
culture as deeply intertwined with a validation of communicative disruption 
that challenges what Bernhard Siegert has called the “empire of semiologi-
cal Puritanism” (5; my translation), a task Pynchon inherits from modernist 
aesthetic and theoretical practice. In this reading, then, e Crying of Lot 49 
exemplies early postmodernism’s reworking of modernist strategies. is 
convergence of concerns is also visible in the novel’s formal arrangement, in 
its absence of closure, its fragmented plot structure, and its complex system 
of intertextual references, all of which are reminiscent of Dos Passos’s and 
Barnes’s nonorganic aesthetics.
 is reading of e Crying of Lot 49 relies, however, on the assumption 
that the Tristero and W.A.S.T.E. are indeed agents of subversion and cultural 
renewal. A number of critics have questioned this assumption by pointing 
out the Tristero’s close association with Pierce Inverarity’s estate and indeed 
the possibility that it might be nothing but an elaborate joke on the part 
of the deceased “California real estate mogul” (5).19 Moreover, the fact that 
W.A.S.T.E. reads “WE AWAIT SILENT TRISTERO’S EMPIRE” (116) 
and that the muted post horn is on one occasion also associated with the al-
phabetism20 D.E.A.T.H. (“DON’T EVER ANTAGONIZE THE HORN” 
[84]) can be taken to suggest that there is a decidedly sinister quality to this 
network, and that it might in fact strive for nothing but the replacement 
of an oppressive system by a totalitarian and potentially violent one. Aer 
all, the “Alameda County Death Cult,” which every month “choose[s] some 
victim from among the innocent, the virtuous, the socially integrated and 
well-adjusted, using him sexually, then sacricing him” (84) is one of the 
groups using the muted post horn as its sign.
 Finally, it has also been argued that the messages the W.A.S.T.E. system 
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circulates are largely devoid of information and therefore do not manage to 
provide any new input to a cultural and communicative system that has run 
down (Tanner 64–65; J. Chambers 110–11). e fact that the secret letters 
sent via Yoyodyne’s internal mail system are full of banalities (35); Oedipa’s 
intuition that the letter sent by Mucho and featuring the small inaccura-
cy (“POTSMASTER”) characteristic of all mail delivered by W.A.S.T.E. 
“would be newsless inside” (30); or the refusal to communicate that lies at 
the bottom of the Inamorati Anonymous, an organization that also uses the 
muted post horn as its sign (76–80), all seem to point in this direction. In 
this reading, W.A.S.T.E. is noise, too, but not in the sense of an unexpected 
signal full of potential information. e messages sent through W.A.S.T.E. 
are noise because they are useless and undesirable communicative “waste.”
 roughout her quest, Oedipa is confronted with the irreducible ambiva-
lence of W.A.S.T.E. and the Tristero, an ambivalence that is already inherent 
in Shannon and Weaver’s original denition of noise as the most informative 
but useless signal.21 Toward the end of the novel, Oedipa attempts to sort the 
dierent possibilities into an orderly scheme:
Either you have stumbled indeed [. . .] on to a network by which X 
number of Americans are truly communicating whilst reserving their 
lies, recitations of routine, arid betrayals of spiritual poverty, for the 
ocial government delivery system; maybe even onto a real alternative 
of surprise to life, that harrows the head of everybody American you 
know, and you too, sweetie. Or you are hallucinating it. Or a plot has 
been mounted against you, so expensive and elaborate, involving items 
like the forging of stamps and ancient books, constant surveillance of 
your movements, planting of post horn images all over San Francisco, 
bribing of librarians, hiring of professional actors, all  nanced out of 
the estate in a way too secret or too involved for your non-legal mind 
to know about even though you are co-executor, so labyrinthine that it 
must have meaning beyond just a practical joke. Or you are fantasying 
some such plot, in which case you are a nut, Oedipa, out of your skull. 
ose, now that she was looking at them, she saw to be the alternatives. 
ose symmetrical four. (117–18)
Oedipa’s search for clarity is, however, doomed to failure. In the ctional 
world of e Crying of Lot 49, none of these four alternatives is privileged as 
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the most plausible one, and neither Oedipa nor the reader is in a position to 
decide which one provides the correct reading of the world.
 e greatest challenge Pynchon’s novel poses to the reader is not to de-
cide which of these interpretations is correct but to accept the impossibil-
ity of such a decision. With the breakdown of any certainty about the role 
of W.A.S.T.E. in the narrative, we are le, with Oedipa, in the space be-
tween. is space is a space between dierent worlds, between a world in 
which Tristero is a catalyst of cultural rejuvenation, W.A.S.T.E. an alterna-
tive channel of communication for the disadvantaged, and Nefastis a sub-
versive, and a world in which Tristero is a totalitarian system, W.A.S.T.E. a 
purveyor of empty messages, and Nefastis a pervert and a madman whose 
Nefastis Machine—which promises to verify Maxwell’s claims—will never 
work. And even this does not exhaust the possibilities; an almost endless 
number of maps may be drawn, none of which can claim to represent the 
totality of Pynchon’s ctional world. As readers of e Crying of Lot 49, then, 
we remain, like Oedipa, caught in the truly postmodern predicament of what 
Brian McHale calls “the ontological ickering of ctional worlds” (99).22
us, binary distinctions dissolve, and we are le in a state of undecidability.
 It is my contention that Pynchon’s main achievement in e Crying of Lot 
49 lies in this contestation of the logic of symmetrical alternatives. Pynchon 
subverts Oedipa’s as well as our own either/or habits of thinking and plunges 
us headrst into the realm of “excluded middles” (125). As Maltby observes, 
the irreducibly ambivalent Tristero epitomizes Pynchon’s challenge to dual-
ist thought:
According to the principle of the excluded middle, anything must be 
included either under a given term or its negative: a proposition may 
be either true or false; it may signify either x or not-x. erefore, a 
third value which postulates a class of undecidable proposition, propo-
sitions that are both true and false, that signify both x and not-x, can-
not be admitted. [. . .] the Tristero system is anticipated (or, if unreal, 
imagined) as the negation of this polarizing logic; its communications, 
when activated, speaking in the terms of the excluded middle, an order 
of meaning that privileges indeterminacy and “ambiguity,” “diversity” 
and “paradox.” (Maltby 142–44)
is contestation of dualisms is, Maltby continues, not conned to the Tris-
tero but elevated by Pynchon to a structural principle. Maltby identies a 
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range of literary strategies that rupture binary logic and narrative closure 
with a view toward including the excluded third: an inversion of the detec-
tive story in which uncertainty and the plurality of explanations increase and 
resolution is deferred indenitely; a use of proper nouns with a variety of 
oen contradictory meanings and connotations (Pierce Inverarity, Tristero, 
Oedipa Maas); a cast of decidedly ambivalent characters (Pierce Inverarity, 
John Nefastis, the anarchist Jesús Arrabal);23 and the contradictory signier 
“waste,” which hints at both those who are refused by society (its refuse) and 
those who actively refuse it (and await silent Tristero’s empire):
e result, one might say, is a Tristero novel. [. . .] Pynchon’s objec-
tive is to fashion a discourse which maximizes the eects of ambiguity, 
indeterminacy, and paradox with a view to occupying the domain of the 
excluded middle. It is a strategy designed to fracture the positivist logic 
which orders meaning into uniform, standardized patterns (binary op-
positions, prefabricated alternatives), a logic, that is, which represses 
diversity of meaning. (Maltby 138, 146)
Maltby joins other critics in linking Pynchon’s aesthetics with the poststruc-
turalist rejection of textual closure, its armation of the freeplay of signi-
ers, its deconstruction of dichotomies, and its insistence on the dierential 
nature of language.24 And indeed, what distinguishes e Crying of Lot 49
from the modernist texts discussed in the preceding chapter is the radical 
undecidability of its signs. More obviously and explicitly than Manhattan 
Transfer, Nightwood, or Cane, Pynchon’s novel lacks an external reference 
point, an irrefutable claim against which divergent readings of its ctional 
world (by Oedipa as well as the novel’s readers) could be evaluated. Pynchon’s 
text registers a rupture in Western metaphysics, the moment Jacques Derrida 
would in the same year describe as “that in which language invaded the uni-
versal problematic; that in which, in the absence of a center or origin, every-
thing became discourse—provided we can agree on this word—that is to say, 
when everything became a system where the central signied, the original or 
transcendental signied, is never absolutely present outside a system of dif-
ferences” (“Structure” 225).25 In the absence of a center, Pynchon’s ctional 
world dissolves into a plurality of possible worlds, none of which can claim 
ontological primacy. More radically than most modernist texts, e Crying of 
Lot 49 thus forecloses any form of totalizing reading. It is in this respect that 
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Pynchon’s text moves most decisively away from a modernist aesthetic, with 
which it otherwise shares a plurality of concerns and strategies.
 Pynchon’s ction does not exhaust itself in the sheer play postmodernism 
is oen (and wrongly) associated with. In the links he establishes between 
a philosophical challenge to binary thought and his representations of the 
ex-centrics of society, Pynchon’s inclusion of the excluded third acquires an 
ethical and political dimension. In this, he anticipates Michel Serres’ delib-
erations in e Parasite. In Pynchon as in Serres, noise becomes a gure not 
only for the third term that is excluded in information theory (by virtue of 
Shannon’s declaration that noise is useless information) and all other forms 
of binary thinking but also for those marginalized by dominant ways of mak-
ing sense: the driers, the disenfranchised, the poor.
 Pynchon’s text registers the violence inherent in this logic of exclusion: 
desperadoes dressed up as Indians and carrying a ring with the muted post 
horn symbol ght with and are killed by the riders of the Pony Express; 
Zapf ’s bookstore mysteriously burns down; Driblette the artist walks into 
the Pacic and drowns; the wretched old sailor will die without leaving a 
trace.26 In his reections on information and noise, Serres urges us to think 
about that violence:
is couple [noise-message] and their relation are set apart by an ob-
server seated within the system. In a way he overvalues the message and 
undervalues the noise if he belongs to the functioning of the system. 
He represses the parasites in order to send or receive communications 
better and to make them circulate in a distinct and workable fashion. 
is repression is also religious excommunication, political imprison-
ment, the isolation of the sick, garbage collection, public health, the 
pasteurization of milk, and so forth, as much as it is repression in the 
psychoanalytical sense. But it also has to do with a history, the his-
tory of science in particular: whoever belongs to the system perceives 
noises less and represses them more, the more he is a functioning part 
of the system. He never stops being in the good, the just, the true, the 
natural, the normal. All dogmatism lives on this division, be it blind or 
decided. (e Parasite 68)
Serres here formulates an insight he shares with Pynchon. It is an insight into 
the inextricable intertwinement of the logic of the excluded middle with a 
discourse of violence, an insight that impels both writers to seek a way out 
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of binary thought. Serres puts it thus: “Hell is the separation of paradise 
and Hell, the Devil is the bifurcation between God and the Devil, evil is the 
crossroads of good and evil, and error is the dualism that only opposes twins” 
(e Parasite 20).
Singing Books
In Ishmael Reed’s Mumbo Jumbo, we can discover a double coding that is 
similar to Pynchon’s simultaneous looking-back to an adversarial modernist 
aesthetics of negativity and noise and his looking-forward to a deconstruc-
tive aesthetics of the dissolution of systems of meaning based on binary logic. 
In its insistence on the artist’s need to speak and write outside dominant 
sense-making structures, Reed’s own “Neo-HooDoo Manifesto” (1970) in-
vites a modernist reading of his texts. His manifesto is a call to black artists to 
liberate their own artistic practice from the strictures of the Judeo-Christian 
aesthetic tradition. Neo-HooDoo encompasses Haitian voodoo, Ancient 
Egyptian mythology, music (funk, blues, ragtime, jazz), dance (“the Philly 
Dog, the Hully Gully, the Funky Chicken, the Popcorn, the Boogaloo” [20]), 
and black literature (Cecil Brown, David Henderson, N. H. Pritchard, and 
Ishmael Reed himself, among others). It is an intentionally eclectic mix of 
African and African-American forms of expression; a mix without clearly de-
ned boundaries but unied in the distance of its elements from hegemonic 
cultural forms: “Whereas at the center of Christianity lies the graveyard the 
organ-drone and the cross, the center of Neo-HooDoo is the drum the anhk 
and the Dance. So Fine, Barefootin, Heard it rough e Grapevine, are all 
Neo-HooDoos” (Reed, “Neo-HooDoo” 22). Like the modernists, Reed calls 
for the innovation of new cultural forms in opposition to a tradition per-
ceived as stiing and dead: “Charlie ‘Yardbird (oth)’ Parker is an example 
of the Neo-HooDoo artist as an innovator and improvisor” (21). In Reed’s 
version, however, the Anglo-Saxon modernists themselves come under re: 
“e reason that HooDoo isn’t given the credit it deserves in inuencing 
American culture is because the students of that culture both ‘overground’
and ‘underground’ are uptight closet Jeho-vah revisionists. ey would as-
sert the American and East Indian and Chinese thing before they would the 
Black thing. eir spiritual leaders Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot hated Africa 
and ‘Darkies’” (20). e modernist heritage Reed draws on is that of Jean 
Toomer and “our theoretician Zora Neale Hurston” (21). It is a tradition 
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that is highly aware of the challenges involved in integrating the nonverbal 
into the format of the literary text. Reed accepts this challenge, declaring 
that “Neo-HooDoo is a Dance and Music closing in on its words” (25). Fi-
nally, like Pynchon, Reed turns to modernist literary strategies in an attempt 
to capture something of the adversarial spirit of 1960s counterculture. His 
“Neo-HooDoo Manifesto” is sprinkled with references to Vietnam, Wood-
stock, and sexual liberation; his Mumbo Jumbo is set mostly in the 1920s, but 
its oppositional impetus owes at least as much to 1960s counterculture as it 
does to the Harlem Renaissance.27 As with the early postmodernism of e 
Crying of Lot 49, a modernist reading of Mumbo Jumbo has its limits. In what 
follows, I will pursue that reading as far as it can take us and then discuss the 
ssures in it.
 In his reworking of the genealogies of black and Western cultures, their 
shared histories of exploitation, appropriation and misrecognition, Reed 
draws rigid distinctions between the vital, creative force of the Jes Grew epi-
demic and the life-denying, sterile, and destructive ways of the Atonist Path.28
Mumbo Jumbo fully explores the divisive poetics of its author’s manifesto.29
Like Hurston and Toomer, Reed makes much of the corporeal dimension of 
black culture, expressed in music, song, laughter, and dance. With his tongue 
rmly in his cheek, Reed even resorts to ethnic stereotyping in places, for in-
stance when Taurus, the “weak Bull” (212) of Western culture, is contrasted 
with the “Loa Agovi Minorie,” who “boasts when mounting a woman that 
his phallus is so hard that the brilliance of his organ’s bulb resembles that 
of a mirror” (213). In Reed’s evocation of the 1920s, whites “eat rays and for 
snack [. . .] munch on sound” (62), while black artists and spiritual leaders 
dance, shout, sing, and move about. Like “Neo-HooDoos,” Jes Grew Con-
verts “would rather ‘shake that thing’ than be sti and erect” (Reed, “Neo-
HooDoo” 20). e boundaries between performance and liturgy, artistry 
and spirituality are blurred as the epidemic rises “to shrieks of Hit me! Hit 
me!” (153), making its way through America. Jes Grew’s foundational text, 
the Book of oth, already contains this admixture of elements. As a tran-
scription of Osiris’s dance steps, songs, and litanies, it is a text of noise, danc-
ing, and singing. It is “the real Book of oth—the original sound” (178). In 
deance of the Atonist Set’s order to “cut out that racket” (163), it channels 
the noise without containing it. e Book of oth is literature as noise in 
the most literal sense. Even more than Toomer’s Cane or Hurston’s eir Eyes 
Were Watching God, it is a “singing book” as Baker (68) denes it, a text that 
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succeeds in conserving the oral qualities of African-American vocalization.30
As such, it manages to preserve the subversive seed of “the time of Osiris” 
when “every man was an artist and every artist a priest; it wasn’t until later 
that Art became attached to the State to do with it what it pleased” (164).
 As Papa LaBas explains in his lengthy monologue at the Villa Lewaro, 
Jes Grew is part of an ongoing cultural and spiritual movement that has its 
roots in the Osirian songs and dances recorded in the Book of oth. What 
Moses condemns as “heathen sounds” reemerges in Jes Grew as “timbrel’d 
anthems dark, boogie, jazz, down-home music, funk, gutbucket” (187). Ap-
propriately, the unruliness of the tradition resurfaces most perceptibly in the 
corporeal and auditory dimensions of Jes Grew’s manifestations. Jes Grew is 
“wiggling wobbling rambling and shambling ringing and chaining” (139). In 
its full bloom, it is a joyful cacophony of music, voices, songs, and laughter 
that shakes up the towns and cities of the United States: “New Orleans is a 
mess. [. . .] It sleeps aer the night of howling, speaking-in-tongues, dancing 
to drums; watching strange lights streak across the sky” (17). LaBas counters 
the Guianese art critic’s charge that “In times of social turbulence men like 
[him] always abandon reason and fall back upon Mumbo Jumbo” (195) by 
proudly accepting the designation and setting Jes Grew’s noise and mumbo 
jumbo against the deathly structures of the Wallower Order and mindless 
instrumental rationality of the Atonist Path: “Why is it Death you like? 
Because then no 1 will keep you up all night with that racket dancing and 
singing. e next morning you can get up and build, drill, progress putting 
up skyscrapers . . . and . . . and . . . working and stu. You know? Keeping 
busy” (62–63). In Mumbo Jumbo, noise connotes strength, joy, and vitality; 
the noises of Jes Grew—whose name already spells spontaneity—are the an-
tithesis of Atonist sterility. Reed stages an acoustic antagonism that pits the 
noises of blacks against the white sounds of progress and utilitarianism. In 
doing this, Reed challenges a desire for acoustic domination by technology 
no one has expressed better than Hezekiah Niles, a journalist and observer 
of westward expansion in the early nineteenth century: “e busy hum of 
ten thousand wheels lls our seaports, and the sound of the spindle and loom 
succeeds the yell of the savage or the screech of the night owl in the late wil-
derness of the interior” (qtd. in M. Smith 108).
 As in eir Eyes Were Watching God, the noise of laughter occupies a spe-
cial position. LaBas even goes so far as to identify it as a religio-cultural phe-
nomenon distinguishing blacks from whites:
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For LaBas, anyone who couldn’t titter a bit was not Afro but most likely 
a Christian connoting blood, death, and impaled emaciated Jew in ex-
cruciation. Nowhere is there an account or portrait of Christ laugh-
ing. Like the Marxists who secularized his doctrine, he is always stern, 
serious and as gloomy as a prison guard. Never does 1 see him laughing 
until tears appear in his eyes like the roly-poly squint-eyed Buddha guf-
fawing with arms upraised, or certain African loas, Orishas. (97)
In his sweeping indictment of what he perceives as a joyless white tradition 
weighed down by its own austerity, LaBas, not unlike Hurston, elevates 
laughter to one of the dening features of a vivacious black culture.
 roughout Mumbo Jumbo, noise disrupts the Atonist Order’s destructive 
patterns of reason and conformity and subverts its desire for domination. In 
the case of “West African peoples who were known to repel an invader by 
‘playing whistles and beating on drums’” (167), noise challenges opposing 
forces in the most direct manner. As the Wallower Order “launche[s] the 
war against Haiti in hopes of allaying Jes Grew symptoms by attacking their 
miasmatic source” (64) and domestic struggles for power become more 
closely linked to international ones, we also nd that noise functions as a 
communicative device that helps to organize the Haitian resistance against 
U.S. imperialism. As Benoit Battraville explains to Black Herman and Papa 
LaBas: “Soon the conch horns and the drums informed the people all over 
the country that we had returned to our ancient religion just as our ances-
tors the Egyptians the Nubians the Ethiopians did in times of trouble. e 
Marines became nervous. ey didn’t expect this” (135). When Herman in-
quires why he has not heard about these events, Battraville’s answer suggests 
that blacks have restricted access to white-controlled means of communica-
tion: “ere was no phone campaign among the rich telephone owners. No 
receptions in swanky Park Ave. parlors. No ads in newspapers or massive 
demonstrations” (136). But the Atonist Order unsuccessfully tries to keep 
in check “Jes Grew’s Communicability” (18), whose “Grapevine Telegraph” 
(20) might not be as sophisticated as the “white telephone” (63)—whose sig-
nal-to-noise ratio was a matter of intense concern to engineers of the 1920s 
(E. ompson 146–47), and that is in Mumbo Jumbo used almost exclusively 
by the Atonists—but equally eective. e battle raging between Jes Grew 
and the Atonists is as much a battle over the means of communication as it is 
a battle over cultural legitimacy and authority. Communications technology 
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becomes a powerful tool in the hands of Jes Grew’s struggle over cultural au-
thority as its noise erupts onto the airwaves, leaving one of radio’s inventors 
wringing his hands in desperation: “What have you done to my child? You 
have sent him out on the streets in rags of ragtime to collect money from 
all and sundry” (94). Jes Grew counters the white appropriation of African 
texts, views, and cultural artifacts with its own appropriation of the chan-
nels of communication that have been invented and largely controlled by 
whites. Its actions leave Hinckle Von Vampton, Grand Master of the Knights 
Templar, agonizing: “Jes Grew was on the Rise. If it captured New York its total 
control on the Radio would be complete” (139). In its struggle to subvert and in-
ltrate the ocial channels of communication, Jes Grew’s activities acquire 
something of the force of Pynchon’s underground W.A.S.T.E. system.31
 What is transmitted over the airwaves and acquires such frightful pro-
portions in the eyes or, rather, ears of Von Vampton is music, which, besides 
dance, is the most prominent manifestation of “Jes Grew, the Something or 
Other that led Charlie Parker to scale the Everests of the Chord. Ri y dip 
soar and gave his Alto Godspeed. Jes Grew that touched John Coltrane’s 
Tenor; that tinged the voice of Otis Redding” (211). e new vibes of jazz 
and ragtime seem innocuous enough and Von Vampton’s concerns exagger-
ated at best. But far from exposing the ludicrousness of white fears, Reed 
has his black characters’ actions conrm their validity beyond the imagina-
tion of whites. Something of the true scale of black opposition is revealed as 
Benoit Battraville elaborates on the possibilities of combining radio, music, 
and voodoo practice:32
Now, as 1 of your theoreticians has already said, no 1 knows how a new 
loa is formed. But we know that when 1 comes about it must be fed, 
similar to the way you feed your Ragtime and Jazz by supporting the 
artists and making it easier for those who are possessed by those forms. 
Buying records and patronizing those places which are not in the hands 
of Atonists. You know that if you don’t do this, Ragtime and Jazz will 
turn upon you or unfed will perish. Similarly we have a Radio Loa who 
just came about during the war. It loves to hear the static concerning its 
victims’ crimes before it “eats” them. (151)
Battraville here explains why he wants the story of those whom Von Vampton 
attempted to recruit to inltrate Jes Grew (the potential Talking Androids) 
recorded on a Dictaphone. Battraville is not merely talking down to an au-
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dience unfamiliar with African religion. e links he establishes between 
music and voodoo are more than analogies; they suggest that the power and 
reach of voodoo and other forms of black spirituality, including music, can 
be enhanced by new technologies of communication.
 To be sure, Reed’s portrayal of Battraville and his plans have a parodic 
quality. But, as I will elaborate further below, parody in many cases means 
serious business. In this case, Battraville’s recourse to recording technology 
turns the tables on a long history of sound technology in the service of West-
ern imperialism, a history that is itself not devoid of (self-) parodic moments. 
Witness, for instance, a late nineteenth-century observer’s concerns that two 
unnamed travelers’ project to record “specimens of Central African languag-
es” may turn out to be motivated by ulterior motives. e article that voices 
these concerns is entitled “e Phonograph in Africa” and appeared in the 
New York Times on January 19, 1885:
It is possible that the two travelers are wicked and ambitious men, who 
[. . .] have conceived the idea of introducing a new religion into Central 
Africa and of ruling the entire country in the character of high priests. 
Nothing could be easier than to carry such a scheme into eect. e 
travelers could describe the phonograph as a new and improved por-
table god, and call upon the native Kings to obey it. A god capable of 
speaking, and even of carrying on a conversation, in the presence of 
swarms of hearers would be something entirely new in Central Africa, 
where the local gods are constructed out of solid billets of wood, and 
are hopelessly dumb. ere is not a Central African living who would 
dare to refuse to obey the phonograph god, and the two travelers, as its 
only authorized priests, could bring the greater part of the continent 
into subjection for as long a time as they could keep their portable god 
in good repair and working order. (4; qtd. in Picker, Victorian 138)
Battraville’s plans both ridicule and appropriate such “techno-colonial 
dream[s]” (Pietz 270).33 e result is an electronic, African-American remix 
of the Gospel according to John that is hilariously funny and deadly serious 
at the same time.
 In Reed’s ctional world, the forgotten tradition of voodoo powerfully 
resurfaces in jazz music and is electried by modern communications tech-
nology. In Reed’s Harlem Renaissance, the Jazz Age, the Machine Age, and 
the Roaring Twenties are one, and jazz seems to conrm the fears of its most 
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viciously racist critics, who saw in it a paradoxical combination of primitiv-
ism and technological modernity gone wrong, disparaging it “not only for 
returning civilized people to the jungles of barbarism but also for expressing 
the mechanistic sterility of modern urban life” (L. Levine 12).
 In Battraville’s words, African-Americans have managed to “isolat[e] the 
unknown factor which gives the loas their rise. Ragtime. Jazz. Blues” (152), 
while Haitians have come up with a “Radio Loa” that both feeds on noise 
(“the static concerning its victims’ crimes”) and spreads the noise. African-
American music becomes more radically deant as it enters an international 
alliance with Haitian voodoo in response to the U.S. exportation of its ra-
cial conicts abroad.34 Music becomes a unifying agent in forging a “Pan- 
Africanism,” which, as a South African trumpeter realizes, essentially con-
sists of “artists relating across continents their cra, drumbeats from aeons, 
sounds that are still with us” (83). Reed insists on the uncontrollable, dan-
gerous nature of music throughout, for instance when he compares a black 
musician’s guitar playing to the way “a tiny evil venomous snake would 
sound if it could sing” (121). Music is also portrayed as dangerously sub-
versive because of its apparent uselessness. In Reed’s ctional world, music 
is opposed to the Atonist logic of instrumental rationality and aligned in-
stead with what Jacques Attali calls composition, “the conquest of the right 
to make noise, in other words, to create one’s own code and work, without 
advertising its goal in advance” (132). What is true today already applied in 
the mythological time of Set, the disciplined administrator, and Osiris, the 
joyful creator: “e people would plant during the day and at night would 
celebrate dancing singing shaking sistrums carrying on so that Set couldn’t 
get sleep and was tired when he went out on the eld and drilled marched 
and gave commands to others” (Mumbo Jumbo 162–63). In Battraville and 
his allies’ work, the revolutionary force of music is elevated to new heights 
as they mix it with the powerful practices of voodoo and spread it electroni-
cally. In Mumbo Jumbo, music indeed seems to “heral[d] the emergence of a 
formidable subversion, one leading to a radically new organization never yet 
theorized” (Attali 6). Music in Reed is the very opposite of the Muzak that 
pollutes the acoustic worlds of Pynchon’s and DeLillo’s narratives. In Reed, 
music is composition, not repetition.
 In its hodgepodge of corporeal, spiritual, and musical elements, Jes Grew 
remains, like Reed’s Neo-HooDoo, a multifaceted and multifarious phenom-
enon that eludes the dominant order’s grasp and control. While Jes Grew 
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ultimately derives its energy from a textual source—which becomes par-
ticularly evident when it begins to vanish aer the Book of oth has been 
destroyed—it continually explodes all textual boundaries. Its own textuality 
is of a decidedly unruly, noisy nature. As the quotation from James Weldon 
Johnson’s preface to e Book of American Negro Poetry illustrates, and like 
the spirituals in Du Bois’s e Souls of Black Folk, Jes Grew cannot be codi-
ed and resists appropriation by any particular group of people: “e words 
were unprintable, but the tune was irresistible, and belonged to nobody” 
(11). In its unrepresentability, Jes Grew implements Reed’s Neo-HooDoo 
aesthetic, which is, as Jerey Melnick points out, “necessarily undened: it 
places a premium on improvisation and individual expression, and opposes 
attempts to codify art or separate it from its roots in folk expression” (300). 
In fact, the nonorganic form of Reed’s narrative as a whole exemplies the 
kind of textuality Jes Grew aspires to in its “warped syntax composition and 
grammar” (215). Its title, Mumbo Jumbo, refers not only to the noisy manifes-
tations of Jes Grew and to Papa LaBas’s Mumbo Jumbo Kathedral and its re-
appropriation and revalorization of the racist’s designation of black customs 
and language but also to the formal organization of Reed’s novel itself, which 
presents the reader with a highly fragmentary, nonlinear, and idiosyncratic 
mixture of voodoo knowledge and Egyptian as well as Western mythology; 
text and image; detective plot and mock scholarship (footnotes, bibliogra-
phy, quotations). If e Crying of Lot 49 is a “Tristero novel,” Mumbo Jumbo 
is a novel that “jes grew.”
 Henry Louis Gates’s list of the variety of media, genres, forms, and styles 
that make up Mumbo Jumbo serves to highlight Reed’s extended use of the 
modernist techniques of fragmentation and collage:
A prologue, an epilogue and an appended “Partial Bibliography” frame 
the text proper [. . .]. Reed’s text also includes dictionary de nitions, 
epigraphs, epigrams, anagrams, photo-duplicated type from other 
texts, newspaper clips and headlines, signs (such as those that hang on 
doors), invitations to parties, telegrams, “Situation Reports” (which 
come “from the 8-tubed Radio”), yin-yang symbols, quotations from 
other texts, poems, cartoons, drawings of mythic beasts, handbills, pho-
tographs, a book-jacket copy, charts and graphs, playing cards, a repre-
sentation of a Greek vase, and a four-page handwritten letter, among 
even other items. (“Blackness” 301)
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Considering the acoustic unruliness of Jes Grew and the noisiness of Mumbo 
Jumbo’s textual structures, it is entirely appropriate that Abdul Su Hamid, 
the Muslim fundamentalist who last owned the Book of oth, intended to 
hide this central text within Reed’s text—itself a book of song and dance—
beneath the center of the noisy Cotton Club, and that Papa LaBas is prompt-
ed to seek it there when T Malice evokes the club’s acoustic atmosphere:
ere’s a terric comedy team called the Warp and Woof formerly of 
the Diastole and Systole who imitate 3rd-rate literary critics with a pas-
sion. ey are hilarious. en there’s the Dancing Bales; that tap dance 
group taps so that the oorboards begin to creak.
 Excited LaBas looks at T Malice. Say that again.
 e Dancing Bales they dance so . . .
 Come on let’s go. (149)
T Malice’s description reminds Papa LaBas of the epigram he found lying 
next to Abdul’s dead body: “Stringy lumpy; Bales dancing / Beneath this 
center / Lies the Bird” (98). But when they nally locate the box that should 
contain the book, they nd it empty. As LaBas and T Malice learn from a 
letter Abdul wrote shortly before he died—reproduced in Mumbo Jumbo as 
the handwritten letter Gates mentions—he burned the book out of moral 
indignation.35 Had Abdul not destroyed the book, the logic of the narrative 
suggests, LaBas would have been able to unify Jes Grew with its text so that 
its noises could still be heard today. And maybe they are, or, rather, were, 
in the unruly 1960s that are such a strong presence in this novel about the 
1920s. At least this is suggested by the hopeful note on which the book ends, 
a note that emphasizes the novel’s concern with history: “Time is a pendu-
lum. Not a river. More akin to what goes around comes around” (218). In my 
reading, the connections Reed establishes between the social and cultural 
context of the 1920s and that of the 1960s at the same time point to a lit-
erary-historical connection, to Reed’s postmodern reworking of modernist 
literary strategies.
 Yet despite Mumbo Jumbo’s erce attacks on Atonist rigidity and lifeless-
ness, despite its celebration of Jes Grew’s boundary-breaking energy and 
vitality, Reed cleverly avoids the stereotyping inherent in a strict binary 
distinction between a bookish, knowledge-based Western civilization and 
an oral, emotionally and bodily expressive black culture. One of Mumbo 
Jumbo’s more radical suggestions is that much of the knowledge circulated 
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in Western, Judeo-Christian culture and its secret societies has its roots in 
a “Black sacred Book” (194), the Book of oth. In Reed’s ctional vision, 
both cultures share one of their central texts. e white appropriation of this 
text, however, fails miserably. When Moses forced the Egyptian populace to 
attend his performance of Osirian song and music and started to sing the 
words of the Book of oth, “e ears of the people began to bleed” (183). 
Likewise, when the Knights Templar begin to derive “strange ceremonies” 
from the Book, “their fortunes revers[e]” (188). In both cases, a naïve trust in 
the power and reliability of the text precipitates disaster. Conversely, at Mo-
ses’s concert, the Osirians, who do not “know the Work that Moses knew,” 
eortlessly ll the air with “beautiful sounds” (185). Apparently the Book 
itself thwarts the Templars’ ambitions by deciding that “it was not going to 
be their whore any more” (188).
 Looking back in a lecture, Papa LaBas emphasizes the importance of tex-
tual foundation for the Jes Grew movement: “Jes Grew needed its words to 
tell its carriers what it was up to. Jes Grew was an inuence which sought its 
text. [. . .] If it could not nd its Text then it would be mistaken for enter-
tainment” (211). When we begin to think that, in its elusiveness, Jes Grew 
moves beyond textuality altogether, LaBas is there to remind us of the struc-
tural intricacies and complexities it retains: “Bongo drumming requires very 
intricate technique. A rhythmic vocabulary larger than French English or 
Spanish” (217). Yet Jes Grew is from the beginning an impure phenomenon 
that exemplies Reed’s Neo-HooDoo aesthetics (“Neo-HooDoo borrows 
from Haiti Africa and South America. Neo HooDoo comes in all styles and 
moods” [“Neo-HooDoo” 22]) and subsumes a range of heterogeneous prac-
tices including jazz music, the literature of the Harlem Renaissance, Hai-
tian voodoo practices, Egyptian mythology, raids on art museums, and the 
emergence of new dance forms.36 Its fundamental impurity is reected in 
the forms of its expression: “Jes Grew was the manic in the artist who would 
rather do glossolalia than be ‘neat clean or lucid’” (211). Even though given 
its name by Papa LaBas’s enemies, “Mumbo Jumbo Kathedral” is a tting 
designation for this spiritual center of Jes Grew. While Jes Grew needs its 
text, it thrives without instrumentalizing and codifying it. e performance 
of religious, artistic, and spiritual actors is more important than observance 
of the exact letter of the text.
 In the confrontations between Jes Grew and its white antagonists, Reed 
stages two crucial concerns of his own aesthetic practice:
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Reed’s project has two distinct, though related parts. He wishes to loos-
en the stranglehold of the Judeo-Christian tradition on the cultural 
patterns of black people everywhere (not simply Afro-Americans). 
Further, he wishes to reestablish the virtue of  ction as performance 
on the part of the artist, wresting it from the domination of the West, 
which to his mind has emphasized contemplation and tranquility over 
performance and activity. (Mason 97–98)
Black Herman, Papa LaBas’s fellow houngan, teaches the second lesson to 
Papa LaBas when he explains how and why he succeeded in making a loa 
depart from Earline’s body: “What it boils down to, LaBas, is intent. If your 
heart’s there, man, that’s 1/2 the thing about e Work. Even the European 
Occultists say that. Doing e Work is not like taking inventory. Improvise 
some. Open up, PaPa. Stretch on out with It” (130). Earlier on, LaBas al-
ready introduced yoga techniques into his Mumbo Jumbo Kathedral when 
Berbelang accused him of being anachronistic. A preference of performance 
over purity is also implied in Papa LaBas’s early judgment of Abdul—whose 
idiosyncratic mixture of pragmatism and strict Muslim beliefs clashes with 
LaBas’s voodoo practice—as “just an irritated lyricist who can’t seem to get 
his music sung” (52).
 e white appropriation of the Book of oth misres because it fails 
to recognize or implement this performative dimension. To recall a distinc-
tion introduced by Derrida in Of Grammatology, the Knights Templar fail 
because they treat oth’s text as a closed structure, a Book that needs ex-
egesis, rather than an indeterminate, open text. Moses recognizes the need 
for performance (“I must play this Book!” [178]) but is hopelessly inept at it. 
e image of him “gyrating his hips and singing the words of the Book of 
oth” (183) must strike readers as humorously incongruous, and his violent 
suppression of the audience’s enthusiastic response to the Osirians’ alterna-
tive musical performance conforms to the Atonist Order’s creed: “Lord, if I 
can’t dance, No one shall” (65). Moses’s performance lacks the corporeal and 
musical qualities of African religion and culture, qualities that Reed parodi-
cally inates in an eort to counter ethnic essentialism but at the same time 
portrays as crucial aspects of black experience.
 It is precisely in its simultaneous armation and negation of essential-
ist conceptions of blackness that Mumbo Jumbo belongs to postmodernism. 
Parody is Reed’s major device to achieve this doubleness. What we nd in 
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Reed is not pastiche, that “blank parody” Jameson dislikes for its lack of a 
satirical (and therefore a critical) sting, but a postmodern parody that does 
what parody always did, namely insist “on the force and the emptiness of a 
prior object” (Bradbury, “Parody” 221; my emphasis).37 What distinguishes 
Reed’s postmodern parody from its modernist precursors (Dos Passos’s dis-
mantling of the ocial war rhetoric in 1919, Barnes’s parody of psychoanalyt-
ic discourse in Nightwood), though, is its more strongly pronounced double-
ness, a doubleness that leaves readers unable to decide whether the text in any 
given parodic passage prioritizes an armative or a negative stance toward 
the object it imitates and distorts. Reed’s parodies not only always arm 
and negate at the same time (all parody does that), but they also seem to do 
both in equal measure. Crucially, this doubleness also informs the novel’s his-
torical imagination, in particular its ambivalent stance on the artistic legacy 
of the Harlem Renaissance. Parody enables Reed to achieve what Pynchon 
achieves through his novel’s entropic imagination: it allows him to challenge 
an either/or logic and include the excluded middle. Schmitz captures some-
thing of this challenge to dualist thinking when he writes that “For Reed 
the problem is to get outside the ‘Euro-Am meaning world’ (Baraka’s term) 
without getting caught as an artist in a contraposed system” (70). In Reed as 
in Pynchon, readers are not asked to make a decision but to accept undecid-
ability as one of the text’s dening features. us, when Papa LaBas praises 
the virility of the Loa Agovi Minorie, when he decries the whites’ absolute 
lack of a sense of humor, when Moses is portrayed as a miserable dancer, 
or when Benoit Battraville speaks about the Radio Loa “eating” its victims, 
Reed both ridicules essentialist notions of ethnicity and puts them to stra-
tegic use in an attack on a white culture perceived as lacking the energy, 
spontaneity, vitality, and emotional expressiveness of black culture.38
 Once we grasp this fundamental undecidability of Reed’s text, his exten-
sive use of elements from Haitian voodoo and American hoodoo becomes 
open to more divergent readings than his manifesto’s unequivocal arma-
tion of hoodoo practices suggests. Here, the reader is caught between at least 
three divergent readings, none of which excludes the others. e rst would 
maintain that voodoo and hoodoo are indeed rst-class passengers on the 
“Now Locomotive swinging up the Tracks of the American Soul” (25) that 
Reed celebrates in his “Neo-HooDoo Manifesto.” e second would point 
out that the references to zombies and voodoo dolls suggest that Reed paro-
dies white misconceptions about voodoo, which come to haunt them in the 
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gures of Papa LaBas, Black Herman, Benoit Battraville, and their modern-
day loas. e third, nally, would insist that Reed’s parodic imagination tar-
gets essentialist black self-conceptions. None of these readings is inherently
more plausible than the others, and the richness of Reed’s narrative seems 
to me to demand a willingness on the part of the reader to accept the im-
possibility of a denitive reading.39 My own reading of Reed’s novel thus 
largely agrees with Gates’s contention that “Reed’s most subtle achievement 
in Mumbo Jumbo stands as a profound critique and elaboration upon the 
convention of closure, and its metaphysical implications, in the black novel. 
In its stead, Reed posits the notion of aesthetic play: the play of the tradition, 
the play on the tradition, the sheer play of indeterminacy itself ” (“Blackness” 
304–5).40 Reed’s parodic play is also what lends his imaginative return to the 
Harlem Renaissance a strongly self-reexive dimension and a problematized 
sense of the past and its traditions.
 Reading Gates (rather than Reed), one cannot, however, shake the feel-
ing that eodore O. Mason has a point when he decides to read Reed’s 
strategy of indeterminacy against Gates as a sign of “a fundamental politi-
cal impotence” (106).41 What both critics fail to see, it seems to me, is that 
Reed does not celebrate indeterminacy and play for their own sake. Mumbo 
Jumbo’s critical impulses do not exhaust themselves in an assertion of the 
freeplay of the signier. Its undecidability is the eect of a double-voiced 
parody whose simultaneous armation and negation of ethnic essentialisms 
and African-American aesthetic traditions serves two dierent critical pur-
poses. Reed’s parodic critique performs the dicult, contradictory task of 
both validating a counterhegemonic black discourse that relies on essential-
ist notions of blackness and challenging racist forms of essentializing.42 e 
parodic imagination of Mumbo Jumbo thus exemplies Linda Hutcheon’s 
contention that “Parody is a perfect postmodernist form in some senses, for 
it paradoxically both incorporates and challenges that which it parodies” 
(“Beginning” 251).43
White Noise
A somewhat dierent form of doubleness is also at the heart of Don De-
Lillo’s White Noise (1985), a novel that embraces the postmodern sensibil-
ity apparent in Reed’s work much more fully. e kind of doubleness that 
structures DeLillo’s work becomes most apparent in its reception by critics 
of diering political persuasions. Bruce Bawer, reviewing White Noise for the 
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neoconservative journal New Criterion, nds fault with much of the novel’s 
design. Bawer bemoans an implausible plot, an obsession with language de-
void of meaning, and is put o by unrealistic dialogues that “defea[t] any 
hope of verisimilitude” (39) and provide sententious, shallow philosophizing 
rather than conveying characters’ feelings. Bawer, moreover, charges DeLillo 
with a primitivism and nihilism that ends up exulting violence as a way of 
escaping the numbing consumerism of American society and is epitomized 
in Jack Gladney’s fascination with Hitler and Murray Jay Siskind’s conviction 
that “violence is a form of rebirth” (290). At the heart of Bawer’s critique, 
however, we discover a somewhat dierent complaint. Bawer is convinced 
that all of DeLillo’s novels are “born out of a preoccupation with a single 
theme: namely, that contemporary American society is the worst enemy that 
the cause of human individuality and self-realization has ever had” (34). For 
Bawer, DeLillo is another tedious, misguided liberal who keeps barking up 
the wrong tree: “While those of us who live in the real America carry on with 
our richly varied, emotionally tumultuous lives, DeLillo (as White Noise am-
ply demonstrates) continues, in eect, to write the same lifeless novel over 
and over again. [. . .] If anyone is guilty of turning modern America into 
xerox copies, it is Don DeLillo” (42).44
 Considering the ideologically motivated ire of Bawer’s dismissal of De-
Lillo, it may prove surprising to encounter an equally aggressive volley leveled 
at the same author from the other end of the political spectrum. In one of 
the few hostile reviews of DeLillo’s novels from the le, John Kucich argues 
that the author himself remains trapped within his protagonist’s white male 
middle-class perspective. For Kucich, both Jack Gladney and Don DeLillo 
are spokespersons for the middle-class intellectual who has absorbed the les-
sons of postmodern politics, which, in the absence of a grounding of politics 
in anything outside of language and discourse, paradoxically falls back on 
locating as the only sites of eective social criticism positions of marginality 
and oppression that are unavailable to the white middle-class male:
at DeLillo should be so devoted to [. . .] social criticism, but so un-
willing or unable to take the next step toward any kind of political as-
sertion; that he should be so bad even at articulating the alienation of 
his white male characters in usefully oppositional ways; that he should 
be so willing to trail o into admitting lamely that “most of us don’t 
know how to feel,” as Jack Gladney concludes in White Noise—this set 
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of problems typies the general estrangement between postmodern 
politics and the white male writer. (334)
Both Bawer and Kucich seem to misunderstand a crucial point about the 
politics of DeLillo’s writing. White Noise neither constitutes the angry at-
tack on contemporary America Bawer is oended by nor does it epitomize 
the apolitical indeterminacy Kucich diagnoses as the malaise of postmod-
ern ction. Linda Hutcheon’s description of postmodernism as a form of 
“complicitous critique” provides a more accurate model for discussing the 
politics of White Noise. It also helps to explain both Bawer’s and Kucich’s dis-
satisfaction with the novel: while Bawer denounces its expressions of dissent, 
Kucich inveighs against the complicitous nature of DeLillo’s perspective on 
contemporary America.
 Hutcheon’s writing on postmodernism presents a formidable challenge to 
Kucich’s assertion that “One of the primary dierences between postmod-
ernism and modernism [. . .] is postmodernism’s refusal to separate its own 
discourse from that of the general culture on the grounds that there is some 
kind of stable truth-status in artistic or critical language” (331). Against crit-
ics like Kucich and Jameson, Hutcheon reminds us to distinguish between 
postmodernism (as a cultural and aesthetic phenomenon) and postmoder-
nity (as a specic socioeconomic formation). While postmodernism is cer-
tainly too aware of its own entanglement in the culture industry to claim for 
itself a position of straightforward antagonism toward postmodernity the 
way self-consciously oppositional forms of modernism did toward moderni-
ty, postmodernism equally certainly is not simply the cultural manifestation 
of a late stage in the development of capitalism. DeLillo is not Disneyland:
postmodernism here is not so much what Jameson sees as a systemic 
form of capitalism as the name given to cultural practices which ac-
knowledge their inevitable implication in capitalism, without relin-
quishing the power or will to intervene critically in it. (Hutcheon, 
Politics 26)
e complicitous nature of DeLillo’s critique is readily apparent in the nov-
el’s paranoid vision, a vision it shares with Pynchon’s e Crying of Lot 49. 
When, at the evacuation center, a worried Jack consults a SIMUVAC em-
ployee about his exposure to Nyodene D, the latter’s response produces a 
paranoid reaction on Jack’s part:
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“I tapped into your history. I’m getting bracketed numbers with puls-
ing stars.”
 “What does that mean?”
 “You’d rather not know.”
 He made a silencing gesture as if something of particular morbid in-
terest was appearing on the screen. I wondered what he meant when he 
said he’d tapped into my history. Where was it located exactly? Some 
state or federal agency, some insurance company or credit rm or 
medical clearinghouse? What history was he referring to? I’d told him 
some basic things. Height, weight, childhood diseases. What else did 
he know? Did he know about my wives, my involvement with Hitler, 
my dreams and fears? (140)
While Jack’s apprehension that the SIMUVAC man might know his “dreams 
and fears” displays something of the delusional quality of clinical paranoia, 
his unease about the fact that a complete stranger has prioritized access to 
his computer history—bluntly identied by the SIMUVAC man as “Your 
genetics, your personals, your medicals, your psychologicals, your police-
and-hospitals” (141)—raises entirely legitimate concerns about problems of 
surveillance, data protection, and privacy in informational societies.45 As 
readers of White Noise, we can never fully be sure to what extent DeLillo 
invites us to dismiss his characters’ paranoid responses as delusional or asks 
us to recognize in them a vehicle for his critique of technology.46 If paranoia 
forms—as I suggest it does—an integral part of DeLillo’s critical project, 
that project is also compromised by it.47
 Rather than unsettling the reader’s certainties about what is real and what 
is not—as Oedipa’s paranoid responses do—paranoia in White Noise has 
the eect of simultaneously validating and undermining the novel’s critique. 
is pattern is not restricted to DeLillo’s critique of technology but extends 
to the novel’s environmental theme. Some of the characters’ environmental 
fears are clearly exaggerated. Jack’s adolescent son Heinrich’s claim that “all 
the deformed babies are coming from [. . .] Radio and TV” (175) is a case 
in point. In other cases we cannot be so sure. For instance, Jack’s suspicion 
that Heinrich’s prematurely receding hairline may have been caused by his 
having been raised, “unwittingly, in the vicinity of a chemical dump site, 
in the path of air currents that carry industrial wastes capable of producing 
scalp degeneration, glorious sunsets” (22) is at least partly conrmed by the 
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airborne toxic event and the emergence of ever more magnicent “postmod-
ern sunset[s]” (227) in its aermath. Jack and Babette’s speculations about 
the causes of these sunsets likewise hover between the fantastic delusions of 
tabloid culture and a rational attempt at explanation by two environmentally 
conscious citizens. Babette’s reference to dierent schools of thought refers 
to an earlier rumor about technicians “being lowered in slings from army 
helicopters in order to plant microorganisms in the core of the toxic cloud” 
that “would literally consume the billowing cloud, eat it up, break it down, 
decompose it” (160):
“is isn’t one of the scarier ones.”
 “It scares me. Boy, look at it.”
 “Did you see last Tuesday? A powerful and stunning sunset. I rate 
this one average. Maybe they’re beginning to wind down.”
 “I hope not,” she said. “I’d miss them.”
 “Could be the toxic residue in the atmosphere is diminishing.”
 “ere’s a school of thought that says it’s not residue from the cloud 
that causes the sunsets. It’s residue from the microorganisms that ate 
the cloud.”
 We stood there watching a surge of orid light, like a heart pumping 
in a documentary on color TV. (227)
Jack and Babette’s obvious fascination with the spectacularly beautiful sun-
sets implicates them in the very ecological critique staged via their delib-
erations. Still, like Jack’s earlier reaction to perceiving the toxic cloud in its 
entirety (“e enormous dark mass moved like some death ship in a Norse 
legend, escorted across the night by armored creatures with spiral wings. 
[. . .] Our fear was accompanied by a sense of awe that bordered on the re-
ligious” [127]), Jack and Babette’s observations remind us that awe involves 
fear as well as wonder and, delusional or not, together with other represen-
tations of paranoid thought serves to alert DeLillo’s readers to vitally im-
portant ecological issues of global reach, exposing “the dark underside of 
consumer consciousness” (191) Jack tentatively locates in the rubbish bags 
of his American family.48 Because of its delusional excesses, paranoia is an 
inherently awed sort of critique that does not, however, fail to pinpoint real 
structural problems of contemporary societies.49
 us, DeLillo’s characters’ conicting and sometimes contradictory re-
sponses to technological as well as environmental hazards lend the author’s 
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critique a highly self-conscious quality. It is this self-conscious quality that 
renders DeLillo’s work apolitical in the eyes of a critic like Kucich. But Ku-
cich’s championing of “politically-engaged ction” (328) sets the wrong stan-
dards for evaluating the politics of DeLillo’s writing. In fact, I would argue 
with Adorno that it sets the wrong standards for any kind of writing (but 
in particular for the modernist writing for which Kucich expresses a prefer-
ence). Yet to judge DeLillo’s writing against Adorno’s call for a literature of 
negativity, a model that still applies, at least partly, to the novels of Reed 
and Pynchon, would be equally misguided. A text like White Noise displays 
little of the formal diculty of the modernist texts discussed in the preced-
ing chapter. Its ingenious blending of serious philosophical and theoretical 
reections (on radical skepticism, on the critique of technology, on hyper-
reality); traditional storytelling techniques (the murder plot, the adventure 
story, the campus novel, the detective story); and a decidedly realist bent are 
important aspects of what makes White Noise a postmodern text. To some 
extent, then, DeLillo has abandoned the modernist project of a cultural cri-
tique that is based on the literary text’s formal and linguistic dissociation 
from social reality. DeLillo’s writing belongs to the later postmodernism 
whose form of cultural critique Andreas Huyssen has described as nonmod-
ernist and nonavantgardist.
 In fact, much of DeLillo’s portrayal of the postmodern soundscape fol-
lows a realist trajectory. In a sense, White Noise returns us to the concerns 
of chapter 1. DeLillo is as careful as Dreiser or Crane in depicting the de-
tails of the acoustic environment his characters inhabit. But DeLillo—with 
one signicant exception, which will be discussed below—does not use his 
representations of acoustic worlds for the kind of sociopolitical boundary-
drawing enacted by many a naturalist writer. In fact, White Noise introduces 
its readers to a world so saturated with sounds and noises from a multiplic-
ity of sources that the very divisions that structure the naturalists’ acoustic 
imagination appear to have all but vanished. Consequently, DeLillo is less 
interested in social divisions within his ctional soundscapes than in the 
sheer proliferation of noises, which has assumed such proportions that it 
has become, he suggests, part of the environmental problem his characters 
are faced with. DeLillo’s realistic depiction of the postmodern soundscape 
becomes a vehicle for his complicitously critical perspective on ecological 
issues of the late twentieth century.
 Concerns about noise pollution were highly topical when White Noise ap-
UP
F
CO
PY
Noise Everywhere: The Postmodern Situation    /    177
peared in 1984. Only three years before, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) had published a report entitled Noise in America: e Extent 
of the Noise Problem (1981). at study was an attempt to assess the extent 
of noise pollution and its eects on the U.S. population at the beginning 
of the 1980s. It listed road trac, air trac, construction work, railroads, 
and industrial activities as the major sources of noise. e authors found 
that road trac was the leading source of community noise and estimated 
that it alone exposed 96.8 million Americans to daily average sound levels 
above the safe level of 55 dB. From the numbers given in the EPA report, we 
can estimate that the combined impact of all major noise sources exposed 
over half the American population to daily average noise levels above that 
safety level (Suter 11). Moreover, at the time more than 9 million workers 
were daily exposed to occupational noise exceeding 85 dB, a sound level that 
can induce hearing loss, impedes communication, and adversely aects job 
performance and workplace safety. In 1982, the Reagan administration shut 
down the Oce of Noise Abatement and Control (ONAC) and thus put an 
end to the activities of that oce within the EPA that was responsible for the 
1981 report.
 Ten years later, Alice Suter, an audiologist at the National Institute for Oc-
cupational Safety and Health, reviewed the changes that had occurred in the 
American soundscape since the shutdown of the ONAC. Her ndings were 
presented to the Administrative Conference of the United States in Novem-
ber 1991. In the concluding chapter of her report, Suter states that “Noise has 
a signicant impact on the quality of American life. ere is no evidence that 
the impact has diminished in the years since ONAC was abolished. Rather, 
it appears that the impact is at least as great, and probably greater, than it 
was ten years ago, due to population growth, especially in urban areas, and 
the proliferation of certain noise sources” (36). Among the adverse health 
eects of noise, Suter lists hearing loss, interference with communication, 
sleep disturbance, annoyance, anxiety, stress, reduced performance of cogni-
tive tasks, and a variety of extra-auditory health eects including elevations 
in blood pressure and raised cholesterol and glucose levels (14–35).
 Don DeLillo’s White Noise was published within the decade demarcated 
by the EPA’s and Suter’s reports. e ndings of these reports provide an 
incentive to read the novel’s title literally (as far as this is possible with a 
term that is itself already metaphorical). To be sure, the acoustic atmosphere 
we encounter as we enter DeLillo’s Blacksmith is a far cry from the sonic 
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hell of Crane’s Bowery in Maggie or the uproar of Dos Passos’s Manhat-
tan. When Jack Gladney, the novel’s rst-person narrator and protagonist, 
“experience[s] aural torment” (241), it is because he imagines the sound of 
his wife Babette and Mr. Gray’s lovemaking. Jack’s rst description of the 
acoustic environment he and his family inhabit in fact stresses that they “live 
at the end of a quiet street,” with the expressway “well below” (4) them. e 
acoustic division Jack establishes between their quiet street and the noisy ex-
pressway anticipates his later attempts to draw a clear line between the family 
of a man who is “not just a college professor” but “the head of a department” 
and “people who live in mobile homes out in the scrubby parts of the coun-
try, where the sh hatcheries are” (117).50 Jack’s representation of an acoustic 
phenomenon thus contributes to his anxious construction of a sense of social 
distinction that he believes will protect him and his family from harm.51
 Jack Gladney is as keen as Sister Carrie to discover the line that separates 
his world from that of the lower social orders, and the acoustic distinctions 
he makes become part of that project. But Jack’s attempts are much more 
heavily ironized by DeLillo’s repeated suggestion that the very boundaries 
Jack seeks to identify have almost completely disappeared within the om-
nipresent and permanent hum of the postmodern soundscape. While Car-
rie still nds refuge in the silence of her hotel suite, the acoustic space the 
Gladneys inhabit is anything but quiet. Ironically, their longing for quietude 
is undermined within the very space they have built for themselves. eir 
domestic sonic environment is fed by the uninterrupted buzz of the gas me-
ter, the thermostat, the radiator, the washing machine, the clothes dryer, the 
refrigerator; it is fed by the anonymous voices emerging from the radio and 
a television set that is always on. Occasionally, a ringing telephone makes 
itself heard above the background noise, or a smoke alarm—which is duly 
ignored.52
 e streets of Blacksmith are relatively quiet; trac and industrial noise 
are mostly heard from a distance. But when the Gladney family enters one of 
the local supermarkets or department stores, their ears are again assailed by 
an extremely dense sonic wall composed of Muzak, consumer messages, cof-
fee grinders, chiming bells, humming maintenance systems, and escalators. 
e remarkable dierence between a silent outdoors and noisy interiors is 
nally eroded when disaster strikes. As the airborne toxic event approaches 
Blacksmith, the combined noise of amplied emergency messages, helicop-
ters, automobile horns, and, towering above it all, air-raid, police, re, and 
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ambulance sirens lls private and public spaces alike and abolishes the dis-
tinction between acoustic interiors and exteriors.
 is brief survey of some of the noises that saturate the acoustic world 
of White Noise should prompt us to recognize what critics interested in the 
novel’s ecological theme oen fail to notice, namely that White Noise is in 
important ways also a novel about acoustic ecology. In its literal sense, the ti-
tle refers to the omnipresence of broad-band noises as keynote sounds of the 
postmodern soundscape. As Barry Truax, a coworker on the World Sound-
scape Project whose rst edition of Acoustic Communication (1984) appeared 
one year before DeLillo’s novel, explains, the constant hum of trac and 
technical appliances such as air conditioners or computers approaches the 
acoustic qualities of white noise:
Trac and air-conditioning are [. . .] examples of “broad-band” sounds, 
that is, sounds whose spectrum or energy content is continuously dis-
tributed over a fairly large range of frequencies. When that range is the 
whole audible spectrum and the distribution is uniform, the sound is 
called “white noise,” by analogy to white light which contains all visible 
frequencies. (1984, 20)
If critics identify white noise with the junk information continually emitted 
by radio and TV (Saltzman 808), we may add that the sound of white noise 
already exhibits the qualities identied with junk information. Truax makes 
the connection between the acoustic quality of sound and its information 
content as he comments on the contemporary “proliferation of low infor-
mation, highly redundant, and basically uninteresting sounds which do not 
encourage sensitive listening” (1984, 13). e type of sound Truax describes 
is a continual presence in the supermarket as well as the Gladneys’ home. 
Jack gives a fairly accurate description of it when he enters Willie Mink’s 
motel room, where his adversary is watching TV with the sound turned o: 
“I heard a noise, faint, monotonous, white” (306).
 Electronic devices produce sounds of great uniformity and little variance. 
Barry Truax follows Murray Schafer in designating these sounds as at-line 
sounds.53 Truax distinguishes between the electrical hum—a low-pitched 
sound caused by the oscillation of alternating current (AC) if the electrical 
circuit is not properly grounded—and the electrical drone, a sound caused 
by the rapid, uniform vibration of various machines including vacuum clean-
ers and electric lawnmowers. e broad-band noise of today’s cities is not 
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only less informative and more redundant than other sounds but also masks 
other, potentially more signicant acoustic events. As a result, sounds blur 
into one another, the soundscape loses acoustic denition, and human be-
ings encounter diculties in communicating across distances (Truax 1984, 
123–26). In short, the electried soundscape interferes with the human pro-
duction and reception of sound. In making this analysis his own, DeLillo 
taps into realist modes of representation that are largely absent from Reed’s 
or Pynchon’s work.
 While the most immediate cause of Willie Mink’s loss of communicative 
abilities toward the end of the novel is an excessive dosage of Dylar, his deso-
late state at the same time represents the extreme case of human communica-
tion that is not only impeded by the ambient noise but has become almost 
indistinguishable from it. But DeLillo has more subtle ways of inviting his 
readers to pass a negative judgment on the postmodern soundscape. Many of 
the noises of White Noise possess an ominous quality. When Jack perceives 
that “e gas meter made a particular noise” (222) or that “at chirping 
noise was just the radiator (94), he reminds us that the machinery we have 
come to accept as an indispensable part of our everyday lives may malfunc-
tion or completely break down. A more vague but at the same time much 
stronger sense of premonition is evoked when Jack listens to the garbage 
compactor’s “ram strok[ing] downward with a dreadful wrenching sound, 
full of eerie feeling” (33) or when its “motorized surge” makes him “retreat 
two paces” (101). Several of the noises that possess this ominous quality are 
described as a presence just beyond the range of conscious perception. is 
is true of the Gladneys’ refrigerator, which produces an “eerie static, insistent 
but near subliminal,” which makes Jack “think of wintering souls, some form 
of dormant life approaching the threshold of perception” (258). It also ap-
plies to the buzz of the supermarket, which is characterized as a “sublittoral 
drone” (168) in one passage and “a dull and unlocatable roar, as of some 
form of swarming life just outside the range of human apprehension” (36) in 
another. Jack’s comparison of the noises to forms of life lurking just beneath 
the surface is again evoked when the beast nally emerges and makes itself 
heard. Startled by the acoustic onslaught of the air-raid sirens, Jack muses 
that “ey made a noise like some territorial squawk out of the Mesozoic. A 
parrot carnivore with a DC-9 wingspan. What a raucousness of brute aggres-
sion lled the house, making it seem as if the walls would y apart. So close 
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to us, so surely upon us. Amazing to think this sonic monster lay hidden 
nearby for years” (118).
 It is no coincidence that the full emergence of noise from out of the am-
bient roar occurs with a signal that announces the text’s ecological disaster. 
e novel’s acoustic and ecological dynamics follow the same trajectory: 
both forms of pollution are of far-reaching proportions but remain barely 
perceptible, lying dormant below the surface until a major event—the ear- 
splitting blast of the sirens, the airborne toxic event—forcefully imposes 
them on DeLillo’s characters’ consciousness. Much as the contamination of 
the grade school or the “smell of acrid matter” (240) that arises from the 
burning insane asylum reminds the citizens of Blacksmith of an environmen-
tal pollution that remains imperceptible for most of the time, the noise of the 
sirens is merely the supreme expression of an acoustic pollution that is om-
nipresent—“Panasonic” (241)—but largely inaccessible to conscious percep-
tion.54 e white noise of White Noise both is an integral part of the town’s 
environmental problem and heralds its more threatening manifestations. 
DeLillo’s ctional world testies to Jacques Attali’s assertion that “change is 
inscribed in noise faster than it transforms society” (5). It is therefore utterly 
appropriate that Jack Gladney becomes “aware of the dense environmental 
texture” (168) as he nds himself in the midst of the noises of the supermar-
ket, where he learns about Dimitrios Cotsakis’s death.
 e consumer messages that contribute to the supermarket’s dense acous-
tic texture also ll the acoustic space of the Gladneys’ home. DeLillo’s rep-
resentation of the disembodied voices that seem to originate from either the 
radio or the television set indicates perhaps most clearly that his judgment 
on the postmodern soundscape is a negative one. Like the noises emitted 
by clothes dryers, radiators, gas meters, or thermostats, these disembodied 
voices are oen reproduced by themselves, as one-line paragraphs:
Dacron, Orlon, Lycra Spandex. (52)
Dristan Ultra, Dristan Ultra. (167)
Leaded, unleaded, super unleaded. (199)
Tegrin, Denorex, Selsun Blue. (289)
Blue jeans tumbled in the dryer. (18)
at chirping sound was just the radiator. (94)
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e gas meter made a particular noise. (222)
e thermostat began to buzz. (302)
e fact that the advertising messages are, like the noises of appliances, 
reproduced as single paragraphs, as acoustic inserts, suggests that their in-
formation content is equally low. ese noises, DeLillo intimates, become 
a form of noise pollution. It is, of course, possible for readers to establish 
meaningful connections between the disembodied TV voices and the sur-
rounding text, for instance when the message “MasterCard, Visa, American 
Express” (100) interrupts Jack and Babette’s discussion about who wants to 
die rst, suggesting a connection between consumerism and death that also 
lies behind Jack’s frantic eorts to dispose of the many useless commodi-
ties that have accumulated in the Gladneys’ house over the years. But the 
very diculty we oen encounter in establishing these links suggests much 
rather that the content of these messages is less important than the fact of 
their near-random but persistent recurrence throughout DeLillo’s text. As 
the narrative progresses, they become so many that they begin to merge with 
the ambient noise, becoming barely distinguishable from it. e ubiquitous 
TV messages, whose information content lies only minimally above that 
of the noise produced by trac or household appliances, signal the always- 
present possibility of a slippage of language into noise within the postmod-
ern soundscape.
 e noises of consumerism, epitomized by the Muzak of the department 
stores—a form of sounding Attali poignantly characterizes as a “monologue 
of standard, stereotyped music” that “accompanies and hems in a daily life in 
which in reality no one has the right to speak any more” (8)—are everywhere 
and have entered, DeLillo suggests, our heads and impaired our language 
and our thinking. In fact, DeLillo’s postmodern subjects have internalized 
the language of advertising to such a degree that their own utterances come 
to resemble advertising slogans. In their rapid exchanges of sound bytes, the 
Gladney family’s conversations at times reproduce the two-part and tripar-
tite form of consumer messages:
“I’m trying to remember three kinds of rock,” I said. “Igneous, sedi-
mentary and something else.”
 “What about your logarithms? What about the causes of economic 
discontent leading up to the Great Crash? Here’s one. Who won the 
Lincoln-Douglas debates? Careful. It’s not as obvious as it seems.”
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 “Anthracite and bituminous,” I said. “Isosceles and scalene.”
 e mysterious words came back to me in a rush of confused school-
room images.
 “Here’s one. Angles, Saxons, Jutes.” (176)
It is at such moments that Jack’s suspicion that “e family is the cradle of 
the world’s misinformation” (81) receives its strongest conrmation. What 
Bruce Bawer would dismiss as unrealistic dialogue is part of DeLillo’s critique 
of the noises that saturate the acoustic space of postmodernity. Later in the 
novel, the anonymous “woman passing on the street,” uttering the words “A 
decongestant, an antihistamine, a cough suppressant, a pain reliever” (262) 
represents an advanced stage of the same process: both the form and the con-
tent of advertising messages have come to inltrate her thoughts and speech. 
Willie Mink’s reproduction of TV talk represents the psychotic extreme of 
the same process. reatened by a jealous husband pointing a gun at him, 
Mink can merely reply: “Containing iron, niacin and riboavin” (310). And 
later, on the same page, “Some of these playful dolphins have been equipped 
with radio transmitters. eir far-ung wanderings may tell us things” (310). 
Of course, this is a comic scene, but its humorous quality should not distract 
us from recognizing that Mink’s desolate state is merely an advanced form 
of the linguistic deprivation DeLillo’s characters are threatened by. DeLillo’s 
observations on the information society are, like Mink’s dolphins, playful, 
and he does suggest that its “incessant bombardment of information” (66) 
may, again like Mink’s dolphins, “tell us things,” but DeLillo’s observations 
never lose their critical edge.
 e German philosopher Gernot Böhme proposes a somewhat dierent 
perspective on the postmodern soundscape than that suggested by acoustic 
ecologists. Well aware that the contemporary acoustic environment is, as he 
puts it, “colonized” (18) by Muzak and a plethora of other machine-made 
sounds, Böhme argues that the postmodern soundscape also encourages a 
new type of listening:
one must admit that the acoustic consciousness of the average indi-
vidual has experienced a noticeable development. is is not only to 
suggest that musical desires and the musical demands contained in 
them have been heightened substantially—it also means that listening 
as such has developed into an important dimension of life and into a 
broad zone of satisfaction for the general public. Of course one must 
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state that the noise of the modern world and the occupation of public 
space by music has led to the habit of not-listening (Weghören). At the 
same time, listening has grown from an instrumental experience—I 
hear something—to a mode through which one participates in the 
world. (16–17)
e omnipresence of sounds from multiple sources makes it almost impos-
sible to locate the origin of sounds and creates for the hearer an experience of 
immersion in an extremely dense acoustic space. is new quality of aural ex-
perience highlights that hearing is always also a corporeal experience, an ex-
perience that involves our bodies as a whole. Böhme describes the new kind 
of listening demanded and encouraged by the white noise of postmodernity 
as follows: “when we are listening [. . .] we are outside ourselves. And this 
being which is outside itself does not encounter voices, tones, sounds, out 
there, but is itself formed, moulded, crenated, cut, lied, pushed, expanded 
and constricted by voices, tones, sounds” (18).
 is is the kind of aural experience, immersion in sound, a number of 
experimental musicians have attempted to create since the mid-twentieth 
century. Some of these artists, LaMonte Young and Allan Kaprow among 
them, used the sounds of water to achieve the desired eect (Kahn 228–32, 
271–76). In White Noise, DeLillo uses aquatic metaphors to represent the 
new aurality. When Jack realizes that the supermarket is “awash in noise” 
(36), when he perceives its “oceanic layers of sound” (288), or comments on 
the “night’s combined sounds” that “c[o]me washing in with a freshness and 
renewed immediacy” (118), he experiences the acoustic space he inhabits as a 
body of water in which his own body is immersed. Yet Jack’s strongest aural 
experience of this kind does not occur when he nds himself engulfed in the 
noises of American consumerism, but when he listens to his son Wilder’s 
crying:
As the crying continued, a curious shi developed in my thinking. I 
found that I did not necessarily wish him to stop. It might not be so 
terrible, I thought, to have to sit and listen to this a while longer. We 
looked at each other. Behind that dopey countenance, a complex intel-
ligence operated. I held him with one hand, using the other to count 
his  ngers inside the mittens, aloud, in German. e inconsolable cry-
ing went on. I let it wash over me, like rain in sheets. I entered it, in a 
sense. I let it fall and tumble across my face and chest. I began to think 
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he had disappeared inside this wailing noise and if I could join him in 
his lost and suspended place we might together perform some reckless 
wonder of intelligibility. I let it break across my body. It might not be 
so terrible, I thought, to have to sit here for four more hours, with the 
motor running and the heater on, listening to this uniform lament. It 
might be good, it might be strangely soothing. I entered it, fell into it, 
letting it enfold and cover me. He cried with his eyes open, his eyes 
closed, his hands in his pockets, his mittens on and o­. I sat there nod-
ding sagely. (78)
It is in this scene where the boundary between the hearing subject and 
the sounds it hears is most fully dissolved. As in the supermarket passage, 
DeLillo uses metaphorical language to depict Jack’s immersion in a sea of 
sound. But Jack’s aural experience in this passage possesses a more intimate 
and near-mystical quality that distinguishes it from otherwise similar experi-
ences at the supermarket. Murray Jay Siskind equally locates a potential for 
mystical experience in the American family when he speaks about its “oth-
erworldly babble” (101). DeLillo seems to suggest that it is in the presence 
of human sound-making rather than the temples of consumerism where a 
“reckless wonder of intelligibility” may still be performed.
 Yet to argue that the novel’s acoustic imagination is split in two between 
a familial acoustic space within which the sounds and noises produced by 
human beings hold a promise of enhanced sense-making and a debased, even 
pernicious machine-made soundscape colonized by Muzak, trac noise, and 
air-raid sirens would be overly simplistic. DeLillo’s text in fact betrays a, per-
haps perverse, fascination with the noises of postmodernity. If the disem-
bodied TV voices become almost indistinguishable from the ambient noise, 
the reverse slippage of noise into language can already be observed in the 
novel’s rst representation of an acoustic phenomenon. Jack’s comparison 
of the roar of trac “wash[ing] past” at night to “dead souls babbling at the 
edge of a dream” (4) points to an incomplete slippage of noise into language 
that must remain incomplete precisely because the object of representation 
possesses mystical qualities that, in the nal analysis, remain beyond the lim-
its of human understanding and representation.
 Jack thus attributes the same otherworldly quality to trac noise that 
Murray attributes to the babble of the American family. is aestheticization 
and mystication of the sonic mundane is repeated in almost identical fash-
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ion when the refrigerator’s “strange crackling sound” conjures up images of 
hibernating souls in Jack’s mind (258). In fact, the ominous quality of many 
of the novel’s noises also hints at the existence of a world beyond the empiri-
cal world the Gladneys inhabit. While the air-raid sirens’ ferocious squawk 
transports Jack’s imagination back to primordial times, the subliminal bestial 
presence he senses among the supermarket’s ambient roar suggests the exis-
tence of a sphere beyond our means of conscious perception. A similar sense 
of mystery is evoked when Heinrich muses that “there are sounds even dogs 
can’t hear. [. . .] High, high, high-pitched. Coming from somewhere” (23), 
when some of Blacksmith’s inhabitants expect that a “voice or noise would 
crack across the sky” and li them “out of death” (234) or when Jack hears 
“a great echoing din, as of the extinction of a species of beast” in a hardware 
store’s “deep interior” (82). ese noises herald not only ecological disaster 
but also the incomplete coming into presence of a transcendental world. e 
novel’s dense texture of sounds and noises regularly produces moments of 
mystical, quasi-religious experience. Even before Murray compares the su-
permarket to a Tibetan house of the dead do Jack’s aural experiences imbue 
its white noise—a sound that, as Kittler reminds us, “no script can store” 
(Grammophon 72; my translation)—with a sense of the otherworld. In this 
context, it is no coincidence that Wilder’s miraculous survival as he rides his 
tricycle across the expressway occurs amidst the “serial whoosh of dashing 
hatchbacks and vans” (322), amidst cars “wailing past, horns blowing,” and 
“sound waves mixing in the air” (323).
 It is, however, at the evacuation center where the noises of consumerism 
come into full mystical presence for Jack, who hears his daughter mutter the 
words Toyota Celica in her sleep:
A long moment passed before I realized this was the name of an auto-
mobile. e truth only amazed me more. e utterance was beautiful 
and mysterious, gold-shot with looming wonder. It was like the name of 
an ancient power in the sky, tablet-carved in cuneiform. It made me feel 
that something hovered. But how could these near-nonsense words, 
murmured in a child’s restless sleep, make me sense a meaning, a pres-
ence? She was only repeating some TV voice. Toyota Corolla, Toyota 
Celica, Toyota Cressida. Supranational names, computer-generated, 
more or less universally pronounceable. Part of every child’s brain 
noise, the substatic regions too deep to probe. Whatever its source, the 
UP
F 
CO
PY
Noise Everywhere: The Postmodern Situation    /    187
utterance struck me with the impact of a moment of splendid transcen-
dence. (155)
As in Jack’s description of night-time trac, it is a murmur—a semiarticulate 
linguistic utterance—that gives Jack access to a tacit knowledge of a world 
just beyond the reach of our conventional means of perception and repre-
sentation.
 In his systems-theoretic reading of White Noise, Tom LeClair (207–36) 
has recourse to the order-from-noise principle to explain the emergence of 
mystery and meaning out of the apparently debased products of consumer 
culture and the debris of the postmodern soundscape:
While expressing polarities, the sound motif, like the novel as a whole, 
comes to signify a wide-ranging awareness of systemic mystery, a new 
knowing and non-knowing. In evolution, Anthony Wilder [sic] re-
minds us, noise is an intrusion “converted into an essential part of the 
system so as to maintain the relationship between system and environ-
ment;” the “ecient system” will “seek to maintain stability by AC-
CEPTING noise, by incorporating it as information, and moving to 
a new level of organization (evolving).” [. . .] In White Noise DeLillo 
collects the familiar sounds of American culture and universal fear; he 
then both turns them up, exaggerating their foolishness for ironic ef-
fect, and turns them down, nding in the lower frequencies a whisper 
of possibility, of uncertainty beyond our present range of knowledge. 
DeLillo’s is the noise of disaster and the noise of possibility. Which 
shall we hear, which shall we make—in the loop? (231–32)
LeClair makes an important point here whose validity extends beyond the 
novel’s more obviously mystical moments.55 roughout White Noise, De-
Lillo encourages us to search for moments of enhanced experience in the 
perception of the mundane.56 Already the novel’s rst chapter—a richly 
satirical account of students returning to campus accompanied by their af-
uent parents, about whom “something [. . .] suggest[s] massive insurance 
coverage” (3)—in the nal sentence takes a sudden, unexpected turn to the 
pathos of everyday life: “On telephone poles all over town there are home-
made signs concerning lost dogs and cats, sometimes in the handwriting of 
a child” (4).
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 For LeClair, the novel’s pervasive sense of wonder and mystery is the linch-
pin of DeLillo’s cultural critique. DeLillo’s ction, LeClair argues, warns us 
against seeking refuge in closed systems that threaten to turn in upon them-
selves—Jack’s obsession with Hitler, Babette’s belief in technological xes, 
Jack’s yearning for a familial safety that would insulate him from the outside 
world. Against this narrow conception of the world and our place in it, De-
Lillo privileges a systemic perspective that accepts the openness, complexity, 
and exibility of the multiple systems we inhabit and interact with. Only 
such a perspective would allow us to regain a sense of awe and wonder at and 
respect for the world we live in. In White Noise, LeClair continues, Murray 
Jay Siskind is—despite his at times pernicious inuence on Jack—the main 
representative of this systemic perspective, and the Gladneys would do well 
to listen to and learn from him. It is, aer all, Murray who embraces most 
fully the openness, uncertainty, and mysteriousness of a complex world of 
multiple interlocking systems and communications, and it is he who discov-
ers “veils of mystery and layers of cultural material [. . .] all the code words 
and ceremonial phrases” (37–38) in the supermarket, “sacred formulas” (51) 
in television, and “God’s own goodness” (285) in technology. e note of awe 
and wonderment on which the novel ends may be read as signaling DeLillo’s 
(and maybe Jack’s) nal endorsement of Murray’s systemic perspective:
Murray Jay Siskind is the tutor in mystery. DeLillo hedges Siskind’s 
inuence in several ways—by making him hyperbolic and occasionally 
wrong in his statements, by giving him an immoral inuence—but I 
believe DeLillo means the reader to take seriously Siskind’s analysis 
of essentially religious experience in secular forms. [. . .] While satiriz-
ing how contemporary man uses and is used by his objects, his things, 
DeLillo also shows how a new perception of what is now natural—sys-
tems among systems, communications, inherent uncertainty, mysteri-
ousness—can accommodate man to his condition as knower and even 
squeeze a modicum of hope from the junk into which a reductionist 
way of knowing has historically converted natural complexity. is is 
the looping accomplishment of White Noise. Morris Berman, in his 
study of science since the Renaissance asserts that the eect of systems 
thinking is a “reenchantment of the world,” a sense of participation in 
systemic seriousness. Understated and uncertain, the ending of White 
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Noise implies this possibility, this futurity—if not for Jack Gladney, 
then for the reader who knows more than he. (LeClair 228–30)
LeClair’s systemic approach provides an adequate model for describing the 
novel’s recurrent slippages of noise into language and consumerist junk into 
a source of awe and wonder. But to locate DeLillo’s critical import in the 
sense of mystery he evokes, to claim that “For DeLillo, the counterpoint to 
both power and consumption is ‘mystery,’ the singly most important value-
word in his ction, nonction, and interviews” (15), is problematic and, I 
believe, misleading.
 e main sources of mystery in White Noise are, aer all, the supermarket 
and the television set, those avatars of consumer culture. LeClair himself 
acknowledges this when he writes that DeLillo “extract[s] from his initially 
satirical materials a sense of wonderment and mystery, nding in the seeming 
rubbish of popular culture a kind of knowledge that would provide a more 
livable set of systemic expectations about life and death” (214). If the main 
purpose of DeLillo’s complicitous critique were to sharpen, as LeClair sug-
gests, readers’ awareness of systemic complexity by making them realize the 
potential for awe and wonderment hidden in the products and messages of 
American consumerism, we would be justied in seeing in DeLillo’s work, 
as Kucich suggests we should, much complicity and very little (if any) cri-
tique. e main problem with LeClair’s approach is that he inherits from the 
early systems thinker Gregory Bateson a preference for open, homeostatic 
systems and a holistic approach that Bateson developed, particularly in Steps 
to an Ecology of Mind (1972), with a concern for the survival of the ecosys-
tem in mind and applies it to the much smaller system of American con-
sumer capitalism, which, as DeLillo’s novel amply demonstrates, represents 
a vital threat to the ecosystem’s possibility of survival rather than a source 
of mystery whose proper recognition would enable us to enter into a more 
encompassing and harmonious relationship with the world we inhabit. In 
this context, it is telling that the passages LeClair (229) chooses to illustrate 
Jack’s newfound insights into systemic complexity and uncertainty do not 
testify to Jack’s reconsideration of his own relation to technology or the en-
vironment. Instead, it demonstrates to his ability to produce Murray-type 
analyses of Babette’s “spirit” (104) as she appears on the TV screen and “the 
language of waves and radiation” (326) he listens to at the supermarket as 
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the novel ends. White Noise does indeed have a looping structure, but the 
loop does not refer to a recognition of “the inherent reciprocity of circular 
causality that makes certainty impossible” (LeClair 226); it leads from the 
station wagons lled with Jack’s students’ consumer goods at the beginning 
of the novel to the stacked shelves of the supermarket at its end.
 DeLillo’s evocation of the mysteries of American consumerism and its 
noises, then, is part of what makes his critique complicit rather than its 
starting point. But DeLillo does not fully join in LeClair’s mystication of 
consumer culture and regularly undercuts Murray’s as well as Jack’s attempts 
to do the same. Not even the Toyota Celica passage allows for a reading of 
Jack’s epiphany as an unequivocal armation of the otherworldly richness of 
consumerist noise. Such a reading would both overlook the passage’s ironic 
qualities—which are reinforced in other parts of the novel, where the list-
like form of advertising slogans is lled with much more serious content 
(“Random Access Memory, Acquired Immune Deciency Syndrome, Mu-
tually Assured Destruction” [303]) or parodied in its incongruity (“CABLE 
HEALTH, CABLE WEATHER, CABLE NEWS, CABLE NATURE” 
[231])—and its reminder that what has become part of Denise’s “brain 
noise” are “near-nonsense words” whose presence may well enhance Jack’s 
consciousness but cloud his daughter’s.
 DeLillo’s suggestion, repeated throughout his narrative, that the noises of 
the postmodern soundscape—fed as they are by “random noise, that irrevo-
cable background to technical media” (Kittler, Grammophon 301; my transla-
tion)—interfere with human communication to the point of reducing it to 
noise, that they occlude our processes of cognition and perception, and have 
in fact become part of the environmental pollution he depicts, represents the 
critical counterpart to Murray’s celebratory mysticism. DeLillo’s aesthetics 
here departs most clearly from Reed’s as well as Pynchon’s in its use of realist 
strategies of representation in the service of a postmodern cultural critique. 
Yet DeLillo does not simply validate the critical perspective while dismiss-
ing the mystical one as corrupt. e novel’s acoustic imagination is part of 
a complicitously critical project, which also encompasses its environmental 
imagination. White Noise betrays a keen awareness that both its author and 
its characters are deeply implicated in the very conditions and processes they 
subject to critical scrutiny without, however, becoming fully absorbed by 
them or relinquishing all critical distance. Hutcheon describes this double-
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ness of the postmodern politics of representation in terms that are directly 
applicable to White Noise:
Postmodernism manifests itself in many elds of cultural endeavor—
architecture, literature, photography, lm, painting, video, dance, mu-
sic, and elsewhere. In general terms it takes the form of self-conscious, 
self-contradictory, self-undermining statement. It is rather like saying 
something while at the same time putting inverted commas around
what is being said. e eect is to highlight, or “highlight,” and to 
subvert, or “subvert,” and the mode is therefore a “knowing” and an 
ironic—or even “ironic”—one. Postmodernism’s distinctive charac-
ter lies in this kind of wholesale “nudging” commitment to double-
ness, or duplicity. In many ways it is an even-handed process because 
postmodernism ultimately manages to install and reinforce as much 
as undermine and subvert the conventions and presuppositions it ap-
pears to challenge. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to say that the 
postmodern’s initial concern is to de-naturalize some of the dominant 
features of our way of life; to point out that those entities that we un-
thinkingly experience as “natural” (they might even include capital-
ism, patriarchy, liberal humanism) are in fact “cultural”; made by us, 
not given to us. Even nature, postmodernism might point out, doesn’t 
grow on trees. (Politics 1–2)
Hutcheon’s choice of the de-naturalizing of nature itself as an example for 
the de-naturalizing impulses of postmodernism makes her more general ar-
gument about the politics of postmodernism read like a comment on the 
ecological concerns of DeLillo’s novel. In White Noise, a plethora of phe-
nomena, ranging from the TV station “CABLE NATURE” (231) to the 
postmodern sunsets to Murray’s assertion that “It’s natural to deny our na-
ture” (297) attest to the collapse of the distinction between nature and cul-
ture into simulations of nature and natural simulacra. ough blurring the 
very distinctions that ground its critical impact, DeLillo’s de-naturalizing 
of nature serves to pinpoint the deleterious extent of human intervention 
in the natural world and thus forms an important aspect of his ecological 
critique, which, however, remains every bit as complicitous as his critique 
of technology.
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 e novel’s environmental theme continually reminds us of the ecologi-
cal costs of American consumerism, of the insecticides that end up in the 
products of the supermarket’s fruit bins, where “Everything seem[s] to be 
in season, sprayed, burnished, bright” (36), of “the radiation that surrounds 
us every day. Your radio, your TV, your microwave oven, your power lines 
just outside the door, your radar speed-trap on the highway” (174). In the 
context of the novel’s ecological concerns, white noise emerges as a metaphor 
for an extensive environmental pollution that nevertheless remains below 
the threshold of most American citizens’ conscious perception. e airborne 
toxic event serves to puncture that veil, but DeLillo’s ecological critique is 
not borne out by his characters’ actions in any consistent fashion. e Glad-
neys themselves are avid consumers who indulge in fast-food binges in their 
car, “fully dressed, in hats and heavy coats, without speaking, ripping into 
chicken parts with [their] hands and teeth” (231–32) or, driven by an intense 
“desire to buy,” seek satisfaction in “shopp[ing] with reckless abandon” (83–
84).57
 In the absence of either a gural, narrative, or authorial voice that can 
extricate itself from the novel’s environmental critique, that critique must re-
main compromised. In its oscillation between sonic mysticism and acoustic 
ecology, the novel’s representation of the postmodern soundscape replicates 
the complicitously critical dynamics of an ecological critique in whose con-
text it acquires its signicance. It cannot be stressed enough that the com-
plicitous nature of DeLillo’s ecological and technological critiques in White 
Noise does not invalidate the novel’s power to intervene critically in the dis-
courses that shape our understanding of postmodernity. DeLillo’s descrip-
tion of Iron City as “a large town sunk in confusion, a center of abandon-
ment and broken glass” (85) that “expresses a ghostly longing for something 
that was far beyond retrieval” (88) may well be read as suggesting that the in-
dustrial age the city’s name alludes to has given way to a new, postindustrial 
order. But DeLillo does not join the chorus of approval of the postindustrial 
society, which the author of that term inspired. If Daniel Bell can write in 
e Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (1974) 
that, in the postindustrial society, “individual utility and prot maximiza-
tion” will “become subordinated to broader conceptions of social welfare 
and community interest” (481), we need DeLillo’s ctional stocktaking ten 
years later to challenge and unsettle the convenient ctions of more compla-
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cent social commentators. White Noise can and, I think, should be read as 
exemplifying the doubleness of a late postmodernism that has come to rec-
ognize the unavailability of a position fully outside the dominant discourses 
and socioeconomic structures of our age without abandoning the work of 
cultural critique.
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Back in 1987 and 1988, the Swiss daily Neue Zürcher Zeitung ran a national 
advertising campaign with the slogan “Lesen macht keinen Lärm” (Reading 
makes no noise).1 Indeed, one is prepared to admit that the process of reading 
does not produce noise in any straightforward sense. With the shi from an 
oral to a predominantly literate culture in the West and beyond, and with the 
individualization of the reading process, reading became a silent activity in 
many regions of the world.2 But what about the texts we read? To claim that 
literature can, in the work of certain writers, become the noise of culture sug-
gests that literary texts at times do make noise. From the double perspective 
of a history of literary acoustics, noise both designates the communicational 
and systemic force of literature and one of its objects of representation. Yet 
even as we insist on the necessity of opening up William Paulson’s line of in-
quiry to include a study of literary representations, we are led to ask whether 
noise can be an object of representation at all. As Katherine N. Hayles points 
out, “as soon as noise moves into the realm of language, it is always already 
not noise but language” (Chaos 29). Noise is that against which language de-
nes itself; it is the other that must be suppressed for language to come into 
being. It is therefore, strictly speaking, impossible to speak or write noise.
 Any inquiry into the representation of noise, then, is faced with the dif-
cult question of the representability of the unrepresentable. In their intro-
duction to Languages of the Unsayable: e Play of Negativity in Literature 
and Literary eory (1989), Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser argue that the 
languages in which we conduct our dialogues with the unsayable must be 
inherently unstable, conforming to the constant, dynamic transformations, 
creations, and undoings of play; they must make the absent present while 
continually unmasking the impossibility of that endeavor: “only through 
play can dierence as oscillation be manifested, because only play brings 
out the absent otherness that lies on the reverse side of all positions drawn 
into interaction” (xiii). To speak the unspeakable, to write the unwritable 
without eacing it, we need a language that enlists but ultimately frustrates 
our desire for presence and communicative transparency. In its ambiguities, 
its indirectness, gurality, and ctionality, literary discourse seems to be a 
privileged site for such an endeavor. Budick and Iser acknowledge this when 
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they describe “the ways in which languages of the unsayable spotlight what 
has been excluded by that which is sayable and said” as “an all-too-easily 
forgotten part of our literary experience” (xi; my emphasis).
 At the same time, Budick and Iser’s reections pinpoint two fundamental 
dangers informing all our encounters, both literary and nonliterary, with 
the ineable. Not to speak the unspeakable threatens to exclude it from the 
realm of human cognition and imagination. All language use is subject to 
this logic of exclusion: whenever we say something, we exclude something 
else that could have been said in its place. is danger, then, is contingent 
on the contingency of human communication.3 Conversely, to speak the 
unspeakable threatens to obliterate the otherness of that which, by its very 
nature, eludes the grasp of the networks of communication that are already 
in place.4 Exclusion and inclusion, then, form the two poles of a double bind 
in which literary representations of noise are also caught.
 One of the ways in which authors have sought to confront (if not over-
come) that double bind is by inventing special language uses that perfor-
matively retain something of the otherness of their elusive objects of rep-
resentation. Budick and Iser describe this literary performance as a form of 
negativity that “constantly lures absence into presence. While continually 
subverting that presence, negativity, in fact, changes it into a carrier of ab-
sence of which we would not otherwise know anything” (xiv). Many of the 
authors discussed in the preceding pages recognize the need for an aesthet-
ics of negativity in this sense. In their attempts to lure absence into presence 
without eacing it, they employ a variety of literary strategies.
 In his depiction of the unspeakable horrors of war, Stephen Crane, for 
instance, achieves what the English writer Robert Graves considers an im-
possibility. When asked in an interview whether he wanted to tell his friends 
at home about his experiences in the First World War, Graves replied: “You 
couldn’t: you can’t communicate noise” (qtd. in Fussell 170). In e Red 
Badge of Courage, Crane seeks to communicate precisely the noise of war, 
both in its literal and its gural sense. Crane’s text represents that noise 
without neutralizing its destructive force and inaccessibility to sense-making 
through an act of narrative integration. Crane’s choice to expose his readers 
to chaotic fragments of subjective experience rather than a coherent plot 
structure constitutes a refusal to turn the indescribable noise and violence of 
war into a readily appropriable object of knowledge.
 Forty-one years later, Djuna Barnes is faced with similar questions of rep-
UP
F 
CO
PY
    /    Conclusion
resentation and representability in an entirely dierent context. Her por-
traits of society’s outcasts in Nightwood withdraw into linguistic obscurity 
to prevent their reduction to the easily available clichés we have for speaking 
about others. In her darkly gurative style, Barnes stages the ethnic, sexual, 
religious, and cultural otherness of her characters and their social practices. 
Nightwood’s fragmented structure, its gural complexity, and its pervasive 
imagery of darkness, death, and decay preserve something of that which re-
sists verbalization in objects of representation that exist in the twilight of 
representability. In Nightwood, Barnes practices an aesthetics of interruption 
and negativity that injects noise into our channels of cultural communica-
tion. e transformation of Robin Vote’s voice into a dog’s bark provides an 
appropriately noisy ending to a novel that is crucially concerned with the 
limits of communicability and the politics of giving others a voice.
 Another thirty years later, omas Pynchon imagines into being a com-
munications system that transmits the voices that go unheard in the ocial 
channels of communication. In one reading at least, W.A.S.T.E. is an infor-
mational network that connects the disenfranchised and underprivileged 
and allows them to communicate in terms that are pushed to the margins 
and excluded by dominant ways of speaking and making sense. W.A.S.T.E. 
seems to oer a possibility for communication beyond the reach of ocial 
culture and beyond its in-built tendency to reduce the otherness of its out-
side to its own terms. Instead, through the primitive medium of its garbage 
cans, W.A.S.T.E. relays the communicative waste a burgeoning informational 
society cannot and will not hear. In the complexity of its formal organization 
and the multiple indeterminacies and ambiguities of its plot, Pynchon’s e 
Crying of Lot 49 enacts the same gesture of communicative resistance, a noisy 
form of resistance that holds the promise of counteracting the degeneration 
of culture into a sea of sameness and redundancy.
 What these three writers share with many of the other writers discussed 
in this book is a keen awareness of the ethical and political dimensions of 
representation. More specically, they have come to realize that any attempt 
to represent the unrepresentable is in danger of obliterating its object of 
representation. eir representations of physical noise testify to this aware-
ness. Any transformation of noise into order and information, these writers 
suggest, is a potentially violent gesture because it threatens to reduce the 
incommunicable other to the language and conceptual structures of the self. 
In accepting noise as one of the constitutive factors of their literary practice, 
UP
F
CO
PY
Conclusion    /    197
writers as dierent in their aesthetic and political sensibilities as Stephen 
Crane, Djuna Barnes, John Dos Passos, Jean Toomer, Zora Neale Hurston, 
omas Pynchon, and Ishmael Reed seek to retain something of the alterity 
and ineability of the noises they represent. In this, they distance themselves 
from epistemological projects whose sole purpose is to make the unknown 
known. Instead, they align themselves with an aesthetics of negativity that 
probes the fuzzy realm of that which ultimately eludes our cognitive and 
representational grasp. Such an aesthetics of negativity aligns itself with 
Adorno’s aesthetic theory in its refusal to oer up its objects of representa-
tion to the reader’s ready consumption.5 is sense of refusal might, nally, 
be at the heart of all literary experience.
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Notes
Introduction
 1. e story of the ood as narrated in e Epic of Gilgamesh is based on the older 
version of the same story in Atrahasis, where the ood is preceded by a plague and two 
droughts, all of which are the gods’ responses to overpopulation and its attendant noise 
(Lambert and Millard 1; Forsyth 151).
 2. I follow Manuel Castells (34–40) and the majority of historians in distinguishing 
between the  rst industrial revolution, which began in the second half of the eigh-
teenth century and had the steam engine as its prime mover, and the second industrial 
revolution, which took o­ a century later and was mainly driven by the introduction of 
electricity.
 3. My account of Shannon draws on Katherine N. Hayles’s excellent discussion of 
Barthes and Shannon (Hayles, “Information”).
 4. As Weaver sums up: “Information is, we must steadily remember, a measure of 
one’s freedom of choice in selecting a message. e greater this freedom of choice, 
and hence the greater the information, the greater is the uncertainty that the message 
actually selected is some particular one. us greater freedom of choice, greater uncer-
tainty, greater information go hand in hand” (Shannon and Weaver 18–19).
 5. In human oral communication, the information source would correspond to the 
brain of the speaker; the transmitter to the physical speech apparatus (vocal chords, 
oral cavity, tongue, and so on), which transforms the message into a coded signal that is 
sent over the communication channel; the receiver to the ear of the hearer; the destina-
tion to the brain of the hearer. See Shannon and Weaver (7–8) for a fuller explanation 
of the diagram. It will be noticed that what has been referred to as sender and receiver 
so far is in this model divided into two distinct elements of the communication pro-
cess, namely information source and transmitter at the one end of the process and 
receiver and destination at the other.
 6. is impression is conrmed when Weaver characterizes the “semantic problems” 
of communication as “concerned with the identity, or satisfactorily close approxima-
tion, in the interpretation of meaning by the receiver, as compared with the intended 
meaning of the sender” (Shannon and Weaver 4).
 7. ere are, of course, problems with Shannon and Weaver’s model of communica-
tion. Even if we put aside for a moment Jacques Derrida’s contention that “as writing 
[écriture], communication, if we retain that word, is not the means of transference of 
meaning, the exchange of intentions and meanings [vouloir-dire], discourse and the 
‘communication of consciousnesses’” (“Signature” 20) and retain a more conventional 
model of communication such as Weaver’s enhanced model (g. 2), we are still faced 
with at least three problematic aspects. First, despite a number of modications to a 
UP
F 
CO
PY
simple sender-message-receiver model, Shannon and Weaver’s model of communica-
tion remains a one-way model that can only account for communication between two 
entities. A broader understanding of communication as it informs, for instance, the 
notion of discourse is well beyond its scope. Second, Weaver’s clear-cut dierentiation 
between “semantic noise” and “engineering noise” cannot be upheld because it presup-
poses a strict separation of the level of the signier (aected by the engineering noise) 
and the signied (aected by the semantic noise). e poststructuralist assertion of the 
primacy of the signier and the endless deferral of the signied has rendered such a dis-
tinction problematic. ird, because Shannon and Weaver’s concept of noise is based 
on the assumption that noise corresponds to all those “things [that] are added to the 
signal which were not intended by the information source” (Shannon and Weaver 7), 
their model does not account for noise added on purpose. In the analysis of literature, 
especially certain types of modernist and postmodern literature, it will be desirable 
to broaden Shannon and Weaver’s concept of noise to include textual distortions and 
fragmentations that we, as readers, tend to see as intended by a writer who uses them 
consciously and for artistic eect (which does not amount to suggesting that the mean-
ing of a literary text can be equated with the author’s intention). e other thinkers on 
information and noise discussed in this chapter address some of these limitations.
 8. Henri Atlan’s “Du bruit comme principe d’auto-organisation” (1972) and 
Prigogine and Stengers’s Order Out of Chaos (1979) are two texts that build upon von 
Foerster’s order-from-noise principle—the former in the study of the evolution of liv-
ing organisms and the latter in its use of an “order through uctuations” model—and 
have themselves become inuential in the elds of theoretical biology and theoretical 
physics, respectively.
 9. Maturana and Varela dene an “autopoietic machine” as follows: “An autopoietic 
machine is a machine organized (dened as a unity) as a network of processes of pro-
duction (transformation and destruction) of components that produces the compo-
nents which: (i) through their interactions and transformations continually regenerate 
and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute 
it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they (the components) exist 
by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network” (78–79).
 10. e most prominent example is the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, who 
in his groundbreaking Social Systems (1984) denes social systems (for example, the re-
ligious system, the economic system, the legal system, the system of art) as autopoietic 
systems that are ordered according to meaning and continually produce communica-
tions out of communications in a recursively closed process. Like Maturana and Varela, 
he maintains that dierent autopoietic systems have dierent ways of interpreting the 
world and therefore cannot absorb each other’s complexity in any straightforward 
fashion. For Luhmann, too, their complexities act as sources of perturbation or noise: 
“the complexity each system makes available is an incomprehensible complexity—that 
is, disorder—for the receiving system. [. . .] All reproduction and structure formation 
thus presupposes a combination of order and disorder: a system’s own structures and 
an incomprehensible foreign complexity, a regulated and a free complexity. e con-
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struction of social systems [. . .] follows the ‘order from noise’ principle (von Foerster)” 
(Social Systems 214). In Luhmann’s model, disorder and noise are as indispensable to 
the survival and development of social systems as they are to the survival and develop-
ment of biological systems: “Without ‘noise,’ no system” (116).
 Concerned as it is with processes of communication and the production of meaning 
in social space, Luhmann’s sociology of autopoietic systems is clearly relevant to liter-
ary and cultural studies. is is true a fortiori of his more recent Art as a Social System, 
in which he denes art as a form of communication that is primarily concerned with 
matters of perception and thus manages to bring into a productive tension social sys-
tems (based on communications) and psychic systems (based on consciousnesses). For 
the most sustained systems-theoretic account of the functioning of the literary system, 
though, the reader is referred to Paulson, discussed at length below.
 11. Lyotard denes paralogy as “a move (the importance of which is oen not rec-
ognized until later) played in the pragmatics of knowledge” (61). With regard to the 
progress of science, he describes the functioning of paralogy as follows: “Science does 
not expand by means of the positivism of eciency. e opposite is true: working on 
a proof means searching for and ‘inventing’ counterexamples, in other words, the un-
intelligible; supporting an argument means looking for a ‘paradox’ and legitimating it 
with new rules in the games of reasoning” (54). Lyotard receives support from physics 
Nobel laureate Ilya Prigogine and philosopher Isabelle Stengers in their joint book, 
Order Out of Chaos: “It is obvious that the management of human society as well as the 
action of selective pressures tends to optimize some aspects of behaviors or modes of 
connection, but to consider optimization as the key to understanding how populations 
and individuals survive is to risk confusing causes with eects. Optimization models 
thus ignore both the possibility of radical transformations—that is, transformations 
that change the denition of a problem and thus the kind of solution sought—and the 
inertial constraints that may eventually force a system into a disastrous way of func-
tioning” (207).
 12. Paulson is aware that, from a systems-theoretic perspective at least, systems of all 
kinds act as sources of noise for other systems (Maturana and Varela 81; Reese-Schäfer 
46). But he insists that literature occupies a special position. Due to its strangeness, its 
poeticity, its internal noise, literature is a priori more disruptive, more noisy than other 
systems.
 13. In fact, Maturana and Varela’s dierentiation between systems that are autopoi-
etic (and therefore living organisms) and systems that are “merely” autonomous allows 
for ways of thinking about literary autonomy that do not equate literary texts with 
living organisms and nevertheless show that literature shares some of their structural 
properties.
 14. Paulson puts it thus: “e principle of constructing a pattern out of what inter-
rupts patterns is inherent in artistic communication, because this kind of communica-
tion arises by deviating from the regularities of nonartistic communication, and this 
deviation must be the source of whatever advantage or specicity artistic communica-
tion possesses. In the language of the Groupe μ (and of Jean Cohen), the poetic func-
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tion implies departures from norms and then the production of new kinds of relations 
and meaning from these departures” (87).
 15. Paulson would concur with German media theorist Friedrich Kittler’s insistence 
that literature must be studied as part of a larger discourse network. He would, how-
ever—as I do, too—take issue with Kittler’s assertion that literature is rst and fore-
most a storage medium of the same order as the phonograph or lm (Kittler, Grammo-
phon; Aufschreibesysteme). Kittler’s contributions to the study of literature are discussed 
further below.
 16. Not surprisingly, systems theory has oen been charged with political conserva-
tism (Lyotard; Kneer and Nassehi 186–92).
 17. For Adorno, artistic deviation must precisely not be integrable if it is to retain 
any oppositional force: “In art what once took care of itself became a specic undertak-
ing, and as a result integration increasingly binds the centrifugal counterforces. [. . .] 
e more successful the integration, the more it becomes an empty spinning of gears; 
teleologically it tends toward infantile tinkering” (Aesthetic 29). In Adorno’s grim vi-
sion, the transformation of noise into order and information becomes an aggressive 
gesture of co-optation. What Paulson regards as a prerequisite for any successful pro-
cess of innovation is for Adorno the neutralization of art’s critical impulses, eected 
primarily via the culture industry, whose “unmistakable symptom is the passion to 
touch everything, to allow no work to be what it is, to dress it up, to narrow its distance 
from the viewer” (Aesthetic 17). See chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of Adorno’s 
aesthetic theory.
 18. Paulson writes, “I owe a special intellectual debt to Michel Serres, whose writings 
were instrumental in convincing me that this was a book I should attempt to write” 
(x).
 19. As Serres puts it in his characteristically gural style: “Noise destroys and horri-
es. But order and at repetition are in the vicinity of death. Noise nourishes a new or-
der. Organization, life, and intelligent thought live between order and noise, between 
disorder and perfect harmony. If there were only order, if we only heard perfect harmo-
nies, our stupidity would soon fall down toward a dreamless sleep; if we were always 
surrounded by the shivaree, we would lose our breath and our consistency, we would 
spread out among all the dancing atoms of the universe. We are; we live; we think on 
the fringe, in the probable fed by the unexpected, in the legal nourished with informa-
tion. ere are two ways to die, two ways to sleep, two ways to be stupid—a head-rst 
dive into chaos or stabilized installation in order and chitin.” (e Parasite 127)
 20. Ross Chambers’s review of Serres’ Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy cap-
tures the principal concerns as well as the feel of Serres’ writing best: “Serres’ recogni-
tion that the game is not the rules does not boil down, then, as it does (say) in Bourdieu, 
to rehabilitating practice in the face of theory. It asks a deeper question concerning the 
practice of theory itself, and enquires which theoretical practice, with its necessary en-
tailments, one is to opt for, as between one which reies the rules and promotes order 
and one which, aware of all that is sacriced and destroyed in the production of order, 
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refuses so momentous a sacrice. e latter option, within our tradition, is by far the 
more dicult of the two: it involves the production of order but without a concomi-
tant sacrice of disorder, or if one will, the maintenance within order of the disorder 
which is its very condition of existence. But this is the option for which Michel Serres 
stands, the game he chooses to play and invites us to join, that of the inclusion of the 
excluded” (189–90).
 21. Serres puts it thus: “I must put three things together: habits or customs, animals, 
noises. At rst glance, they are unrelated. Yet I am not putting them together haphaz-
ardly. I am forced to do so by my tongue: Latin, Greek, Roman. In this somewhat fuzzy 
spot, a parasite is an abusive guest, an unavoidable animal, a break in the message” (e 
Parasite 8). As Lawrence R. Schehr explains in his “Translator’s Introduction” to e 
Parasite, the title of Serres’ book has three dierent meanings:
e parasite is a microbe, an insidious infection that takes without giving and 
weakens without killing. e parasite is also a guest, who exchanges his talk, 
praise, and attery for food. e parasite is noise as well, the static and interfer-
ence in a channel. ese seemingly dissimilar activities are, according to Michel 
Serres, not merely coincidentally expressed by the same word (in French). Rath-
er, they are intrinsically related and, in fact, they have the same basic function 
in a system. Whether it produces a fever or just hot air, the parasite is a thermal 
exciter. And as such, it is both the atom of a relation and the production of a 
change in this relation. (Serres, e Parasite x)
 22. Gerald L. Bruns identies this threat with admirable clarity: “As Emmanuel 
Levinas says in Totality and Innity (1961), knowledge is not a relation to the other 
but the destruction of it; it is ‘the reduction of the other to the same.’ It is a refusal of 
otherness. e other, however, is for its part just what refuses to be contained within 
the conceptual structures that we build up in order to make sense of things. is is what 
the otherness of the other means” (1058). For a concise discussion of the problematics 
of the same and the other in contemporary philosophy and ethics, see Rasch.
 23. For early examples, take Horace’s literary pragmatics of instruction and delight 
(prodesse et delectare) or, later, the Romantic view of poetry as an expression of the 
artist’s feelings.
 24. Moreover, the input-output perspective, with which Paulson constantly associ-
ates representational approaches, in no way describes the practices of those who are 
interested in the mimetic aspects of literary texts, and their implicit association with 
what Lyotard calls the logic of performativity is tendentious to say the least.
 25. Insisting on the subversive potential of self-reective ction, Raymond Feder-
man attributes a similar weight to the formal aspects of Naked Lunch and other early 
self-reexive novels: “the new ction (created on the margin of the literary establish-
ment) sought to show the form rather than the content of American reality. It tried 
to render concrete and even visual in its language, in its syntax, in its typography and 
topology, the disorder, the chaos, the violence, the incongruity, but also the energy and 
vitality, of American reality” (1146).
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 26. Witness, for instance, Günter Grass’s characterization of the activity of authors 
in his acceptance speech for the 1999 Nobel Prize for Literature:
But worst of all they refuse to make common cause with the victors of history: 
they take pleasure milling about the fringes of the historical process with the 
losers, who have plenty to say but no platform to say it on. By giving them a 
voice, they call the victory into question, by associating with them, they join 
ranks with them. (par. 21)
As dierent as they are in their habitus, politics, and literary practice, both Grass and 
Burroughs have learned from Walter Benjamin’s characterization of ocial historiog-
raphy as “the triumphal procession in which the present rulers step over those who are 
lying prostrate” and decided to dissociate themselves from that project, accepting as the 
writer’s task “to brush history against the grain” (Benjamin 256–57).
 27. We may note here that the popular exclusion of certain artworks from the realm 
of art—I am thinking of hostile reactions to John Cage’s compositions or Jackson Pol-
lock’s paintings—has proceeded along similar lines.
 28. is task touches on the dicult question of the translatability of cultures. As 
Wolfgang Iser points out, this is a task that becomes increasingly signicant in a world 
of global information exchange: “In a rapidly shrinking world, many dierent cultures 
have come into close contact with one another, calling for a mutual understanding not 
only in terms of the culture to which one belongs, but also in terms of the specicity 
pertaining to the culture encountered” (“On Translatability” 5).
 29. Overcoming the imitative or referential function of sound in music continued 
to be a main prerogative of experimental twentieth-century music from the musique 
concrète of Pierre Schaeer to the sonic violence of Japanese noise artist Merzbow. See 
also Kahn (101–22). Edgar Varèse put it succinctly when he said, “I need an entirely 
new medium of expression: a sound-producing machine (not a sound-reproducing one)” 
(qtd. in Kahn 387 n. 35).
 30. Moreover, with Jacques Attali, who attributes prophetic force to music, we may 
at least “toy with the idea” that “it is no coincidence that Russolo wrote his Arte Dei 
Rumori (‘e Art of Noise’) in 1913; that noise entered music and industry painting just 
before the outbursts and wars of the twentieth century, before the rise of social noise” 
(9).
Chapter 1. e Soundscapes of Naturalism
 1. Schafer’s book is now most readily available as an identical reprint with a dierent 
title: e Soundscape: Our Sonic Environment and the Tuning of the World (1994).
 2. Schafer explains the origin and characteristics of at-line sounds thus: “e In-
dustrial Revolution introduced another eect into the soundscape: the at line. When 
sounds are projected visually on a graphic level recorder, they may be analyzed in terms 
of what is called their envelope or signature. e principal characteristics of a sound 
envelope are the attack, the body, the transients (or internal changes) and the decay. 
When the body of the sound is prolonged and unchanging, it is reproduced by the 
graphic level recorder as an extended horizontal line. [. . .] e at continuous line in 
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sound is an articial construction. Like the at line in space, it is rarely found in na-
ture. (e continuous stridulation of certain insects like cicadas is an exception.) Just 
as the Industrial Revolution’s sewing machine gave us back the long line in clothes, so 
the factories, which operated night and day nonstop, created the long line in sound.” 
(Tuning 78)
 3. See, for instance, Trachtenberg (142), who suggests that Crane’s city sketches 
share important stylistic features with impressionist paintings. Margot Norris’s rec-
ollection of being confronted in her reading of e Red Badge of Courage with a 
series of disconnected impressionist images rather than a continuous narrative 
makes a similar point with regard to Crane’s depiction of war (personal commu-
nication). Levenson argues both ways when he reminds us that Crane himself was 
“content with the name of realist” (154) and at the same time makes a case for both 
Crane and Norris as precursors of modernism in their investigations into human 
psycho(patho)logy.
 4. See also Hofmann, who points out that “noise carries information about its 
source and producer. e eect of noise on humans is therefore by no means only a 
question of intensity, but oen dependent on the information content of the sound, 
which is evaluated in multiple ways and hardly measurable” (“Schall” 13; my transla-
tion). It should be noted here that Hofmann’s concept of “information content” diers 
from Shannon’s.
 5. ese dierences may be culture-specic. Surveys in the 1960s, for instance, have 
shown that Jamaicans, who were exposed to few technological noises when the sur-
veys were being conducted, were less prone than either Europeans or Americans to 
complain about trac noises and more prone to complain about the noises of certain 
animals (Schafer, Tuning 147–48).
 6. See also Schafer, who devotes a section of e Tuning of the World to “e Devi-
ousness of the Wind” (171–73) and the frightful proportions its noises have acquired 
in human ears throughout the ages.
 7. I am indebted to John Rowe for making me aware of this critical tradition. As 
Melville makes clear in “Hawthorne and His Mosses” (1850), “landscapes of the soul” 
may refer to both an internal landscape (the soul as a territory to be explored) and an 
external one (the landscape as a reection of the workings of the soul). e rst sense is 
evoked when Melville praises “the enchanting landscape in the soul of this Hawthorne” 
(338), the second when he marvels at the “orchard of the Old Manse,” which “seems the 
visible type of the ne mind that has described it”:
ose twisted, and contorted old trees, “that stretch out their crooked branches, 
and take such hold of the imagination, that we remember them as humorists and 
odd-fellows.” And then, as surrounded by these grotesque forms, and hushed 
in the noon-day repose of this Hawthorne’s spell, how aptly might the still fall 
of his ruddy thoughts into your soul be symbolized by “the thump of a great 
apple, in the stillest aernoon, falling without a breath of wind, from the mere 
necessity of perfect ripeness”! For no less ripe than ruddy are the apples of the 
thoughts and fancies in this sweet Man of Mosses. (339)
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Although Melville is here referring to the author’s soul, we may easily adapt the model 
to discuss the relationships naturalist writers establish between characters’ inner lives 
and external objects and events.
 8. Hence also the appropriateness of the last sound we hear in Norris’s McTeague. 
With all principal characters dead or dying, the novel closes with “the half-dead canary 
chittering feebly in its little gilt prison” (442).
 9. See the “Audiographs” section in this chapter for more on Bourdieu.
 10. Schafer denes keynote sounds as sounds “which are heard by a particular so-
ciety continuously or frequently enough to form a background against which other 
sounds are perceived” (Tuning 272). As such, they “help to outline the character of men 
living among them” (9).
 11. One of the reasons for Schafer’s neglect of class issues might lie in his humanist 
outlook, which surfaces most perceptibly in his pronounced distaste for a technocratic 
world he perceives as dehumanizing. His massive utopian project of redesigning the 
world soundscape does take into account cultural dierences as it traces changes in 
the acoustic environment all over the planet. Yet its underlying vision of humanity as 
working toward shared goals in a rational, benign manner—most forcefully expressed 
in his conviction that educational authorities will sooner or later perceive the value 
of introducing so-called ear-cleaning exercises in schools—does not allow for much 
reection on the fact that those who hold the power to make decisions that will alter 
the quality of the soundscape (high-ranking municipal and federal ocials, airport 
authorities, CEOs of corporations in the industrial sector) might be the ones who 
are least likely to be aected by those changes because they can aord to live in areas 
far removed from airports, highway intersections, or centers of industrial production. 
Barry Truax, one of Schafer’s coworkers on the original World Soundscape Project 
and himself a prominent gure in soundscape studies, seems more aware of the social 
divisions of acoustic worlds when he criticizes the criteria used to establish permissible 
levels of noise in noise-abatement legislation: “the criteria are such that even when 
their recommended levels are adhered to, they guarantee only minimal protection and 
acceptability for a certain percentage of the exposed population. Such criteria simply 
reect what the majority can adapt to, and as such they serve to maintain a precariously 
balanced status quo” (1984, 82). However, Truax only sporadically considers issues of 
class and does not develop them into a sustained argument. is is also true of the 
second edition of his book (Truax 2001).
 12. Note also that the desire to “go inside” was reinforced at the time of Crane’s 
writing by the introduction of plate-glass shop windows and their display of commodi-
ties. Blanche H. Gelfant (180–81) analyzes this structuring of desire in Dreiser’s Sister 
Carrie.
 13. Truax describes some of the possible psychological consequences of a lo- 
soundscape: “e lo- environment [. . .] seems to encourage feelings of being cut o 
or separated from the environment. e person’s attention is directed inwards, and 
interaction with others is discouraged by the eort to ‘break through’ that is required. 
Feelings of alienation and isolation can be the result” (Truax 1984, 20).
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 14. Compare Crane’s and Schafer’s descriptions also to those of a southern visitor 
to the “drinking and dance-houses” of antebellum New York: “ere lies a drunken 
female, screaming and yelling” while men are “cursing and swearing in the most blas-
phemous manner—a sort of medley which is indescribable” (qtd. in M. Smith 4).
 15. We may hear in this passage an echo of one of the senses of noise that had already 
become obsolete before Crane’s lifetime: “A company or band of musicians” (OED).
 16. anks are due to Laurenz Bolliger, who provided me with this quote.
 17. As Kaplan’s comments on the ending of the novel reveal, she is using the older 
edition of Sister Carrie, edited by Donald Pizer, rather than the new Pennsylvania edi-
tion, which I am using. In the new version, the nal scene has Hurstwood gassing him-
self rather than Carrie thinking her sentimental thoughts in her rocking chair. Kaplan 
explains her preference for the older edition: “I have chosen to use the edition which 
was published by Dreiser in 1900 and has been read by readers since then, because I 
believe that the revisions either made by or authorized by Dreiser are as much a part of 
Dreiser’s nal product as is his ‘original’ dra. As this argument suggests, I think that 
the deletions show that more is at stake in the ‘new edition’ than accuracy, but [sic] it 
reects a longstanding critical desire to recuperate the great American realist, without 
his embarrassing sentimentality” (181 n. 5). While the greater sentimentality of the 
older edition certainly strengthens Kaplan’s argument, the passages I am discussing 
appear in both editions, and their dierences therefore do not make a dierence to my 
own argument.
 18. It should be noted here that, in the introduction to e Gold Standard and the 
Logic of Naturalism, Michaels qualies his assertion that “Carrie’s economy of desire 
involves an unequivocal endorsement of [. . .] the unrestrained capitalism of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” (45). In short, Michaels argues that one can-
not really be “for” or “against” capitalism because there is no outside-of-capitalism 
that would allow for such a position: “It thus seems wrong to think of the culture 
you live in as the object of your aections: you don’t like it or dislike it, you exist in 
it, and the things you like and dislike exist in it too” (18). Michaels’s argument raises 
interesting epistemological questions but seems to me to demand a radical revision of 
critical practice only if one has previously assumed that a work of ction may represent 
a wholesale rejection or endorsement of a given culture (or even of a given ideological, 
economic, or political system). is is obviously a view few if any critics would adopt. 
As my own readings suggest, it is less a question of whether an author or a reader likes 
a given culture or not than a question of how tensions existing in a given culture are 
(re)negotiated in the ctional worlds of literary texts produced within that culture.
 19. Kaplan (154) wrongly attributes these thoughts to Hurstwood. Her observations 
concerning Hurstwood’s lack of comprehension remain valid nevertheless.
 20. Schafer’s reminder that Hitler insisted on the crucial importance of the loud-
speaker in his 1930s campaign for Germany’s political leadership (Tuning 91) further
attests to the importance of acoustic space and points to the potentially violent nature 
of its conquest. Barry Truax summarizes the links between power, space, and sound: 
“e control of spatial communication [. . .] is essential to centralized power and domi-
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nation. erefore, acoustic power, amplied through the loudspeaker, or in the form 
of any loud sound, is linked to the domination of space” (1984, 13).
 21. Schafer uses the term Sacred Noise to discuss noises that escape legislative regula-
tion due to their association with powerful social actors or institutions. His discussion 
touches on the relationship between noise and power:
We have already noted how loud noises evoked fear and respect back to earli-
est times, and how they seemed to be the expression of divine power. We have 
also observed how this power was transferred from natural sounds (thunder, 
volcano, storm) to those of the church bell and pipe organ. I called this Sacred 
Noise to distinguish it from the other sort of noise (with a small letter), implying 
nuisance and requiring noise abatement legislation. is was always primarily 
the rowdy human voice. During the Industrial Revolution, Sacred Noise sprang 
across to the profane world. Now the industrialists held power and they were 
granted dispensation to make noise by means of the steam engine and blast fur-
nace, just as previously the monks had been free to make Noise on the church 
bell or J. S. Bach to open out his preludes on the full organ. e association of 
Noise and power has never really been broken in the human imagination. It 
descends from God, to the priest, to the industrialist, and more recently to the 
broadcaster and the aviator. e important thing to realize is this: to have the Sa-
cred Noise is not merely to make the biggest noise; rather it is a matter of having 
the authority to make it without censure. Wherever Noise is granted immunity 
from human intervention, there will be found a seat of power. e noisy clank of 
Watt’s original engine was maintained as a sign of power and eciency, against 
his own desire to eliminate it, thus enabling the railroads to establish themselves 
more emphatically as the “conquerors.” (Tuning 76)
 22. is is precisely the specter raised for the lower middle-classes in Marx and 
Engels’s Manifesto of the Communist Party: “e lower strata of the middle-class—the 
small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicrasmen 
and peasants—all these sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because their diminu-
tive capital does not suce for the scale on which Modern Industry is carried on, and is 
swamped in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their specialized 
skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production” (17–18). To account for 
McTeague’s decline, we would have to add professionalization to Marx and Engels’s 
scheme.
 23. is is the place to regret the absence of a discussion of lm in this book. A 
movie like Apocalypse Now (1979) stresses the acoustic dimension of warfare through-
out. ink of the opening sequence, where fan fades to helicopter blades or the use of 
Wagner during the napalm bombing.
 24. is acoustic sense is retained in modern German “bellen” (to bark) and mod-
ern English “to bellow.” Schafer in this context also reminds us of the Nazis converting 
the bronze of church bells into arms in 1940 (Tuning 176).
 25. See Picker (“Red War” 1–10) for a fascinating discussion of the musical and 
acoustic qualities of Whitman’s Civil War poems.
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 26. Many twenty-rst-century readers will also register the similarity between the 
newspaper’s wording and the title of Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western 
Front (1929) and, even though Crane could obviously not have been aware of this, 
will see the rst two layers of irony reinforced by what to us may seem like a refer-
ence to Remarque’s bitterly ironic title. (e original German title, Im Westen Nichts 
Neues, largely lacks the acoustic qualities of the English title but shares its ironic 
bent).
 27. Bruce Smith explains that sounds that “lack locality” (31) are disconcerting pri-
marily because they are hard to make sense of.
 28. As Elias Canetti points out, the noises produced by any crowd bent on destruc-
tion have the additional function of reinforcing the crowd’s identity, particularly in its 
desire to grow beyond its present size:
It is true that the noise of destruction adds to its satisfaction; the banging of 
windows and the crashing of glass are the robust sounds of fresh life, the cries of 
something new-born. It is easy to evoke them and that increases their popularity. 
Everything shouts together; the din is the applause of objects. ere seems to be 
a special need for this kind of noise at the beginning of events, when the crowd 
is still small and little or nothing has happened. e noise is a promise of the 
reinforcements the crowd hopes for, and a happy omen for deeds to come. (19)
We have already encountered such noises on a smaller scale at the beginning of Maggie, 
where Jimmie engages in battle with the clamoring mob of the Devil’s Row children. 
e intimate relationship between a crowd’s identity and the noises it produces is not 
conned to violent packs or crowds. In Crane’s “e Monster,” the crowd gathered 
around the Trescotts’ burning house is excited by its own noise to the point where 
silent deliberation is regarded with suspicion:
e lads hated and feared a re, of course. ey did not particularly want to have 
anybody’s house burn, but still it was ne to see the gathering of the companies, 
and amid a great noise to watch their heroes perform all manner of prodigies.  
[. . .] ey did not care much for John Shipley, the chief of the department.  
[. . .] is quiet man, who even when life was in danger seldom raised his voice, 
was not much to their fancy. Now old Sykes Huntington, when he was chief, 
used to bellow continually like a bull and gesticulate in a sort of delirium. He 
was much ner as a spectacle than this Shipley. (82)
According to Canetti, re itself shares many of the characteristics of the crowd. Its 
destructive potential, its contagiousness, its propensity to emerge spontaneously and 
grow insatiably, and its appearance as an undierentiated mass make re a crowd sym-
bol. As the citizens of Whilomville gather to watch the spectacle of the burning house, 
the crowd rejoices in the reproduction of its own image while its noises merge with the 
noises of the re “roaring like a winter wind among the pines” (76). Crane anticipates 
Canetti in yet another way. As John Rowe points out, Crane analyzes how the noises of 
“rumor, gossip and fantasy contribute to the crowd psychology of scapegoating” (Liter-
ary Culture 154) as the townspeople exaggerate the monstrosity of Henry Johnson, the 
black servant whose face is disgured in the attempt to save Jimmie Trescott. Again, 
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the noises of the crowd serve to reinforce the crowd’s identity, this time by abjecting 
the racial other.
 29. e U.S. Air Force lists twelve dierent nonlethal weapons based on acoustics. 
ese include acoustic bullets (“High power, very low frequency waves emitted from 
one to two meter antenna dishes. Results in blunt object trauma from waves generated 
in front of the target. Eects range from discomfort to death” [Bunker par. 30]); the 
HPS-1 Sound System (“A 350 watt sound system with an audible voice range of 2½ 
miles. Used by the military in Indo-China and then supplied to law enforcement. First 
used by police forces at San Francisco State College and at Berkeley in the 1960s” [par. 
35]); and infrasound (“Very low-frequency sound which can travel long distances and 
easily penetrate most buildings and vehicles. Transmission of long wavelength sound 
creates biophysical eects; nausea, loss of bowels, disorientation, vomiting, potential 
internal organ damage or death may occur. Superior to ultrasound because it is ‘in 
band’ meaning that its does not lose its properties when it changes mediums such as 
from air to tissue. By 1972 an infrasound generator had been built in France which 
generated waves at 7 hertz. When activated it made the people in range sick for hours” 
[par. 36]).
 30. Schafer’s notion of “Sacred Noise” springs to mind here. See note 21 in this 
chapter.
 31. Sister Carrie registers a parallel collapse and inversion within the cityscape when 
a speechless Carrie is addressed by the seductive voices of commodities: “‘My dear,’ said 
the lace collar she secured from Partridge’s, ‘I t you beautifully; don’t give me up.’ ‘Ah, 
such little feet,’ said the leather of the so new shoes; ‘how eectively I cover them. 
What a pity they should ever want my aid’” (98).
 32. Carroll W. Pursell traces the origin of the term military-industrial complex back 
to “President D. Eisenhower’s farewell address to the nation in 1961” (1).
 33. Adams recognizes and reects on the new, global role America plays by the be-
ginning of the twentieth century in a chapter aptly entitled “Vis Nova (1903–1904)” 
(437–47).
 34. For a sustained discussion of mythical thought in literature, see Horn.
 35. Smith also draws on the work of Vivian Salmon to delineate “the multiple ways 
in which Native American languages were read in terms of Irish and Irish in terms of 
Native American languages” (B. Smith 325).
 36. e linguistic process of standardization—by which one particular dialect or 
sociolect is established as the standard language—provides Bourdieu with a good 
example of how a cultural arbitrary is instituted as a norm that is misrecognized as 
legitimate both by those who are able to reproduce that norm and those who are not 
(Bourdieu, Language 43–65). Once the standard language has become widely accepted 
as the legitimate norm, the misrecognition of its legitimacy endows the speaker capable 
of producing it with prestige, authority, and a sense of distinction.
 37. An important theoretical as well as practical feature of these dierent forms of 
capital is their mutual convertibility. Economic capital, for instance, can be invested 
to acquire cultural capital in the form of educational qualications, which not only 
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increase one’s symbolic capital (prestige) but can also be reconverted into economic 
capital as they are cashed in on the job market. For a discussion of dierent kinds of 
capital and their mutual convertibility, see Bourdieu (Outline 179, 183; Language 72), 
Richard Jenkins (84–91), John B. ompson (14–15), and Ritzer (542–43). Note also 
that symbolic violence does not have to be based on the unequal distribution of sym-
bolic capital but may involve other forms of capital, cultural or social, as well.
 38. Bourdieu’s assertion that some ways of speaking are valued more highly than 
others in the linguistic marketplace hardly breaks new ground, and his distancing 
from “linguists,” who, according to Bourdieu, “merely incorporate into their theory a 
pre-constructed object, ignoring its social laws of construction” (Language 44) is an ill-
founded attempt to increase his own symbolic prot. In “e Pronouns of Power and 
Solidarity,” Roger Brown and Albert Gilman already in 1960 focused their attention 
on relations of power embedded in linguistic structures as seemingly insignicant as 
pronoun choice (French tu vs. vous, German Du vs. Sie). Dell Hymes’s “Sociolinguistics 
and the Ethnography of Speaking” (1971) constitutes a sustained critical assessment 
of and departure from Chomskyan linguistics that antedates Bourdieu’s critique of 
structural linguistics by several years. For the purposes of my own investigations into 
naturalist soundscapes, the interest of Bourdieu’s thoughts on language and symbolic 
power lies elsewhere.
 39. George Ritzer explains that the objectivist position is identied by Bourdieu 
with “Durkheim and his study of social facts [. . .] and the structuralism of Saussure, 
Lévi-Strauss, and the structural Marxists,” while the subjectivist position includes 
“Sartre’s existentialism, [. . .] Schultz’s phenomenology, Blumer’s symbolic interaction-
ism, and Garnkel’s ethnomethodology” (536). For a discussion of Bourdieu’s attempts 
to overcome the subjectivism-objectivism dichotomy as well as his tendency to privi-
lege the objectivist perspective nevertheless, see Richard Jenkins (66, 90–91); Harker, 
Mahar, and Wilkes (15); and John B. ompson (11). Particularly Jenkins remains 
doubtful whether Bourdieu’s work escapes objectivist determinism.
 40. Bourdieu puts it thus: “e objective homogenizing of a group or class habitus 
which results from the homogeneity of the conditions of existence is what enables 
practices to be objectively harmonized without any intentional calculation or con-
scious reference to a norm and mutually adjusted in the absence of any direct interaction 
or, a fortiori, explicit co-ordination” (Bourdieu, Outline 80). It is important to note 
here that Bourdieu’s concept of class diers from that of Marxist theorists in signicant 
ways: “Bourdieu does not dene classes in terms of the ownership or non-ownership of 
means of production [. . .]. For Bourdieu, classes are sets of agents who occupy similar 
positions in the social space, and hence possess similar kinds and similar quantities of 
capital, similar life-chances, similar dispositions, etc.” ( J. ompson 30).
 41. Bourdieu explicitly treats speech as a form of corporeal behavior: “It is no coin-
cidence that bourgeois distinction invests the same intention in its relation to language 
as it invests in its relation to the body. e sense of acceptability which orients linguistic 
practices is inscribed in the most deep-rooted of bodily dispositions: it is the whole 
body which responds by its posture, but also by its inner reactions or, more speci cally, 
Notes to Pages 66–69    /    211
UP
F 
CO
PY
the articulatory ones, to the tension of the market. Language is a body technique, and 
speci cally linguistic, especially phonetic, competence is a dimension of bodily hexis in 
which one’s whole relation to the social world, and one’s whole socially informed rela-
tion to the world are expressed. ere is every reason to think that, through the media-
tions of what Pierre Guiraud calls “articulatory style,” the bodily hexis characteristic of 
a social class determines the system of phonological features which characterizes a class 
pronunciation. e most frequent articulatory position is an element in an overall way 
of using the mouth (in talking but also in eating, drinking, laughing, etc.) and therefore 
a component of the bodily hexis, which implies a systematic informing of the whole 
phonological aspect of speech. is “articulatory style,” a life-style “made esh,” like the 
whole bodily hexis, welds phonological features—which are oen studied in isolation, 
each one (the phoneme “r,” for example) being compared with its equivalent in other 
class pronunciations—into an indivisible totality which must be treated as such.” (Lan-
guage 86)
 42. Bruce Smith, who formulates his insights independently of Bourdieu’s work, 
locates the origin of this social mechanism in the early modern period: “In the course 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries [. . .] bodily control became an ever more 
visible index of social hierarchy. Etiquette books like Della Casa’s Galateo are quite ex-
plicit on the subject. Along with spitting, snorting, and breaking wind, open laughter 
became a sign of inferior social status. [. . .] laughter is a matter not only of physiology 
but of politics” (164).
 43. For a more detailed account of linguistic relations of power, see Volker Hin-
nenkamp’s excellent Interaktionale Soziolinguistik und interkulturelle Kommunikation: 
Gesprächsmanagement zwischen Deutschen und Türken (1989), which applies Bourdieu’s 
ndings to the study of intercultural communication.
 44. Cage describes his experience as follows: “It was aer I got to Boston that I went 
into the anechoic chamber at Harvard University. Anybody who knows me knows 
this story. I am constantly telling it. Anyway, in that silent room, I heard two sounds, 
one high and one low. Aerward I asked the engineer in charge why, if the room was 
so silent, I had heard two sounds. He said, ‘Describe them.’ I did. He said, ‘e high 
one was your nervous system in operation. e low one was your blood in circulation’” 
(qtd. in Kahn 190).
 45. Bourdieu explains that: “Systematicity is found in the opus operatum because it 
is in the modus operandi. It is found in all the properties—and property—with which 
individuals and groups surround themselves, houses, furniture, paintings, books, cars, 
spirits, cigarettes, perfumes, clothes, and in the practices in which they manifest their 
distinction, sports, games, entertainments, only because it is in the synthetic unity of 
the habitus, the unifying, generative principle of all practices. Taste, the propensity and 
capacity to appropriate (materially or symbolically) a given class of classi ed, classify-
ing objects or practices, is the generative formula of life-style, a unitary set of distinctive 
preferences which express the same expressive intention in the speci c logic of each of 
the symbolic sub-spaces, furniture, clothing, language or body hexis.” (Distinction 173)
    /    Notes to Pages 69–71
UP
F C
OP
Y
 46. I consider naturalist ction a subcategory of realist ction. is is not to deny 
that there are signicant dierences between the aesthetics and politics of, say, a Norris 
and a Howells, but it suggests that we should discuss those dierences against a back-
ground of shared formal and thematic concerns that distinguishes most literary works 
written between the Civil War and the end of the nineteenth century quite radically 
from modernist preoccupations. Moreover, the achievement of a writer like Crane is 
brought into sharper focus if we recognize the roots he shares with Howellsian realism 
along with the dierences that have prompted many critics to see an anticipation of 
modernist concerns and techniques in his writings. Distinguishing sharply between 
realist writing on the one hand and naturalist writing on the other not only overlooks 
a shared institutional history but also runs the risk of preempting a discussion of both 
continuities and discontinuities in literary history.
Chapter 2. e Noises of Modernist Form
 1. I am indebted to Hartwig Isernhagen for making me aware of the richness of Rus-
sian formalist thought.
 2. As Victor Erlich points out with regard to one of Russian formalism’s main prac-
titioners: “Jakobson’s denition of ‘literariness’ called attention to what is a crucial 
element of any poetic structure. But it was especially pertinent to a literary situation, 
where the poet’s professed aim was manipulation of the medium rather than repre-
sentation of reality” (276). Note also that eminent formalist critics like Shklovsky, 
Jakobson, and Tynjanov were active supporters of the Russian futurist movement in 
literature.
 3. One should be careful not to overstress the Russian formalists’ insistence on the 
autonomy of art, not solely because Marxist-Leninist attacks on formalism’s idealist 
stance—which prepared the ground for the forceful suppression of Russian formalism 
under Stalin—committed the same error. e following passage from Leon Trotsky’s 
Literature and Revolution, rst published in 1924, is a case in point: “e assertion of 
complete independence of the aesthetic ‘factor’ from the inuence of social conditions, 
as is made by Shklovsky, is an instance of specic hyperbole whose roots, by the way, lie 
in social conditions too; it is the megalomania of aesthetics turning our hard reality on 
its head. Apart from this peculiarity, the constructions of the Formalists have the same 
kind of defective methodology that every other kind of idealism has” (181–82). e 
formalist position is distorted when it is equated with an insistence on the complete 
autonomy of art. For instance, in a joint essay published in 1928, Roman Jakobson and 
Jurij Tynjanov conceive of literature as a system that interacts with other systems. e 
nal of their eight theses states:
A disclosure of the immanent laws of the history of literature (language) allows 
us to determine the character of each specic change in literary (linguistic) sys-
tems. However, these laws do not allow us to explain the tempo of evolution or 
the chosen path of evolution when several, theoretically possible, evolutionary 
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paths are given. is is owing to the fact that the immanent laws of literary (lin-
guistic) evolution form an indeterminate equation; although they admit only a 
limited number of possible solutions, they do not necessarily specify a unique 
solution. e question of a specic choice of path, or at least of the dominant, 
can be solved only by means of the correlation between the literary series and 
other historical events. is correlation (a system of systems) has its own struc-
tural laws, which must be submitted to investigation. (80–81)
ere are at least two possible readings of this passage. e rst would interpret it as 
an attempt to expand the scope of literary studies by subsuming as much extratextual 
material as is necessary to retain literary studies as an autonomous discipline that stud-
ies the immanent laws of its object(s). is reading would explain Jakobson and Tyn-
janov’s extremely broad application of a systemic perspective to include within a single 
system not only literature and literary history but also the correlations between literary 
history and other historical “series.” My own reading proceeds along similar lines but 
emphasizes that, while retaining formalism’s scientic impulse, Jakobson and Tynjanov 
here clearly concede that literature is not a fully closed system but interacts with other 
systems. It would be wrong to see their explorations into the relationships between 
literature and extraliterary discourses as a late aberration from formalist principles. 
Even though their views on the interrelationship between literature and extraliterary 
facts represented a further move away from too-narrow concepts of the autonomy of 
literature, an early formalist like Shklovsky was, as we will see below, far less reticent in 
discussing the social signicance and function of literature.
 4. Shklovsky’s wording is strikingly similar to that of Percy Bysshe Shelley’s reec-
tions on art and perception in his “A Defence of Poetry.” ough wavering between an 
ontological and a phenomenological conception of objects (note the “at least”), Shel-
ley already sensed in 1821 that objects do not exist independently of an observer when 
he wrote: “All things exist as they are perceived; at least in relation to the percipient” 
(56). What art does to our perception and, consequently, also to the objects of percep-
tion, Shelley explains in a way that anticipates Shklovsky’s observations by a century: 
“Poetry lis the veil from the hidden beauty of the world, and makes familiar objects 
be as if they were not familiar. [. . .] It creates anew the universe, aer it has been an-
nihilated in our minds by the recurrence of impressions blunted by reiteration” (33, 
56). By changing our perception of objects, Shelley knew, art does not remain enclosed 
within an autonomous sphere, but enters into a dialogue with the world out there.
 5. As Martin Jay points out in his discussion of Adorno’s Aesthetic eory, it is the 
social uselessness and inaccessibility of modernist art—as opposed to committed 
art—that enables it to assume a critical distance in the rst place: “If there is a positive 
moment in aesthetic truth, it is evident only in those works that strive for the utmost 
autonomy from the present society, defying immediate accessibility and popular im-
pact. [. . .] For only in the utter uselessness of such works, which stubbornly resist all 
attempts to instrumentalize them, is the present domination of instrumental reason 
deed” (159).
 6. As Diana Coole notes, a mimetic dimension is also crucial to Adorno’s style of 
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writing. Rather than classifying its objects from a supposedly objectifying distance, 
philosophical language should strive to replicate the form of its objects. Hence the o-
noted performativity of Adorno’s style (Coole 176–77, 182–84).
 7. At least since Adorno, the idea that formal diculty and stylistic experimentation 
constitute positive features of modernist texts has informed the work of modernism’s 
advocates to such a degree that Richard Poirier is able to state that “Modernism can 
be thought of as a period when, more than in any other, readers were induced to think 
of literary texts as necessarily and rewardingly complicated” (106). It should be noted, 
however, that Poirier’s contribution diers signicantly from those of Adorno and oth-
ers in that it is interested in the diculty of form per se rather than the relationships 
between literary form and social function: “modernism is to be located not in ideas 
about cultural institutions or about the structures of life in or outside literary texts. It is 
to be found, rather, in two related and historically veriable developments: rst, in the 
promotion, by a particular faction of writers, of the virtues and necessities of diculty 
and, second, in the complicity of a faction of readers who assent to the proposition that 
the act of reading should entail diculties analogous to those registered in the act of 
writing” (Poirier 105).
 8. For a similar line of argument, see also Terry Eagleton, who blends the languages 
of Marxism and Russian formalism when he states that “Modernism is among other 
things a strategy whereby the work of art resists commodication, holds out by the 
skin of its teeth against those social forces which would degrade it to an exchangeable 
object. [. . .] To fend o such reduction to commodity status, the modernist work 
[. . .] thickens its textures and deranges its forms to forestall instant consumability, 
and draws its own language protectively around it to become a mysteriously autotelic 
object” (140).
 9. During World War I, Du Pont sold explosives in quantities above a hundred 
thousand tons per year to America’s European allies. Du Pont was the main supplier of 
explosives, and its prots were enormous: “According to the American statistics, Du-
Pont supplied 40% of the total ammunition used by the Allies during the war. At the 
works the number employed rose from 5,000 to 100,000, while the output of powder 
rose from 2,500,000 lbs in 1914 to 400,000,000 lbs in 1918. [. . .] Total prots were 266 
million dollars” (Lewinsohn 154).
 10. Bullock’s account is somewhat imprecise because many of the technological 
developments he lists were made before the 1890s. e typewriter was, for instance, 
invented in the late 1860s, and plastics were already available in the mid-1800s. Never-
theless, his suggestion that the impact of these inventions on large segments of the public 
began to be felt in the twentieth century remains valid.
 11. Geneviève Fabre and Michel Feith’s introduction to the collection of essays that 
features Sollors’s article is in many respects closer to my own take on Cane:
Cane partakes of the “double-voicedness” of African American literature, which 
nds its origin and inspiration in Western formal writing as well as in vernacular 
forms of expression. is ties in with the depiction of the African American 
“double-consciousness” that W.E.B. Du Bois made in his landmark work e 
Notes to Pages 80–89    /    215
UP
F
CO
PY
Souls of Black Folks [sic] (1903). us, the split in the work parallels that of the 
writer himself as an heir to more than one culture, several literary traditions, and 
many “races.” e specicity of Cane in the context of the Harlem Renaissance 
lies in the widening of the split, which evolves into a state of formal fragmenta-
tion. e body of the work is “torn asunder” under the pressure of “unrecon-
ciled strivings.” Toomer’s book stages a radical breakup of the unifying principle 
of form. (5–6)
 12. George Hutchinson (42) notes Toomer’s familiarity with Du Bois’s writings as 
well as with the debates between Du Bois and Washington.
 13. I am particularly troubled by critics like George Hutchinson, who go to great 
lengths in their attempts to “rescue” Cane from the African-American literary tradi-
tion:
although it is entirely tting to read Cane in the context of African American lit-
erary tradition—and as one of the most important texts of the Harlem Renais-
sance—it is important to recognize that Toomer’s relation to that tradition is 
ambivalent at best and that Cane also needs to be read in relation to other tradi-
tions and movements. Indeed, it is precisely the ambiguity—and mobility—of 
Toomer’s “identity” in a society obsessed with clarity on this score that moti-
vated the restless searching through which Cane came about, through which 
Toomer le it behind, and without it there could be no book like it. (54)
 14. I am indebted to John Rowe for referring me to Sundquist’s work.
 15. See Picker on Colonel Higginson’s desire to “quite literally captur[e] the spiritu-
als” sung by his African-American soldiers “in words” (“Red War” 13) and his attempts 
“to impose the settled qualities of print on transformative specimens of orality” (14).
 16. In Gérard Genette’s terminology, “any event a narrative recounts is at a diegetic 
level immediately higher than the level at which the narrating act producing this nar-
rative is placed. [. . .] e narrating instance of a rst narrative is [. . .] extradiegetic by 
denition, as the narrating instance of a (metadiegetic) narrative is diegetic by deni-
tion” (Narrative Discourse 228–29). Janie as narrator of her own life story thus belongs 
to a dierent (diegetic) level of narration than the (younger) Janie, who is a ctional 
character on the metadiegetic level.
 17. I am indebted for this type of model to Rosemarie Zeller’s lectures on narratol-
ogy as well as Gérard Genette’s Narrative Discourse. Genette would dispute the exis-
tence of the level of implied author/reader.
 18. See also Carla Kaplan’s reading of eir Eyes Were Watching God, which focuses 
on Hurston’s thematization of the promises and failures of conversation, storytelling, 
and the (erotic) desire to be listened to when one speaks. Kaplan uses the term erotics 
of talk to describe a “signature feature of much so-called minority writing” that “takes 
the specic shape of heightened desire for an ideal listener, a listener whose existence 
is passionately desired but doubted at every possible turn. An erotics of talk, in other 
words, is a guration for both personal desire and social critique, projecting ‘normative 
possibilities unrealized but felt in a particular social reality,’ as Iris Marion Young puts 
it” (70).
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 19. Otis Ferguson, another early reviewer of Hurston’s novel, makes the same point 
with regard to her rendition of the black vernacular: “To let the really important words 
stand as in Webster and then consistently misspell no more than an aspiration in any 
tongue, is to set up a mood of Eddie Cantor in blackface. e reader’s eye is caught by 
distortions of the inconsequential, until a sentence in the supposedly vernacular reads 
with about this emphasis: ‘DAT WUZ UH mighty ne thing FUH you TUH do’” 
(276). Ferguson’s judgment applies to narrative James Weldon Johnson’s inuential 
prescription against using dialect in poetry (Gates, “Hurston” 161).
 20. As Kadlec (214) duly notes, Henry Louis Gates Jr. was the rst critic to credit 
Hurston with “introducing free indirect discourse into Afro-American narration” 
(Gates, “Hurston” 175). Kadlec’s reading diers from Gates’s in that is does not locate 
her achievement in using free indirect discourse in “resolv[ing] the tension between 
standard English and Black vernacular” (Gates, “Hurston” 200) but in staging it. In 
this respect, my own reading is closer to Kadlec’s than to Gates’s.
 21. Dos Passos’s employment of racial epithets is not without its problems. In the 
case of Daughter and the construction boss, the racist remarks are clearly intended to 
elicit the reader’s indignation. Joe Williams’s ethnic slurs can largely be explained as a 
result of the naturalist desire to render working-class speech raw and unltered. How-
ever, Joe’s language use seeps into the narrator’s idiom (“the stench of niggerwoman
sweat” [21]) to such an extent that we may begin to ask ourselves to what degree Dos 
Passos’s modernist transformation of the naturalist project replaces the (working-class) 
brute with the racially other as the gure to be cast out.
 22. Following a hint in one of Dos Passos’s outlines for e Big Money, Hartwig Isern-
hagen in Ästhetische Innovation und Kulturkritik distinguishes between “lives, headlin-
ers, camera eyes [and] newsreels” (161), arguing that “lives” is more neutral than “ction” 
(or my “ctional narrative”) because it does not suggest that what I call “ctional nar-
ratives” are somehow at the center of the trilogy and that “headliner” captures better 
than “portrait” (or my “biographical sketch”) the public status of the gures portrayed. 
Granted, but I nd “headliners” too suggestive of the headlines in the Newsreels and 
“lives” too neutral because it could equally well apply to the biographical sketches or 
the ctional narratives.
 23. e American historian Philip Jenkins concurs with Henningsen’s assessment: 
“e impact of the war on American domestic life was out of all proportion to its 
military involvement” (203).
 24. Henningsen notes that 337,649 U.S. deserters were registered during World War 
I. is is a signicant number, especially if compared with the approximately 570,000 
deserters during the highly unpopular Vietnam War (369).
 25. With regard to Dos Passos’s own positioning toward these conicts and de-
bates, it is signicant to know that he supported the communist candidate William Z. 
Foster in the presidential elections that were held the year 1919 was published. ough 
never a member of the Communist Party, Dos Passos sympathized with its causes and 
published in the New Masses at the time he was writing 1919. His disillusionment with 
Communist Party politics and eventual embracement of deeply conservative political 
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views began somewhat later, even though Michael Gold’s didactic tone in his 1926 
review of Manhattan Transfer in the New Masses—a journal that was cofounded by 
Gold—already indicates the ri: “Dos Passos must read history, psychology and eco-
nomics and plunge himself into the labor movement. He must ally himself denitely 
with the radical army, for in this struggle is the only true escape from middle-class be-
wilderment today. at is what I feel” (74). e denitive split was fueled primarily by 
the communist disruption of a Socialist Party meeting in 1934, the unfavorable reviews 
for e Big Money by leist critics in 1936, and, most important, the execution of his 
friend José Robles by communists during the Spanish Civil War. Granville Hicks puts 
it thus: “Dos Passos in 1932 was closer to communism than he had ever been—and as 
close as he was going to get” (23).
 26. As a driver for the Norton-Harjes Ambulance Service, the Red Cross ambulance 
corps, and the U.S. Medical Corps, Dos Passos had seen, as he records in one of the 
journal entries collected in e Fourteenth Chronicle, “the grey crooked ngers of the 
dead, the dark look of dirty mangled bodies,” and heard “their groans & joltings in 
the ambulance, the vast tomtom of their guns” (qtd. in Nanney 6). While both Dos 
Passos and Hemingway had more war experience than Crane when he wrote e Red 
Badge of Courage, the fact that both Dos Passos and Hemingway had worked for am-
bulance services rather than joining combative forces not only reects their reluctance 
to participate in the killing but at least partly explains the curious sense of detachment 
from actual ghting we experience when reading both A Farewell to Arms and 1919.
 27. is passage is based on the so-called Centralia massacre, which was provoked 
by American Legion veterans attacking the IWW hall of Centralia on Armistice Day 
with the intent of driving the Wobblies out of town. e unionists were expecting the 
attack and defended themselves, killing four legionnaires in the ensuing confrontation. 
Wesley Everest, the only unionist victim, was abducted from prison, castrated, and 
hanged. Centralia’s local museum devotes a space of about 1 by 3 yards to document 
the massacre. e exhibition is placed so inconspicuously that I had trouble nding it 
at all when I visited the museum in August 2001.
 28. See also my discussion of Crane’s e Red Badge of Courage in the previous chap-
ter.
 29. Consider also, for instance, the use of loudspeaker propaganda announcements 
from low-ying planes during World War II and, more recently, in Vietnam, Iraq, Bos-
nia, and Afghanistan (and Iraq again).
 30. I am indebted to Peter Burleigh for drawing my attention to the relevant passage 
in Discipline and Punish. See also Mark M. Smith (112–17) on the regulatory power of 
bells in and out of prisons.
 31. My following observations draw on Alan Sineld’s discussion of common sense 
as a highly potent form of ideology that derives its explanatory power from acts of 
repetition. Sineld uses the term story, but the references to the Althusserian under-
standing of ideology are clear and explicit in other passages of Sineld’s text:
stories are lived. ey are not just outside ourselves, something we hear or read 
about. ey make sense for us—of us—because we have been and are in them. 
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ey are already proceeding when we arrive in the world, and we come to con-
sciousness in their terms. As the world shapes itself around and through us, cer-
tain interpretations of experience strike us as plausible because they t what we 
have experienced already. ey become common sense, they “go without say-
ing.” Colin Summer explains this as a “circle of social reality”: “understanding 
produces its own social reality at the same time as social reality produces its own
understanding.” (24–25)
 32. Jill Bondurant’s Web site, “Music of the Great War” (http://www.melodylane.
net/ww1.htm), features the music and lyrics of some of the better-known patriotic 
World War I songs, including “America I Love You,” “Keep the Home Fires Burning,” 
and “Over ere,” all of which are reproduced in parts in Dos Passos’s 1919.
 33. is level of analysis, which acknowledges the supreme ideological force of 
consensual, commonsense understandings (rather than knowledge), is, it seems to 
me, what is most agrantly missing from Habermas’s theory of communicative reason, 
which proceeds on the idealized model of individual subjects communicating with the 
goal of reaching mutual understanding and does not suciently recognize the poten-
tial oppressiveness of structures of meaning that exist both above and beneath the level 
of intersubjective dialogue (Habermas 294–97).
 34. Fear works; the current “war on terrorism” provides ample evidence.
 35. With regard to the Newsreels, Charles Marz anticipates some of my own ar-
guments in “Dos Passos’s Newsreels: e Noise of History” (1979). But in focusing 
almost exclusively on the headlines, Marz fails to see the literal implications of his 
own title and does not proceed to integrate his reading into a discussion of modernist 
aesthetics.
 36. I do not agree with Lisa Nanney’s assessment that “e segments of U.S.A. [. . .] 
point the reader back to a center, where is located an individual and an artist in the 
fullness of history” (199). Nanney locates this center in the Camera Eyes and their 
introduction of an artistic subjective consciousness (197–98). On the contrary, I would 
argue, their impressionistic quality and stream-of-consciousness technique (which 
Nanney does acknowledge) signicantly contribute to the irreparable fragmentation 
of Dos Passos’s ctional world. More generally, critics who hierarchize Dos Passos’s 
four discourses (with the ctional narratives and sometimes, as in Nanney’s case, the 
Camera Eyes at the center) tend to evade the question of their interrelation and for that 
reason fall short of the mark. (Isernhagen, Ästhetische Innovation 166).
 37. e world’s oil elds have, of course, lost none of their geopolitical importance. 
As I am preparing these pages in March 2003, American forces are attacking Mosul, 
one of the rst targets in the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
 38. e motif of the violent machine can be traced back to literature before natural-
ism. Leo Marx mentions Hawthorne’s sketch of “a malignant steam machine which 
attacked and killed its human attendants” (“e Machine” 115).
 39. In a passage on Sister Carrie in his essay on images of the metropolis in modern 
American literature, Ickstadt oers a cogent analysis of the dialectical relationship be-
tween loss of self and experience of personal freedom and opportunity: “When Carrie 
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arrives in Chicago, all alone and with four dollars in her pocket, when, intimidated, 
she roams the downtown streets looking for a job, she experiences [. . .] her own feeling 
of disorientation and forlornness as the city’s secret: herself as nothing in the midst of 
highrise luxury facades, the stony representatives of impenetrable societal forces. Pre-
cisely then, however, does she perceive Chicago as a kaleidoscope of sheer possibility, 
a fairyland [. . .] out of Arabian Nights” (63; my translation).
 40. See also Becker (46) and Lehan (241) for similar assessments.
 41. Isernhagen (Ästhetische Innovation 137) likewise arms Manhattan Transfer’s 
ambivalence toward the city. He attributes critics’ oversight of the positive aspects of 
city life depicted in Dos Passos’s novel to the enormous inuence of Leo Marx’s pas-
toral theses and their unequivocal valorization of the garden over the machine (246 n. 
4).
 42. e ninth thesis of Marinetti’s 1909 futurist manifesto is adamantly clear 
about the movement’s glorication of war (as well as its misogynist slant): “We will 
glorify war—the world’s only hygiene—militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture 
of freedom-bringers, beautiful ideas worth dying for, and scorn for woman” (qtd. in 
M. Norris 48–49). With regard to Russolo, Douglas Kahn tells us that “Although Rus-
solo would eventually become antifascist, during the second decade of this century he 
was never antiwar” (66). In 1919, Dos Passos places an ironic comment on the futurist 
glorication of strength in the mouth of Sardinaglia, the author of “the march of the 
medical colonels,” who mockingly proclaims himself a futurista: “‘A futurist must be 
disgusted at nothing except weakness and stupidity. [. . .] A futurist must be strong and 
disgusted with nothing,’ he said, still trilling on the mandolin, ‘that’s why I admire the 
Germans and American millionaires.’ ey all laughed” (159–60).
 43. e fact that the sleazy lawyer George Baldwin declines to invest in Sandbourne’s 
project (234–35) adds to rather than detracts from the architect’s integrity.
 44. See also Ickstadt: “Herf ’s total repudiation of the city cannot be Dos Passos’s 
perspective—how else could he have erected such a great monument to it?” (70; my 
translation).
 45. With Tony Hunter and Warner Jones, both Manhattan Transfer and 1919 have a 
male homosexual character, but one would be hard-pressed to discover much sympathy 
for them in Dos Passos’s novels. His ctional treatment of gays reveals the limits of 
his compassion. Particularly with regard to Manhattan Transfer, I concur with Wendy 
Steiner’s assessment that the book “is full of disgust with sexuality, homosexuality, un-
wanted pregnancies, and venereal disease” (858).
 46. One should use the notion of “the unrepresentable” with care. Unless one wants 
to reserve the term representation exclusively for situations in which there exists (the 
possibility of ) a perfect congruence between the territory and the map, there are few 
objects that are truly unrepresentable. God and death may come closest to being unrep-
resentable because few if any have seen the territory and come back to draw the map. 
In most cases, however, including the abject as well as the horrors of the Holocaust or 
Hiroshima, one should speak of dierent degrees of diculty or of (political, ideo-
logical, psychological) resistance to representation. Having said that, I still nd that 
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notions of “the unrepresentable” and “the ineable” and discussions surrounding these 
notions can be made useful for a reading of Nightwood, and I will continue to use the 
terms, with appropriate qualications. My conclusion returns to the question of the 
representability of noise.
 47. See also Jean Gallagher, who argues that Barnes in Nightwood challenges and 
redenes the medical terms homosexual and invert. With regard to the latter, Gallagher 
suggests that Barnes expands the concept to cover the visual eld: “My suggestion is 
that in its representation of the ‘inverted’ characters of Robin Vote and Dr. O’Connor, 
Nightwood also attempts to model an ‘inverted’ observer who is, as the etymology of the 
word suggests, ‘turned in’ to the novel’s visual eld rather than occupying a privileged, 
transcendent, voyeuristic position outside of it, suggesting how, in Kaja Silverman’s 
words, the eye might be ‘shown to look not from a site exterior to the eld of vision, 
but from one fully inside’” (280–81).
 48. See, for instance, Elizabeth A. Meese’s discussion of Nightwood and its mixed 
reception by critics familiar with Radclye Hall’s earlier and far less experimental e 
Well of Loneliness (1928).
 49. Allen (21–37) reads Nightwood as a challenge to Freud’s tendency to equate 
homosexuality with narcissism. Rereading passages in the novel that seem to conform 
to this theory (for example, Nora’s repeated assertion that “She is myself ” [127]), Al-
len discovers in Nightwood alternative models for lesbian relationships that rupture 
discourses of narcissism and sameness, particularly that of the mother-child dyad in-
voked repeatedly by both Nora and O’Connor. Allen summarizes her argument thus: 
“In using Barnes’s narrative to intervene in Freud’s texts, I am prompted not only by 
their similar historical moments and the culturally problematic nature of psychoana-
lytic discourse for women in general and lesbians in particular, but also by the form of 
Nightwood’s narrative. Nora’s retrospective account of her love for Robin both revises 
the identicatory model that is delineated in Freud’s narratives of male homosexual-
ity and narcissism, and writes the maternal position that is largely absent in his work” 
(34).
 50. Robin’s return to Nora at the end of the novel does not contradict this obser-
vation. What returns to Nora is not the object of her representations but a Robin so 
changed that the continuation of their relationship (and indeed the possibility of hu-
man interaction with Robin) becomes doubtful.
 51. Baxter is appropriately cautious when he writes that “Nightwood is not expressly 
metactional. But to a certain extent Matthew O’Connor is” (1186).
 52. Victoria L. Smith argues in a similar vein with regard to Nightwood’s language 
of loss: “Nightwood is a paradigmatic melancholic text. [. . .] e performance of loss 
in the excesses of Barnes’s text—its torrential and Byzantine language coupled with 
its relative unconcern with plot—oers a strategy for recuperating what has been un-
speakable, including the woman, and especially the lesbian, subject” (196). However, I 
would argue that Barnes’s strategy is both one of recuperation and concealment.
 53. Anette Bretschneider’s dissertation, Decadent Djuna (1997), traces decadent 
themes and motifs throughout Barnes’s oeuvre.
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 54. Jane Marcus’s reading of Nightwood as a text that warns of and speaks out against 
the rising fascist powers captures this double nature of Barnes’s text most clearly:
Using Julia Kristeva’s Powers of Horror, I argue that Nightwood, in its original title 
of “Bow Down” and its continual reference to submission and bowing or lower-
ing of the self, is a study in abjection, and that by its concentration on the gure 
of e One Who Is Slapped, the downtrodden victim, it gures by absence the 
authoritarian dominators of Europe in the 1930s, the sexual and political fas-
cists. While Kristeva studies abjection as a pathology, I maintain that Barnes’ 
portraits of the abject constitute a political case, a kind of feminist-anarchist call
for freedom from fascism. Looking at Nikka’s tattoo as a deance of the Leviti-
cal taboo against writing on the body, I see the body of the Other—the black, 
lesbian, transvestite, or Jew—presented as a text in the novel, a book of commu-
nal resistances of underworld outsiders to domination. Its weapon is laughter, a 
form of folk grotesque derived from Rabelais and surviving in circus. (221)
But while Marcus locates the potential for subversion in Barnes’s Rabelaisian humor, 
my reading situates both the mechanisms of repression and their subversion in the 
darkness and negativity of her text. For a dierent perspective, see Kaivola, who stresses 
the potentially dangerous and politically dubious nature of such a double movement: 
“With Nightwood, Barnes works to nd a language capable of breaking through to the 
other side of culture, to its destruction. Despite the contradictions and collusions in 
the text, to a great extent she succeeds. But what Nightwood simultaneously demon-
strates is that it is virtually impossible to use language to represent an alternative that is 
utopian without partaking in existing, sometimes oppressive cultural congurations” 
(100).
 55. Characters in Barnes’s novel are unstable, fragmented, and subject to a sense 
of continuum and ux. ey exemplify a modernist strategy of characterization al-
ready outlined by the Swedish dramatist August Strindberg in 1888: “My characters 
are conglomerations of past and present stages of civilization, bits from books and 
newspapers, scraps of humanity, rags and tatters of ne clothing, patched together as 
is the human soul” (qtd. in McFarlane 81).
 56. Gisela Ecker points out that Nightwood refuses to tell a coherent story and 
supplants narrative with a veritable ood of images that are no longer decipherable: 
“Taken together, these images do not—as is otherwise the case with complex meta-
phors—contribute to acts of signication with a common ground, but distance them-
selves further and further away from the object they designate; their separate parts 
hasten away without converging into their point of origin” (153; my translation). For 
Alan Singer, who, similar to Ecker, discovers in Nightwood an “asymmetrical relation 
between tenor and vehicle” (49) and a rapid dissociation of gural associations from 
any motivating context, this distancing and displacement presents a radical challenge 
to the unity of novelistic plot.
 57. For an early study that has become something of a classic in the eld, see Don 
Zimmermann and Candace West’s study of male interruption patterns in “Sex Roles, 
Interruptions, and Silences in Conversation” (1975).
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 58. Bonnie Kime Scott traces a sustained interest in beasts and the blurring of the 
human-animal boundary throughout Barnes’s oeuvre.
Chapter 3. Noise Everywhere: e Postmodern Situation
 1. e weakening of historicity, itself but one manifestation of a more general post-
modern depthlessness, is for Jameson one of the dening features of postmodernism. 
He characterizes the postmodern age as “an age that has forgotten how to think histori-
cally” (Postmodernism ix) in the very rst sentence of his book.
 2. is impossibility of “pure” critique is also armed by “postmodern” theory. It 
is, for instance, centrally present in Jacques Derrida’s assertion that even critiques of 
metaphysics (such as his own) cannot escape the language and concepts of metaphys-
ics: “ere is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to attack 
metaphysics. We have no language—no syntax and no lexicon—which is alien to this 
history; we cannot utter a single destructive proposition which has not already slipped 
into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to con-
test” (“Structure” 226).
 3. Hutcheon’s general attitude to modernism is hostile. In A Poetics of Postmodern-
ism, she repeats standard objections to the movement when she writes about “mod-
ernism’s dogmatic reductionism, its inability to deal with ambiguity and irony, and 
its denial of the validity of the past” (Hutcheon, Poetics 30). Contrary to Hutcheon, 
I believe that her account of postmodernism as “complicitous critique” is perfectly 
compatible with a more sanguine view of modernism. I develop this argument in the 
following pages.
 4. Jameson captures the relationship between early postmodernism and the mod-
ernism that preceded it accurately when he describes 1960s postmodernism as a reac-
tion against an institutionalized high modernism:
Not only are Picasso and Joyce no longer ugly; they now strike us, on the whole, 
as rather “realistic,” and this is the result of a canonization and academic institu-
tionalization of the modern movement generally that can be traced to the late 
1950s. is is surely one of the most plausible explanations for the emergence 
of postmodernism itself, since the younger generation of the 1960s will now 
confront the formerly oppositional modern movement as a set of dead classics, 
which “weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the living,” as Marx said in a dif-
ferent context. (Postmodernism 4)
Hutcheon refers to the same process of institutionalization and domestication when 
she argues that, in searching for valid models of oppositional artistic practice, post-
modernism had to reach back to “modernism’s initial oppositional impulses” (my em-
phasis).
 5. Note how Jameson in an interview with Anders Stephanson moves from describ-
ing postmodernism as a reaction against a specic form of modernism, institutional-
ized high modernism, to arguing that it constitutes a rejection of “modernist values” 
tout court: “Historically, it did begin as a reaction against the institutionalization of 
modernism in universities, museums, and concert halls, and against the canonization 
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of a certain kind of architecture. is entrenchment is felt to be oppressive by the gen-
eration that comes of age, roughly speaking, in the 1960s; and, not surprisingly, it then 
systematically tries to make a breathing space for itself by repudiating modernist val-
ues. In the literary context, values thus repudiated include complexity and ambiguity 
of language, irony, the concrete universal, and the construction of elaborate symbolic 
systems” ( Jameson, “Regarding Postmodernism” 3–4).
 6. Jameson discusses the question of break or continuity in his introduction to Post-
modernism (xii–xiv).
 7. Whether nonorganic form represents, as Bürger (90–91) argues, an artistic at-
tempt to reintegrate art and life or dissociates, as Adorno has it, the former from the 
latter in order to critique contemporary conditions of living all the more eectively 
from a putative outside, remains open to debate. Perhaps the two explanations do not 
necessarily exclude each other; it may be only in the postmodern era where Adorno’s 
paradox that “Asociality becomes the social legitimation of art” (Aesthetic 234) assumes 
its full signicance. As for a history of adversarial modernism, such a history has yet 
to be written, but Astradur Eysteinsson’s e Concept of Modernism (1990) would, in 
its insistence on the adversarial potential of modernist form, serve as a good starting 
point.
 8. e reader is referred to Freese for the most comprehensive treatment of the uses 
of the second law of thermodynamics in postwar American ction. His h chapter 
provides a detailed reading of e Crying of Lot 49. See also Mangel, Schaub (Pynchon), 
and Slade for other convincing readings of the function of entropy in Pynchon’s novel. 
My following account of Maxwell’s Demon and the second law relies most heavily 
on Mangel; Freese; and Bimalendu N. Roy’s Fundamentals of Classical and Statistical 
ermodynamics (2002).
 9. A closed system is dened as a system in which “exchange of energy may occur 
but no transfer of matter occurs between the system and its surroundings” (Roy 10). 
One of the standard physics textbooks available at the time of Pynchon’s writing of 
e Crying of Lot 49 explains the second law of thermodynamics as follows: “every 
system le to itself changes, rapidly or slowly, in such a way as to approach a denite 
nal state of rest. is state of rest (dened in a statistical way) we also called the state 
of equilibrium. Now, since it is a universal postulate of all natural science that a system, 
under given circumstances, will behave in one and only one way, it is a corollary that no 
system, except through the inuence of external agencies, will change in the opposite 
direction, i.e., away from the state of equilibrium” (Lewis and Randall 76).
 10. See Paulson for a discussion of Maxwell’s Demon as “a theorization of nine-
teenth-century fantasies—perpetual motion, energy without expenditure, the produc-
tion of a generalized reservoir” (41–42).
 11. At this point, Pynchon’s background as an engineering physics major at Cornell 
and his work as a technical writer for Boeing Aircra in Seattle should be mentioned 
(O’Donnell 3–4).
 12. e second half of Mangel’s article goes on to discuss the links between informa-
tional and thermodynamic entropy in e Crying of Lot 49. Unfortunately, while her 
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explanation of entropy in the thermodynamic sense as well as her application of the 
concept to a reading of Pynchon’s novel are to the point and convincing (194–200), 
the latter part of her article suers from a failure to clearly distinguish between the 
two notions of entropy. See also Dean A. Ward (25–26) and Freese (523–26) for similar 
criticisms of Mangel.
 13. Stefano Tani, who reads e Crying of Lot 49 as a postmodern detective novel, 
likewise stresses the circular structure of the novel: “Oedipa the [. . .] post-modern 
detective quits sizing up clues and accepts mystery as her story ‘ends’ as it started, with 
ve words which are also the title. [. . .] Circularity emphasizes the fact that suspense 
remains” (24).
 14. See, for instance, Schaub (Pynchon); Seed; Maltby; and O’Donnell.
 15. Tony Tanner (63–65), for instance, suggests a reading of the Tristero as an agent 
of opposition and communicative renewal but at the same time points out the highly 
ambivalent nature of a network that seems to include the Peter Penguid Society, which 
only “reveal[s] a pointless secrecy concealing meaningless, ‘newsless’ repetitions” (65).
 16. In a defense of e Satanic Verses, Rushdie explains why he used the name Ma-
hound for the prophet Mohammed. Well aware that “Mahound” is “a medieval Euro-
pean demonization of ‘Muhammad,’” Rushdie argues that “Central to the purposes 
of e Satanic Verses is the process of reclaiming language from one’s opponent. [. . .] 
‘Trotsky’ was Trotsky’s jailer’s name. By taking it for his own, he symbolically con-
quered his captor and set himself free. Something of the same spirit lay behind my use 
of the name ‘Mahound’” (402).
 17. In the late 1990s, KCUF returned in the fully commercialized guise of “fcuk,” 
the logo used by the UK-based fashion retailer French Connection UK since 1998. I 
am indebted to Timothy Grundy for pointing this out to me.
 18. For similar readings of W.A.S.T.E., see Seed (148–56) and O’Donnell (1).
 19. For discussions of Inverarity’s role, see Abernethy (22) and Henkle (104). e 
ambivalent nature of W.A.S.T.E. and the Tristero becomes clearly apparent once we 
take a closer look at Inverarity’s involvement with them. As one of the major sharehold-
ers of the Yoyodyne rm, Inverarity is directly responsible for the suocating working 
environment that Koteks, one of Yoyodyne’s engineers, talks about. It is entrepreneurs
like him who have created environments like San Narciso, which is “less an identiable 
city than a group of concepts” (14) and where “address numbers were in the 70 and 
then 80,000s. [. . .] It seemed unnatural” (15). Oedipa’s epiphanic realization toward 
the end of the novel that “San Narciso had no boundaries” and that Pierce Inverarity’s 
“legacy was America” documents the extent to which his “need to possess, to alter the 
land, to bring new skylines, personal antagonisms, growth rates into being” (123) have 
penetrated or, indeed, pierced the country. In such passages, Inverarity becomes a capi-
talist “founding father” (16) not only of San Narciso but of America as a whole.
 e tower Oedipa is entrapped in is not only the solipsistic tower of her mind or 
the roles (housewife, lover, executrix) that are thrust upon her but also the connes of 
an all-pervasive and therefore closed capitalist system that demands conformity, sties 
creativity, and prevents genuine forms of human communication. Maltby makes the 
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link between capitalist practices and solipsistic states of mind explicit: “e America of 
Lot 49 is an America under the dominion of capital, a social order which is understood 
to isolate individuals and create self-centered forms of subjectivity which militate 
against genuine communication and, by extension, against authentic community. e 
society of Lot 49 is populated by self-enclosed egos. Images of enclosure abound in the 
novel; there are repeated references to towers, furrows and cul-de-sacs” (140). is is 
further emphasized in the novel by the frequent allusions to the Narcissus myth (“San 
Narciso,” “Echo Motel”). It therefore comes as no surprise that, for the anarchist Jesús 
Arrabal, Inverarity is “too exactly and without aw the thing we ght” (83). W.A.S.T.E. 
is one possible reaction against an America Inverarity has helped to build.
 Yet, as Oedipa gradually realizes, “Every access route to the Tristero could be traced 
also to the Inverarity estate” (117). Paradoxically, Inverarity might even be the origina-
tor of the alternative communications system W.A.S.T.E. Up to the very end of the 
novel, it remains unclear whether Inverarity’s close association with the Tristero ex-
poses the Tristero’s subversiveness as a mere pretense or hoax or whether the associa-
tion actually manages to redeem Inverarity’s existence and actions. As with so many 
other characters, situations, and events in e Crying of Lot 49, we remain together 
with Oedipa in the realm of excluded middles.
 20. If, as Stanley Koteks explains, Oedipa makes a mistake when she pronounces 
W.A.S.T.E. “like a word” (Lot 49 60) because every letter must be pronounced indi-
vidually, W.A.S.T.E. is an alphabetism and Koteks is wrong in referring to it as “an 
acronym” (60), which is dened as “A word formed from the initial letters of other 
words” (OED). e same applies to D.E.A.T.H. Such blunders on the part of charac-
ters associated with the Tristero raise further doubts about the network’s credibility 
and eectiveness.
 21. Shannon and Weaver’s insights can therefore be made fruitful for a reading of 
e Crying of Lot 49 not only because Pynchon’s novel is crucially concerned with 
processes of communication (Oedipa’s initial comparison of San Narciso to the circuit 
of a transistor radio [14–15] provides the appropriate setting) and because it stages a 
confrontation between informational and thermodynamic entropy but also because 
the ambivalent nature of the Tristero and the W.A.S.T.E. system mirrors the ambiva-
lences inherent in Shannon and Weaver’s denition of noise.
 22. For McHale, e Crying of Lot 49 is a modernist text because, in its adherence 
to the detective story format, it remains interested in the epistemological questions he 
considers to be at the center of the modernist enterprise (147). Contrary to McHale, 
I would argue that Pynchon stages a modernist heroine’s frustrated quest for knowl-
edge and truth in a radically indeterminate postmodern world. e Crying of Lot 49 
thus beautifully exemplies McHale’s own claim that the move from modernism to 
postmodernism involves a “shi of dominance from epistemology to ontology” (8).
 23. For a discussion of proper names in e Crying of Lot 49, see also Tanner (57–
60).
 24. For other critical attempts to establish links between Pynchon’s ction and 
poststructuralist theory, see, for instance, Mepham (145, 150), Madsen, and Sherard.
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 25. Derrida’s famous talk “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences,” from the published version of which this quote is taken, was rst given at 
Johns Hopkins in 1966.
 26. Kerry Grant (20 n. 17.17) has also pointed out that, by associating the state-run 
postal oces with the erce-looking Uncle Sam posters, Pynchon comments on the 
oppressive nature of the monopoly W.A.S.T.E. is ghting against.
 27. Reed suggests as much in a self-interview that was rst published in June 1974: 
“I wanted to write about a time like the present or to use the past to prophesy about 
the future—a process our ancestors called necromancy. I chose the twenties because 
they are very similar to what’s happening right now. is is a valid method and has been 
used by writers from time immemorial. Nobody ever accused James Joyce of making 
up things. Using a past event of one’s country or culture to comment on the present” 
(“Ishmael Reed” 156–57).
 28. In Reed’s ctional world, the Jes Grew epidemic subsumes the upsurge of Af-
rican-American creativity in the 1920s and its return in the 1960s while the Atonist 
Path comes to stand for a Judeo-Christian tradition perceived as stale and oppressive. 
As Reginald Martin explains, the word Atonism originates “in the worship of the one, 
true sun-god, Aton of ancient Egypt” (New Black 84). Martin goes on to comment that 
“Atonism” at the same time evokes “atone” and thus a (white) guilt culture from which 
the adherents of Jes Grew as well as Reed seek to dissociate themselves.
 29. See also Neil Schmitz’s remark on Reed’s manifesto, which at the same time 
provides a good description of what goes on in Mumbo Jumbo: “In the ‘Neo-Hoo-
Doo Manifesto,’ which rst appeared in the Los Angeles Free Press (September 18–24, 
1970), Reed devises a myth that divides history into a war between two churches, two 
communities of consciousness: the ‘Cop Religion’ of Christianity and the transformed 
Osirian rite, Voodoo” (75).
 30. See the “Antiphonal Play” section in chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion 
of Baker’s notion of the “singing book.” Similar to Baker, Henry Louis Gates Jr. reads 
Mumbo Jumbo as a “speakerly text” (“Blackness” 296) akin to Hurston’s eir Eyes Were 
Watching God. Schmitz is less optimistic about Reed’s success in integrating the oral 
and the written: “In a sense, the problem with Mumbo Jumbo is that it is not mumbo 
jumbo at all” (81). To me, Schmitz’s otherwise brilliant article suers from a tendency 
to separate the literary discourse from all other discourses in too strict a fashion. is 
comes to the fore, for instance, when he writes that, “simply put, the language of music 
is not the language of literature” (81). To be fair to Schmitz, it must be said that Reed’s 
categorical statements and his claims of having invented a radically new aesthetic, most 
prominently in the “Neo-HooDoo Manifesto,” invite such critiques.
 31. Neil Schmitz also notes that Reed “write[s] in the parodic manner of omas 
Pynchon and Donald Barthelme” (70). I will return to the question of parody in Reed 
below.
 32. Some of the most vitriolic early attacks on jazz music associated it with voodoo 
in order to emphasize its savagism. is excerpt from a 1920 issue of the Revue Musicale 
testies as much to the writer’s racist hatred of black music as to his fear of its social 
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repercussions: “Jazz is cynically the orchestra of brutes with nonopposable thumbs and 
still prehensile toes, in the forest of voodoo. It is entirely excess, and for that reason 
more than monotone: the monkey is le to his own devices, without morals, without 
discipline, thrown back to all the grooves of instinct, showing his meat still more ob-
scene. ese slaves must be subjugated, or there will be no more master” (qtd. in Attali 
104).
 33. I am indebted to John M. Picker’s Victorian Soundscapes for drawing my atten-
tion to both the New York Times article and William Pietz’s discussion of it in “e 
Phonograph in Africa: International Phonocentrism from Stanley to Sarno.”
 34. See Rowe’s Literary Culture and U.S. Imperialism for a sustained discussion 
of the multiple intersections between U.S. imperialism in the more narrow sense and 
domestic forms of imperialism centered around race, class, and gender. Rowe’s study 
focuses on literary culture’s (oen deeply problematic) interventions in those congu-
rations and processes.
 35. Reginald Martin suggests that the burning of the book by a black man also 
“takes another stab at the new black aesthetic critics, such as Gayle, Houston Baker, 
and Amiri Baraka, who had the chance to codify Afro-American tradition, but who, 
in Reed’s eyes, failed because their perceptions were too narrow and because their stan-
dards were at least partly set by training in white universities, which caused them to 
ignore important parts of Afro-American tradition” (New Black 92). Reed and the 
new black aesthetic critics have denounced each other publicly and aggressively in es-
says, articles, interviews, and books. Reed more specically criticizes what he perceives 
as those critics’ socialist bent, their rigid standards of evaluation, as well as Baraka’s 
black nationalist rhetoric. Martin (New Black 25–62) provides a good overview of the 
debates.
 36. Mumbo Jumbo’s eclectic mix also illustrates “the eacement [. . .] of the older 
(essentially high-modernist) frontier between high culture and so-called mass or com-
mercial culture” (Postmodernism 2) that Jameson considers to be one of the dening 
features of postmodernism. While Jameson tends to regard this erasure of boundaries 
as another symptom of the further encroachment of the logic of late capitalism upon 
the cultural sphere, Andreas Huyssen reminds us that the dissolution of a strict dis-
tinction between high and low may serve a specic purpose for minority artists: “it is 
precisely the recent self-assertion of minority cultures and their emergence into public 
consciousness which has undermined the modernist belief that high and low culture 
have to be categorically kept apart; such rigorous segregation simply does not make 
much sense within a given minority culture which has always existed outside in the 
shadow of the dominant high culture” (194).
 37. Parody is oen regarded as a ludic form, a comic and distorted imitation of 
literary and stylistic conventions. As such, parody is said to foreground linguistic play-
fulness at the expense of more serious concerns. Accordingly, the Bloomsbury Guide to 
English Literature (1989) situates parody in opposition to serious literary works in its 
denition of the term as “A literary form which constitutes a comic imitation of a seri-
ous work, or of a serious literary form” (783). Likewise, Gérard Genette in Palimpsestes 
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discusses parody as a ludic genre and distinguishes it from both satiric and serious 
[sérieux] reworkings of earlier texts. But parody is never a total negation of a previous 
text and always retains some of the model’s thematic and formal concerns. Parody both 
arms and negates what it imitates.
 In distinguishing parody from pastiche, Jameson equally acknowledges the relative 
“seriousness” of parody: “Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique, 
idiosyncratic style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language. But it 
is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior motives, ampu-
tated of the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter and of any conviction that alongside the 
abnormal tongue you have momentarily borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality 
still exists. Pastiche is thus blank parody, a statue with blind eyeballs” (Postmodernism 
17).
38. For a discussion of oppressed subjects’ need to both contest essentialisms and 
occasionally use them strategically, see Elizabeth Gross’s interview with Gayatri Spivak 
in esis Eleven (Spivak).
 39. Similar ambivalences also attach themselves to the historical Black Herman, 
who was practicing as a magician in the 1920s and became “the most famous black 
magician in American history” (Early 235). As such, he is both something of a black 
culture hero and a fraud.
 40. As Gates argues, the main protagonist’s name already signies indeterminacy: 
“As I have shown, the name ‘LaBas’ is derived from Èsù-Elégbára. e Yoruba call Èsù 
the god of indeterminacy (àriyèmuyè) and of uncertainty” (“Blackness” 312).
 41. Mason’s critique of Gates has its own problems, the most obvious being his 
uncritical endorsement of Lukács’s (by now seriously dated) pronouncements on the 
historical novel. Linda Hutcheon’s e Politics of Postmodernism and A Poetics of Post-
modernism make a convincing case for the inapplicability of traditional notions of the 
historical novel to postmodern “historiographic metaction.” See also the beginning 
of this chapter.
 42. One could, I think, construct the argument that Gates loses sight of the critical 
potential of parody because he aligns it all too quickly with a notion of play. Note, for 
instance, his threefold repetition of “play” in the following passage: “It is indetermi-
nacy, the sheer plurality of meaning, the very play of the signier itself, which Mumbo 
Jumbo celebrates. Mumbo Jumbo addresses the play of the black literary tradition and, 
as a parody, is a play upon that same tradition” (“Blackness” 313). Moreover, I would 
argue that essentialist notions of blackness are not only the object of Reed’s critique 
in Mumbo Jumbo but, paradoxically, also one of its devices. Gates’s analysis of Reed’s 
critique therefore falls short of the mark:
Both Ellison and Reed, then, critique the received idea of blackness as a nega-
tive essence, as a natural, transcendent signied; but implicit in such a critique 
is an equally thorough critique of blackness as presence, which is merely another 
transcendent signied. Such a critique, therefore, is a critique of the structure of 
the sign itself and constitutes a profound critique. e Black Arts Movement’s 
grand gesture was to make of the trope of blackness a trope of presence. at 
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movement willed it to be, however, a transcendent presence. Ellison’s text for to-
day, the “Blackness of Blackness,” [. . .] analyzes this gesture, just as surely as does 
Reed’s Text of Blackness, the “sacred Book of oth.” In literature, blackness is 
produced in the text only through a complex process of signication. ere can 
be no transcendent blackness, for it cannot and does not exist beyond mani-
festations of it in specic gures. Put simply, Jes Grew cannot conjure its texts; 
texts, in the broadest sense of this term (Parker’s music, Ellison’s ctions, Romare 
Bearden’s collages, etc.), conjure Jes Grew. (“Blackness” 315–16)
 43. Hutcheon’s armation of the critical function of parody is a common thread 
running through her two books on postmodernism. In A Poetics of Postmodernism, she 
writes:
We have seen that what both its supporters and its detractors seem to want to 
call “postmodernism” in art today—be it in video, dance, literature, painting, 
music, architecture, or any other form—seems to be art marked paradoxically 
by both history and an internalized, self-reexive investigation of the nature, the 
limits, and the possibilities of the discourse of art. On the surface, postmodern-
ism’s main interest might seem to be in the processes of its own production and 
reception, as well as in its own parodic relation to the art of the past. But I want 
to argue that it is precisely parody—that seemingly introverted formalism—that 
paradoxically brings about a direct confrontation with the problem of the rela-
tion of the aesthetic to a world of signicance external to itself, to a discursive 
world of socially dened meaning systems (past and present)—in other words, 
to the political and the historical. (22)
While I fully agree with her thoughts on parody, I nd that her reading of Reed’s pa-
rodic imagination repeats Gates’s mistake of overlooking the ways in which essential-
ism, too, becomes a strategic and critical tool in Reed’s hands. is, I would suggest, is 
what one discovers when one takes a closer look at Reed’s assertion of racial dierence, 
a trait of his ction that does not escape Hutcheon:
Ishmael Reed’s consistently parodic ction clearly asserts not just a critical and 
specically American “dierence” but also a racial one. And, on a formal level, 
his parodic mixing of levels and kinds of discourse challenges any notion of the 
dierent as either coherent and monolithic or original. It draws on both the 
black and white literary and historical narrative traditions, rewriting Hurston, 
Wright, and Ellison as easily as Plato or Eliot [. . .] while also drawing on the 
multiple possibilities opened up by the folk tradition. Reed is always serious, 
beneath his funny parodic play. It is this basic seriousness that critics have fre-
quently been blind to when they accuse postmodernism of being ironic—and 
therefore trivial. e assumption seems to be that authenticity of experience 
and expression are somehow incompatible with double-voicing and/or humor. 
(Poetics 134)
In the light of Reed’s deeply essentialist pronouncements in his “Neo-HooDoo Mani-
festo,” a reading of Mumbo Jumbo that emphasizes only Reed’s challenges to essentialist 
thinking seems untenable to me.
    /    Note to Page 171
UP
F 
CO
PY
 44. For an inspired rebuttal of Bawer and like-minded conservative critics of De-
Lillo, see Crowther.
 45. In fact, Charles J. Sykes’s description of the continuing expansion of the surveil-
lance society in e End of Privacy (1999) makes Jack’s worries seem rather harmless. 
Sykes (25–30) provides a list of the data items that a single individual sitting at his 
computer can nd out about another individual within a few hours and at little ex-
pense. ese include the other’s occupation, her car brand, the name and age of her 
spouse and children, the value of her house, the taxes she pays, the demographics of her 
neighborhood, her stock, bond and mutual-fund records, her Social Security number 
(available for $30), her credit-card number ($450), her bank balance ($200), telephone 
records ($80–$200), credit report ($75), and medical history ($400). And this does 
not include invasions of privacy on a far larger scale by companies like Microso or 
government agencies such as the CIA or NSA (which are also discussed by Sykes). It is 
only the information one citizen can, with the readily available help of Internet sleuths 
and information brokers, gather about another citizen with a minimal amount of eort 
and money.
 46. For an excellent Heideggerian reading of the novel’s technology critique, see 
Michael Valdez Moses’s “Lust Removed from Nature” (1991). Moses suggests that 
DeLillo’s critique focuses less on the deleterious eects of technological machinery 
on the human mind and body than on the harmful dominance in postmodern cul-
ture of a technological mindset. Modern technology not only challenges nature so as 
to transform it into a standing-reserve (Bestand). Ironically, once humankind has 
brought large parts of nature under its control through the challenging revealing of 
technology, technology turns back upon human beings, challenging them to challenge 
nature. In the process, human beings themselves become reied as a standing-reserve. 
Heidegger regards this process, by which human beings are caught up in a technologi-
cal framework as they seek to impose it on nature, as the essence of modern technology 
and calls it “enframing.”
 For Heidegger as for Moses, the chief danger of enframing is that it imposes an 
inauthentic existence on us, an inability to “experience the call of a more primal truth” 
(Heidegger 28). In Heidegger’s existentialist philosophy, this “more primal truth” is 
the fact of human nitude. Technology, then, alienates us from the experience of our 
own mortality. And this is precisely the analysis of technology oered by DeLillo in 
White Noise. Murray’s assertion that “technology [. . .] creates an appetite for immortal-
ity” (68) is borne out by the mass media, whose endless representations of disasters in 
remote areas create the impression that death is something that happens to others and 
lead Jack to pronounce in the face of a massive toxic spill in his immediate neighbor-
hood that “at’s for people who live in mobile homes out in the scrubby parts of the 
country, where the sh hatcheries are” (117); it is borne out by modern medical tech-
nology, whose computerized representations of disease and dying “mak[e] you feel like 
a stranger in your own dying” (74); and it is borne out most obviously by Dylar, that 
“interesting piece of technology” (187) that promises to eliminate the fear of death. 
Moses concludes that “white noise serves,” among other things, “as DeLillo’s meta-
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phor for the way in which technology covers over an existential perception of nitude” 
(81).
 47. See also the collection of essays Paranoia within Reason (1999), edited by George 
E. Marcus, for a variety of accounts of paranoia that are also nonpathologizing. In his 
introduction, Marcus describes paranoia as a cultural symptom rather than a psycho-
logical pathology. Marcus traces the prevalence of paranoia as a mode of explanation 
in contemporary America to two dierent historical sources: the legacy of “decades of 
paranoid [Cold-War] policies of statecra and governing habits of thought” that “de-
ne a present reality for actors in some places and situations that is far from extremist, 
or distortingly fundamentalist, but is quite reasonable and commonsensical” (2–3), 
and the corrosion of sense-making metanarratives and the ensuing postmodern form 
of a crisis of representation, which creates “an impulse to gure out systems, now of 
global scale, with strategic facts missing that might otherwise permit condent choices 
among competing conceptions” (4). In the late twentieth century, Marcus concludes, 
paranoia can no longer simply be dismissed as a deluded aberration from rational prin-
ciples but should be acknowledged and studied “as a ‘reasonable’ component of ratio-
nal and commonsensical thought and experience in certain contexts” (2).
 48. See Kerridge (190–92) for a Kristevan reading of this passage as staging the 
return of the repressed and abjected.
 49. Paranoia in this sense is a form of cultural critique that follows Noam Chom-
sky’s insight that institutional analysis is dismissed as conspiracy theory primarily by 
those who consider our institutions to be fundamentally and inherently just (Melley 
16).
 50. Jack’s division of acoustic space along the line of social class is also a social reality. 
As Henrik Karlsson points out: “More and more, the acoustic environment is becom-
ing a question of power, and of money with which to buy silence. More and more 
it is becoming a matter of luxury consumption, perverted forms of which also aict 
the poor. In the big cities of Central Europe, the areas located nearest to railway lines 
and motorways are inhabited by the poorest—immigrants and dropouts—because the 
noise there makes ats less attractive and, consequently, cheaper” (11).
 51. is connection between social distinction and a sense of security is crucial to 
Jack’s professorial self-fashioning. is emerges most clearly in Jack’s mental reply to 
the SIMUVAC employee’s ominous suggestion that Jack’s exposure to Nyodene D. 
constitutes a serious health hazard: “I wanted my academic gown and dark glasses” 
(142).
 52. Steven Connor makes an interesting comment on sirens that is pertinent to my 
discussion of White Noise:
Strange that the word we use for a sound that cannot and must not be ignored 
derives from a myth of a sound that must be resisted. Strange, but also appropri-
ate, since ours is a world that is full of ignored unignorability. We are all tied to 
the mast of indierence and disregard. e care taken to make sirens unignor-
able is matched by the slowly and carefully learned capacity of the city-dweller 
to lter them out. Alarms strive to nullify this auditory anaesthesia. But there is 
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always a cost. Perhaps what is most stressful about a world full of alarms is the 
generalisation of a readiness to act which does not nd adequate discharge in 
action. (pars. 30–31)
Connor here touches on the problem of listener desensitization in lo- soundscapes 
that is also discussed in chapter 1 of this book.
 53. For a discussion of the physical properties of at-line sounds, see the beginning 
of chapter 1 and note 2 of that chapter.
 54. “Panasonic” was one of DeLillo’s working titles for the novel (LeClair 230). He 
decided to drop it because of copyright infringement issues.
 55. See also DeLillo’s more recent e Body Artist (2001), in which a seemingly insig-
nicant noise announces the mysterious man who will bring change and motion into 
the body artist’s life (18, 40).
 56. is is also Arnold Weinstein’s argument, whose description of the feel of De-
Lillo’s writing closely resembles LeClair’s: “DeLillo is the metaphysician of the kitchen 
and the breakfast room, the poet of fast food. [. . .] ere is something literally wonder-
ful about this kind of writing, a kind of conceptual generosity that restores our doings 
to light and language, brings awe back to the world” (299).
 57. See Ferrard for an analysis of consumption in White Noise as the main source of 
the Gladney family’s unity.
Conclusion
 1. e Neue Zürcher Zeitung is a high-quality Swiss daily that is read beyond the 
borders of Switzerland. It is neoliberal in economics and national politics, progressive 
in culture, and an excellent source of news on foreign aairs (not only but also because 
its evaluations of U.S. foreign policy present a healthy alternative to the hawks’ view of, 
say, Foreign Aairs).
 2. See Ong for a wide-ranging study of the shi from orality to literacy.
 3. is view of communication also informs Shannon’s notion of information as 
selection. Budick and Iser put it thus: “e modern coinage negativity, or some equiva-
lent means of eschewing indicative terminology, becomes inevitable when we consider 
the implications, omissions, or cancellations that are necessarily part of any writing or 
speaking. ese lacunae indicate that practically all formulations (written or spoken) 
contain a tacit dimension, so that each manifest text has a kind of latent double. us, 
unlike negation, which must be distinguished from negativity, this inherent doubling 
in language dees verbalization. It forms the unwritten and unwritable—unsaid and 
unsayable—base of the utterance” (xii).
 4. Diana Coole notes that all thinking about negativity is informed by an irreduc-
ible paradox, for “as soon as we think it, it ‘is.’” She calls this “the aporia of negativity” 
(46).
 5. Note that Budick and Iser are at pains to distinguish their notion of negativity 
from Adorno’s (xiii). For reasons touched upon in various parts of this book, I believe 
that they share more than either side would (have) be(en) prepared to admit.
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